**Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme**

MARTIN JAY


This book offers a history of one of modernity's most contested philosophical concepts: experience. This is no small undertaking given the centrality of experience for thinkers in philosophical traditions ranging from rationalism to idealism, empiricism, and historicism. We are fortunate to have in Martin Jay an intellectual historian who is up to the task of tracing the history of this concept in order to find its most important articulations. No book could exhaustively treat this topic, so Jay's attempt should be judged on the merits not of completeness but on his use of a tool indispensable for the historian: selection. While some of Jay's inclusions seem relatively unmotivated (e.g., the religious thinker Rudolf Otto and the postmodern theorist Roland Barthes), most of the central characters we would normally expect are present: Montaigne, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Dilthey, Dewey, and the critical theorists and poststructuralists who are Jay's own specialty. One may wonder why Jay winnowed such figures as Russell and Husserl but, as every book reviewer understands, one must start chopping somewhere.

The book divides into three parts, although one will not glean this from the table of contents. The first part consists of a brief introduction which thematizes the many aspects of the concept of experience, followed by a first chapter tracing the long history of the philosophy of experience leading from Greek thought to Montaigne, Bacon, and Descartes. The upshot of this story is that the early moderns turned the concept of experience away from Montaigne's experimentalist view of experience in favor of a concept of experience reconstituted around a "pencil for purification and boundary creation" (38). It is in modernity, Jay tells us, that specialized forms of experience become objects of interrogation in their own right (Weber obviously looms in the background of this view). In the book's next two parts Jay deals first with various spheres of experience central to modern thought and then with twentieth-century traditions that have sought to reunify the divided forms of experience that the moderns so carefully purified.

The book's second part consists of five chapters which explore five different realms of experience. These are, in order, epistemic, religious, aesthetic, political, and historical experience. It would take far too long to engage Jay's able expositions of the best representatives of each of
these traditions. I will instead focus on a lingering concern occasioned by Jay’s narrative here. There is a worry that Jay underestimates Kant’s impact upon modernity’s central concept of a purification of various forms of experience. This results in Jay’s seeming lack of appreciation of Kant’s influence upon his own historiographical procedures. If Jay’s overall narrative of experience is shaped by a Weberian conception of modernity as divided up into various spheres of experience, each of which comes in its own purified form, then his story is itself already a result of the logic of partition first perfected by Kant. It was Kant who implemented “the radical modalization of experience,” which disaggregated the unified images of experiential wholeness (260). The unfortunate result of Jay’s neglect here is that his presentation of modernity tends to follow modernity’s presentation of itself.

Perhaps Kant was right about what modernity would become. It would, however, be nice to see a little more argument as to exactly how it was that Kant and Weber were right that we moderns could carve ourselves up into divided bits (here a scientist, there a moralist; here a historian, there an aesthete). This would be especially useful in the context of Songs of Experience since the common Kantian-Weberian narrative is criticized by some of the thinkers Jay takes up in the book’s third part, especially poststructuralists like Foucault and pragmatists like Dewey who refused to accept modernity’s standard narrative of itself to the effect that facts and values can be neatly distinguished.

In the third part Jay turns to contemporary traditions that challenge modernist modalization. He devotes a chapter each to three traditions that seek to “reverse the process of differentiation” initiated sometime around Kant and culminated sometime around Weber (263). As readers of his previous books will expect, Jay is best in describing how each of these traditions as importantly critical of modernity, Jay’s narrative masks some deeper differences. Whereas pragmatists and poststructuralists mounted a substantial challenge to both modernity and modernity’s standard historiography, critical theorists too often accepted modernity’s own presentation of itself. On the one side, pragmatism and poststructuralism broke from modern philosophy in attempting to historicize the very history of modernity. On the other side, lingering universalist aspirations within critical theory encouraged resistance to such strategies. The resulting difference was that thinkers like Dewey and Foucault historicized modernity in ways that enabled them to break away from modernity’s narrative of itself more profoundly than could Benjamin, Adorno, and later Habermas. The merits of each of these moves remain debatable, of course. The point in the context of this review is that a greater sensitivity to the modernist inflections of his own historiography could have sharpened Jay’s presentation of some of the decisive differences which continue to separate various traditions of twentieth-century thought, their important similarities notwithstanding.

Colin Koopman, McMaster University

Against Cartesian Philosophy
PIERRE-DANIEL HUET

Against Cartesian Philosophy is the first and long overdue English translation of Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae. Its translator and editor, Thomas Lennon, is a seventeenth-century scholar perhaps best known for producing, with P. J. Olsencamp, the authoritative English translation of Malebranche’s Search After Truth. Here, in the first volume in the Journal of the History of Philosophy’s new JHP Books series, Lennon brings his erudition to bear on a work that, though now largely forgotten, may well have been the nail in the Cartesian coffin.

Huet published the first edition of his Censura in 1689, apparently at the urging of the Duc de Montausier. The work censured not just Descartes, but Cartesianism in general, in particular Malebranche, whose Search After Truth Huet had publicly denounced four months after it first appeared. What is today striking about the Censura is the extent to which Huet’s interests in Descartes anticipate those that have particularly occupied scholars over the last half century. That is, unlike his contemporaries who were more preoccupied with the Principles, and with Cartesian physics and metaphysics, Huet concentrates his attention on the Meditations and on Descartes’s methodology, in particular his method of doubt, the cogito, clear and distinct ideas, and so on. Thus, while the Censura in principle censures all of the Cartesian philosophy, with each of its chapters corresponding to some central tenet of Cartesianism, fully half the work is concerned with issues central to Descartes’s first two meditations. As the text makes clear, however, Huet did not regard it as necessary to refute every point of Cartesianism since
he felt that in refuting Cartesian skepticism the mechanism of the cogito and the Cartesian notion of evidence, he had destroyed the foundation on which Descartes’s system was constructed, and with it the entire system.

However, the work is not merely a critique of the Meditations but also, and just as importantly, a salvo in the querelle between the ancients and the moderns. For Huet, a cleric and lifelong bibliophile, whose Paris residence apparently collapsed under the weight of his books (16), the Cartesian’s rejection of the study of ancient philosophy, history, languages, and geography amounted to an unforgivable “pride, arrogance, and vanity” (24). This is most evident in the Censura’s final chapter, “A General Evaluation of the Cartesian Philosophy,” in which Huet argues that the only good ideas in the Meditations were already devised by such figures as Aristotle, Augustine, and the Academic skeptics. While Descartes himself admits as much in the Prefatory Letter that precedes the Meditations, Huet’s charge that “Descartes advanced nothing new” (218) is almost certainly directed against Malebranche at least as much as it is against Descartes. Huet underscores this charge with acid sarcasm in Chapter Two (“An Examination of Descartes’s View of the Criterion”), where he mocks the Cartesian injunction to attend closely to the object of study: “Forsooth, the philosophical until now have been ignorant of this secret, that for a thing to be perceived by the mind, the mind must attend to it! Forsooth, the truth has eluded us until now because, when we sought it, we dallied with an unfocused and unfastidious mind! It took the appearance of Descartes to remind us to focus the mind and pay attention” (132).

While Huet’s text is both historically and philosophically interesting in its own right, there is much more to recommend this volume. Lennon precedes the work with a preface and introduction that are as readable as they are useful to readers new to Huet. The preface argues for the relative importance of the Censura in the history of Cartesianism (and response to it) and offers an explanation for why the work is no longer read. (Essentially, Lennon argues that the Censura delivered such a death-blow to Cartesianism that it rendered itself obsolete.) The introduction features a warm and witty biography of Huet, as well as a discussion of the context and reception of the work that few are better qualified than Lennon to give.

The text itself is carefully annotated, and Huet’s fifth edition (1694) additions and deletions are clearly demarcated from the text of the original edition. This in particular sheds a good deal of light on Huet’s relationship with one other figure who was important in the late seventeenth-century French reception of Descartes: Pierre-Sylvain Régis. Régis, whom Huet dubbed the “Prince of the Cartesian” (27), published a scathing attack on the Censura when it first appeared. In response, Huet published an edition of the Censura with considerable additions (mostly in the first half) replying to Régis. Lennon’s introduction gives a careful discussion of the exchange between Huet and Régis, and of the details of Huet’s written responses to Régis. Lennon’s thoughtful annotations of Huet’s 1694 additions help the reader to discern further the shape of the controversy between Régis and Huet. This sheds interesting light not only on the French reception of Descartes but much more broadly on the tone and substance of the querelle.

In his preface, Lennon writes that “both of the two kinds of historians of philosophy, the textualists and the contextualists, those interested primarily in philosophy and those interested primarily in history, should find Huet’s Censura of great value” (11). This is true not only of Huet’s text but of Lennon’s contributions to it, which teach us that the very best historians of philosophy, such as Lennon himself, are both kinds of historians in equal measure.

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Géophilosophie de Deleuze et Guattari
MANOLA ANTONIOLI

Dans son récent ouvrage intitulé Géophilosophie de Deleuze et Guattari, Manola Antonioli se donne pour tâche d’identifier les apports de la réflexion du psychanalyste Félix Guattari dans la pensée de Gilles Deleuze qui est encore trop souvent aujourd’hui étudiée de manière autonome. Pour Manola Antonioli, il apparaît clair que la multiplicité interne de cette œuvre commune constitue la force d’une écriture et d’une pensée qui y puissent une formidable capacité d’ouverture sur les multiples territoires qu’elles se proposent d’explorer. Les ouvrages qu’ils ont signés en commun constituent des «agencements machiniques» auxquels chacun des deux auteurs apporte des rouages mis au point dans une activité de recherche et d’écriture précédentes. Deleuze a ainsi évoqué cette expérience de collaboration: «Une philosophie, nous avons essayé d’en faire Félix Guattari et moi, dans L’Anti-Édipe et dans Mille plateaux qui est un gros livre et propose beaucoup de concepts. Nous n’avons pas collaboré, nous avons fait un livre puis un autre, non pas au sens d’une unité, mais d’un article indéfini. Nous avions chacun un passé et un travail précédent : lui en psychiatrie, en politique, en philosophie, déjà riche en concepts, et moi, avec Différence et répétition et Logique
du sens. Mais nous n'avons pas collaboré comme deux personnes. Nous étions plutôt comme deux ruisseaux qui se rejoignent pour faire un troisième qui aurait été nous» (Gilles Deleuze, entretien avec Raymond Bellour et François Ewald, *Magazine littéraire* no. 257, septembre 1988, 17). En soulignant les enjeux d’un dialogue qui fut incontestablement décisif pour Gilles Deleuze, Manola Antonioli entend plus particulièrement interroger la proximité entre géographie et philosophie en montrant comment notre compréhension du monde contemporain appelle une redéfinition, voire une réévaluation des notions d’espace et de territoire. En effet, à la multiplication des temporalités coexistantes à laquelle on assiste aujourd’hui, il faut ajouter la multiplication des espaces et la complexification de notre inscription dans le territoire. S’il est désormais impossible de construire un (grand) récit d’une succession d’événements, régi par des lois de stricte causalité, orienté d’un point de vue téléologique, « il est également impossible de parler des territoires comme d’entités naturelles, figées et immuables. En témoigne l’évolution de la géographie, qui n’est plus l’étude de l’enracinement séculaire d’une communauté humaine dans un milieu naturel, mais une analyse des flux et des réseaux, des paysages urbains et des mutations induites par l’industrialisation et l’ informatisation» (14). Les réalités technologiques, l’informatisation des sociétés sont telles que nous vivons de plus en plus au croisement de plusieurs territoires et de plusieurs temporalités. Il devient désormais difficile d’identifier des oppositions, des structures binaire, d’établir, par exemple, une opposition tranchée entre sédentarité et nomadisme. Nous sommes tous, au moins virtuellement, nomades et sédentaires. Dès lors, ces fameux concepts de réseau, de flux, de nomadisme s’avèrent interrogés non plus pour eux-mêmes, mais à la lumière d’événements qui dominent la période actuelle. Loin donc de se limiter à un simple exercice d’exégèse, Manola Antonioli suggère des grilles de lecture qui permettent d’interpréter les complexités du temps présent, complexités qui nécessitent que soit définie une logique transversale ouverte sur la complexité des devenir. Une telle logique est en effet de plus en plus nécessaire pour lire les «nouvelles cartes aux frontières mouvantes» (31). Il est à cet égard indéniable qu’une des grandes qualités de cet essai est d’apporter des mises au point tout à fait rigoureuses sur des concepts qui se trouvent abondamment vulgarisés aujourd’hui. Comme l’auteur le rappelle avec justesse, ce qui intéresse Deleuze dans le terme de nomadisme (contrairement à ce qu’on a l’habitude de penser et de répéter), ce n’est pas l’idée d’extrême mobilité ou d’une errance paroxystique (d’ailleurs il ne cesse de nous rappeler que les circuits coutumiers des nomades sont beaucoup plus fixes qu’on ne le pense, que les vrais nomades ne bougent pas beaucoup), mais surtout la forme de distribution dans l’espace (qui devient dans sa philosophie, espace mentale, espace social, espace politique et esthétique) à laquelle nous renvoie l’étymologie de ce mot. Les nouvelles technologies de la communication s’avèrent être un excellent exemple d’une telle distribution. Internet est autant un lieu de maîtrise qu’un lieu de fuite, il devient l’exemple même d’un entrelacs de lignes, partagé entre les pouvoirs financiers et étatiques qui essaient de le maîtriser, se segmenter et de fixer les flux qui le traversent et les lignes de fuite qu’il crée et qu’il échappent en partie à toute tentative de contrôle, entre la menace d’isolement qui semble peser sur les internautes confinés volontairement dans une auto-ségrégation technologique et les contacts multiples qu’il permet de nouer (33). Liée à ce mouvement qui bouleverse les structures traditionnelles, la question de la mondialisation est également centrale dans cet essai. Qu’en est-il du nouveau régime de domination qu’elle semble impliquer? 

Il paraît de nos jours évident que l’analyse du pouvoir ne peut pas se limiter aux instances modernes, aux «segments durs» constitués par des centres visibles du pouvoir (l’État, l’armée, l’église, l’école), mais tout centre de pouvoir visible n’est que le lieu où entrent en résonance toutes sortes de micropouvoirs, des devenirs imperceptibles où le pouvoir n’existe qu’à l’état diffus et démultiplié (111). Il est donc de plus en plus difficile de se limiter à identifier des systèmes d’oppression et des opprimés comme deux ensembles bien distincts. La tâche de toute analyse politique, économique ou sociale devient dès à présent bien plus complexe. Dans la carte géopolitique et géo-économique du monde actuel, il s’agit plutôt d’interpréter des lignes de force en suivant les devenirs involontaires d’une multiplicité de lignes ou de dimensions entremêlées, dures ou souples, microscopiques ou macroscopiques : «Quand on projette aux limites de l’univers une image du maître, une idée d’État, ou de gouvernement secret, comme si une domination s’exerçait sur les flux moins que sur les segments et de la même façon, on tombe dans une représentation ridicule et fictive» (G. Deleuze et F. Guattari, *Mille plateaux* [Paris: Minuit, 1980], 257). L’hétérogénéité vient constituer une caractéristique fondamentale de tout le processus de mondialisation en cours, dont Deleuze et Guattari signalisaient avec lucidité, et cela dès 1980, les prémisses. À l’effacement progressif des frontières étatiques et des limites de la souveraineté nationale s’accompagne le bouclage des frontières entre des phénomènes commerciaux, religieux, politiques et culturels: «L’État-nation, tel qu’il a été construit par la modernité européenne, présuppose un lien solidaire et défini entre un peuple, un appareil politique, policier et militaire centralisé et un territoire dont les frontières peuvent être bien définies, une unité politique homogène et souveraine, qui fait face à d’autres unités souveraines à l’extérieur de ses frontières. Or la caractéristique essentielle des
organisations internationales contemporaines est celle de transgresser les frontières et les barrières étagées, d’où la tendance actuelle à parler d’organisations transnationales, qui passent à travers les frontières étagées» (158). On assiste en effet à une détériorisation du pouvoir et à une crise de l’État qui est perpétuellement dépassé par la puissance des flux économiques, par les exigences du capital qui interviennent dans la politique et qui émeuvent l’État d’être le centre de la réalité politique et de son interprétation. Les États sont bien impuissants devant le pouvoir des actionnaires et se montrent souvent bien incapables de réguler les délocalisations d’entreprises : «La stratification et l’appareil de capture vertical qui est au fondement de la forme-État a tendance à s’affaiblir face à la transversalité des flux d’argent, de travail, d’information et de personnes de nature horizontale et transétagée» (161).

Cependant, Deleuze et Guattari refusent la thèse selon laquelle le capitalisme mondialisé pousserait à une homogénéisation inéluctable des formations sociales dans le cadre des relations économiques internationales. Une telle tendance n’est en fin de compte qu’apparente. D’une part, on continue de remarquer une grande hétérogénéité des États. D’autre part, le capitalisme international laisse subsister en sa périphérie une certaine polymorphie : «Ces formations sociales hétéromorphes ne constituent pas des survivances ou des formes transitionnelles, puisqu’elles sont déjà impliquées à un certain degré dans le système d’échange capitaliste, mais inadéquates aux conditions et aux dimensions du marché mondial» (162). Plus le capitalisme mondial installe à la périphérie une haute industrie et une agriculture hautement industrialisée, réservant provisoirement au centre les activités dites post-industrielles (électronique, informatique, conquête de l’espace, surarmement), plus elle crée dans le centre aussi «des zones périphériques de sous-développement, des tiers-mondes intérieurs, des Sud intérieurs. Masses de la population livrées à un travail précaire (sous-traitance, travail intérimaire ou au noir), et dont la subsistance officielle est seulement assurée par des allocations d’État et des salaires précarisés» (Mille plateaux, 586). En outre, l’informatisation planétaire est loin d’être si univoque. Félix Guattari émet à cet égard l’hypothèse selon laquelle il existe la possibilité de faire passer la machine sous le contrôle de la subjectivité. Pourquoi cependant les potentialités créatrices portées par les récentes évolutions technologiques et télécommunicationnelles n’aboutissent pour l’instant qu’à un renforcement des formes d’asservissement machinique et à l’appauvrissement de l’expérience subjective et collective ? Qu’est-ce qui pourrait enfin nous permettre d’accéder à une «ère post-médias», à des révolutions de l’intelligence et de la création ? À ce niveau de questionnement, le pari de Guattari est que d’autres modalités de production subjective deviennent concevables. D’autres formes de partage de savoir et de pouvoir, des formes alternatives de réappropriation existentielle, esthétique et politique pourraient être élargies à l’ensemble des collectivités humaines. À cet égard, Manola Antonioli rappelle à la toute fin de son ouvrage ces quelques mots d’Édouard Glissant dont la pensée s’inscrit particulièrement bien dans l’horizon de cette lecture stimulante de Deleuze et Guattari : «Ce que l’on appelle mondialisation, qui est l’uniformisation par le bas, le règne des multinationales, la standardisation, l’ultraégalisme sauvage sur les marchés mondiaux, pour moi c’est le revers négatif d’une réalité prodigieuse, que j’appelle la mondialité. La mondialité, c’est l’aventure sans précédent qu’il nous est donné à tous aujourd’hui de vivre, dans un monde qui pour la première fois, réellement et de manière immédiate, foudroyante, se conçoit à la fois multiple et unique, et inextricable. C’est aussi la nécessité pour chacun d’avoir à changer ses manières de concevoir, de vivre et de réagir, dans ce monde-là». Dans une époque de fragmentations généralisées, cette référence positive à l’écrit, la pensée et la philosophie antillaises (qui aurait sans doute mérité d’être plus développée) deviennent pertinente pour Manola Antonioli dans la mesure où Édouard Glissant propose une pensée «archipélique» qui s’accorde bien avec la philosophie de la déterritorialisation. Il y a derrière cela un enjeu ontologique ou «co-ontologique» primordial. Car nous devons en effet apprendre à habiter autrement nos villes, nos territoires et à concevoir différemment nos enracinements, nos corps, nos pratiques politiques, sociales et artistiques. L’instabilité et le déséquilibre de l’île déserte sur laquelle nous nous trouvons ouvrent de formidables possibilités de recommencement et de transformation : «L’île est le minimum nécessaire à ce recommencement, le matériel survivant de la première origine, le noyau ou l’œuf irradiant qui doit suffire à tout reproduire» (G. Deleuze et F. Guattari, «Causes et raisons des îles désertes», dans L’île déserte et autres textes. Textes et entretiens 1953–1974 [Paris : Minuit, 2002], 16). Mais pour que cela devienne possible, il faudra probablement renoncer à l’illusion d’une unité originelle, d’une unité d’avant la séparation, d’une origine perdue que l’on pourrait un beau jour retrouver. Il faudra au fond apprendre à renoncer à toute forme de nostalgie et à accepter la persistance d’un chaos et de ses devenir. Car toute origine est déjà séparée d’elle-même, disloquée, soumise à une altérité qui fait que nous ne sommes nous-mêmes qu’en étant conscients des parts d’hétérogénéité irréductibles qui nous constituent. Or pour Manola Antonioli, l’aventure de la «mondialité» ne sera possible que dans un monde en archipel, «monde aux multiples interfaces, qui multiplie les échanges, les passages et les rencontres. Deleuze et Guattari n’ont jamais cessé de soumettre l’image de la pensée au tremblement et à la discontinuité, ont inlassablement décrypté les ritournelles et les clichés qui figent notre
Philosophers of language in both the Continental and Anglo-American traditions, Hagi Kenaan argues, have systematically neglected the personal dimension of language. *The Present Personal*, accordingly, "is a philosophical attempt to think the depth of the possibility of listening to the other person" (ix), where doing so involves something other than listening to their language or words merely as such. Philosophy of language, Kenaan argues, must better distinguish the propositional content of speech from what a speaker says in a more personal sense: "The possibility is there for me to listen to what you are saying without actually listening to you. When philosophy thinks of language, this difference between 'what you say' and its apparent double, 'what you say,' typically goes unnoticed or else is dismissed as insignificant" (2). Understanding what this distinction amounts to, and tracing some of its implications, are the aims of this study. *The Present Personal* is a book I would recommend rather highly. It is original, concise, tightly argued, and very well written. Kenaan demonstrates an unusual phenomenological sensibility and a freshness of approach that make this, his first book, one of some importance—and not exclusively for specialists in philosophy of language but for those as well for whom this field may be of secondary interest.

Kenaan argues that while the personal is far from peripheral to human language it has been ignored entirely as a theme in the philosophy of language, due in large part to the hegemony of propositional thinking. "The propositional," he writes, "levels the personal. It altogether misplaces the possibility of listening to the personal, and it does so by objectifying language in a manner that leaves room only for an external understanding of the relationship between language and the individual. The propositional allows us to think of this relationship only after the fact of constructing language and the individual as two independent, fully constituted, entities" (177–8). The manner in which an individual speaker is present in his or her speech is philosophically elusive for the reason that this is not a matter that can be articulated as a fact. It defies expression in objective, propositional terms and instead requires a phenomenology of the tension between the speaker and his or her speech, since "[i]t is in this tension," Kenaan maintains, "that the personal is present. This tension is where the personal lives" (178). If it is unsurprising to hear that propositional thinking, and hence the forgetfulness of the personal, dominates analytic philosophy of language it is perhaps more surprising that Kenaan finds much the same at work in Continental thought. Although Continental approaches to language often reject the privileging of the propositional, Kenaan argues that the alternatives offered by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Derrida, and others only perpetuate a forgetfulness of the personal. What all overlook is the sense in which one can be said to be personally present in one’s speech and the strained relation that exists between the public structure of language and the singularity of the speaker.

After a lengthy introduction, the book’s six chapters include an analysis of existential critiques of the hegemony of language’s propositional form, including especially Kierkegaard’s objection to the forgetfulness of the singular individual. While sympathetic with the spirit of Kierkegaard’s critique, Kenaan holds that the view Kierkegaard and other existential thinkers substitute “too easily evolves into a new form of conceptual captivity, one that internalizes the limits of language as a given necessity. The self is left facing the apparently immutable structure of language, and all it can do, as Wittgenstein puts it, is ‘run up against the limits of language’” (16). Kenaan also addresses more recent philosophy of language, particularly Austin and Heidegger, in which the issue turns to the implications of rejecting language’s propositional structure. Does the pragmatic turn initiated by Austin or Heidegger’s turn toward the poetic—two conceptions of language that reject the preeminence of the propositional—help us to conceptualize the personal, Kenaan asks? His reply is a categorical negative: “In spite of their [Austin’s and Heidegger’s] nonpropositional vision of language, the trajectories they open for philosophy remain removed from and external to the ordinary reverberation of language within which the personal speaks” (16).

Kenaan then attempts a phenomenology of the personal within language that is briefer than one might wish, but nonetheless well turned. If uncovering the personal means attending phenomenologically not merely to the content of what is said or the person of the speaker but to the tension between them, Kenaan proceeds by developing an analogy between the experience of linguistic meaning and the aesthetic experience of beauty, drawing on Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*. Conceiving of the personal in speech means allowing the words of one’s interlocutor to reverberate in a manner similar to Kant’s account of the
aesthetic judgment of the beautiful. For Kant, the judgment of beauty cannot be reduced to subjective feeling while being rooted in it; it makes a claim to universal validity and defies the paradigm of the constitutive laws of understanding elaborated in the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kenaan, beauty provides a model of the personal dimension of speech in that both alike become manifest in the reverberation—the irreconcilable tension—between subjectivity and objectivity.

Kenaan’s approach to the personal primarily draws upon Kant and phenomenology as well as the literary work of Kafka and Kundera, among others. Unfortunately, the book provides little to no discussion of such noteworthy Continental figures as Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, and Lévinas. Although Kenaan would likely offer a similar assessment of these philosophers to his critique of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, one wonders whether his project might be able to appropriate at least some of their work (Gadamer on dialogue, for instance, Ricoeur on metaphor, or Lévinas on the said/saying distinction) or, if not, then to offer a novel critique of the same. In any event, The Present Personal deserves a strong recommendation. It is undoubtedly an original contribution to the philosophy of language and will be of interest to philosophers in both the Continental and analytic traditions.

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The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy
IAN JAMES

In the last decade Jean-Luc Nancy has come to occupy a prominent place in Continental philosophy. The growing importance of Nancy’s work can also be witnessed in the secondary literature in English. This past year, two books have appeared which proposed an overview of Nancy’s wide-ranging thinking: B. C. Hutchens’ Nancy and the Future of Philosophy and Ian James’s The Fragmentary Demand. While the former focusses more on the relevance of Nancy’s thought to current discussions around (for the most part political) issues such as nationalism, racism, and the media, the latter is more intent on situating Nancy’s thinking in the history of philosophy and contrasting it with other contemporary Continental philosophers. It offers both a discussion of all major themes in Nancy’s thinking as well as an account of Nancy’s readings of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Bataille, among others. Its most valuable contribution, however, is its concise but enlightening analyses of the philosophies directly discussed by Nancy or used by James to contrast with Nancy’s thinking. These summaries are essential for any introduction to Continental thought, and their absence is too often what prevents neophytes from grasping the stakes of Continental philosophy. This book is presented after all as an introduction to Nancy’s thought and is intended either for those familiar with parts of Nancy’s corpus and wanting to understand its originality and importance within twentieth-century philosophy, or for those with some background in Continental philosophy who want to see what new insights Nancy’s thinking can offer.

In the introduction, James explains the significance of the book’s title. Using Blanchot’s discussion of Nietzsche in L’entretien infini, from which the phrase “fragmentary demand” stems, James claims that the diversity and eclecticism of Nancy’s corpus represents an attempt to do justice to the demand imposed on thinking by exposure to the multiplicity and fragmentation (of philosophy, of the world, of sense). Far from using the fragmentary and non-systematic nature of Nancy’s work as an occasion to bask in abstruse and intricate formulations, James presents Nancy’s thought in a well-structured way and in clear language. The book is divided into five chapters, each presenting a main theme in Nancy’s work: subjectivity, space, body, community, and art. James shows how each theme leads into the next, removing any appearance of arbitrariness that Nancy’s scattered discussions might have and uncovering a certain unity (though not a systematic one) in Nancy’s philosophical concerns.

A short summary of the first, and by far the strongest, chapter illustrates the tight structure and breadth of James’s book. After situating Nancy’s thinking in the French reception of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche by discussing a crucial but unfamiliar article of Nancy’s (“Nietzsche: Mais où sont les yeux pour le voir”), James turns to a discussion of Nancy’s book on Kant, Logodaealdus: Le discours de la syncope. He begins with a five-page summary of the stakes of Kant’s first Critique and of the schematism in particular. This summary leads into a concise discussion of Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. James then shows how Nancy takes up the issue of grounding and groundlessness from Heidegger, followed by a discussion of the undecidable relation between Darstellung and Dichtung (presentation and poetry). This allows him to underline a subtle but crucial difference between Heidegger and Nancy: while for Heidegger the absence of foundations within (critical) philosophy is encountered only in the moment of recoil before the abyss, for Nancy this absence of foundation is constitutive of philosophical discourse as such. For Nancy,
it is the whole language of metaphysics that is groundless and that resists, as language, any grounding. This shows why Nancy must oppose Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. The subtle but crucial distinction between Heidegger and Nancy would not become apparent to a reader unfamiliar with either of these texts and their respective stakes if no concise summary were offered. Indeed, one of the strengths of the book is how it shows not only Nancy’s indebtedness to Heidegger, but also his radical departure from him. This is achieved, oddly enough, without any in-depth discussion of *Être singulier pluriel*.

Throughout the book, James offers many similarly concise discussions. Chapter 2 on space offers an interpretation of Husserl’s *Thing and Space* and of Heidegger’s account of space in *Being and Time* and in the *Beiträge* before moving to a discussion of spacing as sense. The opening section on the classical debate around space seems less relevant since it is only used as a foil for a phenomenological account and discarded right away. Chapter 3 offers a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s *Phénoménologie de la perception* and *Le visible et l’invisible* and of Derrida’s *Le Toucher* before moving on to a discussion of Nancy’s rethinking of incarnation and his deconstruction of Christianity. Chapter 4 on community offers a thorough discussion of Bataille, Blanchot, and Nancy, and also addresses criticism of the political aspects of Nancy’s thought from Lefort, Critchley, Fraser, and Norris. Chapter 5 offers a discussion, first, of Hegel and the plurality of art forms and, second, of Nancy’s recent works on painting. The wide scope of the book and the versatility of its author are undeniable, despite some inaccuracies (for example, the equation of the death of the others and the death of *das Man* in Chapter 4), which do not endanger the interpretation as a whole. Of course, as always, the disadvantage of a book on a prolific writer, James could not take into consideration the most recent works of Nancy on dance, painting, the body, skin, the poem, etc. published since 2005. Some of those works are listed in the bibliography, but the bibliography is already outdated. We must also mention some typos in the French titles, the most important one being Jean-François Lyotard’s *Différend* which has been twice transformed into a Derridean *Différand*.

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**Nihilism and Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, and Law**

GIANNI VATTIMO


The fourteen essays gathered in this volume have one major aspect in common: they all reflect the concerns and anxieties of one of Europe’s most original thinkers, the leading hermeneutic philosopher and member of the European Parliament from the European Socialists. In his foreword to the book, Richard Rorty points out the radical awareness of our specific historical conditions which necessitate a mode of thinking on par with Vattimo’s: “So philosophy ceases to be ancillary either to theology or to natural science. Instead, it takes the form of historical narrative and utopian speculation. For leftists like Vattimo and Dewey, it becomes ancillary to socio-political initiatives aimed at making the future better than the past” (xiii). At the time when metaphysical justifications, grounds, and rationalities appear utterly impoverished, notwithstanding their holding sway upon our era of globalization and militarism, the very notion of philosophy is questioned because, à la Heidegger, it can no longer be a search for, and discourse of, foundations. Rather, postmodernity heralds the re-emergence of philosophy as “sociological impressionism,” or to adopt a term from Foucault, an “ontology of actuality” (3, 87). Why actuality? Because attunement to the actual, to the sociological “facts,” enables us to receive Being not as stable presence but as an “event.” In this situation, philosophy can no longer claim to hold the supra-historical stance that dwells in ageless Truths. Together, philosophy and sociology allow us to remember Being historically as we witness, in our actual positions, the destiny of Being in appearing in an irreducible multiplicity of existences, or put simply, in our undeniable cultural diversity that challenges the reductive technological Enframing (*Ge-Stell*) despite the latter’s current planetary expansion into the farthest corners through globalization. No wonder why otherness has increasingly become the issue of our postcolonial times, or why maintaining universalities—colonial dominations or cultural melting pots—has become ever more difficult and unjustifiable.

An acknowledgment of this kind accompanies the announcement, with Heidegger, of the decline of the West, that is, the dissolution of the idea that there is a unitary significance and direction in the history of humanity. Modernity, the epoch in which being modern was the highest value, has lost its pertinence in the face of increased de-legitimation of such values and ultimacies. A philosophy of the decline therefore rejects both foundationalism and relativism and dwells on *Verwindung*—as both distortion and healing—instead of an *Überwindung*—overcoming—of
metaphysics which, as Heidegger recognized (in his “Overcoming Metaphysics” in the English volume, The End of Philosophy [University of Chicago Press, 2003]), inevitably risks a naive leap of faith. Secularization, as “consuming [Christianity] without destroying it” (31), presents a glimpse into the history of Being in the West, as the age-old theoretical constructs that persistently moored Being unto presumably solid fundaments run their course into irrecoverable impoverishment.

Several consequences, both conceptual and practical, follow these theoretical premises to which various chapters of the book attend. First is a need for a revised understanding of ethics. A postmetaphysical ethics celebrates consensus and negotiation rather than the implementation of immutable principles. The sociological factuality of cultural plurality and multiculturalism enables the search for various ethical stances with respect to contemporary issues. But such ethical options, once considered as sociological facts of our postmodern era, in turn reveal an important aspect of our specific historical time of transition: we have arrived at the awareness that “ethics can never speak the language of hard proof” (48). Vattimo’s weak ontology or “ontology of the weakening of Being” (19), then, leads to an “ethics of finitude” which amounts to the exclusion of violence (46). Why finitude? Because the mortality that remains ours reports that “Being is not eternal structure given once and for all…. It is [rather] event, happening, historicity” (74). Reduction of pain is therefore a necessity for postmetaphysical ethics. That is how Vattimo’s “weak thought” (il pensiero debile) is connected to the question of the law.

Running justice against the law—that is to say, taking the law at every moment as it holds sway and is implemented in the form of sanctions and punishments back to the pre-edifying impulse of justice—remains on par with, and represents the “institutional” practice of, Vattimo’s postmetaphysical ethics. Justice, as the event that gives rise to normative fiat we call the law, without causing them, does not itself resemble a norm. Justice must be understood as the singular event behind every regime of laws, an archic moment without archic intentions. The law can only “do justice” through interpretation (136). As interpretation, the law does not preside over facts, and this is how the law in our transitional, postmodern age must be understood: just as philosophy which for long aspired to guarantee Truth and foundations has now reached its point of consummation, so the law must also be taken as based not on Truths but on norms that are only representations of precedents, or interpretations of interpretations. As such, the laws are not timeless and eternal but historically bound. The postmetaphysical mode of acting—Verwendung—introduces this epochal awareness, this specific historicity, to the law. Epochal awareness, then, is expressed in our critical epoché, a historical view that unmasks the nonjustice in the law through nihilistic interpretation.

On a more practical level, the law must be twisted and distorted (Verwunden) to reduce violence. Not just the violence that the law is set up to prevent, but the violence that the law itself commits in the form of punishment that defines our systems of retributive justice: “I use ‘violence’ to mean the peremptory assertion of an ultimacy that, like the ultimate metaphysical foundation (or the God of philosophers), breaks off dialogue and silences the interlocutor by refusing even to acknowledge the question ‘why?’” (98). Vattimo argues that crime and punishment are external to one another (166–7). Since punishment cannot rectify the violence committed against a victim, every form of punishment will ultimately amount to (a desire for) vengeance. Since the reduction of violence is on his agenda, punishment must be replaced with education, rehabilitation, and reform. To this end, a postmodern proceduralism should replace the metaphysical foundations in the law, because if we agree that metaphysics is impoverished, and in the absence of stable substances that function as foundations and principles, ethics, law, and politics can only be procedural. I shall return to this point shortly.

Politically as well, “weak thought” introduces interesting crossroads. Two epochal events characterize our time: one is Heidegger’s “end of metaphysics” and the other is the rise of Popperian, pragmatic liberalism. While these two events are connected, seeking causality in their connection represents a misunderstanding. The loss of substance that has resulted in increased proceduralism is the starting point in this respect. This situation, of course, provides new opportunities for democracy, which is not identical with liberalism. A democracy that is no longer based on solid foundational Truth(s) will inevitably submit to the rising pluralism of our postcolonial time. Andenken, Heidegger’s “recollective thought,” is defined by Vattimo as a democratic thought. Recollective thought becomes the mode of thinking in this era: it recognizes that “there is no origin located somewhere outside the actuality of event,” and consequently we return to recomposing our experience of this historical phase of humanity (87). This experience is most apparent in the concrete and pragmatic nature of our politics today. When it is acknowledged that society is an aggregate of diverse positions without privileged foundations, politics becomes a place for the conflict of interpretations to play itself out in a democratic field. This democratic project is recognizably “leftist” because, as was the case with the traditional left, this postmodern, democratic left situates itself in a philosophy of history, but unlike the traditional left, the postmodern, “nihilistic left” does not seek foundations or rationalities in history to justify its own existence.
Derrida had described Heidegger's thought as guided by a motif of "Being as presence—understood in a more originary sense than it is in the metaphysical and ontic determinations of presence or of presence as the present" ("The Ends of Man" in Margins of Philosophy [University of Chicago Press, 1982], 128). According to Derrida, then, the "Heideggerian hope" would be "the quest for the proper word and the unique name" ("Difference" in Margins of Philosophy, 27)—that is to-be—a quest Derrida calls metaphysical. Vattimo raises issue with Derrida's "poetic discourse" which risks worldview relativism, in Vattimo's judgment, at an epochal time when philosophy needs a systematic theory to get out of subjective descriptions in the face of the threat of the old guard of "rigorous sciences" that reduce philosophy to the ancillary of some presumed ultimacy (25). This is why we still need to acknowledge Being, not to bring it back as stable presence, but to allow its vicissitudes to eventuate in our pluralistic age. This interpretation of Heidegger, of course, problematizes Derrida's suspicion of Heidegger's approach to Being.

Vattimo does not endorse the messianic hope, a point that he makes while perhaps having Derrida's Spectres of Marx in mind. With this rejection, one infers, the two concepts of proceduralism and projecturality come to the fore. Once again, our subscription to projecturality stems from our sober attempts at dwelling in possible epochal openings at a time of caesurae when epochal principles qua permanent, stable presence in theoretical foundations have become shaky, indefensible and ultimately unjust. Dwelling in the possible is therefore an essentially political move that involves preferring a "liberal, tolerant, and democratic society rather than an authoritarian and totalitarian one" (19). Proceduralism must be understood in this respect when, say, the law on one hand is pushed back to reveal the nonjust that it contains and conceals, and on the other hand is pushed forward by emptying it from the retributive violence it contains. Since we have no blueprint for creating a future for humanity once and for all, proceduralism enables us to act here and now and make decisions based on the openings as various social, political, and institutional processes reveal to us. That is fine. The danger, however, lies in the reductive violence that every procedure entails in our age of dominant, technological Enframing which reduces all existents to resources, as Heidegger put it in his "Question Concerning Technology." I understand Vattimo's point that the impoverishment of ultimate principles and ideologies renders procedures bereft of substantive contents. I also understand that one can dwell in such lack of substance in order to explore possible openings in the existing systems, openings that can lead us to a pluralistic and democratic society that aims at eliminating violence. The danger, however, remains: this gigantic
and seemingly “autarkic” system that technologically governs every aspect of our lives—as it reduces our planet to a resource, human beings to labor power for exploitation, democracy to a caricature of choice of the lesser evil once every four years, and the law to the means of suppression of social anomalies—has grown into a Weberian iron cage and a Kafkaesque total system that mystifies anyone who seeks to identify its source of power. That is the true “danger” in the sense that Heidegger used the term. Whether Vattimo’s proceduralism will lead to the “saving power” remains to be seen, although one may express disbelief if one is able to conceive of the magnitude and pervasiveness of this planetary but headless monster. But having said this, would risk not be an inseparable part of dwelling in epochal possibilities?

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**Feminism and the Final Foucault**

DIANNA TAYLOR and KAREN VINTGES, Editors


*Feminism and the Final Foucault* is an anthology of articles, many by prominent feminist Foucaultians such as Judith Butler, Ladelle Mc-Whorter, and Jana Sawicki, which brings together feminist interpretations of the last writings of Michel Foucault. In their Introduction to the work, “Engaging the Present,” editors Dianna Taylor and Karen Vintges situate Foucault’s final writings within the context of post-World War II Europe, claiming that his work responds to the need to criticize and reflect creatively upon the present while developing new forms of meaning-making and emancipatory modes of existence. Although Foucault’s decision to delve into the details of elite ancient Greek and Roman practices of the self in his final writings has been taken by some readers to be esoteric and apolitical, the editors of this volume argue that in these works Foucault was successfully seeking resources for theorizing politics without universal Truths, for thinking about an ethics that neither dispenses with nor reasserts normativity, and for developing a notion of politics as ethics. Taylor and Vintges argue that Foucault’s final work formulates new ways of theorizing and enacting personal and political responsibility in the contemporary context which can, moreover, engage fruitfully in a dialogue with feminist theory in thinking about practices, identities, and political commitment. While more or less critical of the potential usefulness of Foucault’s final work to feminist political practice, all the articles in this volume share “the belief that feminism and the final

Foucault do have something to say to each other” (4). The chapters of *Feminism and the Final Foucault* are divided into three parts; not having space to review each of the fourteen chapters in depth, I will discuss one chapter from each section.

Part One of this volume is entitled “Women’s Self-Practices as Ethos: Historical Practices.” Each of the three chapters in this section explores a case study of a woman whose personal and writing practices can be interpreted as what Foucault called “arts of existence.” While Foucault exclusively considers male examples of cares of the self in antiquity, noting that these practices were not made available to women in the ancient political context with which he is concerned, Part One of *Feminism and the Final Foucault* shows that women in both historical and contemporary contexts have developed ethical self-techniques and therefore suggests that it is possible to trace a line in history of women’s “arts of existence” (4).

The chapter that I will consider in detail from Part One is Jeannette Bloem’s “The Shaping of a ‘Beautiful’ Soul: The Critical Life of Anna Maria van Schurman.” In this article Bloem examines the manners in which the early modern Dutch scholar Anna Maria van Schurman came to theorize and enact practices of caring for her soul which challenged the theological and gendered technologies of discipline of her time. Bloem shows that van Schurman felt that through individual spiritual practices which she developed and made into a way of life, she could transform her soul. For the Foucault of *Discipline and Punish*, the soul is a product of discipline, while in the final Foucault this soul can also simultaneously be produced through technologies of self-governance. Van Schurman saw herself as devoting her life to transforming her disciplined soul into the kind of soul that she would wish to have based on theological views that she developed and for which she offered philosophical arguments. Like Foucault, van Schurman explicitly saw this cultivation of her soul through practice as an “art.” These choices and practices significantly went against the grain of early modern Christian theology and gender roles, and included van Schurman’s joining a separatist and expelled religious community in which she lived in the same house as men, and writing scholarly works in Latin in which she developed her views on theology, ethics, metaphysics, and physics. In contrast to contemporary female devotees, van Schurman abandoned the “modesty topos” (19) and based her religious writings on philosophical arguments rather than dreams and revelations. Unlike most female mystics, she thus refrained from presenting her ideas as passive vehicles for God, and instead claimed as her own arguments that were viewed as heretical, refuting church dogma and accepted moral philosophy, even while leading a lifestyle which flouted Christian ideals of feminine virtue. In her *Euceria*, a work...
that Bloem argues can be read as an instance of non-confessional self-writing comparable to those explored by Foucault in "L’écriture de soi," van Schurman argues that her rejection of more traditional female roles was for her own betterment, a means for her to govern her spiritual life and improve her soul in manners which she rationally chose rather than consented to through discipline. Bloem’s article convincingly establishes that van Schurman’s life and writings functioned as practices of the self which at least partially undid the work of discipline and remade the subject’s soul. In “E. G.: Emma Goldman, for Example,” and “Exit Woolf,” Kathy E. Ferguson and Stephen M. Barber make similarly convincing cases for the practice of technologies of the self in the lives and writings of Emma Goldman and Virginia Woolf.

Part Two of *Feminism and the Final Foucault* is entitled “Feminism as Ethos.” Two chapters in this section consider the ways in which Foucault’s late philosophy can be used to theorize the possibility of social change. Jana Sawicki, in “Foucault’s Pleasures,” approaches this question with respect to queer politics, while in “Bodies and Power Revisited” Judith Butler considers the difficult question of how subjects can resist the very discourses to which they owe their existence. Each of the other four chapters of Part Two considers a particular set of feminist practices in terms of their relation to Foucaultian technologies of the self, or explores the extent to which feminism itself can be considered an ethos. In “Experience and Truth Telling in a Post-Humanist World,” Mariana Valverde considers various truth-telling practices used within the feminist movement, for instance, consciousness raising, self-help groups, and feminist autobiography. In “An Ethics of the Self,” Helen O’Grady makes the case that despite Foucault’s “challenge to forms of knowledge that have constructed categories of illness [and] pathology” (92), certain forms of therapy used in counseling women with low self-esteem and excessive concern for the care of others can function as and help women cultivate technologies of self-care which undo the harmful effects of gendered discipline. In “Inventing Images, Constructing Standpoints: Feminist Strategies of the Technology of the Self,” Sylvia Pritsch considers image-making as a third feminist practice which can be understood as a technology of the self, even while exploring the limitations of a Foucaultian approach to feminist practice and how these are remedied by feminist scholars such as Donna Haraway, Teresa de Lauretis, and Elspeth Probyn. Finally, in the chapter that I would like to explore in greater depth, Ladelle McWhorter considers what she calls “woman-affirming practices.”

McWhorter begins her wonderfully written chapter, “Practicing Practicing,” by explaining her reasons for agreeing with Foucault that philosophy is a practice of the self and should thus be about transforming one’s life, a part of all of one’s activities. As McWhorter observes, this notion of philosophy is difficult to reconcile with the obligations of the academic profession, including the task of writing the very chapter under discussion. Unlike the experience of philosophy within the confines of academic institutions, however, McWhorter describes the ways in which feminist “woman-affirming practices” have functioned as transformative of her self and can be seen as ways of working upon the self in order to transform the gendered, disciplined soul into a soul that is self-fashioned and in a positive process of becoming. Initially, reading feminist texts enabled McWhorter to realize that the kind of embodied subject that she had been socialized to be was abjected for political and economic reasons, not because it was in any way inherently abject. By learning about the contingency of the way that she and other women experience their bodies, McWhorter describes being able to come to experience her body in more empowering ways. Feminism thus functioned as a form of joyful self-transformation, or as a Foucaultian care of the self.

McWhorter goes on to explain how her feminist practice developed into eco-feminism, and how this continued to be a transformation of her way of experiencing herself, her body, and her relation to the world, in the way that technologies of the self should be ongoing processes. But as McWhorter notes, it was soon not simply a matter of “inventing ourselves,” but of establishing new feminist norms of what woman should be, and a very quick collapsing of these normative claims into new feminist ontologies. Woman-affirming feminist practices quickly cease to be technologies of the self as Foucault describes them. Ultimately, for McWhorter, woman-affirmation practices and feminism in general come to be conservative processes of self-recovery rather than being processes of self-creation, becoming, or differing. McWhorter is deeply suspicious of this move to self-recovery, and moreover does not recognize herself in or feel empowered by the self that aims to be recovered. For McWhorter, woman-affirming ceases to be self-affirming at this point, and this brings her to contrast rather than compare feminist practices and Foucaultian technologies of the self.

Having initially described feminism as a practice of joyful self-fashioning, McWhorter thus comes to the conclusion which she herself acknowledges is “painful,” since she is indebted to the self-transformations which feminism equipped her to make, which is that ultimately feminism, or what it has become, is incompatible with her ongoing philosophical practice. McWhorter concludes by considering whether feminism could abandon the ontological and normative category of woman, or understand woman not as a category but as a “site of volatility,” without losing its ability to engage in politically effective ways for the sake of women as they now exist, without becoming a “mere verbal
Part Three is entitled “Feminist Ethos as Politics,” each chapter of which considers Foucault’s late work in terms of the political “tools” that it provides for contemporary feminism. For lack of space, I will not discuss the excellent chapters by Susan Hekman, Margaret A. McLaren, Amy Allen, and Dianna Taylor, but will concentrate on the final chapter of this volume, Karen Vintges’s “Endorsing Practices of Freedom: Feminism in a Global Perspective.” In this essay, Vintges engages with the problem that a somewhat reductive reading of postmodernism seems to pose for feminism, and indeed for ethical and political philosophy in general: in the wake of postmodern critiques of universals, “grand narratives,” the Enlightenment, and “Western modernity’s claim of progress through reason” (275), feminists have felt unable to make normative claims condemning specific violations of human rights and of women in particular without being charged with imposing their own particular, modern, secular, and Western vantage points on other cultures as universally true. Consequently, feminists in the wake of postmodernism have not felt theoretically equipped to condemn practices such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage, punishing women for being raped, polygamy, and so forth, as these practices occur in non-Western cultures. As a result, Vintges argues that postmodern thought, to which she is philosophically committed, has been “devastating” for feminism (275).

One result of this devastation has been that feminists have begun to reject postmodernism and argue once more for the universality and truth of Western, liberal, secular values. Suzan Moller Okin, for instance, argues that “feminists should no longer hesitate to accept Western liberalism’s ‘fundamentals’ as the universal norm of a cross-cultural feminism” (276). Similarly, Seyla Benhabib borrows from Habermas in arguing that the rational decision making of Western modernity and of the democratic liberal state should be applied to a cross-cultural dialogue. The values of the modern West are thus taken as universally true by these feminists, and to be applied across cultures. Vintges agrees that we need a pluralistic ethical universalism, but argues that the positions of Okin and Benhabib are not sufficiently cross-cultural. While Foucault’s philosophy is often charged by both feminist philosophers and defenders of liberal values with lacking any normative content, Vintges feels that it is Foucault’s work that can provide feminists with an ethical universalism which remains pluralistic and cross-cultural, or a way of thinking normatively that does not impose any particular cultural truth. Indeed, Foucault objected to being labeled “postmodern” and considered himself a modern philosopher, while his genealogical works oppose the crippling workings of domination and the disciplining of subjects into docile bodies, thus implying a normative set of values. Nevertheless, many have wondered how Foucault could ground such implicitly normative claims within his philosophy of social construction, or how, having rejected notions of objective truth and a transhistorical subject, Foucault could make such claims at all. Vintges argues, however, that Foucault’s tacit anti-domination or pro-freedom stance in the genealogical works, which nevertheless do not theorize the grounds of possibility for this freedom, is provided with an explicit formulation in the final writings while in no way resorting to Truth claims.

In his last writings Foucault condemns forms of domination that result in subjects who cannot enact practices of freedom, such as the women and slaves of ancient Greece. Nevertheless, these practices of freedom of which he approves and would have made universally available are, in Foucault’s words, “not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (cited 280). Foucault is describing something like a compatibilist notion of freedom, not inconsistent with his genealogical works. Importantly, practices of freedom or of the self do not need to have particular content specific to the West or to liberalism, but are given to subjects by their particular cultures, and not only by Western cultures. Condemning domination which denies freedom practices to individuals and preferring political practices that enable subjects to cultivate the arts of existence of that particular society is thus a normative and universalizable stance taken by Foucault’s philosophy which nevertheless does not advocate any specific Western, liberal, humanistic, or other norms as objectively or rationally True. Vintges calls this “freedom practices for all” and “Foucault’s ethical universalism without Truth,” and explores the manner in which “this perspective relates to non-Western cultures” (287), for instance to non-secular thought. Vintges argues that for Foucault, spirituality involves personal, ethical transformations of the subject, and that spiritual practices can be understood as “freedom practices within religion.” Foucault considered such practices both in terms of the Shi’ism he encountered in Iran and in terms of the ascetic practices of medieval Christianity. Vintges herself explores Sufi mysticism as a form of freedom practice available to both men and women in Islam. Vintges thus argues that a Foucaultian feminist can oppose domination and advocate the cultivation of freedom practices, in this way taking a normative and universal stance, without imposing Western, liberal, secular values on another culture, and without resorting to notions of objective Truth.

While many of the chapters of Feminism and the Final Foucault
consider what freedom practices exist and have existed for women in the West, Vintges’s chapter argues for “A cross-cultural feminism ... [that] can be coined as a shared ethos—or commitment without Truth—that wants to endorse and foster freedom practices for all women in all cultures...” (293). Vintges’s chapter provides convincing responses to many persistent arguments with which Foucaultians are confronted—particularly questions of normativity and agency—as well as a resolution to the question of how postmodern feminism can make normative claims within a multicultural context. As a concluding chapter to an important work on feminism and Foucault, Vintges’s chapter provides satisfying solutions to nagging questions in both Foucaultian and feminist thought.

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Franco Basaglia. Portrait d’un psychiatre intempestif
MARIO COLUCCI et PIERANGELO DI VITTORIO


Le livre de Mario Colucci (psychiatre) et Pierangelo Di Vittorio (philosophe) présente la vie et l’œuvre de ce personnage influent qui est à l’origine de l’une des expériences les plus révolutionnaires et avantgardistes en psychiatrie contemporaine. Son engagement et ses écrits ont en effet inspiré la rédaction de la loi 180 (adoptée le 13 mai 1978) qui commande la suppression des hôpitaux psychiatriques dans la ville de Trieste à la faveur de la mise en place d’un réseau d’accueil communautaire. Originellement paru en italien sous le titre Franco Basaglia (Milano, éd. Bruno Mondadori, 2001), ce Portrait d’un psychiatre intempestif décrit les sources intellectuelles de Basaglia en cherchant aussi à expliquer ce que plusieurs considèrent comme l’échec de l’application de la loi 180. Échec qui résulterait en partie, selon Colucci et Di Vittorio, d’une mécompréhension de la pensée basaglienne.


Les auteurs insistent sur le caractère philosophique des travaux de Basaglia qui, parallèlement à ses études en médecine, fréquente avec assiduité les écrits des phénoménologues allemands et des existentialistes français en cherchant très tôt à renouveler la psychopathologie traditionnelle et à ébranler la nosographie psychiatrique. Les ambitions de Basaglia ne sont pas uniquement théoriques. Elles comportent également des dimensions éthiques et politiques en situant le thème de la liberté au cœur de la réflexion.

Basaglia partage implicitement avec Foucault une critique de l’intellectuel universel et de la biopolitique. Mais l’ouvrage dégage bien l’originalité de Basaglia qui n’est pas un simple « Foucault italien ». Colucci et Di Vittorio montrent que l’« histoire de la folie » proposée par Basaglia n’est pas établie du point de vue des instances de savoir/pouvoir, mais plutôt de celui des « insurgés ». Un angle d’approche qui, en outre, a été plus tardivement adopté par Foucault. Sur ce point, nous nous permettons de renvoyer aux contributions de Colucci et Di Vittorio parues dans un ouvrage que nous avons dirigé (Michel Foucault et le...
contrôle social [Québec: PUL, 2005]). La prise de distance vis-à-vis de l’antipsychiatrie orthodoxe constitue une autre spécificité basaglienne. Basaglia était sensible au risque de dérive idéologique associée à l’antipsychiatrie de type anglais qui associait le délié au « voyage » en cherchant à renverser les rapports de normalité entre la société et les individus perçus comme fous (« c’est la société qui est malade, et non les fous ! »). Le lexique basaglien montre d’ailleurs les signes de la plus grande prudence. Ce qui est bien rendu par Colucci et Di Vittorio qui décrivent l’activité révolutionnaire de Basaglia en termes de mouvement anti-asilaire et de luttes anti-institutionnelles permanentes. Le véritable défi consiste à dépasser la psychiatrie traditionnelle sans nier la souffrance des individus. Les auteurs cherchent ainsi à définir un modèle alternatif de psychiatrie à caractère non scientifique, ou encore un art thérapeutique n’émanant pas simplement d’une approche réformiste associée à la création d’une « communauté thérapeutique », car celle-ci risque de maintenir la présence d’agents de contrôle social. La psychiatrie alternative se développe à travers un travail plus radical de transformation des attitudes et des croyances. En outre, Basaglia se montre critique vis-à-vis des approches françaises (psychothérapie institutionnelle, psychiatrie de secteur) et américaines (Community Mental Health Centers). À l’instar du modèle anglais, ces tentatives de réforme ne parviennent pas à rompre avec le paradigme hospitalier. Rupture que réalisera la loi 180. Toute l’œuvre de Basaglia commande la rédaction d’une telle loi qui demeure pourtant le point de départ des transformations, et non d’arrivée. C’est pourquoi les conséquences et les défis nouveaux de son application constituent l’autre versant des préoccupations basagliennes.

L’ouvrage contient un riche appareillage de notes et citations ainsi qu’une bonne bibliographie franco-italienne. Il intéressera aussi bien les philosophes que les sociologues de la santé mentale. On remarque quelques erreurs dans la référence de certains ouvrages francophones dont la pagination semble avoir été malencontreusement importée des versions italiennes par le traducteur qui, du reste, a réalisé un excellent travail. La chronologie des événements n’est pas toujours linéaire et on constate certaines répétitions, mais rien pour gêner la bonne compréhension. On peut aussi regretter que le texte de la loi 180 n’ait pas été joint en annexe. Toutefois, ces petits défauts se font vite oublier par la pertinence de cette première biographie intellectuelle consacrée à un auteur dont les écrits méritent d’être revisités à notre époque où la désinstitutionnalisation des services de soins psychiatriques se réalise sans grand leadership. On sait, par exemple, que les sommes économisées par la fermeture de lits ne suivent pas les ex-patients psychiatriques dans la communauté. De plus, les personnes classées malades mentales sont le plus souvent présentées dans les médias comme dangereuses pour les autres alors qu’en réalité elles représentent un plus grand risque pour elles-mêmes, la personne dite normale ayant plus de chance de commettre un homicide. Plusieurs études récentes continuent de décrire le processus de désinstitutionnalisation comme la mise en place d’un « asile sans murs » construit à travers un ensemble de techniques de contrôle. Ce que Basaglia craignait déjà en évoquant la « nouvelle idéologie communautaire ». L’œuvre de Basaglia constitue la tentative la plus élaborée visant à problématiser la désinstitutionnalisation dans toutes ses dimensions, ses possibilités, ses contradictions et ses limites. Ce que Colucci et Di Vittorio parviennent admirablement à nous communiquer.

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La passione del ritardo: Dentro il confronto di Heidegger con Nietzsche
FERDINANDO G. MENGAG

Ferdinando G. Menga’s La passione del ritardo (The Passion of Delay) has two principal goals. First, it provides a close reading of Heidegger’s appropriation of Nietzsche, arguing that Heidegger’s judgment that Nietzsche marks the completion of metaphysics or metaphysical thinking is misplaced because it presupposes that Nietzsche’s reading of the nothing of existence forgets its fuller source and origin, namely, Being. By carefully examining what both Heidegger and Nietzsche mean by the concept of being and its origin, but he did not conceive of being as abstract and the opposite of itself. Rather, the origin remains inaccessible, a thesis Heidegger rejects. Employing the thought of Waldenfels and Derrida, Menga demonstrates that Nietzsche too was concerned about the question of being and its origin, but he did not conceive of being as abstract and the opposite of itself. Rather, the origin remains inaccessible, a thesis Heidegger rejects. Employing the thought of Waldenfels and Derrida, Menga argues his second principal thesis: that the question of the meaning of being should not be thought within the rubric of presence and absence, but rather as constantly evading us; it constantly defers or delays itself. If this is the case then we neither know what being is nor do we know what it is not. Presence and absence, being and non-being, these categories fail to capture what being may be. At this point, Menga draws upon the work of Bernhard Waldenfels to show that if we can even think of an origin, this origin is completely other to any of our ontological categories. It must be thought of as radical alterity.
The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter concentrates on what Heidegger intends by metaphysics by reading key passages in *Being and Time* as well as other works. He concentrates on the distinction between the history of being (Seinsgeschichte) and the forgetting of being (Seinsvergessenheit), culminating in a reading of history as having a communal destiny that ought to focus on the centrality of the question of the meaning of being. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a close reading of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. Here, Menga shows how Heidegger misreads the question of origin in that he fails to question what he means by origin itself and how it comes to appear. Waldenfels is invoked to show that the meaning of the being of the origin is not accessible as is evidenced in and through the thought of Derrida. Chapter 4 looks at the Heideggerian limits of interpretation vis-à-vis the will to power and the eternal recurrence. Chapter 5 is central and questions the distinction and viability of an authentic nihilism, as opposed to an inauthentic one. The path is paved here to rehabilitate Nietzsche from Heidegger's reading. The final chapter is devoted to Nietzsche proper, although Derrida takes up a substantial part of this chapter. The question of origins as somehow accessible through their appearance is seriously put into question through a Derridean reading of signs and their appearances. In the end, what Heidegger claims to have demonstrated about Nietzsche and the possibility of being originally manifesting itself is radically challenged.

Menga does a superb job in carefully reading Heidegger's texts on Nietzsche. He displays an impressive knowledge of secondary material and resources. For example, he makes use of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault when most readings of Heidegger's Nietzsche have stayed away from later French interpreters. This being said, one wonders whether a more ample and closer reading of Nietzsche himself, not only with reference to Heidegger, would have made this book even stronger. The overemphasis on Heidegger distracts from potentially larger questions, including whether the questions of being and origin are valid questions ab initio. Moreover, on my view, it seems that Nietzsche provides a deeper challenge to the otherness or inaccessibility of the origin as developed by Menga et al. It is not so much that there is no origin or that it is completely other or unnameable while it is somehow structuring (vide Derrida), but that it has a certain authoritative or valuing/evaluative function. It is precisely our appropriation and determining the notion of origin that renders it at the disposal of both masters and slaves, especially as developed in the *Genealogy of Morals*. The "whiteness" of the origin and our response to it are part of a greater power structure; this is what must be examined, at least this is how I read Nietzsche. Finally, I wonder whether one could simply read Derrida's Nietzsche in order to arrive at similar conclusions to those of Menga. What Menga does that Derrida does not do as clearly is show the textual heritage, to borrow an expression from Derrida himself, which permits Heidegger to read Nietzsche in the way that he does. In the end, this book is excellent and will provide scholars and philosophers both with the background and reading necessary in order to situate and understand the relationship between Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida.

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**The New Heidegger**

MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI

New York: Continuum, 2005; 224 pages.

Novelty is rarely the standard by which philosophers profess the contribution of a philosophical text. For this reason, readers of Miguel de Beistegui’s *The New Heidegger* are likely to be concerned not only with the extent to which de Beistegui’s Heidegger is actually a *new* Heidegger, but also with the philosophical need that this new Heidegger is intended to serve. What calls out for a new Heidegger? For some, the old Heidegger is already one Heidegger too many. De Beistegui’s aim is to introduce an English-reading audience with no prior knowledge of Heidegger to the ebb and flow of Heidegger’s thought by offering a thematic approach that concentrates on several of his fundamental ideas rather than on specific texts or lectures. There is need for such an introduction, de Beistegui believes, largely because existing commentaries have focused on Heidegger’s canonical works, and have thus far failed to include adequately the newer volumes of Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* that have been published in English translation over the last decade or so. By addressing these more recently published volumes, and by including “the most significant developments in the literature on Heidegger,” de Beistegui hopes his introduction will provide those not well acquainted with the history of contemporary Continental philosophy “a sense of the extraordinary impact of Heidegger’s thought on twentieth-century philosophical and non-philosophical life” (5).

It is quite surprising, however, and a little disappointing, to discover that the new Heidegger that manifests itself in the first two chapters of de Beistegui’s book comes out looking a great deal like the old Heidegger. It is, once again, primarily the existential analysis of *Being and Time* that sets the tone and determines the trajectory of de Beistegui’s interpretation. For example, the problem of nothingness that Heidegger addresses in his 1929 lecture, “What is Metaphysics?” is, for de Beis-
de Beistegui’s understanding of Heidegger’s Nazi affair, but rather than chief assumption of Heidegger’s most famous work, rather than introducing a new Heidegger in the sense de Beistegui requires. New in the sense de Beistegui requires.

Alongside de Beistegui’s understanding of Heidegger’s most after the publication of Being and Time, it is a rather conventional approach to the problematic.

Even more decisive is de Beistegui’s subordination of fundamental ontology as a whole to the existential analysis of Dasein. This is perhaps the most recurrent motif in English-language accounts of Heidegger, and is again a testament to the incredible impact of Heidegger’s first major published work. De Beistegui writes: “as a method, phenomenology remains subordinated to the possibility of solving the mystery of the Being of the human being, and, as a result, of the meaning of Being in general” (24). Here, nothing less than the meaning of Being as such is viewed as a consequence of developing a sound understanding of the human Dasein. Certainly, this is Heidegger’s own impression of the relationship between existential ontology and fundamental ontology in 1927, but the problem of how and why Dasein-analysis should inevitably give way to a thematic understanding of Being in general is precisely one of the questions that plagued Heidegger most after the publication of Being and Time. For this reason, I think it is legitimate to expect that a text aimed at introducing a new Heidegger would provide some sense of the way in which the newer volumes of the Gesamtausgabe challenge the core assumption of Heidegger’s most famous work, rather than simply give way to it.

In fact, the spectre of the old Heidegger haunts de Beistegui’s book throughout. Chapters 3–5 clearly rely on works that are not particularly new in the sense de Beistegui requires. Alongside Being and Time it is chiefly “What is Metaphysics?”, “On the Essence of Truth,” “The Question Concerning Technology,” and “On the Origin of the Work of Art” that factor in these central sections. Chapter 6 provides a concise summary of de Beistegui’s understanding of Heidegger’s Nazi affair, but rather than charting any radically new territory, he explicitly relies on well known contributions from Ott, Farias, Wolin, and Safranski, as well as on de Beistegui’s own Heidegger and the Political. Surprisingly, there is little extended discussion of works such as Heidegger’s very difficult Contributions to Philosophy—a book that, having been published in translation only in 1999, would seem to qualify as one of de Beistegui’s “new texts,” and which is certainly in need of a synthetic evaluation that places it within the context of Heidegger’s overall thought. For these reasons, the principal merit of de Beistegui’s book resides not in introducing a particularly new Heidegger but in providing a concise and engaging account of a Heidegger with whom many are already familiar. Of particular excellence in this regard is de Beistegui’s account of the relationship between truth, technology, and art. Here, de Beistegui’s thematic approach allows him to develop a seamless interpretation of the many connections between Heidegger’s conception of truth as aletheia, technology as das Gestell, and art as a saving power. By refusing to approach these topics as subjects isolated within the confines of any particular work, de Beistegui is able to inscribe these issues into a picture of Heidegger’s mature phenomenology as a whole. It is also in the chapters devoted to these three issues that de Beistegui’s own novelty begins to shine through. His broad reading of das Gestell as “system” opens new avenues for Heidegger’s account of technology, such as those concerning cybernetics and the philosophy of mind. His discussion of contemporary art likewise moves Heidegger’s phenomenology in a compelling direction, and raises important questions about the relation between Heidegger’s vision of art and our own specific cultural position.

It is also within the context of his ongoing discussion of truth, technology, and art that de Beistegui’s book is most successful as an introduction. While I believe that his initial discussion of Heidegger takes too much for granted about Being and Time to provide an accurate handbook for those with no previous knowledge of that book, de Beistegui manages to analyze many central themes in Heidegger’s later thought without resorting to the complex terminology found in Heidegger’s own work. De Beistegui meets the high standard of providing a well rounded and insightful interpretation of Heidegger’s meaning without resorting to the way in which Heidegger himself lectured and wrote. Overall, while de Beistegui’s new Heidegger ends up looking much more familiar than one might hope, anyone with a background in Continental thought who is interested in the relationship between truth, technology, and art in Heidegger’s philosophy would be wise to obtain a copy of de Beistegui’s well written and engaging book.

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