Chrudzimski's article (16.2)
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Title
Chrudzimski's article (16.2)
Article Item Type Metadata
Title
Negative States of Affairs: Reinach versus Ingarden
Abstract
In Reinach’s works one finds a very rich ontology of states of affairs. Some of them are positive, some negative. Some of them obtain, some do not. But even the negative and non-obtaining states of affairs are absolutely independent of any mental activity. Despite this claim of the “ontological equality” of positive and negative states of affairs, there are, according to Reinach, massive epistemological differences in our cognitive access to them. Positive states of affairs can be directly “extracted” from our experience, while to acquire a negative belief we must pass through a quite complicated process, starting with certain positive beliefs. A possible and reasonable explanation of this discrepancy would be a theory to the effect that these epistemological differences have their basis in the ontology of the entities in question. Our knowledge of the negative states of affairs is essentially dependent on our knowledge of the positive ones precisely because the negative states of affairs are ontologically dependent on the positive ones. Such a theory has, in fact, been formulated by Roman Ingarden. According to him, negative states of affairs supervene on some positive ones and on certain mental acts of the conscious subjects.
Volume
16.2 (Fall/Automne 2012)
Pages
106-127
Files
Citation
“Chrudzimski's article (16.2),” Symposium, accessed April 26, 2024, http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/symposium/items/show/314.