James Mensch's Article (17.1)
Dublin Core
Title
James Mensch's Article (17.1)
Article Item Type Metadata
Title
The Question of Naturalizing Phenomenology
Abstract
The attempt to use the results of phenomenology in cognitive and neural science has in the past decade become increasingly widespread. It is, however, open to the objection that phenomenology does not concern itself with the embodied, empirical subject, but rather with the non-causally determined “transcendental” subject. If this is true, then the attempt to employ its results is bound to come to grief on the opposition of two different accounts of consciousness: the non-causal, transcendental paradigm put forward by phenomenology and the causal paradigm assumed by cognitive and neural science. In what follows, I shall analyze this objection in terms of the conception of subjectivity the objection presupposes. By employing a different conception, I shall then show how it can be met. My aim will be to explain how we can empirically use the insights of phenomenology without denaturing the consciousness it studies.
Volume
Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring 2013
Pages
210-228
Files
Collection
Citation
“James Mensch's Article (17.1),” Symposium, accessed April 28, 2024, http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/symposium/items/show/345.