

*Florin Curta and Jace Stuckey*

**Charlemagne in Medieval East Central Europe (ca. 800 to ca. 1200)**

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**ABSTRACT:** During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the legend of Charlemagne gained widespread popularity, as the figure of the emperor became a model for rulers and crusaders. However, at the same time, there was no equivalent cult of the emperor in East Central Europe, despite intensive intellectual exchange with those parts of the continent in which Charlemagne served as the highest political ideal. The examination of two early texts—the chronicles of Gallus Anonymus and Cosmas of Prague—reveals that although not completely absent from the chroniclers’ repertoire of historical parallels and examples, Charlemagne was either mentioned simply as a chronological marker or (especially in the Chronicle of Cosmas of Prague) given attributes that do not appear in any other contemporary works and which suggest a local reinterpretation of his role in history and of his personality. Additionally, this is confirmed by an examination of a slightly later text—the *Gesta Hungarorum*, the earliest surviving work of medieval historiography in Hungary.

*John-Paul Himka*

**The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd**

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**ABSTRACT:** This study examines three actors in the Lviv pogrom of 1 July 1941: the Germans, Ukrainian nationalists, and the urban crowd. It argues that the Germans created the conditions for the outbreak of the pogrom and encouraged it in the first place. They also shot Jews en masse, both during and after the pogrom.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) set up a short-lived government in Lviv on 30 June headed by a vehement anti-Semite. It simultaneously plastered the city with leaflets encouraging ethnic cleansing. It formed a militia that assumed leadership in the pogrom, arresting Jews for pogrom activities. The militiamen were also present at the execution of Jews. The day after the pogrom they began to work directly for the Einsatzgruppen, again arresting Jews for execution. OUN co-operated in these anti-Jewish actions to curry favour with the Germans, hoping for recognition of a Ukrainian state. OUN’s anti-Semitism facilitated assistance in anti-Jewish violence, but it was not an independent factor in the decision to stage a pogrom.

The urban crowd, composed of both Poles and Ukrainians, took advantage of the particular conjuncture of high politics to act out an uninhibited script of robbery, sexual assault, beating, and murder.

*Roman I. Shiyan*

**The “Rumour of Betrayal” and the 1668 Anti-Russian Uprising in Left-Bank Ukraine**

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**ABSTRACT:** This study explores the origins of the “rumour of betrayal” and its role in the 1668 anti-Russian uprising in the Left-Bank part of Cossack Ukraine. It examines important political developments involving the Cossack polity and identifies the Armistice of Andrusovo between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia (1667), which cemented the division of Ukraine, as a turning point leading to the uprising. Ukrainians perceived the Armistice as a “betrayal,” and their fears about the future gave rise to rumours of the betrayal and impending doom to their Fatherland. The reconstruction of the content of the “rumour of betrayal” and the political context under which it emerged points to it as the main factor behind the 1668 uprising, which marked a major, albeit temporary, setback in the Russian “Ukrainian policy” of that time.

**SPECIAL SECTION: TWENTY YEARS ON: SLAVIC STUDIES SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF  
THE SOVIET UNION**

**SECTION THÉMATIQUE : ÇA FAIT VINGT ANS... : ÉTUDES SLAVES DEPUIS  
L'ÉCROULEMENT DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE**

*Adrienne M. Harris*

**The Lives and Deaths of a Soviet Saint in the Post-Soviet Period: The Case of Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia**

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**ABSTRACT:** This article analyzes the popular response to Soviet myths in the post-Soviet period through the lens of the complicated treatment of Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia. As arguably the most famous Soviet World War II martyr, Kosmodem'ianskaia's image splintered after *glasnost* and has been located at the nexus of debate in various media since 1991. This paper poses questions about the fracturing of national memory when a nation has undergone upheaval: about the stability of heroes, about citizens' responses to them, and about heroes' transformation in the new regime. Catriona Kelly has demonstrated that the treatment of a national hero can illuminate the circumstances that produced the hero and the cultural climate of subsequent decades. Building on her work, this article asks "Why and how has the image of Kosmodem'ianskaia remained relevant while other Soviet heroes have been neglected since 1991?" This article posits that Kosmodem'ianskaia's continued significance lies above all in the flexibility of her image and the transitional aspects of her body. Her depictions in various contexts represent prominent responses to the authoritarian regime which gave birth to both Kosmodem'ianskaia and her legacy. The variety of her images demonstrates the continued relevance of this figure two decades after the collapse of the USSR.

*Ben A. McVicker*

**The Creation and Transformation of a Cultural Icon: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in Post-Soviet Russia, 1994–2008**

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**ABSTRACT:** Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's return to Russia in 1994, twenty years after his exile from the Soviet Union, was regarded by many as one of the most symbolic events of the immediate post-Cold War era. Arguably the most famous dissident of the Soviet period was returning to his native land, where communism had at last disintegrated and given way to a transitional-democratic regime.

However, despite receiving a prophet's welcome upon his arrival, Solzhenitsyn showed nothing but contempt for the Russian government's efforts to stabilize the country amid economic and political turmoil. Within eighteen months, Solzhenitsyn had squandered any moral sway he might have held, and had been reduced to an out-of-touch curmudgeon and object of satire amid the Russian populace.

Ten years later, however, Solzhenitsyn's name and works had been given a new relevance and popular appeal, in light of a government-led effort to restructure his persona for a new generation of citizens. The long-term process through which the Russian government has accomplished this is the focus of this article.

*Mary A. Nicholas*

**“We Were Born to Make Fairytales Come True”: Reinterpreting Political Texts in Unofficial Soviet Art**

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**ABSTRACT:** Written texts became an especially significant element of unofficial pictorial art during the late Soviet period. Beginning in the early 1970s and continuing through the end of the Soviet Union, such painted words played a transformative role on the canvases of unofficial Russian artists. The resulting contrast between textual and visual art helped make conceptualism—the most important Russian art movement of the end of the twentieth century—an unexpectedly influential branch of unofficial Soviet art. In the case of Russian conceptualism, such artistic texts were often borrowed from the world of politics in a subtle re-evaluation of both the pictorial art that they supplanted and the political system in which they arose. This article investigates the various ways in which painted, printed, and handwritten political texts appear on the canvases of unofficial artists in the late Soviet period, 1972–1992. Art played a significant role as an ideological weapon in both the Soviet Union and the West. A better sense of the manner in which this war of words was waged in unofficial art expands our understanding of the end of the Soviet system.

*Maryna Romanets*

**Out of the Soviet Closet: Yurko Pokalchuk’s “Erotomaniac” Fictions**

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**ABSTRACT:** As a reaction to totalitarian constraints, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, an astounding eruption and incorporation of sexually explicit imagery and iconography into diverse cultural forms occurred in Ukraine. These newly emerging discursive practices subverted the prescribed and officially enforced prudery of the sterilized Soviet society, which profoundly eroded any comfortable sense of the body in the sphere of representations that constitute social identity. While examining Yurko Pokalchuk’s Ukrainian “foundational” pornographic fictions, this article explores how the writer’s representations of sexuality are articulated through the dual discourse of erotic desire and transgression, focusing on the link between sexual transgression, the transgression of conventional discursive norms and regimes, and the subversion of social values, all of which are working against various social and cultural fixities. Pokalchuk’s “erotomaniac” fictions, radically departing from totalitarian paradigms persistently promoted by socialist realist literature, are capable of invoking transgression through their imbrication of the public and private discourses of power and pleasure, of politics and the erotic. By employing the pornographic—the consumption of which in itself is still widely regarded as a socially transgressive practice—as the engine of transgression, he releases the sexual bodies that have been securely kept in the closet of dominant ideologies and literary conventions, public morals and societal prohibitions, uncertainties and self-censorship, into the representational sphere.

*Helena Yakovlev-Golani*

**Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the Slavic Triangle**

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**ABSTRACT:** This article focuses on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarus and Ukraine during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. It addresses the question: Which specific factors influenced Russian foreign policy towards the aforementioned European states? The goals of the study are to illuminate these factors and to compare Russian foreign policy at the time of Yeltsin’s administration with that during Putin’s presidency. Russo-

Ukrainian and Russo-Belarusian relations are analyzed using the method of structured focused comparison. The research examines presidential speeches, decision-makers' memoirs, decisions or the absence thereof, and official declarations of the Russian government towards Ukraine and Belarus, as well as official agreements and empirical reality that exemplify the implementation of Russia's foreign policy. The empirical analysis reveals that geopolitical considerations, threat perception, interest groups, and decision-makers' perception of the past influenced the formation of Russia's foreign policy. Perception of the past, however, is fundamental to the understanding of this process.