Cultivating Ecological Imagination: John Dewey and Contemporary Moral Education

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In sharp contrast to the futile search for an irrecusable principle to regulate human conduct, John Dewey situated ethical reasoning within the broad context of the whole person in action. Free of the autocratic tendency to mold moral and social life in an allegedly pure and disinterested image, he replaced obsolete notions of perspective-free rationality with flexible, rule-sensitive situational inquiry. Taking raw experience, not manufactured philosophic distinctions, as the only responsible starting point and terminus for social theorizing, he aimed to ameliorate the tangled circumstances of social life through an engaged philosophic method. Accordingly, Dewey argued that "social and educational theories and conceptions must be developed with definite reference to the needs and issues which mark and divide our domestic, economic, and political life in the generation of which we are a part" (HWT, LW 8, 46).

This article uses Dewey's philosophy as a platform to explore an underappreciated cognitive resource that must be cultivated if we are to respond with courage in our generation to the challenges of rapid globalization, particularly the global scene of human impact on the natural environment. Dewey envisioned an approach to both ethics and education that would liberate human energies from enslavement to mechanized habits toward lives of critical inquiry, social responsiveness, emotional engagement, and artful consummations. In a word, he urged the cultivation of imagination along lines of the social values of liberal arts education. Imagination is a function of human embodiment, just as nest-building is a function of bird embodiment. Raw capacities are more readily canalized along cultural routes for humans than for birds, hence each generation must deliberate about the sort of imagination we should be cultivating. We desperately need to give much greater attention today to cultivating an ecological imagination to see things in their social and natural relations. We must learn to see beyond simple relations of consumers to commodities if we are to respond to an economic scene in which expanding affluence sanctifies the innocence of consumers—an innocence purchased by ignorance of the hazards our actions pose to our natural and social environments.

This paper does not take positions on the major controversies in contemporary environmental thought, nor does it make recommendations on
which principles should guide public policy. The article is silent on such far-reaching ethical issues as whether we should follow the "precautionary principle" (i.e., when we do not know the hazards, do not take the chance, a principle usually coupled with "reverse onus": guilty until proven innocent), or be governed by risk-benefit calculations, or follow a third option that avoids extremes of obstinate conservatism and obtuse utilitarian accounting. There is little here, then, of immediate practical relevance to the policymaker or environmental ethicist solely concerned with doing the right thing about global climate change, genetically modified organisms, organochlorines, or the like. The article aspires instead to a more general practical demand to discern the sort of people we and the next generation need to become to ameliorate the struggles of our place and time.

In modern industrialized cultures, theorizing on moral education must speak to what John McDermott calls the "spiritual anorexia" of our time. Many are starved of relations: morally, intellectually, and aesthetically. Dewey and William James, like their European counterparts in the phenomenological tradition, maintained that we dwell in relations that escape perception. These relations inhere in what is variously called primary experience (Dewey), pure experience (James), or the lifeworld (Merleau-Ponty, etc.). Drinking of the river of Lethe rather than the stream of experience, we forget that the lifeworld comes not in dualities but in a mosaic of directly experienced continuities, relations both natural and social. As Dewey eloquently expresses it at the close of Human Nature and Conduct: "Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist" (MW 14, 226).

A sense of these continuities brings meaning to what would otherwise be the "flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves" (MW 14, 227). But more than psychological health is at stake. Earth's 6.4 billion people (up from two billion in 1927), and the two to three billion who will join us by 2050, face a daunting challenge familiar to us but not anticipated by Dewey: a generational bottleneck due to the scale of our environmental impact—resource depletion, habitat degradation, pollution, climate change, desertification, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, falling water tables, world grain deficits, incautious genetic manipulation-for-profit, infectious disease resistance, and the like. More than any preceding generation, this generation and the next will determine the Earth's ability to sustain life. We will simultaneously determine the extent to which we will share dwindling natural resources or continue through military means to enforce a disproportionate distribution of environmental burdens and benefits.

If social theories are to address our struggles, they must increasingly focus on expanding and deepening moral, scientific, and aesthetic con-

cern for our natural and social environments. Above all, ethical and educational theories risk irrelevance to the degree that they ignore or marginalize the vital capacity to perceive the relations that inhere in natural and social situations: imagination.

Moral Education and Responsible Ethics

As a philosopher heading an Environmental Studies program, I have developed a deep respect for my colleagues who work in the trenches of environmental policy-formation. However, policy-formation is not one of my strengths. My own work has gravitated toward developing an adequate psychology of deliberation and identifying virtues of wise deliberation. When my Environmental Studies colleagues engage in detailed discussions of the pros and cons of proposed policies to address an environmental problem, my attention is invariably drawn to how they tend to grapple with the situation. Whether the issue is local, such as whether a Vermont farmer should reduce nitrogen runoff by establishing a river buffer zone, or international, such as whether China should have proceeded with constructing the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze, I notice their keen perception of the complex nature of problems. I also notice their highly cultivated empathy for those who would be affected by one or another policy, their imaginative probings for technical and communal solutions, their rich aesthetic responses to natural and cultural landscapes, the vitality of their intellects, their sensitivity to cultural traditions, and the disappearance of any wall dividing themselves from others.

This exemplifies social deliberation prior to overt experimentation. In such policy conversations my colleagues perceive actual conditions in light of what is possible, and they habitually notice how values in one part of a social or natural system affect values elsewhere in the system. This not only supports the vital import of ecosystemic thinking; it also highlights the role of imagination in such thinking. As Dewey noted in Art as Experience: "Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual" (AE, LW 10, 348). Imagination, amplified by science, yields comprehension by enlarging experience beyond what is immediately apprehended. "To grasp the meaning of a thing, an event, or a situation," Dewey observed in How We Think, "is to see it in its relations to other things" (HWT, LW 8, 225).

Policies are developed and advocated by individuals, and individuals are prone to an autocratic sense of unambiguous certitude about their own preferred conclusions. This restraints imagination from doing the vital work that must precede all experimental testing of policies, namely, "seeing familiar objects in a new light and thus opening new vistas in
experience” (HWT, LW 8, 278). Wise policies are advanced by individuals for whom divergent perspectives are allies, not adversaries. There is need for patience, discipline, and care to perceive aesthetically and to respond artistically to complex problems in community with others. Following a democratic road opened by imagination, a wise policymaker sees and responds to a situation in its relations. This is true of all wise choices.

Consequently, we should expect to find powerful resources in mainstream Western ethical theory to help develop moral imagination. We should expect a body of carefully vetted research on a capacity so essential to flourishing and to building sustainable societies. We find instead ethicists, trained to redirect civilization intelligently, rapt in an almost autistic pursuit of universal ordering principles and rules.

To clarify usage, moral imagination as used here is value-neutral. “Moral” here denotes a sphere of experience, not a term of judgment. Imagination is moral insofar as it enters into considered evaluation of incompatible alternatives when the choice of conduct bears on what sort of character and world is developing. Unless joined to rigorous reflection about ideals and ends, such as ideals of ecological sensitivity and of democracy as a way of life, imagination is unlikely to be ameliorative. Its cultivation is necessary, but not sufficient.

A central dogma of Western ethical theory is that it identifies one or more foundational principles or concepts that enable us to set aside customary beliefs in favor of moral laws, rules, or value rankings that will tell us the right way to organize moral reflection. Moral skeptics accept this dogma, justifiably reject the possibility of discovering or constructing such a foundation, and pronounce the death of ethics. Dewey rescued ethics by declaring the death of this dogma, then he reframed the debate.

Dewey was motivated by both practical and theoretical considerations in rejecting idealized matrices for ethical reasoning. The well-intentioned quest for a purified, impartial starting point is impractical because it ignores the richness and complexity of experience as lived. Such theories propose to illuminate, yet they short-circuit the work of moral imagination by arbitrarily concealing situational factors that should be perceived. Imagination’s role is reduced to drudgework for a purportedly higher formal scheme, as though it is better to be internally consistent than responsible. The key theoretic difficulty, now familiar to many Continental and Anglo-American philosophers, is that the quest for bedrock principles and rules to make ethical reasoning perfectly unbiased—at least as a norm or ideal—relies on an obsolete Enlightenment notion of transcendental reason as a nonsocial, emotion-free view from nowhere.

Thankfully, there is a growing demand in philosophical ethics to reject unidimensional theories in favor of multiple considerations. This demand stems in part from the past century’s rejection, at least in academic circles, of ahistorical matrices for values. But the plea for multiple considerations arises primarily from honest attention to the complex textures and hues of moral life. This bodes well for work on moral education.

The legitimate aim of ethics is not the satisfaction philosophers feel when they sort out an internally consistent theory—common practice notwithstanding. From a pragmatic standpoint, particularly as inspired by Dewey, ethics is the art of helping people to live richer, more responsive, and more emotionally engaged lives. This is a branch of pragmatic philosophy, understood as the interpretation, evaluation, criticism, and redirection of culture. This is closer to Aristotle, who inquired into the best human life, than to Kant, who approached ethics primarily as rational justification of an inherited moral system. While advocating the guidance of principles and rules as a means to responsible moral behavior, Dewey’s pragmatist ethics does not pretend to supply a univocal principle or supreme concept to “correctly” resolve all ethical quandaries about right and wrong or to filter out conflicts over values.

The work of Dewey and Aristotle stand in sharp contrast with the culture-wide debate between relativism and universalism that continues, notoriously, to smother any cry for public institutions to engage in moral education. In The Politics, Aristotle criticizes Sparta for autocratically drilling citizens to be inflexibly subservient to law, and he praises the nobility of Athenian education for cultivating practical wisdom and emotional attunement. Aristotle acknowledges the utilitarian role of codified rules in economizing effort, guarding against bias, and drawing boundaries for bad reasoners. But the ideal in Aristotelian education, as Martha Nussbaum explains, is to actualize the undeveloped ability of citizens to be perceivers. For both Dewey and Aristotle, the supreme moral vice is not failure to universalize motives (Kant) or calculate pleasurable consequences (Mill); it is obtuseness—that is, an underdeveloped ability to perceive and respond to the relations that inhere between things, events, concepts, and persons.

There is a vital practical role for traditional Western ethical theories in moral education, beyond the obvious need for a critically reflective medium for vetting and evaluating divergent moral frameworks. Our relationships to each other and to nature are inherently ambiguous and conflict-ridden, so we need all the help we can get to make judgment more responsible and less biased by what Dewey calls “the twisting, exaggerating and slighting tendency of passion and habit” (MW 14, 169). We make more reliable decisions when we engage conflicted situations with a toolbox of carefully honed principles to economize moral
reflection, even absent any nexus from which diverse theories can be seen as fully commensurable. A pragmatist approach to moral education mediates between polarities of closed systems, on the one hand, and offhanded recklessness, on the other hand. Good moral education, like good instruction in painting or poetry, cultivates an ability to steer between extremes of haphazard drifting and pat solutions.

This requires developing a tolerance for suspense, which in turn necessitates that educators attend to the virtue of patience in moral choice, ignored by most ethical theorists to our detriment. James captured the psychology of suspense in deliberation when he argued that the evolutionary point of thinking is the restoration of manageability to doubtful circumstances. Because this restoration culminates an uneasy process, it is marked by "a strong feeling of ease, peace, rest." But James's infamous and seemingly oxymoronic "rational sentiment" is not to be equated with truth. For classical pragmatism, to discern the truth of an assertion or proposed course of action requires investigating what follows from acting on it. How will the world reply? At the same time, the telltale rational sentiment is felt whenever doubt is replaced with settled opinion.

In *How We Think*, Dewey takes this a step further. He argues that deliberation is "a kind of dramatic rehearsal. Were there only one suggestion popping up, we should undoubtedly adopt it at once." But when alternatives contend with one another as we forecast their probable outcomes, the ensuing tension sustains inquiry (*HWT*, *LW* 8, 200). James and Dewey together reveal that most Western ethical theorizing is not patient enough to sustain the needed tension. Ethical theorists sacrifice engaged perception that is "finely aware and richly responsible" for the sake of theoretic clarity that is myopic. Yet reliable moral knowledge, as Martha Nussbaum explains, entails "seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling" (*HWT*, *LW* 8, 152). This emphasis on nuanced perception as an underappreciated deliberative capacity highlights a path toward responsibility and points to patience as a virtue lacking in contemporary theorizing.

**Defining Imagination**

The question "What is the imagination?" implies that there is a discrete mental power—a primitive force instead of a function—whose task is to do specifiable things such as form images. Imagination, on this reified view, is usually a crafter of images but is given to mischief—thus Kant's suspicion. Imagination as free reflective play is essential to aesthetic judgment, for Kant, but in morals it is self-indulgent. With Adam Smith and David Hume as notable exceptions, Western philosophers have tended to echo Plato's judgment in the *Republic* and *Ion* that imagination is veridically worthless. As a limited capacity prone to fancy and opposed to stepwise reason, philosophers in the main have dismissed imagination altogether as a pre-scientific relic or, transfigured by German and English Romanticsm, adored it—that is, removed it from the muck of practical affairs and placed it on a pedestal as a "godlike power that enters into the world on the wings of intuition, free of the taint of contingency and history."

In the late 1980s, philosophers began to revisit imagination as a vital player in moral judgments such that, in Mary Warnock's words, "in education we have a duty to educate the imagination above all else." "No longer is it necessary," Yi-Fu Tuan remarked, "to contrast a moral but dour person with an imaginative but flamboyant and irresponsible one." Still, dozens of books and articles later, there remains today a tendency to retain an unhelpful split between self-contained faculties whereby reason without imagination is empty while imagination without rule-governed reason is blind. Imagination is accorded a limited role that does not intervene widely in conduct.

On Dewey's view, in contrast, "imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement" (*DE*, *MW* 9, 245). Dewey scholarship has only recently begun to appreciate the revolutionary import of this insight. All active intellectual life, poetic or theoretical, is imaginative to the degree that it "supplements and deepens observation" by affording "clear insight into the remote, the absent, the obscure" (*HWT*, *LW* 8, 351). Its opposite is mechanical experience narrowed by acclimation to standardized meanings. Two "imagination" recur as themes in Dewey's writings. They are: 1. *Empathetic projection*. Taking the attitudes of others stirs us beyond numbness so we pause to sort through others' aspirations, interests, and worries as our own. This provides much of the content for deliberation, and it must be carefully distinguished from the common egocentric habit of projecting our own values and intentions onto others irrespective of differences. Empathy, for Dewey, is necessary but not sufficient for reliable moral judgment (*E*, *LW* 7, 268–9).

2. *Creatively tapping a situation's possibilities*. By imagination, Dewey most often means the ability concretely to perceive present circumstances in light of what is possible. In contrast to imaginative experience, the inertia of habit may yield uniformity and mechanical routine. Imagination in this cognitive, concrete, contextualized sense, when wed to makings, results in expressive art. By amplifying perception, imagination "constitutes an extension of the environment to which we respond." This is true of both senses of imagination. Dewey discusses empathy as "sympathy," defined as
"entering by imagination into the situations of others" (E, MW 5, 150). Sympathy names a type of immediate sensitivity without which not only would we be callously indifferent, but there would not even be "an inducement to deliberate or material with which to deliberate" (E, LW 7, 269).

For Kant, in contrast, empathy is morally, though not prudentially, worthless since it motivates action through feelings instead of subjecting oneself exclusively to the command of reason. In the absence of a wide survey of the situation, sympathetic inclination may prejudice one in favor of what or who is near and dear, to the point of not caring for others affected. Dewey, like Hume, grappled with this problem. In opposition to Kant's extreme answer that sympathy is unnecessary, even subversive, they each concluded that it is essential to all moral judgment, while not on its own sufficient. Recent evidence from neuroscience, such as Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error and Looking for Spinoza, favors Dewey, Hume, and work in feminist care ethics: disaffective behavior is morally obtuse.

According to Dewey's theory of "dramatic rehearsal" in deliberation, empathetic imagination is complemented and expanded in deliberate, practical reflection, which requires perceiving possibilities for action—especially through communication and dialogue—and rehearsing the consequences of acting on them (E, LW 7, 271). Imagination, empathy, and rehearsal operate simultaneously to expand our perception of social and natural relations so that past lessons and as yet unrealized potentialities "come home to us and have power to stir us" (LW 9, 30).

Hyperindividualism and Interdependence

In his recent book on finding hope in difficult times, oral historian and social critic Studs Terkel reports a conversation with a Chicago labor organizer. Terkel asks this African-American woman what motivates her to pursue social justice. She responds: "I'm just trying to make it a little easier for people to be nice to each other." She did not say, in individualist and emotivist language, that "righting wrongs makes me feel good about myself." She is responding to our interdependence, not simply to her own emotional needs. She has dedicated her life to transforming social conditions that foster avarice and suffocating imagination. Because of people like her we now live in a world that, even on the most pessimistic account, is not as bad as it might have been.

In contrast, consider a more confused person: "I don't have kids," says the author of a typical letter to the editor of a newspaper, "so why should I have to pay to educate other people's offspring?" This is more than meanness. In Jane Addams' phrasing, it is an utter failure to comprehend the situation. Dewey lamented ninety years ago that such hyperindividualism—in contrast with healthy individuality that embraces interdependence—is "an unnamed form of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remediable suffering of the world" (DE, MW 9, 49). It had already reached the level of "insanity" long before the astoundingly complex international and ecological crises of our own time.

If such hyperindividualism were limited to obnoxious letters to the editor, it would not merit philosophic scrutiny. But it is deeply embedded in the social, political, and economic philosophies that help to underwrite the unsustainable consumption rapidly reshaping and stressing our nations and planet. Consider, for example, the "rational actor model" of deliberation, the cornerstone of decision theory. The rational-actor model conceives rational choice mathematically as cost-benefit analysis, which is "literal, logical, disembodied, dispassionate, and consciously calculable." Despite decades of criticism by postmodernists and pragmatists, economic reason is heir to Kant's universal human reason. In stark contrast with Dewey's work on dramatic rehearsal, rational choice is conceived as separable from any cultural conditioning, transcending time, not historically conditioned, at its best when detached from a community of co-investigators, substantially separated from the limitations of physical life, and able to be cleaved from feelings and bodily inclinations. A version of game theory, the rational-actor model aspires to be literally descriptive of probabilistic reasoning, seemingly unaware that the mathematics requires metaphorical interpretation to be relevant to human choice, by way of the "Nash equilibrium." This is the set of strategies, such that each strategy is the best reply for all the actors. That is, it is the overall set of strategies that will allow all to maximize their payoffs. By implication, moral education is reduced to training in cost-benefit calculations of self-interested actors striving to maximize individual satisfactions. Any role for imagination is utterly missing.

In spite of the strictly descriptive pretensions of its adherents, the rational-actor model plays a significant prescriptive role today in education, economics, international relations, and environmental policy. It is part of the philosophy of the emerging global free market. Increasingly markets are tailored to the model, often and infamously through coercion from the World Bank (presided over by American neocconservative Paul Wolfowitz), World Trade Organization, or International Monetary Fund. These organizations are not simply investing in the developing world; they are "making the world safe for rationality" under the banner of a narrowly capitalistic interpretation of democracy. Yet cultures, nonhuman animals, and ecosystems do not count as autonomous rational actors striving to maximize payoffs. Consequences include unraveling of ecological diversity and the disintegration of whole cultures. The model
perpetuates what environmental analyst Lester Brown calls our “environmental bubble economy, one where economic output is artificially inflated by overconsumption of the earth’s natural assets.”

The rational actor model also contributes to an educational paradigm, championed by conservatives in the United States, in which knowledge is conceived as a commodity to be bought and sold in privatized, consumer-based institutions. The rational actor model has pragmatic value in the behavioral sciences and in some areas of policy analysis (e.g., “the tragedy of the commons”), and the moral accounting metaphor from which it is derived is conventional in many industrialized countries. But as a descriptive model of deliberation it is myopic, and as a prescriptive ideal it is bankrupt.

Dewey’s plea to Americans in 1929 is now a global plea to all industrialized and industrializing nations: “the problem of constructing a new individuality consonant with the objective conditions under which we live is the deepest problem of our times” (LW 5, 56). It is crucial to guard individual creativity from being thwarted by an over-organized social environment. Yet it is equally paramount and psychologically realistic to welcome our interdependence—across current boundaries of nationality, wealth and power, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, and even species—and identify our own lives with sustaining and ameliorating the encompassing lifeworld.

In this vein, I am aware of no better alternative to the rational-actor model than Dewey’s democratic model. When interests conflict, a democratic way of life elicits differences and gives them a hearing instead of sacrificing them to preconceived biases. This engages our imaginative capacity to stretch perception beyond what we immediately notice. A democratic imagination—an apt name for imagination as it operates in the context of competing social and political advocacies—opens up an expansive field of contact with which to interact flexibly so that goods are enjoyed rather than repressed and so that difficulties can be treated comprehensively instead of in isolation. This “greater diversity of stimuli” (MW 9, 93) opened by imagination expands awareness of exigencies struggling for recognition. Integrative values may emerge to reconstruct and harmonize conflicting desires and appraisals. Personal choices and policy decisions may then be made in richly responsible colloquy among advocates for competing values.

Our greatest global challenge is to make it easier for people to care more about each other and the natural systems that sustain life. It does not help us to attain this goal if we forge policies by projecting the hyperindividualistic assumptions of one historical group onto all humanity as the source of all motivation and rational choice. It is cultivation of

ecologically sensitive and democratically comprehensive moral imagination, not cold calculation or rule-governed reason, that will best meet the problems of our place and time. As Shelly remarked: “Imagination is the chief instrument of the good” (AE, LW 10, 350).

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References


Notes

1. See my John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). For a helpful overview of

2. "Aristotelian education is aimed at producing citizens who are perceivers. It begins with the confident belief that each member of the heterogeneous citizenry is a potential person of practical wisdom, with the basic (that is, as yet undeveloped) ability to cultivate practical perception and to use it on behalf of the entire group. It aims at bringing these basic abilities to full actuality." Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 103. Also see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).


4. It may sap moral strength, usurping reason and yielding victory to feeling. If a person "surrenders authority over himself, his imagination has free play," Kant claims. "He cannot discipline himself, but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy." Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 140. On faculty psychology, see G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 427. They analyze this picture as embodying the metaphor of a "Society of Mind."


10. As a form of direct responsiveness, empathy is "the animating mold of moral judgment" (E, LW 7, 270).

11. On this creative function of imagination, see Raymond Boisvert, John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 127–9, 139. On art and imagination, Dewey writes: "Possibilities are embodied in works of art that are not elsewhere act-ualized; this embodiment is the best evidence that can be found of the true nature of imagination" (AE, LW 10, 272). A variant is highlighted in Charles Peirce's theory of "abductive inference."


13. Dewey writes: "It is sympathy which saves consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculation, by rendering vivid the interests of others and urging us to give them the same weight as those which touch our own honor, purse, and power" (E, LW 7, 270–1).


17. In Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 521. This analysis is based on Lakoff and Johnson’s critique, 515–38.


20. Dewey also frequently speaks of imagination not as a kind of cognitive activity but simply to *locate* activity as going forth in inner vision—“in imagination”—versus activity proceeding overtly, irrevocably, irretrievably.