Dirk Quadflieg's Article (17.1)
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Title
Dirk Quadflieg's Article (17.1)
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Title
On the Dialectics of Reification and Freedom: From Lukács to Honneth—and Back to Hegel
Abstract
This paper addresses the question of the extent to which the process of reification is identical with domination and thus opposed to freedom. While this is clearly the case in Lukács's famous essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," the first generation of the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno, rejects such a criticism of reification as still too closely tied to a false understanding of subjective freedom. Rather, as Adorno suggests in his later works, one has to take into account that any relation to oneself is fundamentally dependent upon a relation to the object. Unfortunately, this insight into the dialectic of subject and object, freedom and reification, is overlooked in Habermas and Honneth's redefinition of reification in terms of intersubjectivity. To bring out the importance of Adorno's thesis, I refer to the notion of "making oneself into a thing" (Sich-zum-Ding-Machen), as developed in Hegel's early Jena Writings, and argue that a fundamental form of reification is a condition for a specific kind of social freedom.
Volume
Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring 2013
Pages
131-149
Files
Collection
Citation
“Dirk Quadflieg's Article (17.1),” Symposium, accessed April 28, 2024, http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/symposium/items/show/341.