Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Taste for Moral Metacritique

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Nietzsche seems to have brought about a remarkable “cure” upon himself in the 1886 Prefaces to *Human, All Too Human*. This was a cure, or a “liberation,” from the disastrous personal state he suffered through during the period of *Zarathustra’s* composition, namely, having to deal with the loss of the only one real love of his life, Lou Salomé, the humiliation by, and subsequent break with, Wagner, the loss of the circle of friends and of the educated public at Bayreuth, the loss of his own teaching position, the literal denunciation of him by his own family, a period of illness and intense loneliness, compounded by the biting memories of the personal insults and losses he had sustained, as well as by the memories of the joys he had since forsaken. He effectuated this “cure” in the 1886 Prefaces to *Human, All Too Human*, by proposing a series of deeply autocritical reflections, which enabled him to regain a sense of self-mastery and by drawing out a detailed strategy to control his own sense of perspective, thus distancing himself from the emotional control exercised upon him by the traditional morality of mores, the imperative of the “thou shalt,” with its binding “fetters” of prescribed feelings, duties, reverences, obligations, and emotional commitments—not least of which was the heartfelt sense that love itself was somehow salvific, salvational.

Reviewing the joys that nature itself bestows upon someone so “cured” as himself, Nietzsche ends the discussion of his own “liberation” in the new Prefaces to *Human, All Too Human* with a series of light-hearted “injunctions”—the last of which affirms the resolution to Zarathustra’s paradoxical departure at the very close of Book Four: smiling, strong as bronze, accompanied by his laughing lion: “You shall... You shall... You shall... You shall—enough: from now on the free spirit knows what ‘you shall’ he has obeyed, and he also knows what he now can, what only now he—may do....”

The “Foundations” of Morality in the Preface to *Daybreak*

Having freed himself from the injunctions of the traditional morality in the new Prefaces to *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche raises the subsequent issue as to the real conditions of their remarkable pervasiveness, their resistance to philosophical inquiry, their status as cultural givens, indeed as “truths.” Was it sufficient for Nietzsche to feel personally
liberated from his own inner experience of the morality of mores, i.e., the experienced facticity of the "old fetters," and his personal rejection of them, or could his autocritique itself be generalized? Could it be generalized beyond the analysis of his own moral feelings, e.g., of shame, humiliation, pity, duty, love, reverence, etc., and to the occasions that provoked them, much less to the painful memories which sustained them? He addresses these issues in another of his 1886 Prefaces, the Preface to Daybreak, where the autocritique—as given in the Prefaces to Human, All Too Human—is extended, as a metacritique, to the very nature of morality itself, understood as "the problem of morality"—effectively serving as a "critique of morality."

If morality had constituted the very "foundations" of Western thought since Plato—due to the latter's identification of the transcendent unity of the One, the Good, and the True, the Greek philosophical adequation of virtue and happiness, or the Christian ascetic ideal (all variants of the "old God")—Nietzsche sees it as his task in the new Preface to Daybreak to tunnel into "the foundations." "Digging out an ancient faith ... I commenced to undermine our faith in morality." Indeed, he likens himself to a "subterranean man," even to a "mole," like those spirits who "bore, dig, gnaw, and moisten" to assist in the work of destruction. The initial "problem" of morality, as Nietzsche states it in the new Preface to Daybreak, is its resistance to criticism. It is the subject "reflected on least adequately" because it was too dangerous to do so. On the one hand, morality has traditionally arrogated to itself a position of transcendent authority, in the face of which, he says, "one is not allowed to think, far less to express an opinion," due to what is conventionally held to be at stake for the individual, namely, "Conscience, reputation, Hell, sometimes even the police." But second, what is also "problematic" about morality, for Nietzsche, is its extraordinary seductiveness, its unparalleled agency of persuasion, of commanding thought and action, in function of its received prescriptive power, namely, its symbolic agency to constitute the very motivation of will, desire, and affect in the individual, as well as to provide the very terms of intelligibility for self-understanding—for rendering one's own life meaningful. As Nietzsche relates this,

But morality does not merely have at its command every kind of means of frightening off critical hands and torture instruments: its security reposes far more in a certain art of enchantment it has at its disposal—it knows how to 'inspire.' With this art it succeeds, often with no more than a single glance, in paralyzing the critical will and even in enticing it over to its own side.... For morality has from of old been master of every diabolical nuance of the art of persuasion."

If faith in morality orchestrates the social symbolic itself, or what Nietzsche terms the entire order of "speech and persuasion," in a gesture of authority, power, and valuation—resistant even to self-criticism—then, he asks, "Why is it that from Plato onwards every philosophical architect in Europe has built in vain?" The correct answer would be precisely that the philosophers themselves "were building under the seduction of morality"—even though every artifice built upon such a foundation of morality "is threatening to collapse or already lies in ruins." The wrong answer would be the Kantian response, namely, that the critique of reason had not yet been made, hence the traditional foundations of philosophy were still dogmatic and insecure. Under the Kantian account, one could restore the proper range and compass of reason, and thus attain a transcendentally grounded and purified philosophical system, rendering it immune to error and falsehood, yet from the standpoint of reason one could secure room for faith and a universal morality. Nietzsche's response, however, tellingly demonstrates the contrary: that reason itself is diminished in range and scope due to Kant's prior moral commitment:

To create room for his 'moral realm' ... [Kant] saw himself obliged to posit an indemonstrable world, a logical 'beyond'—it was precisely for that that he had need of his critique of pure reason! In other words: he would not have had need of it if one thing had not been more vital to him than anything else: to render the 'moral realm' unassailable, even better, incomprehensible to reason—for he felt that a moral order of things was only too assailable by reason! In the face of nature and history, in the face of the thorough immorality of nature and history, Kant was, like every good German of the old stamp, a pessimist; he believed in morality, not because it is demonstrated in nature and history, but in spite of the fact that nature and history continually contradict it. Far from maintaining Kant's position of limiting the capacity of reason to make room for faith, Nietzsche questions the very adequacy of reason to perform such a critique in the first place: "[C]ome to think of it, was it not somewhat peculiar to demand of an instrument that it should criticize its own usefulness and suitability? That the intellect itself should 'know'
its own value, its own capacity, its own limitations? Was it not even a little absurd?"10

Likewise, in a note for the same Preface to *Daybreak*, he remarks:

In the end: is it likely that an instrument can criticize its own effectiveness?—What I focused on was rather the fact that no skepticism or dogmatism ... could be brought forth without ulterior motives or mental reservations—by the fact that they have a second order value as soon as one considers what, basically, compels one to take that position: even the will to certainty, if not only the will, first of all, I want to live—this is a fundamental idea: for Kant, just as well for Hegel and Schopenhauer—even the skeptic's position of maintaining the epoche, the historian's, and the pessimist's positions are all moral in origin.11

Indeed, Nietzsche further extends his critique of reason to show that the ostensible foundation of reason, namely, our trust in reason, is itself grounded in a moral choice: "But logical evaluations are not the deepest or most fundamental to which our audacious mistrust can descend: faith in reason, with which the validity of these judgments must stand or fall, is, as faith, a moral phenomenon.12

That truth, reason, logic, and knowledge derive from social needs and communicative requirements is, of course, one of the most central and ongoing concerns of Nietzsche's entire work.13 Likewise, that traditional moral values find their origins in the political and religious community's set of self-preservative (i.e., vital) prescriptions, prohibitions, and so on, all this ultimately points to the moral foundations of veracity, validity, and science itself. One of the earliest statements to this effect is from his work of 1872, "The Philosopher":

What does the truth matter to man? The highest and purest life is possible with the belief that one possesses truth. Man requires belief in truth. Truth makes its appearance as a social necessity. Afterwards, by means of metastasis, it is applied to everything, where it is not required. All virtues arise from pressing needs. The necessity for truthfulness begins with society. Otherwise man dwells within eternal concealments. The establishment of states promotes truthfulness. The drive towards knowledge has a moral origin.14

In his new 1886 Preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," Nietzsche claims in retrospect that *The Birth of Tragedy* first raised the "problem of science" already in his discussion of the Socratic demise of the tragic: "And science itself, our science—indeed, what is the significance of all science, viewed as a symptom of life? ... for the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science." He goes on to say: "The task which this audacious book dared to tackle for the first time: to look at science in the perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life"15

But in the 1886 Prefaces and in Book V of *The Gay Science*—anticipating his analysis in *On the Genealogy of Morals*—what is at issue is not so much the origins of morality as its critique. For Nietzsche himself, after completing the arduous feat of recovering his own "youth," his "innocence of the child," or the "great cure" of self-overcoming—through his performative writing of *Zarathustra* and his articulation of this experience in the new Prefaces of *Human, All Too Human*—it is increasingly incumbent on him to express his personalized "experience" of self-critique in more analytical and philosophical terms. Nietzsche perhaps most directly addresses this need in the new Preface to *Daybreak* and in sections 344 and 345 (Book V) of *The Gay Science* (both texts were completed on the same day, Nov. 13, 1886).

**Autocritique, Truth, Morality—in One's Person**

The magnitude of "the problem of morality," its identity with the whole of the social symbolic order, and its ability to govern all reasoned judgment, signifies that it is extremely difficult to criticize and to evaluate it effectively—which is why Nietzsche terms it the "seductress," the "Circe of the philosophers."16

Traditional historical analysis of morality has tended to focus on the origins of particular systems of morality, but additionally, for Nietzsche, quite often historians unwittingly import the value terms of their own culture when attempting to evaluate the moral systems of other cultures. Gently paraphrasing the Introduction to Hume's *Treatise*, Nietzsche remarks:

These historians of morality ... are still quite unsuspectingly obedient to one particular morality and, without knowing it, serve that as shield-bearers and followers—for example, by sharing that popular superstition of Christian Europe which people keep mouthing so guilelessly to this day.... Their usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some consensus of the nations, at least of tame nations, concerning certain principles of morals, and then they infer
from this that these principles must be unconditionally binding also for you and me.\textsuperscript{14}

Alternatively, such historical analysis may just as well conclude “that among different nations moral valuations are \textit{necessarily} different and then infer from this that no morality is at all binding.”\textsuperscript{15}

Nietzsche concludes that both approaches are “equally childish.” What such interpretations have in common is that they mistakenly criticize received public opinion about morality, stemming from such considerations as the “origins” of the particular morality, its purported divine sanction, the “ superstition of free will,” the “soul” fiction, or other such errors, and think they have criticized the morality itself. Ultimately, the “value” of any particular moral injunction is different from and quite independent of such opinions and errors as to its origin. Interestingly, and problematically, what entitles Nietzsche to address critically the “problem” of morality will turn out to be his own personality. That is to say, his own formation within the traditional morality—his “at home”—the whole set of inherited valuations, that he articulated in the new 1886 Prefaces to \textit{Human, All Too Human}. It is precisely those valuations that he rejected, denied, and contradicted from within, due to the appalling effects he suffered from them in his own person—his so-called “sickness”—and, in his autocritical “travels,” their reversal and overcoming, which brought about his newly found “happiness.” As he would remark:

It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress and his greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it.\textsuperscript{16}

Rather, Nietzsche says, he “approached morality in this personal way and... knew morality as a problem, and this problem as his own personal distress, torment, voluptuousness, and passion.”\textsuperscript{17}

By focusing on his personal criticism of moral values, i.e., by stressing his own autocritique, Nietzsche nonetheless raises a whole set of questions in turn. To what extent is the imperative to criticize morality itself a moral imperative? Would such a moral critique thus be a contradiction? To what extent would such a critique be truth functional? If the new valuations were in fact true, could they be extensional, i.e., universally binding? In which case could they assume the form of a moral injunction at all, a “thou shalt,” as it were? Or, finally, is the very notion of morality itself at stake in the Prefaces of 1886 and in Book V of \textit{The Gay Science}? Indeed, it is.\textsuperscript{18}

In the remarkable section 344 of \textit{The Gay Science}, entitled “How we, too, are still pious,” Nietzsche proposes an itinerary that he will develop formally in the Preface to \textit{Daybreak}. In raising the “problem of morality,” one necessarily has to confront the issues of moral probity, honesty, and truth—all elements involved in a critique of morality. In the aforementioned section, Nietzsche examines the paradigmatic case of truth itself, which is the stated objective of the modern scientific account. He asks whether such “truth” may merely be the object of conviction, the deeply held conviction that truth is the most important value, and whether this conviction serves largely as a “regulative illusion.” He then claims that the presupposition behind this conviction is that “\textit{nothing} is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything [else] has only second-rate value.”\textsuperscript{19}

Given this hierarchy of valuation, Nietzsche then develops his argument in terms that more easily accord with his personalization of the problem: what, he asks, is this “unconditional will to truth?” Opposing truth to its opposite, falsehood and deceit, he introduces two possible responses: that the will to truth signifies the will not to deceive oneself, and that it means the will \textit{not} to deceive. The first response would suggest that truth—and, by extension, science—would serve as an instrument of utility, as a “caution,” he says, against deceit, harm, and danger. But Nietzsche makes the rejoinder that life itself often enough \textit{demands} “semblance, meaning error, deception, simulation, delusion, self-delusion,” etc., and that one’s trust is often better served with a bit of deception than with adhering to an unconditional will “to truth at any price.” As he remarks, “‘At any price’: how well we understand these words once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar!”\textsuperscript{20}

Hence, the will to truth—or “the faith in science”—stems not from concerns of utility or caution, but from the second response, the will not to deceive, which can be construed to entail the first, namely, the will not to deceive oneself. With this, he says, “\textit{we stand on moral ground}.”

Nietzsche’s autocritique of morality inevitably leads to the question as to its own truthfulness, and the question of truth in turn raises that of our faith in science, which finally leads us back to the order of faith, conviction, and morality.

Thus the question ‘Why science?’ leads back to the moral problem: \textit{Why have morality at all} when life, nature, and history are ‘not moral?’ No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and
ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science *thus affirm another world* than the world of life, nature and history.\(^{21}\)

Nietzsche then draws the conclusion as to the wellsprings of this conviction, this “will” to truth, and “faith” in science:

But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a *metaphysical* faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.\(^{22}\)

**German, All Too German: The Self-Sublimation of Morality**

Despite the passing of the old, angry God, we nonetheless live under his shadow—as Nietzsche constantly reminds us—namely, within the terms of traditional ontotheology. Indeed, its “diabolical persuasion” extends to the very constitution of one’s own personality; and the resolution of *this* contradiction (i.e., between Nietzsche, the individual, and the moral codes that constitute him according to the traditional order) is ultimately what Nietzsche attempts to delineate in the late Prefaces, especially in the Preface to *Daybreak*. He had already signaled one of the principal reasons why even the modern individual—the godless anti-metaphysician—is regulatively governed by the faith that the “truth is divine”: precisely by the sublimation of the Christian conscience into the scientific conscience, i.e., of faith into atheism. In part, as a consequence of Luther’s “peasant revolt” of the spirit, “the most fateful act of two thousand years of discipline for truth in the end forbids itself the lie in faith in God.” As he explains this in section 357 of *The Gay Science*,

You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, the father confessor’s refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and governance of a god; interpreting history in honor of some divine reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world order ... that is *all over now*, that has man’s conscience against it.\(^{23}\)

Given the terms and perspectival limitations of the 1886 Prefaces, however, this rejection of the moral world order might be better expressed by saying that it had Nietzsche’s personal conscience against it.

The maintenance of the contradictions between faith and reason ultimately made room for the admission of moral absurdity itself. Nietzsche invokes two historical figures who, to his mind, typically advanced such views: Kant and Luther. In the case of Kant, one is “content to fill up the gap with an *increase* in trust and belief, with a renunciation of all provability for one’s belief, with an incomprehensible and superior ‘ideal’ (God).”\(^{24}\) In the case of Luther, Nietzsche quotes his remark that “If we could grasp by reason that the God who shows so much wrath and malice can be just and merciful, what need would we have of faith?” Equating this remark about Luther’s somewhat desperate view of theology with Tertullian’s celebrated credo, “I believe because it is absurd,” Nietzsche proudly announces, “It was with this conclusion that German logic first entered the history of Christian dogma.”\(^{25}\)

Indeed, Nietzsche continues, a millennium later, even among his own contemporaries:

We Germans of today ... still sense something of truth, of the *possibility* of truth behind the celebrated dialectical principle with which in his day Hegel assisted the German spirit to conquer Europe—Contradiction moves the world, all things contradict themselves’—: for we are, even in the realm of logic, pessimists.\(^{26}\)

But the contradiction between reason and faith, which opens the space of morality, is itself sublated by the recognition that reason’s dialectical capacity is in turn predicated upon faith, or as he claimed, “faith in reason,” and the moral “will” to truth. In which case, Tertullian’s “belief” is set up in tandem alongside the “absurd,” whereby morality itself is simply withdrawn from reason, argument, or reality. To follow out Nietzsche’s jocular Hegelianism at this point, one might well object that precisely morality alone remains as the detritus—or as the sublimated synthesis—of a failed contradiction. In this case it must be asked, “why should” morality be withdrawn at all? What kind of imperative would be invoked to make such a claim? Nietzsche’s conclusion is both ironic and astute: ironic in that the imperative to overcome morality—“to go beyond faith in morality”—is itself a moral imperative. In this respect, the Preface to *Daybreak* exhibits his pessimism towards morality (and any sense of its universal authority, purchase, or truth). It does so, he claims, in function of logical contradiction, which of course he has already discredited. *Daybreak* (and in particular, the Preface, with its task of
giving a critique of morality), he remarks, "does in fact exhibit a contradiction and is not afraid of it: in this book faith in morality is withdrawn—but why? Out of morality! Or what else should we call that which informs it—and us?" 27 The final, stressed "us" is telling in its astuteness. "Us" is, of course, the "we," or better, the "me" of the author himself. By the same token, the use of the plural indicates Nietzsche's continuity with the tradition—in this case of a certain German "pessimism" regarding reason and indeed skepticism concerning the rational defensibility of faith and morality, which is why he terms the present work, *Daybreak*, "a German book."

More positively, the distributive "us" designates Nietzsche's Reformationist and Enlightenment credentials in his adhering to the traditional imperative of truth—"translated and sublimated"—from the Christian morality of the confessional conscience into the "morality" of the scientific conscience.28 To this extent, at least, one could say that Nietzsche seems to be quite content to be "morally informed" by the prevailing *nomos*, the "modern" sense of German philosophical culture. Indeed, he goes on to say, "there is no doubt that a 'thou shalt' still speaks to us too, that we too still obey a stern law set over us and this is the last moral law which can make itself audible even to us, which even we know how to live." 29

But having just "withdrawn morality ... out of morality," he qualifies "this last moral law" as being one of *taste*: "Or, what else should we call that which informs it—and us?" He responds that "our taste is for more modest expressions." 30 He clarifies this in a note from the period of the new Prefaces, where he describes his writings as being

... distinguished by a clear will to open up horizons, a certain artful prudence in dealing with convictions, a distrust towards the traps set forth by [the traditional sense of] conscience, and for those magic towers that every strong faith evokes; one can see in ... [these writings], on the one hand, the circumspection of the child who has been burned, and on the other, the disappointed idealist—but more essential, it seems to me, is the Epicurean instinct of the lover of enigmas who doesn't want to be rid of the enigmatic character of things in advance, and finally, more essential than all, the aesthetic aversion towards the grand words of virtue and the absolute; this taste that rebels against all those too blunt oppositions, wants a good part of uncertainty in things and suppresses oppositions, as a friend of the half-tone, shadows, afternoon light, and infinite seas.31

Thus, the impetus for withdrawing morality is that of a personally cultivated artfulness, an "aesthetic aversion," bred from experience and experimentation, always factored by the perspective of one's own judgment—and this impetus emerges as conscience, "intellectual cleanliness," or as he would specify this in *The Gay Science*, an "intellectual conscience.... A conscience behind your 'conscience.'" 32 In the Preface to *Daybreak* he would say:

[W]e too are still *men of conscience*, namely, in that we do not want to return to that which we consider outlived and decayed, to anything 'unworthy of belief;' be it called God, virtue, truth, justice, charity; that we do not permit ourselves any bridges-of-­lies to ancient ideals.... [I]t is only as men of *this* conscience that we still feel ourselves related to the German integrity and piety of millennia, even if as its most questionable and final descendents, we immoralists, we godless men of today.33

Having experienced and explained in his own person the death of God, and the moral foundations subtending the very tradition of Western thought, Nietzsche returns from his "five or six years" of being a "subterranean man," a "solitary mole," who "tunnels and mines and undermines"34 those foundations, with a sense of joy: "Like a new and scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragement, and dawning day... Indeed, we philosophers and 'free spirits' feel... as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, astonishment, presentiment, and expectation." 35

Such an individual is personally capable of contradiction and of sublating contradiction. On the one hand, he can contradict morality "out of morality." This occurs "in us." Such a will "does not draw back from denying itself because it denies with joy." On the other hand, such a will has, in the course of these "five or six years," been itself transformed from that of the moralist to that of the "artist"—informed by "my taste—a malicious taste, perhaps?"—whose "venerable art" of philology, a "goldsmith's art and connoisseurship," yields a conscience "hostile, in short, to the whole of European ... idealism." He effectively concludes his moral metacritique in the Preface to *Daybreak* by claiming, "in us there is accomplished—supposing you want a formula—the self-sublimation of morality." 36 Realistically, such a mock-Hegelian formula of itself is hardly extensional or unconditional in character. Rather, his stated aim in the Preface to *Daybreak* is far more modest and personal. As he tells the reader:
Here in this late preface, which could easily have become a funeral oration ... I have returned and, believe it or not, returned safe and sound. Do not think for a moment that I intend to invite you to the same hazardous enterprise! Or even only to the same solitude! For he who proceeds on his own path in this fashion encounters no one: that is inherent in 'proceeding on one's path'.... For his path is his alone. 37

Ultimately, the authority and power of the traditional moral order of valuation—its effective agency—may well be critiqued and challenged by the individual. In this sense, its significance for the individual is fully mutable, precisely according to the codes of the larger symbolic order. 38 Precisely for this reason, when Nietzsche begins his extended critique of morality in On The Genealogy of Morals, his starting point is the question, "What was the real etymological significance of the designations" for certain moral terms—good, bad, etc.—"coined in the various languages?" 39

But to say that the "self-sublimation of morality" occurs in his own person is simply to acknowledge that a cultivated aesthetic judgment more appropriately designates or denotes what were previously held to be moral acts or sentiments. If indeed there are only "moral interpretations" of the signifying order, 40 one may well, as Luther did—addressing the Diet of Worms—merely withhold assent: "Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise." Or, as Nietzsche himself would remark in one of the concluding sections of On the Genealogy of Morals: "I have the taste of two millennia against me: but there it is! 'Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise.'" 41

A very German book. And yet, "his path is his alone."

Notes


4. Ibid. KSA 3: 12–3.

5. Ibid. KSA 3: 13. This parallels Nietzsche's extended discussion of the "death of God" and its enormous consequences in, e.g., GS V, secs. 345, 357, and 358, following his claim that the "belief" in the Christian God has become "unbelievable."


7. Ibid. KSA 3: 15.


10. Perhaps this is specified most pointedly in GS, secs. 110, 111, and 354.


17. Ibid., p. 284. KSA 3: 578.
18. In section 5 of the new Preface to *BT*, his veritable attack against traditional Christian morality is particularly strident, engaging what he terms his own "antimoral propensity" (*BT*, p. 23. *KSA* 1: 18).


27. Ibid., sec. 4, p. 4. *KSA* 3: 15–6.

28. Or, as he says in an unpublished note for the Preface to *Daybreak*: "A world we can revere, that accords with our drive to worship—that continually proves itself, by guiding the individual and the universal: this is the Christian view from which we are all descended. A more and more precise, mistrustful, scientific attitude (and a more ambitious instinct for sincerity, thus again under Christian influence) has increasingly disallowed us that interpretation" (Note "For the Preface to *Daybreak*,” 2 [165] p. 92). KSA 12: 147.


30. Ibid.


34. Ibid., secs. 1, 5, pp. 1, 5. *KSA* 3: 11, 17.


38. See especially *GS*, V, sec. 354, "On the 'genius of the species.'"

