Montaigne and Nietzsche: Ancient and Future Wisdom

GIORGIO BARUCHELLO, University of Guelph

Graham Parkes’ Contribution

The influence of Michel de Montaigne on Friedrich Nietzsche has been widely recognized by scholars for a few decades already, and the name of the former has been added to that of Thucydides, Machiavelli, La Rochefoucauld, Voltaire, and Dostoyevsky within Nietzsche’s pantheon of intellectual heroes. Montaigne has been regarded as an important point of reference particularly for Nietzsche’s writings of the 1870s and early 1880s. Such themes as solitude, the free spirit, the decentering of humankind, and doubt are each clearly reminiscent of Montaigne.1 Graham Parkes has been first among Nietzsche’s commentators to investigate a fascinating dimension of their intellectual relationship—that concerning the issue of death.2 As part of a larger study in the philosophy of death, Graham Parkes argues that Montaigne’s view of death is astonishingly similar to several German and Japanese authors of disparate historical periods:

... namely ... Nietzsche and Heidegger ... Dogen, Shosan, and Nishitani... Comparisons admittedly lose some of their force when the thinkers and ideas are abstracted from their historical contexts, and scepticism is generally justified in cases where disparate philosophers are said to be “saying the same things about the same things”. But even though death can be regarded as a cultural construct, the similarities in attitude and response to the prospect of death are striking. There is a sense in which the engagement with death as what Jaspers called a “limit-situation” reaches something basic in human existence.3

Examining the relationship between Montaigne and Nietzsche, Parkes argues that with respect to death the philosophical approach of these two thinkers is remarkably similar. Both authors, Parkes claims, conceive of death as an ongoing process accompanying the human being along the entire life-path, the recognition of which constitutes the basis of a common philosophical illumination leading to freedom, happiness, and wisdom. Death is not an impending menace intervening ab externo, but is unveiled ex interno, as a way to better understand the course of the life-path itself. This knowledge, Montaigne argues, distinguishes the sage from the crowd who are condemned to encounter death unprepared:

They go, they come, they trot, they dance—of death no news. All that is fine. But when it comes, either to them or to their wives, children, or friends, surprising them unprepared and
defenseless, what torments, what cries, what frenzy, what despair overwhelms them! Did you ever see anything so dejected, so changed, so upset? We must provide for this earlier.... Let us rid it of its strangeness, come to know it, get used to it. Let us have nothing on our minds as often as death.4

Three centuries later, Nietzsche writes: “How strange that this sole certainty and commonality do almost nothing for people, and that nothing is farther from them than the feeling that they form a brotherhood of death?”5 Only the understanding of death can bring about life’s most profound transformation, since only this higher form of awareness helps the sage to discharge false idols and useless concerns. Montaigne writes: “[W]e are blind and reasoning in the world boils down finally to this point: to teach us not to be afraid to die.”6

Parkes claims that Montaigne and Nietzsche are likewise accepting of human finitude and cultivate practical wisdom under its light. They step out of the long Platonic and Christian line that sharply dichotomizes life and death and offers an “evasion from life” in nomine mortis. Against Montaigne’s and Nietzsche’s acceptance of human limitations, this line sees mundane existence as of little value, intrinsically unstable, and ultimately doomed: “[D]ying to the world in advance, dissociating myself from the body, so that when the physical death arrives I am no longer home to receive it.... [T]he idea is to die away from the world and detach from the body in order to identify with the ultimate, transcendent Reality.”7 Montaigne and Nietzsche resist “these modes of transcendence,” which Parkes identifies also in several Eastern approaches.8 Challenging these tragic, antimundane, psyche/amana-centered traditions, Montaigne and Nietzsche understand death “as an integral part of life, an ever-present aspect that is normally kept hidden. What is recommended is a detachment from life that somehow reverses itself, such that one re-enters life with heightened vitality—as in the Zen master’s exhortation to ‘live having let go of life.’”9

In sum, Parkes finds Montaigne and Nietzsche alike in conceiving death as something essentially intertwined with life, the philosophical scrutiny of which ensures a form of existential liberation, and consequently something to be accepted as a positive fact of human experience.

Undoubtedly, a number of similarities may be identified between Montaigne and Nietzsche. The historical and intellectual bond they share is unmistakable. However, I shall argue that Parkes overstates their similarities with respect to the philosophy of death, betraying the true spirit of Montaigne’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprises. First, Parkes’ account oversimplifies their interpretations of death. Second, it understates their differences with respect to existential perspectives and cosmological assumptions.

The existential liberation connected with Montaigne’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical understandings of death is fundamentally dissimilar. For Nietzsche,
we shall no longer be.”

Accordingly, “the wise man should withdraw his soul within, out of the crowd, and keep it in freedom and power to judge things freely.”

By contrast, the goal of Nietzsche’s work is “to give men back the courage to their natural drives—to check their self-underestimation (not that of man as an individual but that of man as nature)—To remove antitheses from things after comprehending that we have projected them there.” His “revaluation of all values” includes a reconsideration of passions as the fundamental source of human action. Such drives are the expression of a more fundamental conatus that characterizes all life: the will to power. Nietzsche hardly shares Montaigne’s ideal of liberation via philosophica.

Excess is a reproach only against those who have no right to it; and almost all the passions have been brought into ill repute on account of those who were not sufficiently strong to employ them. One must understand that the same objections can be made to the passions as are made to sickness: nonetheless—we cannot do without sickness, and even less without the passions. We need the abnormal, we give life a tremendous choc by these great sicknesses.

Nor does Nietzsche hold much admiration for the “moderate” and “temperate” individual: “The ‘great man’ is great owing to the free play and scope of his desires and to the yet greater power that knows how to press these magnificent monsters into service.” Moreover, Nietzsche’s wisdom does not call for the preservation of what is good in the present human being, or what was good in Montaigne’s Roman and Greek spiritual mentors. Nietzsche wants to move beyond: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what is lovable in man is that he is an over-going and an under-going.”

In spite of his deep admiration for the classics, and in spite of an equal respect for the French author, Nietzsche rejects Montaigne’s opposition of reason and passion, breaking down the distinction itself together with other traditional distinctions or antitheses such as good and evil, appearance and reality, compassion and selfishness. Nietzsche wishes to rewrite the lexicon of morality itself, including that on which Montaigne’s wisdom is based.

Montaigne’s references to the traditional moral lexicon and to the concept of existential pressure express the very conception of enslavement that Nietzsche condemns. In fact, they represent the heritage of negative nihilism. For Nietzsche, ressentiment lies at the core of many a religion and philosophy. The feelings of powerlessness, limitation, and the suffering of radical contingency are the enslaving structures of self-preservation, including the Christian religion, Hegel’s Idealism, and so on. The realization of life’s frailty makes the human being desire, create, and ultimately believe in the caging dreams of such structures: “Religion has the same effect which an Epicurean philosophy has on sufferers of a highest rank: it is refreshing, refining, makes, as it were, the most of suffering, and in the end even sanctifies and justifies.”

The most ubiquitous form of authority—spiritual authority—draws its force from the human being’s incapacity to accept existential limits. “Faith,” says Nietzsche, emerges from the “fear of a general ‘in vain.’” Religious casts of all times have known this truth very well. Their distinctive mark is to have “granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away ... [and] prevented man from despising himself.” Not everyone can tolerate the self-loathing that stems from the recognition of one’s contingency. Only a few pessimists have proven themselves capable of enduring it, superior intellects such as the Buddha, Leopardi, and Schopenhauer, who refused the consolatory dreams of any enslaving Hinterwelt, even as they themselves were incapable of accepting contingency in the serene, joyful way that Nietzsche does.

Against both “preachers of the Hinterwelt” and pessimists, Nietzsche offers his own positive nihilism. Rather than despair at the fact of one’s contingency and finitude, the sage, or in Nietzsche’s words, “the strong,” “the noble,” “the healthy,” celebrates: this too is life.

The ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo!—not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this spectacle—and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs himself—and makes himself necessary.

Nietzsche’s noble type dares to face his own mortality, wants all to be as it is, and, purged of ressentiment, achieves real freedom. No longer does he perpetuate his enslavement to absolute values and to those who dispense them.

Against Montaigne’s claim that “to philosophize is [per se] to learn to die,” and that “dissensions of the philosophical sects in this matter [death] are merely verbal,” for Nietzsche, philosophers are far from comprehending death in the same way. For Nietzsche, philosophy’s response to death entails neither the same doctrinal conclusion nor the same liberation. Indeed, many philosophies teach precisely how to become, or remain, a slave. Moreover, Nietzsche is far from believing that philosophy as such can help one to attain freedom—the fullness of life. The conquest of this has less to do with the philosophy one espouses, or with
any artefact of consciousness, than with one’s dominating passions, one’s instincts and inclinations pro life:

Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and unstron. Consciousness gives rise to countless errors that lead an animal or man to perish sooner than necessary, “exceeding destiny,” as Homer puts it. If the conserving association of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if it did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness and its credulity.25

Montaigne vs. Nietzsche: On Pain and Pleasure

Life has many faces, and Nietzsche’s noble individual experiences them all, rather than, in the manner of Montaigne, “call[ing] madness any transport, however laudable, that transcends our own judgment and reason.”26 Life in general, and the individual in particular, benefits from the many diverse possibilities that the “magnificent monsters” of our soul can produce—in spite of, or even thanks to, the suffering they may involve. Nietzsche does not condemn excess, infelicity, and pain a priori. Errors, even sickness, are among the many faces of life: “Pain is not considered an objection to life: ‘If you have no more happiness to give me, well then! You still have suffering.’”27 Nietzsche condemns philosophers who “are prejudiced against appearance, change, pain, death, the corporeal, the senses, fate and bondage, the aimless.... They are led by instinctive moral definitions in which former cultural conditions are reflected (more dangerous ones).”28 Montaigne is among them, his main concern being the liberation of human beings from suffering. Both death and suffering more generally are constant themes of his Essays from the early 1570s to the late 1580s. Indeed, Montaigne’s entire wisdom orbits around the attainment of a quiet, serene life. Even the Stoics, so often at the center of his teaching, become immoderate when calling forth difficult trials of virtue. Why should the sage undergo such trials when existence is so generous in misfortunes? “There is too much effort and harshness in that.... We little men must flee the storm from further away; we must try to avoid feeling it, not try to endure it, and dodge the blows we cannot parry.”29

In Nietzsche’s terms, Montaigne represents hardly more than Zarathustra’s “spirit of gravity,” since he derives from the contemplation of our finitude a “temperate” and “moderate” attitude toward life. One wonders whether Montaigne attains any genuine wisdom (in Nietzsche’s sense) at all, or whether he is merely another of the nihilists at whom Zarathustra’s invective is directed.

Not amor fati, of which Zarathustra is the prophet, but fatalism pervades Montaigne’s Essays. The latter affirms, “it will happen,” and counsels indifference to the thought that one day all shall end. The former replies, “I will it to happen,” teaching us to love it even “in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: ‘the eternal recurrence.’”30 Montaigne, however, is neither pessimist nor “preacher of the Hinterwelt”; he is neither Schopenhauer nor Luther. Still, the wisdom he imparts throughout his Essays is not Zarathustra’s. While Nietzsche shares with Montaigne a profound awareness of the inescapable finitude of all things human, he deduces from this a joyful affirmation of contingency rather than detached acceptance. Montaigne’s wisdom is contained in Zarathustra’s, but Zarathustra-Nietzsche has moved beyond this. Whereas Montaigne preaches indifference to unhappiness in view of happiness, Nietzsche counsels equanimity before happiness and unhappiness:

“The sum of displeasure outweighs the sum of pleasure; consequently it would be better if the world did not exist”—“The world is something that rationally should not exist because it causes the feeling subject more displeasure than pleasure”—chatter of this sort calls itself pessimism today! Pleasure and displeasure are accidentals, not causes; they are value judgments of the second rank, derived from a ruling value—“useful,” “harmful,” speaking in the form of feelings, and consequently absolutely sketchy and dependent. For with every “useful,” “harmful,” one still has to ask in a hundred different ways: “for what?” I despise this pessimism.... [I]t is itself a sign of deeply impoverished life.31

Montaigne’s response to death is life-affirming only insofar as life is capable of granting happiness, which Montaigne identifies with a Hellenistic, virtuous, rational life. By contrast, Nietzsche proffers life-affirmation per se, independent of happiness or suffering. Placing no limit upon life-affirmation, any determination of existence—death included—is, for Nietzsche, a function of life. True to the spirit of much of Hellenistic quietism, Montaigne’s wisdom aims at the attainment of all that tends to improve life: “the security, the freedom from pain and suffering, the exemption from the ills of this life.”32 Facing death helps the wise re-enter life with a precise goal firmly in view: the attainment of a “beautiful life.” “The most beautiful lives, to my mind, are those that conform to the common human pattern, with order, but without miracle and without eccentricity.”33 What could be further from the Nietzschean spirit of creation, from the heroic “attitude and response” to death, celebrating life for its own sake?
Montaigne and Nietzsche

Some historical context can help us understand this divergence. Montaigne lives in the battlefield that is sixteenth-century Europe. He seeks an ivory tower where the sage can contemplate the discovery that the Platonic and Aristotelian dogmas of the past are not as solid as had been imagined, that his Christian quasi-divine status is not as assured as he had believed. Montaigne’s philosophy is the first psychotherapy of the Renaissance, one dwelling in a novel secular dimension. Montaigne contemplates the challenges of his times: Copernicus is challenging the pomposous cathedras of traditional scholastics; Florentine philology and neoplatonism have crossed the Alps and are actively cultivating the art of critical inquiry; Pyrrhonism returns in vogue as the best alternative to both papists and protestant fanaticism; and conventional anthropological views are questioned by encounters with the savage New World. Montaigne, as psychotherapist, holds out the ideal of human happiness.

Nietzsche lives in the century of history, objective idealism, and positive science. Absolute knowledge is proclaimed capable of comprehending all that is real. On one hand, optimism pervades the corridors of European universities. Every phenomenon can be explained as the effect of causes and, more profoundly, as an epiphemnon of the Absolute Spirit. The Prussian and British academies own the keys to life’s secrets. On the other hand, boredom due to an unprecedented period of peace pervades many hearts on the continent. Nineteenth-century Europe seems to have lost its original romantic impetus. Instead of poets and visionaries, the continent is spawning hordes of wealthy bourgeois bellies and hungry proletarians. Nietzsche has stolen the fire of the gods; what he wishes for Europe is a new life, or better, and more radically, a new European. Zarathustra, one should never forget, is searching for the Ubermensch.

Montaigne vs. Nietzsche: On Nothingness and Selfhood

Both Montaigne and Nietzsche regard death as essentially interwoven with life itself. Montaigne writes: “Death is the condition of your creation, it is a part of you.... The constant work of your life is to build death. You are in death while you are in life.... [D]uring life you are dying.”34 Nietzsche reverberates: “Let us be wary of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is merely a species of the dead.”35 Their characterizations, however, of the interweaving of life and death are decidedly different. Montaigne’s view aims at allowing the living and dying individual to become optimally aware of death and to liberate himself from the fear of it. Death is a problem for the self, and Montaigne provides the self with an opportune therapy: one who wants to reduce suffering and live a worthy life till the end must “familiarize with death,”36 realizing that being conscious of one’s own mortality constitutes the basic step toward a wiser life. Only then, no turbulence of the spirit, no panic, no terror vacui shall remain within the spirit. On the contrary, serene, detached self-control will lead the soul to its proper fulfillment and eventual annihilation. The sage learns to tolerate his finitude so deeply that he can even call death upon himself. On this point, Montaigne quotes the Greek gnomic poets:

Either a painless life, or else a happy death.
To die is good for those whom life brings misery.
’Tis better not to live than live in wretchedness.37

In Nietzsche’s terms, the interrelation of life and death is expressed at different ontological levels. Not only the existential sphere, but cosmology is at the center of his reflections on death. His cosmological assumptions are more articulated than Montaigne’s. Destruction, creation, birth, and annihilation are seen within a broad frame of universal, all-encompassing Werden. The basic ontological notion on which Montaigne fashions his wisdom—the individual self or ego to which happiness, pain, and pleasure are attributed—is fundamentally recast:

We set up a word at the point at which our ignorance begins, at which we can see no further, e.g. the word “I,” the word “do,” the word “suffer”—these are perhaps the horizons of our knowledge, but not the “truths.” Through thought the ego is posited; but hitherto one believed as ordinary people do, that in “I think” there was something of immediate certainty, and that this “I” was the given cause of thought, from which by analogy we understood all other causal relationships. However habitual and indispensable this fiction may have become by now—that in itself proves nothing against its imaginary origin: a belief can be a condition of life and nevertheless be false.... The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects.... My hypothesis: The subject as multiplicity.38

Not even Montaigne, master sceptic and anticartesian that he was, had dared so much. For Nietzsche, the I dissolves into the multiplicity of selves that has become a leitmotiv of postmodernism. The individual presupposed by Montaigne is deconstructed, while his reason—the starting point, for Montaigne, of the response to death and the path to wisdom—is reduced to a ghostly construction. The world itself, as Montaigne conceives it, vanishes along with the traditional notion of the I.

Into this seemingly chaotic flux comes a provocative Einsicht: “The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible phenomenon: to be discussed first.”39 Not even Montaigne, whose illnesses constantly reminded him of the relevance of the body, had gone so far. For Nietzsche, the body becomes that upon which all else is founded. The “tremendous blunder” of the metaphysical
tradition is precisely the “absurd overestimation of consciousness, the transformation of it into a unity ... something that feels, thinks, wills.”

More radical still is Nietzsche’s view that no life or death is definitive, insofar as the fate of the living and dying is to repeat its existence again and again, with no change or variation. While for Montaigne death, in a sense, stabilizes human existence, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence achieves the very opposite, a profoundly destabilizing perspective which denies sense to the category of Being itself. Nietzsche therefore recovers in his own way a feature of Stoicism that Montaigne did not consider in his Essays: the circularity of time. Yet he does not limit himself to this, or he would fall into a renewed form of nihilism. The Stoic view counsels passive acceptance of a law-like flowing of the same, whereas Nietzsche calls for an active participation in the flow, transforming the law itself into an act of one’s will. The Nietzschean individual accepts his limited, ephemeral condition, not merely to endure it, but also and eventually to rejoice in it.

Diving into the chaotic stream of will in its eternal recurrence, the shattered “self” is regained to reality. Nietzsche, instead of falling into despair, as Schopenhauer or Leopardi had done, invites us to accept and rejoice in the chaotic flux of contingency. From a strictly cosmological point of view, the notion of the eternal recurrence makes the distinction between life and death puzzling, if not meaningless. It is on the existential level that the distinction retains meaning, for the awareness of death should make the subject more aware of life; on this, Nietzsche and Montaigne are in agreement. Yet, going beyond Montaigne, Nietzsche’s life-affirmation becomes so radical as to make death a sublime moment of life. The subject can avoid a nihilistic fear of contingency, which death eminently symbolizes, by affirming contingency, or indeed by making death itself one’s wish for life. For without death no life would have value. Nietzsche’s “death of God” subverts traditional theological perceptions of the real: in the place of a religion of immortality is a religion of mortality. Groundlessness and chance become the new frame in which human life is understood and experienced.

Notes


2. Parkes is the first commentator to argue in favor of a similarity between Montaigne’s conception of death and Nietzsche’s. On Montaigne alone and the issue of death, see C. Lyas, “That to Philosophize is to Learn How to Die,” Philosophical Investigations 16; 2 (1993); and J. Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). On Nietzsche and death, see J. Vincenko, “Nietzsche and Epicurus,” Man and World 27; 4 (1994), where the author stresses the “tragic joy” that guides Nietzsche’s acceptance of death, beyond the quietist “inverted Platonism” of the Epicureans.


8. Ibid., 83.

9. Ibid., 83.


12. Ibid., I, 12.

13. Ibid., II, 31.


37. *Ibid.*, I, 33. This concept is bound to become milder in the later writings of Montaigne.

