

Quasi-Cause in Deleuze: Inverting the Body Without Organs

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In his recent book *Organs Without Bodies* (2004), Slavoj Žižek raises an objection to Deleuze and Guattari's work on the body without organs as desiring machine. Žižek accepts the concept but argues that the right way to think about it is rather its inversion, organs without bodies. Žižek argues that a change in the conceptualization of causation and desire, from the concept of quasi-cause in the early Deleuze of *The Logic of Sense* (1969) to the late work of Deleuze and Guattari on the body without organs in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1974), is responsible for a certain rigidity and reification that reduces desire to production as product, rather than leaving it open, as process. The vector on which the body without organs rides and which gives it its direction—the direction in which the actual virtualizes—in fact involves organs without bodies, which, as Žižek shows, invokes the Lacanian Real.

This essay takes its cue from Žižek's critique of Deleuze and Guattari, but rather than directly engaging with Žižek its focus extends beyond his particular critique and moves on its own to explore some of the related problems of ontology and ethics in Deleuze and Guattari as well as Lacan. It is not possible here to address in full the underlying connection of ontology and ethics that is at stake in this discussion. The focus is restricted to the problematic shift in Deleuze's notion of the body without organs. The shift concerns whether the body without organs must include a relation to quasi-cause, which is the case in the early Deleuze of *The Logic of Sense*, or whether it can be treated independently of quasi-cause, which is the case in Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*. I outline the sharp turn of *Anti-Oedipus*, a breaking away from the connection between body without organs and quasi-cause, in order to set up the ethical question emerging out of this shift. Is the shift in Deleuze and Guattari economizing on the otherness of this body? Is *Anti-Oedipus*, in proposing a reductionist ethics of pure production, in need of a further critique? At the end of this discussion, I point out some affinities that Deleuze and Guattari miss between the Lacanian Real and the structuring of the Kantian transcendental field (in ways that make it homologous with the real).

I begin with a brief general exposition of the concept of desiring machines, that is, the body without organs, in Deleuze and Guattari. I then trace the shift in the concept of the body without organs through an analysis of relevant passages of *The Logic of Sense* and *Anti-Oedipus*. I

conclude that something like the Kantian transcendental field (as Lacan reconsiders it) may be just the mediator that is needed between Deleuze/Guattari and Lacan (and between the early and late Deleuze).

Desire's Series

Deleuze and Guattari work toward an ontology of multiple desire. If this multiplicity is to engender an ethics, then there cannot be anything exogenous to this ethics. There is no cause from a phenomenologically or intersubjectively constituted object outside the subject that would bring about such an endogenous ethics. The multiplicity of desire that roots ethics in Deleuze and Guattari is a movement, a continuum—a field of immanence in which nodes of totalization transform into lines of flight toward a transcendence which is, however, immanent to this same field and continuum. The becoming other of multiple desire is, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *Anti-Oedipus*, a movement in which the purity of becoming follows the lines of flight of a deterritorialization which is simultaneously triggered into absolute territorialization (the orchid and the wasp). Consequently, the body without organs is the immanence of a difference, a fold, where the lines of flight that constitute absolute territorialization (becoming similar to oneself) supersede mere resemblance. They are nevertheless transposed on the same continuum (topographical surface), triggering the process of deterritorialization.

Clearly, the couple territorialization/deterritorialization corresponds to the classical process of auto-constitution (e.g., in Husserl's phenomenology of empty intuition and essence). "The mouth, tongue, and teeth find their primitive territoriality in food. In giving themselves over [to language], to the articulation of sounds, the mouth, tongue, and teeth deterritorialize."¹ Deleuze and Guattari offer an elegant solution to the thorny issue of the origin of identity. The very heart of their achievement is the concept of the body without organs. They get rid of the ghost in the old Cartesian machine. The means and medium of their procedure is desire—desiring machine (*assemblage*, *agencement*). In the dissolution of the abstract machine as triggered by a catalyst connector, a floating affect or intensity, Deleuze and Guattari find the desiring machine, the body without organs. The becoming body of the abstract machine does not pass through the appeal to a cause (or a free will), a transcendent nature proper as cause (to speak with Kant). The sort of subjection that brings about this production—a pure production—is a movement of desire that is not bounded by possibility, because Deleuze and Guattari move away from Heidegger. The organs of the body without organs are severed from all reference to part/whole relations, and so from the old phenomenological forms of dependence—that is, from intersubjective

relations of self and other. Alternately, the intrinsic makeup of the body without organs rejects heterophenomenology—various approaches to ethics by reference to an Other that is at the very origin of the affective sensibility of the self (in the way of Lévinas). The sharp distancing from, and critique of, Lacanian psychoanalysis at the source of the Oedipal body falls in the last category.

On Deleuze and Guattari's argument, phenomenological approaches to the body (that is, to Merleau-Ponty's lived body) have in common with Lacanian psychoanalysis this feature: they fall short of comprehending the polyvocality of desire, since desire, they claim, cannot relate to anything that is transcendent in kind. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is not a relation; it is a movement, an immanent field of difference, a fold, a quantum of magnitude, an intensity. The Oedipal body of Lacanian psychoanalysis is not schizophrenic, is not a desire that is a pure production of difference; it is neurotic, phallic, formed by a desire that is transcendent and mastered from a point of view located in a beyond. Lacan depends on a residue of cause/effect relations, a before and after of temporal relations as structured in a worldly time (notably, dependence on language as ontological, à la Heidegger); he depends on possibility/necessity/actuality, the classical categories of phenomenology from Husserl onwards. Finally, he depends on an ethics of representation in which subjection carries out its imperative from a positivized conformity with relations of conservative, straight political oppression. The body that is Oedipal re-territorializes existing relations, and so far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned this body comes straight out of the Hegelian totalizing view of desire for the Other where the Other is assimilated and known. This body is extant; it occupies the time and space of causal essences and so is not virtual. It is not riding on a vector, a space-time continuum from which derives the actualization of the virtual, but is *qua* essence (or as subject) trapped in the mundane time of reified *res extensa*. It is a lifeless vessel, not a desire. Hence the war against Lacan, a war waged on "totality." The essentialism that Deleuze and Guattari seek to avoid concerns the so-called supplanted transcendent source of causation (such as Oedipal desire is, in their view). In other words, what they must avoid is anything like a social discourse that causes this subject to emerge (that is, the structuralist essentialism of which they accuse Lacanian language, as cause forming the subject), just as they must avoid anything like an interior life of the subject (that is, the lived body of phenomenology). But there is no simple way of detecting these influences that must be avoided.²

Quasi-Cause and the Series

In what follows I refer to two main texts, *The Logic of Sense* and *Anti-Oedipus*. I argue that in *The Logic of Sense* there is a compelling presentation of otherness that comes close to the Lacanian ethics of the Real. An otherness marks the body without organs with a surplus in immanence, which brings about Deleuze's very insistence on such a thing as the quasi-cause, a strange term of Deleuze's own coinage. This otherness brings about a movement, a continuum between depth and surface, which shows that the body without organs can be nothing but a pure reference of the quasi-cause. But this otherness is lost, recedes from the body without organs, as Deleuze and Guattari make the transition to *Anti-Oedipus*. I am first of all interested in showing some of the symptoms of such a recession and discussing its consequences for ethics.

There is a wonderful abundance of play and otherness in the body without organs in the early Deleuze. The first mention of the body without organs occurs in *The Logic of Sense*, in the notion of a strange body in Empedocles that in turn influenced Hölderlin. Deleuze writes:

In the famous Empedoclean alternation, in the complementarity of hate and love, we encounter, on the one hand, the body of hatred, the parcelled-out body sieve: heads without a neck, arms without shoulders, eyes without a face; but on the other hand, we encounter the glorious body without organs: formed in one piece, without limbs, with neither voice nor sex. Likewise, Dionysus holds out to us his two faces, his open and lacerated body, and his impossible organless head: Dionysus dismembered, but also Dionysus the impenetrable. Nietzsche was able to discover depth only after conquering the surfaces.³

The body without organs is contrasted to a merely sensuous body, yet qua "being" of the sensuous it is sense-less, voice-less, sex-less, incorporeal. It is juxtaposed to a body that is merely sensuous, as depth is to surface. But the caveat is that one is to rediscover depth only after conquering the surfaces. What is juxtaposed with the surface does not bear reference to extant entities, to some sort of extensive quantities, but to a kind of becoming: the body without organs is formed in one piece. But if this unique body forms in one piece—evades a part/whole distinction—then how does it come to be? If the body without organs comes about—is produced—how is it that such a production evades the chains of parts and wholes of corporeal causes? We must find a link to this origin-less origin, this pure, open production.

Deleuze's quasi-cause is exactly this link. In an early chapter of *The Logic of Sense*, "Fourteenth Series of Double Causality," Deleuze discusses depth and surfaces, the incorporeal sense, not yet by means of the body without organs but by means of a link between cause and effect—a third—which he calls quasi-cause. However, it is clear that the discussion of quasi-cause thematically pertains to the event that is the body without organs. The semantics of quasi-cause suggests a cause that is strange as it works not all the way down (by locking everything into causal chains), but by being not full, and so by being "quasi," that is, a halved or partial cause. Typically, one would want to find a logic of the excluded middle here, to have a clean cut between two ways in which we can interpret the not-full: either it is a cause found in the standard order of causes, yet is deficient by the latter's standard of production, since it does not end up with a product of corporeality, or such a cause is essentially not of the order of causes, yet is called "cause" by way of resemblance—a kind of similarity to causal processes (not an identity). But the ingenuity of Deleuze's quasi-cause is that it surprises us. Deleuze argues for a connection between the disjunctive options above, for an inclusivity of the disjunction. The classical linear account of causality is surpassed by the connection in the disjunction. Deleuze's new view of the actualization of the virtual is this surpassing.

For Deleuze, the thematic of quasi-cause enters with the Stoics, who discovered the autonomy of the effect of the incorporeal event, or incorporeal sense: sense is essentially produced. But with the Stoics there comes a new meaning of production. Amid the homogeneity of causes, there is a *being* of the sensuous, an impassability (not a neutrality) that is asymmetrical to the merely sensuous that is produced and that is nevertheless in relation to ideational cause. This cause/production cannot be contained in the same field that would retain classical rational cause. "We have seen that this cause is nothing outside of its effect, and that it maintains with the effect an immanent relation which turns the product, the moment that it is produced into something productive."⁴ The relation of production to quasi-cause means that in this production there never enters an external product. The immanence of the quasi-cause to the series proves impenetrable to corporeality, the perceptible sensuous—the classical concept of sensibility as external—as real cause. The solid time of corporeal being/product is evaded and the abundance, a productivity of the very being of the sensuous, is preserved in the immanence of the surface to itself (a depth in the surface), a pure aleatory production. The sort of being that is caused by quasi-cause is all-inclusive of a surface-depth and evades the corporeal order of being and worldly time. I already referred to this abundance of the Deleuzian being of the sensuous as otherness—a perpetual, dynamic event, a becoming, not

static, exceeding the order of the actuality of *res extensa*. This excess evades the time series yet is immanent to it (not outside of time, as the classical notion of sensibility as externality would have it).⁵

In sum, in the two early chapters of *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze accomplishes a great deal of the work on the body without organs, although this work is not explicit. But the source of quasi-cause is the actualization of the virtual. Similarly with the source of the body without organs. Thus the link between the two: both are differential differences, syntheses of differentiation: "It is of the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm difference."⁶

Because of this link the view from *The Logic of Sense* keeps close the ties between otherness and the body without organs. Clearly the two concepts do not merge, cannot be reduced to one another, because both mediate a connection to a differentiation of what can be only a surplus, on which depends the very notion of serialization, depth-surface as quantified in the series. Nonetheless, despite this link between the body without organs and otherness, Deleuze's critique in *The Logic of Sense* is certainly directed against the classical transcendental view of consciousness as personal or as substance. It is this point that needs to be kept in mind, with a view to the ethics of *Anti-Oedipus* to which we shall return later. Deleuze's argument about the body without organs, as well as quasi-cause, does not develop in a vacuum but in the context of a Humean inspired critique of classical rationalism, Kantian transcendentalism, as well as Husserlian phenomenology.⁷

In the chapter in which he introduces quasi-cause, Deleuze abandons Husserl and Kant, the proponents of this classical transcendentalism. Husserl and Kant remain bound to propositional logic—of the subject and predicate variety—and miss the incorporeal sense that is in immanently productive relation to its quasi-cause. ("This [Kantian] thing = x is not at all therefore like a nonsense internal and co-present to sense, or a zero point presupposing nothing of what it necessarily engenders."⁸) Already in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze's point is that for Kant (or for Husserl) the transcendental field is indeed neutral, impersonal (a dull surface) since it does not and cannot retain personal consciousness (the I am of the Self remains indeterminate *vis-à-vis* the I think of the I as determinate). Kant supercedes Descartes's cogito that does not think at all by introducing a surface, that is, thinking—the transcendental field—but such a field is not the field of quasi-cause.⁹ While the Kantian Self is indeterminate, since it is determined only by transcendental determination in time (given to itself only as an object of appearance), this Self is thinking: Kant suspends the conclusion that its essence is some rational substance (I am). The advantage of quasi-cause is that it is a link, an intensity—the being of the sensuous as a swarm of difference.

Such a difference is preserved in the purity of the effect (autonomy of this effect), and does not mix with mass, e.g., bodies with mouth, etc. Surely the supercession of both Descartes and Kant through quasi-cause is compelling. But as we will see later, here it is likely that Deleuze underestimates the Kantian transcendental field (of time and sensibility). It seems to me that further analysis of the immanence of differential differences in the Kantian transcendental field would have lent radical support to Deleuze's new discovery.¹⁰

To go back to the body without organs, the early Deleuze's radical discovery appears to be this: whatever the body without organs is, it must be treated in relation to quasi-cause. This injunction about the inseparability of body without organs and quasi-cause is significant for if one were to violate it—and I suggest that the Deleuze and Guattari of *Anti-Oedipus* violate it—one would be guilty of reducing surface to depth. The violation would reduce the series, which indicates the actualization of the virtual—the order of pure becoming (events as non-things)—to some subset of the actual of *res extensa*, the order of a being (reified things). Deleuze of *The Logic of Sense* is well aware of this injunction.

Deleuze returns to the body without organs—not as metaphor but as intensity—in one of the final chapters of *The Logic of Sense*, "Twenty-Seventh Series of Orality," devoted to language and Freudian, Kleinian, and Lacanian psychoanalysis (hence the focus on orality, which replaces the history that liberates sounds and makes them independent of bodies). It is this return that supports the connection drawn above between quasi-cause and Empedocles' body without organs, for Deleuze himself does not explicitly draw this connection.

The body without organs is located in the Freudian, the Kleinian, and the Lacanian unconscious; it is the "good" object as "lost" object. The intriguing feature of the lost object is that it is simultaneously lost and non-lost (re-found), for its source is an otherness in experience that refuses objectification; it is a non-object. (The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.¹¹) The question here once again surpasses orders of static causation and is one of a dynamic genesis, from depth to the production of surfaces. But in stressing schizo-analysis, Deleuze sides with Klein. Partial objects (breast, milk, sound) that are introjected by the nursing child who strives to reconstitute a complete good object and to identify himself with this object, form a paranoid-schizoid position which the child occupies. Deleuze argues:

What the schizoid position opposes to bad partial objects [e.g., withdrawal of the breast]—introjected and projected, toxic and excremental, oral and anal—is not a good object, even if it were partial. What is opposed is rather an organism without parts, a

body without organs, with neither mouth nor anus, having given up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this price.¹²

Deleuze opposes partial objects to the sensuous body, which is broken into pieces by partial objects, just as other bodies—as partial objects—break this sensuous body. While this may suggest a symmetry between partial object and body, an asymmetrical relation overrides this relation of mutual destruction. Deleuze insists on a duality and a complementarity of the schizoid-paranoid body, one that takes place more appropriately in depth, beneath the realm of sense, and that is referred to the body without organs. There is the nonsense (the “*that* does not make sense,” *ça n’a pas de sens*) that constitutes the sensuous body, the nonsense of the body and the splintered world. But simultaneously with it is the nonsense of the block of bodies or of inarticulate words, of language. Both sorts of nonsense act as positive-productive processes on both sides. The body without organs here seems to be inseparable from the latter series, of blocks of bodies or of inarticulate words. In these two elements, bodies/words, what is repeated is the language against which both these sides—the pure effects (nonsense) of body and world—are said to work as positive-productive process. This more elaborate concept of the body without organs as schizoid-paranoid leads Deleuze this time to oppose Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis.

On a closer look it is clear that Deleuze depends on preserving the complex definition schizo-paranoid (not just schizo). This can only be in recognition of the link that is still importantly irreducible, the link between quasi-cause and body without organs. The body without organs—this schizo-paranoid body—becomes the good object/the lost object, as Deleuze shows. But the impenetrability, the affirmation of the first difference that this body without organs refers to, cannot be separated from the quasi-objectness of the lost/non-lost object. The very meaning of the lost object is that it is nonsensical in producing a whole on either side of the lost/non-lost, while at the source of the production there is only the partiality of the object. Yet it is not a matter of symmetry—the two nonsenses are not symmetrical for if they were, they would cancel out one another—and so far as they both are in surplus of affirming a first difference, the radical ambiguity of the constitution that is the body without organs evades retention in the order of the actual but actualizes the virtual—and the virtual is not one but many, multiple differential intensities. It must be that the play of the ambiguity of the first/affirmation must be preserved, for without it the entire project of difference and repetition would be cancelled out. The purity of the

difference of differentiation does not, and cannot, refer to an unambiguous first.¹³

I contend that with *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze moves away from classical theories of the Kantian transcendental field, of identity, of external representation, cause/effect, away from a biologism or even a socio-biologism in Freud/Lacan and into intensities. But there is nothing to suggest that *The Logic of Sense* suffers from phenomenological or essentialist tendencies in the main concepts of interest to us, the body without organs and quasi-cause.

Quasi-Cause and the Phallic Real

It is puzzling to find a new role for the body without organs, one severed from the quasi-cause, in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*. The goal of the book is clearly a critique of the Lacanian and psychoanalytic Oedipal body. It is important to keep in mind exactly what sort of critique is undertaken by the project of *Anti-Oedipus*. One of the reasons for keeping this question open is that what announces itself as a critique targets a practically non-existing Lacan, but at best Lacanians.¹⁴ Another reason—a more important one in my view—is that the scope of the critique in the proposed ethics of pure production in *Anti-Oedipus* is actually rather broad: it is a critique of the old Enlightenment project of critique itself, of rational constructivism, Kant’s as well as Hegel’s transcendental field. For the time being my question is this: Who is the Oedipus of Deleuze and Guattari’s acclaimed work *Anti-Oedipus*?

Oedipus has two bodies. *Anti-Oedipus* takes as its target the Oedipal body construed as a double agency—an I and a Self—where the I is immanent and determined yet the Self is indeterminate.¹⁵ The I of Oedipus is the singular, surface, sensuous being of Oedipus—the male child. The Self is the phallic subject, which is understood as the infamous lack of desire, the fear of castration that is to come through the master signifier determining the subject. There is the surface, the immanent, singular I of the boy, penetrated by his desire for mother-incest (the I projecting its body onto an organ, identifying with it). But there is also the universal, that is, the phallic Self of Oedipus—the Lacanian subject—whose constitution is determined by a transcendence that an exogenous law of the Father bestows upon it. On Deleuze and Guattari’s view, in this double body of Oedipus it is a biological-sociological and even a theological and priestly motivation that grounds the Father’s law.¹⁶ This structure is blamed on Freud/Lacan. Lacan is thereby under critique for uncritically buying into hetero-normative patriarchal relations of a mere socius.

Oedipus's desire to murder his father is what gives evidence of the transcendence of the second body, the body of the Other. The projective identification of the little boy with the organ of his physical body is then doubled in a phallic identification: the subject of the law of the father is first of all the subject of the Other of transcendence. Such a transcendence, if Deleuze and Guattari's reconstruction is right, comes from an outside, a naturalization, positivization, of mere existing social relations into other symbolic relations. The problem is that the reconstruction of the Lacanian Oedipal body may be adequate to the pre-1964 Lacan, but is far from doing justice to the late Lacan who in *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (1964) develops a critical distance from Freud as well as the triad symbolic-imaginary-real. What goes wrong with Deleuze and Guattari's reconstruction of Lacan is that they choose to ignore the changes in the theory of the Real in the late Lacan, where the Real is produced through a double lack in the law of transcendence, the lack of lack in the Real. As Lacan puts it in *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, there is *no* lack in the Real.¹⁷ I will come back to this other Lacan of the Real in the last part of this essay, where I will also take up some issues occupying the larger scope of the anti-rationalist and anti-Kantian critique of *Anti-Oedipus*.

Leaving aside the small issue of who is the real Lacan targeted in *Anti-Oedipus*, let us return to the body without organs of this work for a problematic shift in this concept occurs within it. In order to examine this claim, I turn my attention once more to the juxtaposition of the body without organs and the Lacanian body of Oedipus, for there is a clear reciprocity between the body without organs and the quasi-cause of *The Logic of Sense* and the Lacanian Oedipal body as discussed above.

Quasi-cause is to the body without organs as the phallic subject (desire for patricide) is to the identified subject (desire for mother-incest). Deleuze's revolution in *The Logic of Sense* is that quasi-cause breaks away from a classical transcendent beyond. His early critique of Lacan is found in his argument that the subject is not phallic, not mastered by a transcendent beyond. Rather, quasi-cause is the vector of the real in the actualization of the virtual; the vector of the real is immanent to the field of difference. It follows that in the dissolution of the phallic subject, the subject must remain immanent to the field of immanence. Accordingly, the body without organs, the impenetrable and neutral yet not impersonal body, parallels or substitutes for the Lacanian identified subject, for the singularity of the love (for the mother) of Oedipus. Note that while Deleuze tends to position the body without organs as schizoid-paranoid (more to the point, masochist, since this body is fullness yet impenetrable, sex-less, voice-less, deaf, without mouth or anus), the Oedipal body comes across as retentive or anal-

repressive, neurotic-sadist, mastering or phallic. The love of Oedipus identified with desire for the mother is phallic because it is a love based on a repression. The false memory of a childhood repressing the sight/memory of the forbidden scene is produced into a screen against which emerges the phallic subject, the second body of Oedipus, identifying with the law of the father. Without the screen there is no repression and no phallic subject, no second body of Oedipus. But the (memory) screen is not a difference in immanence. The law of the father that supports it leans on a transcendence from a beyond.

Arguably, the Deleuzian quasi-cause is structurally homologous with the screen. Discussing this structural homology in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze holds that there is repression because of repetition, not the other way around; there is no repression in advance of repetition.¹⁸ Also for Deleuze and Guattari of *Anti-Oedipus* and after, the series of the assemblage that produces the desiring machine is triggered by a blockage not of a false memory—a photo—but of a memory-less childhood—a sound.¹⁹ The blockage is anticipation as intensity, a pure production; it is sound (not photo), a memory-less childhood, as in Joseph K.'s life (not false memory). Contra the Lacanian screen, Deleuze and Guattari argue for the differentiation of repetition out of a pure difference, the field of immanence. But we must ask nevertheless as to the source of pure difference that is at work in Deleuze and Guattari's blockage. Logically, we are to look back to intensities that are pure production.

In *Anti-Oedipus* the body without organs is exactly this blockage and intensity, a body not processed through a personal consciousness as interpretation, but an experimentation with intensities. Yet what is not clear is from where the pure difference of the differentiation of repetition comes. There is the pure production of the disjunctive syllogism and there is the body without organs as its repulsion. It is because of the nonsense that is positively productive on both sides of the disjunction that the disjunctive syllogism runs the desiring machine of production. Indeed, the body without organs is the agent of this production. But how? What lies at the source of the differentiation that is the body without organs?

Desiring-production forms a binary-linear system. The full body is introduced as a third term in the series, without destroying, however, the essential binary-linear nature of this series: 2, 1, 2, 1.... The series is completely refractory to a transcription that would transform and mold it into a specifically ternary and triangular schema such as Oedipus. The full body without organs is produced as antiproduction, that is to say it intervenes within the process as such for the sole purpose of rejecting any attempt

to impose on it any sort of triangulation implying that it was produced by parents. How could this body have been produced by parents, when by its very nature it is such eloquent witness of its own self-production, of its own engendering of itself?²⁰

If the body without organs is a fullness—the eloquent witness of its own self-production, of its own engendering of itself—as Deleuze and Guattari argue, then we are to understand it as affirmation of a differential difference. But, if so, must we not have recourse to a quasi-cause that multiplies the difference? Is not the quasi-cause responsible for the autonomy of the effect? Deleuze and Guattari do not think so. *Difference and Repetition* should lead us to a fourfold—I/Self and Same/Other—bound both to a quasi-cause and a body without organs as first principles of a polyvocal desire or pure intensities.²¹ But there is hardly any evidence of the fourfold, I/Self and Same/Other, left in *Anti-Oedipus*, to provide support for such presence. There is only one possibility: the differentiation must come through the body without organs. This claim is indeed just what the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* are proposing.

It is a welcome critique that this full body without organs is not the production of its Lacanian/Oedipal parents; it is instead a witness and a self-producing or self-engendering. The problematic shift, however, becomes visible when we are forced to conclude that even if we are to conceive (as we should) the body without organs as agency that is not a product (not born by parents), nothing compels us to isolate this body from quasi-cause. What remains most unclear in the book are the reasons leading up to this practical elimination of quasi-cause. The real question is what becomes of the body without organs if it is severed from its quasi-cause, as it is in *Anti-Oedipus*? To reduce desire to the triangulation model of the Oedipal family, as Lacan does, is a sign of sure positivism. But to do better than Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari must avoid the positivism of the body as pure production.

To live up to the notion of the body without organs of *The Logic of Sense*, the blockage (repulsion²²) that Deleuze and Guattari pursue in *Anti-Oedipus* must be structurally homologous with the phallic organ of the Lacanian model without the memory screen (transcendence from the law of the father). On my view, something like the phallic still must retain precedence over the complete indifferenciation, indeed a homogenization of the love of a universal schizophrenia, as *Anti-Oedipus* claims. The reason for this requirement is that the witness that is this body cannot be a pure positivity. There must be a first difference producing both sides—the witness, on one hand, and self-production, self-engendering, on the other hand. The phallic moment of this first difference consists in this: that all of the actualization of the virtual finally

aims in just one direction: the vector of the real. Yet this vector, while being a pure production, is not, and cannot be, itself of the same order as its repetition. It is sufficient for the vector of the real to be similar (not the same) for it to be internally represented, that is, repeated, in the binary machine that is the disjunctive syllogism. However, in this being similar to itself, the vector of the real is a return of a pure difference (a pure production) that is non-negligibly *other* than pure self-engendering. Whereas the vector of the real is only similar to itself, the body without organs requires a doubling effect, namely, repulsion. But is not the quasi-cause of the body without organs (of the early Deleuze) the source of exactly this doubling effect?

The objection that Žižek levels against *Anti-Oedipus* insists on the inversion—organs without bodies. The inversion reflects better the othering role of the phallic (or the screen), when what causes this othering is no longer the transcendence of the law of the father, but the late Lacanian Real.²³ The word “phallic” in this inversion no longer has a place in *res extensa*; it is not the referent to an Oedipal organ but is a vector—the vector of the Lacanian Real that, like the real of Deleuze and Guattari, is also produced. “Kant avec Sade” (1964)²⁴ is devoted to Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*, uncovering in it a freedom that is not governed by a law a priori but rather by the *jouissance* of the Other as equivalent to the law of the Thing in itself. Here Lacan uncovers the true dimension of the Kantian transcendental field (not as screen). This Lacanian/Kantian transcendental field emerges as structured by the passivity—pathology (a pure, open, productivity)—of an affect relating to an experience that cannot itself be objectified and so cannot be levelled to the transcendental object as appearance of a possible experience in time. The differential limit of the object = X of pathological affect—the thing in itself—is not itself reifiable as limit (is not rational substance), for only the illusory dialectical Ideas of reason are this limit’s unrepresentable presentations. Moreover, the transcendental subject is not at all the identity of a personal consciousness, as Deleuze wants to suggest, but rather the prototypical transcendental object = X—the differential limit through which the field and its quasi-cause—the Thing (here, homologous with the real)—is constituted and regulated in the repetition of a difference that is not identical with itself.

We can argue that both Lacan and Kant preserve the subject as the differential limit of Deleuze’s first difference, without reifying either causes or bodies, indeed without reifying the pure production that is Deleuze’s body without organs. But in this context we can also see that there is no need to sever the quasi-cause from the body without organs that the early Deleuze had discovered.

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Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 19.
2. For a Lacanian critique of Foucault's historicist method as positivism, see Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 1–15.
3. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 95.
4. *Ibid.*, 95.
5. A good way to understand quasi-cause is to look at the fluidity of the event in the depth-surface of liquids. For example, events of a liquid surface are caused by a real cause, inter-molecular modifications, yet they are caused by variations of a surface tension on which they depend as their (ideational or "fictive") quasi-cause. *Ibid.*, 94–5.
6. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 267.
7. See Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay in Human Nature*, trans. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and Constantin Boundas, "An Ontology of Intensities," *Epoché* 7, 2002.
8. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 97.
9. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 24ff. Here it must be said that Deleuze never escapes the reductionist influence of Sartre (*The Transcendence of the Ego*) when reading the Kant of the first *Critique*. This influence is felt also in Deleuze's work on Kant's third *Critique*, in Deleuze, *Kant's Critical*

Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). See Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 97–8.

10. It must be said that Deleuze inaugurates the great French wave of the postmodern condition and interest in Kant's third *Critique*. Deleuze should also be credited with revival of the current interest in Kant's first *Critique*. Through influence by J. Vuillemin and H. Cohen, Deleuze draws on post-Kantianism, the role of intensive quantities, which is put forth in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 231. However, when Deleuze turns to discussion of the Kantian transcendental field in the first *Critique*, he always dismisses the role of the Kantian aesthetic as mediation and "rapture," which is what Heidegger discovers in this field. Deleuze dismisses Heidegger's work on Kant and the aesthetic for he associates this interpretation with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's "will to power" of the *Nachlass* and nihilism. But Heidegger makes some valuable discoveries both about Plato ("rapture") and Nietzsche, which are then linked to the aesthetic in Kant, and it is these discoveries that add to the claim about a transcendental field in Kant as a differential difference, the "affirmation of differences." See Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); and Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 77–114; 200–220.

11. Sigmund Freud, *On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works*, trans. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 145.

12. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 188.

13. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 257–61.

14. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 53. On this issue, see also the essays by Shannon Winnubst, Dan Smith, and Andrew Cutrofello in this volume. For a fuller view of the compatibility between Deleuze and the late Lacan, see Andrew Cutrofello, *Imagining Otherwise: Metapsychology and the Analytic A Posteriori* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

15. For a good overview of the importance of these categories to Deleuze's own project, see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 262–305.

16. Deleuze, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Vol. 1, 112.

17. See Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977), 186.

18. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 271.

19. Deleuze, *Kafka*, 67.

20. Deleuze, *Anti-Oedipus*, Vol. 1, 14–5.

21. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 300–1.

22. Deleuze, *Anti-Oedipus*, Vol. 1, 9.

23. Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 103: "Far from being reduced to the traumatic void of the Thing [as Kantian transcendental screen] resisting symbolization, the Lacanian Real thus also designates the senseless symbolic consistency (of the 'matheme'), as well as the pure appearance irreducible to its causes ('the real of an illusion'). Consequently, Lacan not only supplements the Real as the void of the absent cause with the Real as consistency but he also adds a third term, namely, that of the Real as pure appearing, which is also operative in Badiou in the guise of what he calls 'minimal difference.'" On page 87, Žižek gives an excellent explanation of symbolic castration and the argument about inverting the body without organs: "[F]ar from being the opposite of power, it is synonymous with power; it is that which confers power on me. And one has to think of the phallus not as the organ that immediately expresses the vital force of my being, my virility and so forth but, precisely, as such an insignium, as a mask that I put on in the same way a king or judge puts on his insignia: 'phallus is an organ without a body' that I put on, which gets attached to my body, without ever becoming its 'organic part,' namely, forever sticking out as its incoherent, excessive supplement."

24. Lacan, "Kant with Sade," trans. James Swenson, *October* 51, Winter 1989.