

Apollonian/Dionysian—Master/Slave: A Response to David B. Allison

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On the back cover of David Allison's fine book, *Reading the New Nietzsche*, Arthur Danto proclaims that, "David Allison's book is the only one ... [that Nietzsche] would have endorsed, as having gotten his philosophy down exactly as he would have wished, but hardly dared expect." Since I do not wish to show any disrespect to either Danto or Allison, I have no intention of disputing the credibility of Allison's presentation of the Apollonian/Dionysian duality in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Rather, I would like to offer a complementary view of this matter coming from a slightly dialectical, one might even say Hegelian, perspective.

Nietzsche's admiration for the Greeks is great, and it is with deep regret that he mourns the passing of a culture that has never been equaled.¹ Yet for all the excellence of Greek culture, it ultimately succumbed to the same dialectical forces that destroy all peoples. The will to power that was the foundation of the Greek path of overcoming was an act of *creation*, an attempt to erect a truth to live by in an effort to *forget* a world knowledge that was depressing. Virgil recounts how Silenus, the tutor and companion to Dionysus, was forced to share his most profound wisdom:

Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: 'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to *be*, to be *nothing*. But the second best for you is—to die soon' (*BT*, sec. 3, p. 42).

Nietzsche understands the founding of Greek culture to have been a monumental act of creation in order to escape a state of wretchedness, to fight against depression. It is not that Nietzsche agrees with the wisdom of Silenus and praises the Greeks for battling against it. In fact, from a Nietzschean perspective, the wisdom of Silenus is a *created* mythology, a falsification of the world. The value of this falsification, as negative as it seems, is that its extreme negativity stimulates the declaration of a correspondingly positive will to power.

Silenus threw down a challenge to the Greeks: Life is tragic and miserable; either die and so escape the pain of this realization, or create something that will make it possible for you to live—to want to live. The challenge was to live and *value* life when mythological wisdom told them that any attempt

to live is in contradiction with an earlier truth. This earlier truth was not understood as a creation, not thought to be evitable, and it claimed that the best thing was not to live. From this fundamental will to power, the will to discharge the energy of life, the Greeks embarked upon a path of overcoming that was founded upon a contradiction. Such a task required the invention of powerful allies, and these allies became the occupants of the Pantheon.

Along with the creation of the gods, Nietzsche argues, came the fundamental path of overcoming for the Greeks: Attic tragedy. Yet when Nietzsche describes the quintessential Greek will to power in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, there is no reference to tragedy: "You should always be the first and outrival all others: your jealous soul should love no one, except your friend"—this precept made the soul of a Greek tremble: in following it he followed his path to greatness" (Z, p. 85). The difficulty posed by this difference may seem great unless it is recognized that tragedy is not the Greek will to power, but the mechanism that makes possible the expression of that will. It is the unique power of Greek tragedy that permits and encourages a discharge of the will which in turn directs the Greeks to be first in all things.

The distinction here must be very finely made. Tragedy is not per se the will to power of the Greeks, yet even when tragedy is recognized as an aspect of the Greek falsification of nature, it is more intimately connected with the actual Greek path of overcoming than equivalent falsifications in other peoples. The peculiarly powerful character of Greek tragedy as a path of overcoming must be understood in terms of the tremendous internal dynamic that is generated by the opposition of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Nietzsche understands this opposition to be of paramount importance:

We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the *Apollonian* and *Dionysian* duality—just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations (*BT*, sec. 1, p. 33).

While the artistic ramifications of this opposition are of supreme interest to Nietzsche, and are indeed the chief focus of *The Birth Of Tragedy*, they are beyond the realm of the present discussion. What is of concern here is how the Apollonian/Dionysian duality relates to the earlier discussion about how peoples evade confrontation with the dialectical contradictions posed by their will to power. It has been argued that *all* wills to power involve a declaration of *created* values, and that such a creation is followed quickly by an effort to regard such values as *true* and not *created*. In such a situation, only the most stagnant of cultures can be assured that the discovery of the

untruth of its will to power, *the untruth of all wills to power*, will not be encountered. It was argued that the discovery of the untruth of any given will to power constitutes its dialectical contradiction, so what must be established is the degree to which the Apollonian/Dionysian duality aids the Greeks in avoiding the discovery of the untruth of their will to power, and thus the contradiction to that will.

Nietzsche consistently maintains that will to power properly pursued is in accordance with the instincts, and that within a people the natural tension is usually between will to power and avoidance of the truth, or rather, untruth of will to power. What is unique and magnificent about the Greek will to power is that the built-in tension is not between will to power and the foundation of will to power, but between the Apollonian and the Dionysian.²

Most cultures must suffer the tension generated between their wills to power and the forces that must be expended to prevent the discovery of the grounding of that will to power, but the Greeks have a significant advantage. A tension exists between the two parts of the Greek expression of will to power which works to strengthen that will rather than weaken it. The paradigm for the dialectic of peoples suggested that it became increasingly difficult for a people to avoid the contradictions built into their will to power, and that powerful steps would have to be taken in order to avoid its destruction as a people. In the case of the Greeks, the tension between the Apollonian and the Dionysian works to *divert* attention and energy from probing the base of the will to power because the pursuit of that will, to a large measure, simulates the very inquiry that they must avoid. It might be more accurate to suggest that the Apollonian/Dionysian duality so thoroughly occupies the minds and instincts of the Greeks that the issue of where this duality comes from, or whether it is created or uncreated, true or false, fails to become a matter of cultural obsession. Accordingly, the devices that other peoples may have to employ to preclude knowledge of the foundation of their will to power prove less necessary. As a consequence of a people using less of its will to constrain and protect the foundation of will to power, the effect of the expression of will to power is that much more salutary, thus making inquiry into the root of the will to power that much less alluring. The cycle repeats: The great success of the Greek will to power makes constraints upon it less necessary than in other peoples. The lack of these constraints makes the will to power more successful and yet, seemingly, less dangerous to itself. The great triumph of the Greek will to power is that the more it liberates the will, the more secure it is in liberating the will.

What accounts for the remarkable success of the Greek will to power is its innate capacity for adaptivity and growth. In other peoples, even other great peoples, the highest expression of the will to power is in the foundation of that will. From that point on a people must divert some of its resources

to the maintenance of the original will to power, even to the extent of weakening its own will in an effort to preserve its avowed path of overcoming. Greek will to power is bound to the dynamic of the Apollonian/Dionysian dialectic, and change in the expression of will to power—which is dangerous, if not fatal, to most other peoples—is intrinsic to the Greeks.³

The genius of the Greek will to power is that its parts act to supplement each other's deficiencies rather than to expose them. Each half of the duality works to elicit a more powerful expression from the other, thus making the Dionysian more effective by virtue of the Apollonian and vice versa. At the same time this mutual dependency acts as a moderating force, suggesting that the highest excellence is achieved by a synthesis that prevents either the Apollonian or the Dionysian from achieving complete dominance.

With such an efficient and successful path for overcoming, it might seem that the Greeks were in a position to delay indefinitely the encounter with the contradiction of their will to power. The expression of the Dionysian effectively discharges the energy of the instinct, while the Apollonian works to guide the direction of these discharges into expressions of its own forms. The problem is that the Apollonian forces that have assisted the discharge of the Dionysian energy have been unable to eradicate completely the immoderate nature of the Dionysian. "The individual, with all his restraint and proportion, succumbed to the self-oblivion of the Dionysian states, forgetting the precepts of Apollo. *Excess* revealed itself as truth. Contradiction, the bliss born of pain, spoke out from the very heart of nature" (*BT*, sec. 4, p. 46).

The excess results, so to speak, in a Dionysian hangover, which gives a fleeting glimpse of the contradiction at the root of the will to power and the ancient wretchedness that Dionysian expression had hitherto managed to escape. Dionysian expression never completely rids itself of its depressive, lethargic elements, and according to Nietzsche, when it is released without the moderating effects of the Apollonian the effect is less than salutary:

This chasm of oblivion separates the worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality. But as soon as this everyday reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as such, with nausea: an ascetic, will-negating mood is the fruit of these states (*BT*, sec. 5, pp. 59–60).

Gradually, the Dionysian has become dependent on the Apollonian (not unlike Hegel's description of the master/slave relationship). The duality which had worked so well with such an apparently congenial *modus vivendi* has developed an imbalance, seemingly in favor of the Apollonian:

[T]he Dionysian reveler sees himself as a satyr, *and as a satyr, in turn, he sees the god*, which means that in his metamorphosis he beholds another vision outside himself, as the Apollonian complement of his own state.... In the light of this insight we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollonian world of images (*BT*, sec. 8, pp. 64–5).

The Dionysian continues to discharge its energy, but the discharges are now understood to take place in an Apollonian context. From this it might seem that a new equilibrium will be established and the Dionysian expressions are to be safely controlled and directed by the forces of Apollo. To an extent this is what happens, and it does reduce the danger of the unbridled power of the Dionysian. For a short time it does seem that the expression of the Greek will to power can reform itself and sustain the Greek people without forcing them to confront the contradiction of the original will to power. An important change has taken place, however, and Nietzsche understands this to be a crucial turning point.⁴

The Apollonian has not merely come to a negotiated peace with the Dionysian, nor has the Dionysian been forced to moderate itself without corresponding changes to the Apollonian. Rather, the Apollonian has become as dependent on the Dionysian as the latter had become on the former. As a result, when the forces of the Apollonian caused the Dionysian to discharge its energy in the Apollonian world of images, the Apollonian suffered permanent alteration. One opposition in a duality cannot change without altering the entire duality. This means that neither the Apollonian nor the Dionysian remains capable of fulfilling its original purpose, and the duality that acted to complement the parts is now driven into a schism which threatens the contradiction of the old Greek will to power.

It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epos, while, on the other hand, it has alienated itself as much as possible from Dionysian elements. Now, in order to be effective at all, it requires new stimulants, which can no longer lie within the sphere of the only two art-impulses, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These stimulants are cool, paradoxical thoughts, replacing Apollonian contemplation—and the fiery *affects*, replacing Dionysian ecstasies; and, it may be added, thoughts and affects copied very realistically and in no sense dipped into the ether of art (*BT*, sec. 12, p. 83).

From Nietzsche's perspective, the modification of the Dionysian and the Apollonian brought about a new form of tragedy, the Euripidean, and from

this emerged a new duality to replace the superseded Apollonian/Dionysian opposition:

Even Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called *Socrates*. This is the new opposition: the Dionysian and the Socratic—and the art of Greek tragedy was wrecked on this (*BT*, sec. 12, p. 82).

The introduction of Socrates is the great cusp in Nietzsche's dialectic of the Greeks. It is from this point on that Nietzsche understands the Greek will to power to begin to fight the instincts and embark upon a path of decline. The advent of Socrates will open the floodgates of rational individualism and destroy the delicate balance that had protected the ancient Greek will to power.

In the general discussion of the dialectic of peoples it was claimed that a people faced several options when confronted with the destruction of their will to power, one of which was the declaration of a new will. This is the Greek solution. Rather than descend back into a herd state of wretchedness, the Greek will to power, which all along has demonstrated a talent for ongoing modification, has modified itself yet again. The new Greek will to power, the opposition between the Dionysian and the Socratic, bears little resemblance to its predecessor. In the Apollonian/Dionysian duality, the instincts were discharged in and guided by the Apollonian. In the new opposition, the Socratic tendency is to fight the instincts and ultimately redefine "instinctive" to that which leads to unhappiness.

'Only by instinct': with this phrase we touch upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency. With it Socratism condemns existing art as well as existing ethics. Wherever Socratism turns its searching eyes it sees lack of insight and the power of illusion; and from this lack it infers the essential perversity and reprehensibility of what exists. Basing himself on this point, Socrates conceives it to be his duty to correct existence: all alone, with an expression of irreverence and superiority, as the precursor of an altogether different culture, art, and morality, he enters the world, to touch whose very hem would give us the greatest happiness (*BT*, sec. 13, p. 87).

It must be asked: How does Socrates, this single plebeian individual, succeed in transforming the entire basis of the Greek will to power? To answer this question it may help to turn, as Nietzsche certainly must have, to the *Apology of Socrates* and review the indictment that brought Socrates to trial. "Socrates is guilty of engaging in inquiries into things beneath the earth and in the

heavens, of making the weaker argument appear the stronger, and of teaching others the same things" (*Apology*, 19c). To paraphrase the charge against Socrates, he was alleged to be guilty of impiety, scientific inquiry, and seditious sophistry. Nietzsche is inclined to describe the Socratic transgressions in slightly different terms, but for the most part agrees that Socrates was guilty of all these things and more.

To begin, Socrates, almost like the priest in the description of the herd, sets about the task of overthrowing the values of nobility. He does this by reversing the understanding of the role of instinct from an active force to a passive one. In the ancient expression of the Dionysian, instinct was the most immediate and most worthy basis for human activity. Socrates introduces a conception of the instinct that acts to suppress the expression of the will:

We are offered a key to the character of Socrates by the wonderful phenomenon known as 'the *daimonion* of Socrates.' In exceptional circumstances, when his tremendous intellect wavered, he found secure support in the utterances of a divine voice that spoke up at such moments. This voice, whenever it comes, always *dissuades*. In this utterly abnormal nature, instinctive wisdom appears only in order to *hinder* conscious knowledge occasionally. While in all productive men it is instinct that is the creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is instinct that becomes the critic and consciousness that becomes the creator—truly a monstrosity *per defectum*! Specifically, we observe here a monstrous *defectus* of any mystical disposition, so Socrates might here be called the typical *non-mystic*, in whom, through a hypertrophy, the logical nature is developed as excessively as instinctive wisdom is in the mystic. But the logical urge that became manifest in Socrates was absolutely prevented from turning against itself; in its unbridled flood it displays a natural power such as we encounter to our awed amazement only in the very greatest instinctive forces (*BT*, sec. 13, p. 88).

It was Apollo who spoke through the Delphic oracle and told the Greeks that there was none wiser than Socrates. How curious that Socrates replaces the Apollonian half of the duality, as if by the appointment of the god, and then uses the influence of another god, his "divine voice," to erode the power of the Dionysian.

To call Socrates the cause of all these changes in the Greek will to power without understanding Socrates also as an *effect* would be to overstate the case. Nietzsche's conception of Socrates has a dualistic quality which might be understood as the opposition of the theoretical Socrates and the artistic

Socrates. Nietzsche is wary of casting Socrates purely in the role of an iconoclast:

And though there can be no doubt that the most immediate effect of the Socratic impulse tended to the dissolution of Dionysian tragedy, yet a profound experience in Socrates' own life impels us to ask whether there is *necessarily* only an antipodal relation between Socratism and art, and whether the birth of an 'artistic Socrates' is altogether a contradiction in terms (*BT*, sec. 14, p. 92).

Whether Socrates can really be understood to found a new form of Greek drama is an intriguing question, but the present question is how the Socratic impulse succeeded in dissolving Dionysian tragedy. Somehow, Socrates managed to invert the meaning of the instinct from an active force of life to a passive and suspiciously ambiguous force. This may seem like the movement toward the ascetic ideal that was observed earlier, an attempt to deny the passions and elevate a narrowly defined conception of the spirit. This, however, is not what is happening and it should not be confused with the Greek situation. Nietzsche reminds us:

Whoever approaches these Olympians with another religion in his heart, searching among them for moral elevation, even for sanctity, for discarnate spirituality, for charity and benevolence, will soon be forced to turn his back on them, discouraged and disappointed. For there is nothing here that suggests asceticism, spirituality, or duty (*BT*, sec. 3, p. 41).

Socrates does not offer the Greeks anything quite like the ascetic ideal to overcome the attractions of Dionysian expression. Yet the result of the Socratic exertions has an effect very similar to that of the priest: the subversion and destruction of *noble* virtues. What Socrates offers the Greeks is philosophy and its servant, dialectic.⁵

It seems incredible that philosophy, even dialectical philosophy, should be able to overthrow the noble values of the Greeks, yet Nietzsche is adamant on this point:

And again: that of which tragedy died, the Socratism of morality, the dialectics, frugality, and cheerfulness of the theoretical man—how now? might not this very Socratism be a sign of decline, of weariness, of infection, or anarchical dissolution of the instincts? (*BT*, sec. 1, p. 18).

It is clear that Nietzsche sees the introduction of Socratic philosophy to be coincident with the introduction of the Greek interest in morality. Before Socrates, the will to power of the Greeks was to be first in all things; love and friendship were paths to greater expressions of excellence: "Let us call this period the *pre-moral* period of mankind: the imperative 'know thyself!' was as yet unknown" (*BGE*, II, sec. 32, p. 44). The "pre-moral" period, as Nietzsche calls it, ended when Socrates managed to persuade the Greeks of two things: that virtue was beauty and that knowledge led to virtue. This equation came about as the result of the synthesis of the two Socratic oppositions, the theoretical/dialectical and the aesthetic. It seems that to defeat the Dionysian that remained when the Greek opposition changed from the Apollonian/Dionysian to the Socratic/Dionysian, Socrates had to appropriate not just the credibility of the Dionysian but the salutary affects as well. To destroy the credibility of the Dionysian, Socrates attacked the instinct and turned it into a passive "divine voice of prudence." To eradicate completely the attraction of the Dionysian, beauty—hitherto the province of Dionysian expression—must also be taken over by the Socratic. "Now we should be able to come closer to the character of the *aesthetic Socratism*, whose supreme law reads roughly as follows. 'To be beautiful everything must be intelligible,' as the counterpart to the Socratic dictum, 'Knowledge is virtue'" (*BT*, sec. 12, pp. 83–4).

Aesthetic Socratism is an important issue for Nietzsche, especially when attention is turned toward the issue of individuals. It seems Nietzsche has mixed feelings about the status of the Socratic individual. As we see in later chapters concerning individuals, one of the standards by which Nietzsche judges the quality of a given individual is the degree to which they live their life without the desire for revenge. After all, what is revenge, but a species of *ressentiment*? Nietzsche often expresses suspicion that the Socratic expression of dialectical rationalism is not merely the act of an individual who has decided to pursue an independent will to power, but possibly a manifestation of *ressentiment*:

As a dialectician, one holds a merciless tool in one's hands: one can become a tyrant by means of it; one compromises those one conquers. The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to prove that he is no idiot: he makes one furious and helpless at the same time. The dialectician renders the intellect of his opponent powerless. Indeed? Is dialectic only a form of *revenge* in Socrates? (*TI*, sec. 7, p. 476).

Nietzsche raises other questions as to Socrates's motive in advocating scientific thought and dialectical reasoning. Socrates claimed to use these tools to found a new basis for the understanding of virtue and beauty, but

Nietzsche is again suspicious that Socrates himself was advocating scientific thinking for reasons that were less public:

How now? Is the resolve to be so scientific about everything perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against—*truth*? And, morally speaking, a sort of cowardice and falseness? Amorally speaking, a ruse? O Socrates, Socrates, was that perhaps *your* secret? O enigmatic ironist, was that perhaps your—irony?

On the other hand, conversely, could it be that the Greeks became more and more optimistic, superficial, and histrionic precisely in the period of dissolution and weakness—more and more ardent for logic and logicizing the world and thus more ‘cheerful’ and ‘scientific’? (*BT*, sec. 1, p. 18).

These accusations might be interpreted as an indication that Socrates is first among the Greeks to have confronted the contradiction that lay at the base of the Greek will to power. Socrates, it seems, has glimpsed the truth of the Greek will to power, namely, that it is not true. The individual will of Socrates seems able to accept the realization that there is no truth. This may explain why Socrates was so content with the wisdom of the Delphic oracle, who proclaimed the wisest man him who claimed to know nothing. From his own insight, Socrates realized that there was no knowledge, except knowledge of one’s own ignorance. This may help explain Nietzsche’s aggravated contempt for Socratic dialectic. Socrates *knew* that there was no truth and that the Greeks were not in fleet pursuit of anything true. Yet Socrates continued in his rational, logical, *dialectical* ways: “One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive” (*TI*, sec. 6, p. 476).

If Socrates knew that his innovations were not going to save the Greeks from decline, he certainly did nothing to indicate it. Socratic influence, despite its claim to know only that it did not know, took over the dynamic of the Greek will to power, even to the extent of making it the grounding for Greek art:

Here *philosophic thought* overgrows art and compels it to cling close to the trunk of dialectic. The *Apollonian* tendency has withdrawn into the cocoon of logical schematism; just as in the case of Euripides we noticed something analogous, as well as a transformation of the *Dionysian* into naturalistic affects. Socrates, the dialectical hero of the Platonic drama, reminds us of the kindred nature of the Euripidean hero who must defend his actions with arguments and counterarguments and in the process often risks the loss of our tragic pity; for who could mistake the optimistic element in the nature of dialectic, which celebrates

a triumph with every conclusion and can breathe only in cool clarity and consciousness—the *optimistic* element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually outgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction—to the death-leap into bourgeois drama. Consider the consequences of the Socratic maxims: ‘Virtue is knowledge; man only sins from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy.’ In these three basic forms of optimism lies the death of tragedy. For now the virtuous hero must be a dialectician; now there must be a necessary connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality (*BT*, sec. 14, p. 91; also see *BT*, sec. 15, p. 97).

As the end of this analysis of the dialectical rise and fall of the Greeks draws near, perhaps a brief review is in order. The initial will to power of the Greeks was posited to overcome the *nausea* and *pessimism* experienced as the result of the perception that the world was a hostile and life-negating reality. The will to live, the affirmation of existence came about only as a consequence of Greek efforts to *forget* their perceptions of the world and discharge their will to power within a created framework, a declared set of truths. This framework took the form of the Apollonian/Dionysian opposition which for generations provided a safe “playground,” both tragic and comic. Gradually, the Apollonian/Dionysian opposition degenerated, with the discharge of instinctual will to power becoming emasculated in the Apollonian world of images. The change in the Dionysian, however, brought about a change in the Apollonian such that the entire opposition could no longer effectively sustain the will to power of the Greeks.

At this point a new opposition entered the scene, with what remained of the Dionysian finding a new opposition in the Socratic. The Socratic opposition completed the task begun by the Apollonian, that is, the destruction of the instincts. Instincts were no longer channeled into the *contemplative* Apollonian, but actively opposed and attacked by the *rational/dialectical* Socratic. It is at the point in the dialectic of the Greeks that the instincts are no longer an option for the expression of their will to power. As Nietzsche remarks:

The fanaticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice: either to perish or—to be *absurdly rational*. The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato on is pathologically conditioned; so is their esteem of dialectics. Reason-virtue-happiness, that means merely that one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark appetites with a permanent daylight—the daylight of reason. One must be clever,

clear, bright at any price: any concession to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downward* (*TI*, sec. 10, p. 478).

In a curious inversion, the dialectic of the Greeks has brought them almost to their beginning. They began with the choice of expressing the instinct or perishing, and now, courtesy of Socrates, they face the choice of negating the instinct and being and, as Nietzsche puts it, "to be absurdly rational," in order to avoid perishing.

One is given a different perspective about the charges brought against Socrates when he is viewed in this light. Far from being the brave individual, the noble lover of truth, Socrates had become the purveyor of an opiate that had brought the noble will to power of the Greeks to its knees. It is little wonder that the Greek people wished to be rid of him:

At bottom, it was as impossible to refute him here as to approve of his instinct-disintegrating influence. In view of this indissoluble conflict, when he had at last been brought before the forum of the Greek state, only one kind of punishment was indicated: exile. Socrates refused exile and, in any case, he had done his damage: *The dying Socrates* became the new ideal, never seen before, of noble Greek youths: above all, the typical Hellenic youth, Plato, prostrated himself before this image with all the ardent devotion of his enthusiastic soul (*BT*, sec. 13, p. 89).

While the ancient Greeks followed their will to power through the Apollonian/Dionysian opposition, in accordance with the instinct and guided by divine contemplation, they lived in harmony with, and with appreciation of, their gods. The advent of rationalism was the greatest tragedy of the Greeks. It was this rationalism that brought an end to the Greek gods and left a legacy of fear. Of this final tragedy of the Greeks Nietzsche says:

What is amazing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance of gratitude it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in *this* way. Later, when the rabble gained the upper hand in Greece, *fear* became rampant in religion, too—and the ground was prepared for Christianity (*BGE*, III, sec. 49, p. 64).

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Notes

1. "And so one feels ashamed and afraid in the presence of the Greeks, unless one prizes truth above all things and dares acknowledge even this truth: that the Greeks, as charioteers, hold in their hands the reins of our own and every other culture, but that almost always chariot and horses are of inferior quality and not yet up to the glory of their leaders, who consider it sport to run such a team into an abyss which they themselves clear with the leap of Achilles" (*BT*, sec. 15, p. 94).

2. "The two different tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at variance; and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful births, which perpetuates an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the common term 'art'; till eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will,' they appear coupled with each other, and through this coupling ultimately generate an equally Dionysian and Apollonian form of art—Attic tragedy" (*BT*, sec. 1, p. 33).

3. "The Apollonian frenzy excites the eye above all, so that it gains the power of vision. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poets are visionaries par excellence. In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the whole affective system is excited and enhanced: so that it discharges all its means of expression at once and drives forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and every kind of mimicking and acting. The essential feature here remains the ease of metamorphosis, the inability *not* to react (similar to certain hysterical types who also, upon any suggestion, enter into *any* role). It is impossible for the Dionysian type not to understand any suggestion; he does not overlook any sign of an affect; he possesses the instinct of understanding and guessing in the highest degree, just as he commands the art of communication in the highest degree. He enters into any skin, into any affect: he constantly transforms himself" (*TI*, sec. 10, pp. 519–20).

4. "The opposition between Apollo and Dionysus became more hazardous and even impossible, when similar impulses finally burst forth from the deepest roots of the Hellenic nature and made a path for themselves: the Delphic god, by a seasonably effected reconciliation, now contented himself with taking the destructive weapons from the hands of his powerful protagonist. This reconciliation is the most important moment in the history of the Greek cult: wherever we turn we note the revolutions resulting from this event. The two antagonists were reconciled; the boundary lines to be observed henceforth by each were sharply defined, and there was to be a

periodic exchange of gifts of esteem. At bottom, however, the chasm was not bridged over" (*BT*, sec. 2, p. 39).

5. "With Socrates, Greek taste changes in favor of dialectics. What really happened there? Above all a *noble* taste is thus vanquished; with dialectics the plebs come to the top. Before Socrates, dialectic manners were repudiated in good society: they were considered bad manners, they were compromising. The young were warned against them. Furthermore, all such presentations of one's reasons were distrusted" (*TI*, sec. 5, pp. 475–6).