While Trudy Govier’s book, *Dilemmas of Trust*, is directed mostly at the lay reader, it does contain some insights of interest to the academic reader on the nature of trust. Govier contends that trust is pervasive in all facets of the human experience. From trusting ourselves, to trusting various public institutions and professions, we are a society whose collective and individual conduct is based on what we expect others to do. Govier restricts the scope of the discussion in this book to inter-personal relationships. In addition to being a more manageable context for a discussion of trust, this restriction in scope allows her to focus on the primary individual relationships that are usually the most important in people’s lives — namely, relationships of friendship, family, and romance. It should be noted that this book is not about defining or exploring these relationships. Instead Govier assumes standard, if somewhat romanticized, definitions of these relationships and examines the function of trust within their machinations.

Govier begins by making several general and introductory comments about trust which help define and contextualize her discussion. First, trust can be described, on a fundamental level, in terms of both its function (within a relationship or with the self) and its affect (how the person who is trusting feels). Basically, a person who trusts functions with the confidence that an other will generally and in most circumstances act with caring, kindness, loyalty, honesty, and so on. A person who trusts feels comfortable and relaxed, able to open up and feel vulnerable with the person who is trusted. Of course, from this description of trust we can extrapolate the definitions of distrust and being worth of trust. Second, Govier discusses certain trends in the personal and academic treatment of trust. For example, trust tends to be overlooked as a topic, or taken for granted, until or unless it has been misplaced and something goes wrong. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, Govier contends that trust is not pure (and certainly not blind) faith. Trust is established or given based on evidence of trustworthiness, and is revoked with betrayal or evidence of untrustworthiness.

Roughly half the book is spent working through the various relationships (friendship, family, romantic, self) to sketch out the role played by trust. What
is common to all of the relationships discussed by Govier is intimacy. Necessary for intimacy is trust. Intimacy is built on, according to Govier, communication and knowledge. A person has to know herself; that is, listen to her instincts, assess her own character, and communicate this knowledge to an other. A person has to know an other to have a relationship (of any kind) with her. Knowing and communicating personal knowledge is what creates vulnerability and it is through this vulnerability or openness that intimacy is established. Trust — that is, relying on the other person to treat you and your communications of self with care and kindness and to not act so as to use that information to betray you — is what allows one to be vulnerable and open with an other. If you trust an other, you will be able to tell the truth about yourself, without risk of brutal judgement or wicked intentions on the part of the person trusted. Knowing yourself, and trusting yourself are essential to picking out others who are trustworthy. The “evidence” that is used to determine trustworthiness varies from person to person and from situation to situation, but in all cases, knowledge of the person — the whole person and not just isolated incidences — is used as the basis of judgement. In order to trust, one must have — insofar as it is possible — some knowledge of the other’s intentions. If those intentions are good, the person is trustworthy; if those intentions are bad (i.e., harmful to us) then the person is not trustworthy.

While the basic role of trust in relationships is clear (establishing intimacy), it manifests itself slightly differently corresponding to those characteristics which define the relationships themselves. For example, part of what characterizes a friendship as opposed to a familial relationship is that friendships are chosen relationships and familial relationships are not. In a chosen relationship there is less of an assumption of trust. We tend to think that we ought to have a high degree of prima facie trust in members of our family. Consequently, betrayal of a familial relationship can be much more devastating than other forms of betrayal. To use another example, one of the main differences between a friendship relationship and a romantic relationship is that the latter usually involve a higher level of intimacy (both mental and physical) which of course, requires a special kind of vulnerability and trust. So while trust is important and fundamental in all relationships, the role of trust, or the nature of how trust becomes established, can vary depending on the kind of relationship in question.

Another important variable in the role trust plays in various relationships concerns the degree of trust initially granted, and the degree of trust ultimately established. As mentioned above, we approach different people with different degrees of prima facie trust. Family members usually get the highest degree, friends, pals, co-workers, and acquaintances (in descending order) come next, with strangers coming in at the lowest end of the scale. Notice however, that

Govier is advocating some measure of prima facie trust even to strangers. The role that the relationship plays in one’s life usually identifies the level of trust to be established. For example, co-workers do not need to be depended upon to help one deal with a personal crisis, but they do have to be trusted to competently complete their portion of a business project. The level of trust established correlates with the level of harm caused by a possible betrayal.

Perhaps the most important section of the book deals with this issue of betrayal and its aftermath. Govier discusses at length the notions of forgiveness and re-establishing trust. According to Govier, forgiveness and regaining trust are usually positive things for a person who has been betrayed. If the betrayer has shown remorse, and has indicated regret and a willingness to guard against future betrayal, it seems that it is in the best interest of the person betrayed (in terms of closure, and re-establishing the self) to forgive. Govier does discuss what might constitute the unforgivable, but in the end seems to think that, if for no other reason than peace of mind and closure, forgiveness is usually the best choice for a person betrayed. It is at this point that she draws a line between forgiveness and re-establishing trust/relationship. It is one thing to forgive a betrayal, but it may be another thing to re-enter a relationship with some one who is, say, abusive. How exactly we are to draw this line, or what it might mean to forgive but sever a relationship, are issues not pointedly discussed.

If there is a weakness to be found it is in the tone of the book which is, in places, preachy. Descriptions instead of arguments are often offered, even though conclusions are reached, and advice is given. A rather florid picture of inter-personal relationships is drawn, even while topics such as betrayal, abuse, and violence are discussed. To be fair, however, the book is not intended to be a scholarly-type thesis on trust.

The strengths of the book are its accessibility and readability. Govier approaches her discussion of the importance of trust from a real-world perspective and speaks informatively to the reader, whether the reader has a philosophical background or not. The book is more than interesting; it gently encourages one to examine one’s own relationships — the successful and the failed alike.

While probably not appropriate as a primary text, this book would make excellent supplementary reading in a graduate level course. Additionally, anyone — academic or not — interested in inter-personal trust would thoroughly enjoy this book.

ROBIN TAPLEY. University College of the Cariboo
This work was originally published in 1933; the second edition, of which this is a reprint, in 1963. Its revival is perhaps due to a renewed interest in the events leading up to the dominance of analytic philosophy in Anglo-American schools, rather than a continuing interest in the ideas of Meinong, who until recently was seen more in terms of the caricature than in those of Meinong’s contributions to both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions.

The renewed interest in the foundations of analytic philosophy appears not to be a result of students and the other ordinary people’s complaints that this tradition affords too little reality to feelings and ideals but to an indeterminacy in its concept of truth. This is accompanied by attempts to reconstruct the identity theory, such as those of Jennifer Hornsby, who is especially concerned to avoid the idealism apparently implicit in the identity theory of truth. The value of Meinong’s work and Findlay’s study can thus be discerned in Meinong’s realism and his identity theory of truth. However, this work also answers a demand from students with an interest in Gadamer and the challenge to Gadamer’s aesthetics mounted by Roman Ingarden, as the latter’s aesthetics was clearly grounded in a value theory such as Meinong’s.

As Findlay remarked, the ground for, but also a source of the conflict, in the philosophy of Meinong is the realism he adopted from the work of Brentano, who argued for the fundamental distinction between mental states, or Vorstellung, and the judgements we make about our mental states. Our judgements allow us to distance ourselves and to establish the intentionality of these states, as well as giving them the status of acts of referring an ideal content to an object distinct from either the act of referring or the content. Meinong learned from Twardowski to think of the object as immanent in the mental state and to distinguish the object on grounds, for example, that in many cases the object is disqualified from existence owing to its self-contradictory nature, whereas mental acts exist (Balzano’s point); physical objects have nonmental properties; objects can be thought of in many more ways than a finite mind can encompass; and general ideas, such as the idea of a triangle, contain more in their nature than can be contained in a finite content of a mental state. According to Meinong, as opposed to Twardowski, the mental act and its content are the same, and the distinction of the mental act and its object is grounded in the fact that there are nonexistent objects, as in Balzono’s and Twardowski’s view; objects occur in time and are extended in space, whereas the content is outside of space and time; and the idea of the object is needed to individuate the content of ideas.

Only those ideas of objects (“objectives”) subsist if they are facts, that is, if they correspond to existing objects (83). This distinguishes Meinong’s objectives from Russell’s or Moore’s propositions and lays the ground for the identity theory of truth. Truth doesn’t depend on correspondence, as facts are part of the truth of the Urteil (the conviction and the affirmation or denial in an idea), rather than something external, to which ideas correspond. Thus, the relation of a true idea to its object is in no way accidental. Far from its being an external relation, as in the correspondence theory of truth, it is one of identity (88–89). The conflict between the idealism implicit in this theory of truth and the realism of Meinong appears to be the source of Findlay’s main criticism of Meinong’s work, that “his researches really indicate … a deep inseparability between our conscious approaches and the features we discern in the world, the senselessness of trying to deal with the one without bringing in the other” (340).

Objects and the apprehension of objects differ, according to Meinong, in that the latter exists independently of time and space and in its being universal. For example, an idea of a relation relates terms that are independent in the object but necessarily connected in the idea of the object. This is what Findlay meant by saying their relation is “ideal.” Findlay observed that the object and the idea are nevertheless interdependent: the relational property on the side of the mental is generated through the relation, whereas the adequacy of the relation depends on the properties of the object (40–41). As a consequence of this Platonistic split between the idea and the object, Meinong was unable to allow the reality of the noesis noeseos, which cannot have even the quasi existence (Quasisein) of a contradictory object in the realm of the outer existence (Außersein) reserved for the nonexistent, merely subsisting objects of thought. But this enabled Meinong to respond to Russell’s more important objection: not the argument that the theory countenances the existence of the round square but that if the object corresponding to the idea of the round square is really round then the object corresponding to the idea of the really existing round square really exists (105), an ontological proof of the round square. On Meinong’s view, the round square fails to exist in that it fails to have the “modal moment” constituting the truth of the idea. Although this approach seems to imply a modal moment for each modal moment, Meinong could deny a modal moment requires a modal moment because “such an assumption would resemble that of some one who attempted to think of the very thought he was thinking; in both cases, according to Meinong, not even an impossible object would be presented but only a complete void” (107). This may also enable one to respond to Findlay’s objection to Meinong’s concept of negative facts, the problem that gave rise
to Russell’s theory of descriptions and the dominant preoccupation of analytic philosophy. Although Findlay seemed to be correct to remark that the idea of a complete knowledge would have to include the negative fact that there are no other truths (51–52), one can contend that this self-reflective idea is never formed in even an infinite understanding.

According to Meinong, one’s inner experience and judgement cannot be identified because the latter is diachronic, whereas the former is synchronic (233). Thus, on the one hand, Meinong appeared to reject the possibility of the idea of idea. On the other hand, Bradley’s infinite regress of relations to their terms, although unavoidable, really suggests no difficulty if Meinong succeeds in the argument that the regress is only vicious if the original relation fails to do its work (146). According to Meinong, “a continuum is ... an object of a higher order founded upon indeterminate constituents” (150), suggesting that the further development of ideas of idea is really to be expected because of the objectivity of their objects and is really just the mind’s further exploration of the object’s reality. And the epistemological problem of the infinite regress of ideas of idea is overcome according to Meinong, as in Aristotle’s thought, through immediate understanding (190).

However, if Findlay was correct, Meinong’s solution to the ontological problem neglects the determinate reality of the relation as a whole complex over and above its parts: “a relation is really nothing but a curious characteristic which cannot inhere in one object alone, but only in a number of objects, and in each only in so far as it inhereis in the others as well” (150). On this score, it is interesting to note that Findlay suggested the idea currently developed in Falkenstein’s work on Kant’s aesthetic: such complex ideas as those of space and time are more likely to occur “by some purely physiological synthesis” (248) than as ideal complexes, as in Meinong’s understanding. Overall, Findlay was uncomfortable with Meinong’s indeterminate, incomplete objects, with their failure to conform to the law of the excluded middle (162), and the incomplete object’s being apprehended in ways suggestive of complete objects (183). Using Johnson’s determinable–determinate conception of the relation of the universal to particular objects, Findlay suggested the alternative view on which the concrete is discovered in the universal relation, rather than the relation discovered the unfolding of thought about the concrete: “there are indeterminate characteristics, relations and objectives, and there are indeterminate objects which, if they were fully determinate, would be concrete things” (165). A relation or universal is thus a primary reality, such that, for example, when we use blue, it refers to “a perfectly definite determinate of certain determinations, and has a being of its own” (83).

The idea of the incomplete object is nevertheless the ground, in Meinong’s work, for the concept of the “implexive” so-being of objects in thought: for example, the idea of the isosceles triangle is contained in this way in that of the triangle (125, 169–170). The object, for Meinong, is only given to consciousness through the determinate content of the idea (173), that is, “auxiliary objects” (178), or objects considered partially complete. With the auxiliary object, there are nuclear and extranuclear properties (176). Whereas to be analytic, a property must be nuclear to the auxiliary object, “synthetic judgements can only be about incomplete objects” (181). All this is crucial to Meinong’s conception of the possible and probabilistic judgements.

These are about the relation of the idea of an object to its factuality, and the possible is always due to a certain tendency in the idea of an object, for Meinong; so, for example, a right-angled triangle is less probably actual than a scalene, as the right angled has “a narrower range of variation” (212). Counterfactuals require a possible-worlds semantics; however, only incomplete objects are shared between worlds (217). This understanding of the possible also pertains to sensory perception, memory and induction as sources of knowledge, according to Meinong, as the inner sense of assurance about perception, memory and induction and the impossibility of reasoning without ideas of memory (260, 262–263).

Although Findlay recognized that the drift of Meinong’s thought steered toward the view of existence as concreteness, which would help in answering many of Findlay’s objections, an objection to concreteness as existence is, as Findlay remarked, that the reality of a thing appears to involve its thinness; no matter the detail in which we conceive of the reality of a thing, it has to intuitively exist (245). A response to this objection might be that this criterion of existence is met for concepts in as much as objects have value, according to Meinong, as this appears to give the requisite meaning to objects. Value appears to consist in effects on the Urteil in confrontation with the structure of objects. The feeling arising from an object is its “dignitative," and the desires arising from dignitatives are “desideratives" (312–313). One can argue that the thinness of the concept is supplied in the way the infinite regress of the more and more concrete conception of a thing is overcome from the epistemic viewpoint, through the intuition of the object, the ways the object impacts on one’s attitude of concern. One can also remark that Meinong correctly distinguished this phenomenon from desire, on grounds that desire is for the nonexistent object but the experience of value occurs in as much as the object is considered to exist (267). Only the fact of a thing — “existence for thought and belief” (268) — can explain value, and this involves judgement. Thus, one can also discover a value in knowing (271) and in imagining (291–293).

Against this view of the value of objects, Findlay raised the most important objections. A number of paradoxes, for example, result from Meinong’s insistence that self-sacrifice is a virtue, and these paradoxes reflect
that merit has more to do with increasing good than decreasing evil (287).
According to Findlay, we cannot balance the infinite good of absent evils against the infinite evil of absent good, and the problem is again that Meinong identifies the good with the mere absence of evil (297–299). A lot of value experience derives from finding things with a certain potential, but it is difficult to say what has to be realized of this potential to explain the value of these objects, that is, without reference to a "natural value concept" developed by an individual (300–301). One may argue that it stems from a failure to recognize the implications of Meinong's solution to the epistemological problem of the infinite regress, as the effects of auxiliary objects on our attitudes of concern do not have to follow a measurable or universal pattern. Sometimes, as Findlay remarked, "feeling seems to depend on prior desire," and the two, desire and feeling, appear to be two "ways of experiencing the same attitude" (291). We value the nonbeing of some things. One can also solve this problem supposing 1) the distinction of desire and the attitude of concern, and 2) allowing that desire is among the effects of auxiliary objects on our attitudes of concern.

The importance of Findlay's study derives from its criticism of the early rejection of Meinong among the English-speaking philosophers and the ways this rejection affected the course of the analytic tradition up to and including the later writings of Wittgenstein; its highlighting, especially for English-speaking readers, an important foundational influence on the phenomenological tradition; and its possible referentialization of both traditions with its critical remarks. Although Findlay criticized the empirical factor in linguistic philosophy and praised Meinong's "brave rejection of the 'prejudice in favour of the actual'" (321), a greater emphasis on the immediate reality of ideas was, according to Findlay, a necessary counterweight to Meinong's realism of objects. Findlay may have overlooked the possibility that the theory of values would help to provide this counterweight, but Meinong's realism undermines any understanding of the relation of objects and their values.

JAMES THOMAS, Ottawa, Canada

Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture and Politics
ALAN D. SCHRIFT, ed.

Every new anthology requires a justification. In this case, the apparent occasion for yet another suite of Nietzsche papers is the creeping sense—aroused by Ferry and Renaut's Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, published in France nine years ago—that Nietzsche is no longer relevant in a "post-postmodern world" (3). Despite the paucity of evidence for such an international philosophical conspiracy, this collection seeks to (re)establish the centrality of Nietzsche's multifaceted work in contemporary theoretical reflections upon our sprawling cultural and political landscapes. This means, however, that the focus of the contributors is not so much "getting Nietzsche 'right'" (4) as it is establishing his continuing importance for these ongoing debates. When Daniel Conway writes that Nietzsche unwittingly "attracts treacherous followers who will betray him and distort his teachings to suit their own designs," (38) we have good reason to apply this observation to his fellow contributors. Do not expect, therefore, to find a great deal of detailed, textual work on the sense of eternal recurrence, or the nature of will to power, or the implications of perspectivism. And do not expect any light shed on Nietzsche's complex relationships with post-Kantian German philosophers, for the Nietzsche presented here is largely the forward-looking anticipator of recent French theory, agonal democracy, and American "culture wars." Indeed, a quick scan of the index reveals that Rush Limbaugh receives about the same number of citations as Hegel. By design, then, the more conventional preoccupations of Nietzsche scholars get short shrift in a volume that is more Nietzschean in spirit than about Nietzsche's thought per se.

The question then becomes the meaning of this Nietzschean spirit. If it means, as it does for someone like Stanley Rosen, a recovery of Nietzsche's authorial intentions, then breathless claims of how "Nietzsche queers the phallus" (25) will seem scandalously inconsistent with that spirit. But if it means, as it does for Foucault, unfaithfulness to the letter of the text, then the groans and protests of Nietzsche's words will seem but a minor irritation on the way to an ever-expanding range of theoretical and political uses. In other words, if Nietzsche-as-handmaiden can help us to get somewhere, then we shouldn't worry too much about what Nietzsche himself would think of the destination. Certainly in this collection, it is Foucault's meaning that prevails. In many of these invited articles, one senses that a perfidious nod in Nietzsche's direction merely secures the liberty to go on and discuss the real topic at hand—be it Foucault, Lacan, Arendt, modern literature or feminism—much like those wearisome, off-topic conference papers which
bend and twist and perform acrobatics in order to appear to address a conference theme. There is doubtless much to learn from Nietzsche's many contemporaries, but one wonders whether a volume on Nietzsche is the appropriate venue for much of this material.

Specifically, the papers themselves are as diverse in quality as they are in subject matter. With a few exceptions, however, they tend to feature either The Birth of Tragedy or On the Genealogy of Morals as their points of departure. One is left wondering, consequently, about the relevance of "middle" works like Human, All Too Human—a text which arguably offers more detailed remarks about art, culture and politics than the more renowned earlier and later books. The volume itself is divided into three sections: "Drama," "Cultural Dramatics," and "Culture and the Political." Since Alan Schrift also provides an introduction wherein these papers are all clearly summarized, I will limit my remarks to those papers which especially merit either critical praise or blame.

There are two interesting papers in part one, written by Daniel Conway and David Allison respectively. Conway and Allison are veterans of the Nietzsche scene, and although neither piece is especially substantive, each attempts to work through an important issue without feeling compelled to situate Nietzsche in 1960s Paris. Conway provocatively examines how Nietzsche's late work failed to give birth to future generations of appropriate disciples—"swashbuckling warrior-genealogists" (37)—because Nietzsche's self-understanding inadequately comprehended his own decadence and decay. This is a key issue, and strikingly relevant to Nietzsche's philosophical legacy, but Conway himself works in broad brush strokes, and his thesis is consequently weakened by a lack of careful, specific, textual support. Allison's thesis is more manageable, focusing on how Nietzsche's early discussion of our ecstatic responses to music have been largely confirmed by contemporary psychoacoustical research. Of interest is Allison's (continuing) attention to the 1871 work, "On Music and Words," wherein Nietzsche begins to break free of Schopenhauer and romanticism by arguing that our ego-suspending, ecstatic responses are triggered by "the subjective states of our experience of music," (69) such that the very opposition between subject and object is elided. The fact that we now have scientific evidence that the resolution of dissonance may stimulate the release of endorphins provides an interesting footnote to Nietzsche's theory, but it is hardly the stuff on which Nietzsche's continuing relevance ought to rest. Shedding new light on a little-noticed but significant work ought to be sufficiently meritorious. Does our estimation of Nietzsche really hang in the balance of linking Dionysus to neurochemistry?

Unfortunately, part one also contains some of the weaker essays in the volume. Debra Bergoffen's "Oedipal Dramas" and John Burt Foster's "Zarathustrian Millennialism before the Millennium: From Bely to Yeats to Malraux" are perhaps the worst offenders of the disappointing trends mentioned above. Bergoffen's essay is often mired in Lacanian jargon; Foster's essay is not really about Zarathustra at all, and he does not manage to do justice to any one of these literary figures either. Duncan Large's essay, "Nietzsche's Shakespearian Figures," promises much, and is indeed a useful prolegomenon for further work, but ultimately devolves into an almost historical tour through Shakespeare's German reception and his changing status within Nietzsche's own biography without really getting to the heart of Nietzsche's philosophical interest in the great Bard's drama.

Five more articles fall under the "Cultural Dramatics" heading. Judith Butler's contribution on Nietzsche and Freud is the sole paper not written for the anthology, and since it is part of a recent book, I will not comment on it here. The best paper in the volume is co-authored by David Owen and Aaron Ridley. They conclude that Nietzsche's frequent invocation of human types should not be taken as evidence of biologist, since "only a cultural understanding of human types can make sense of Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and of his therapeutic ambitions" (137—my italics). This paper receives the highest grade since it provides an extended, systematic argument connecting Nietzsche's strategic employment of human typologies with his deeper philosophical criticism of modern culture. Linking surface and depth, establishing consistency across diverse texts, and challenging superficial interpretations: surely these critical practices exemplify the kind of effort and intelligence Nietzsche would want from his readers.

The most bizarre paper of the volume is Alphonso Lingis' "Satyrs and Centaurs: Miscegenation and the Master Race," which manages to trade in scholarly protocols for extended phenomenological ramblings on topics ranging from the nature of our moral perceptions to our erotic attractions. Lingis attempts to wax poetic, but at one point falls embarrassingly into the depths of what can only be called philosophical soft porn: "Whether we are straight or gay, we feel our penis pulsing when we look over some rocks in the summer beach and see a man writhing under a gleaming erection" (160). The essay lumbers on to critique several of Nietzsche's quasi-biological categories, and as such we must wait for the likes of Owen and Ridley to set things right.

Schrift's own essay considers Nietzsche's place within the context of recent cultural and academic squabbles. Schrift is a fine scholar, and has done more than anyone to track Nietzsche's reception in French thought; I have certainly learned much from his earlier books. But I wonder if the local anti-Nietzschean sentiments in some pockets of France and the hot air of American conservatives really merit such consideration. As in one or two other papers, Schrift's concern with the present state of cultural and academic affairs will, I am afraid, unwittingly erode the continuing relevance of his paper as the
issues, themes and proper names change. For now, however, it is an interesting glance at Nietzsche’s unique place in the current mix.

The final section contains three of the stronger (and longer) papers, but again their treatment of Nietzsche’s work as a means rather than an end may not be endearing to Nietzsche purists. In “Nietzsche for Politics,” Wendy Brown is surely on the right track when she suggests that Nietzsche’s enduring political contribution resides in his capacity to expose and challenge extant political. But this thesis, important on its own, is needlessly complicated by the unwelcome admixture of largely unsupported remarks about the nature of democracy which Brown extracts from Tocqueville and a particular reading of Spinoza. We learn, for example, of democracy’s “relatively automatic cathexis onto undemocratic principles” (208).

Dana Villa, a top Arendt scholar, discusses Arendt’s political appropriation of Nietzsche’s agonistic ideal in light of recent political theoretical complaints that procedural liberalism stifles difference and conflict in the name of a homogenizing stability. Villa’s contribution is very fine indeed, although again Nietzsche’s texts serve as a mere point of departure for a more wide-ranging look at democratic theory and public life. This use of Nietzsche continues in Jeffrey Nealon’s piece wherein the phenomenon of white male anger is examined through a Nietzschean lens. Unfortunately, the very effort to make Nietzsche seem topical and relevant is undermined by the fact that the phenomenon under consideration is already fading from the cultural radar screen. One wonders who will find this essay relevant in five or ten years.

Other Nietzsche anthologies such as Allison’s The New Nietzsche and Gillespie and Strong’s Nietzsche’s New Seas sustain our interest because the essays are uniformly strong—some classically important—and the focus of each volume is coherent. Schrift’s new collection also contains several fine papers, but it is difficult to see how it might shape our future understanding of Nietzsche or even be considered essential reading by philosophers who need no reminding of Nietzsche’s obvious, continuing importance.

JONATHAN SALEM-WISEMAN, Humber College

---

The Just
PAUL RICOEUR

The Just, translated by David Pellauer, is the most recent of Ricoeur’s works available in English. Originally published in 1995 as Le Juste it is a collection of essays from the early 1990s focusing on political and legal philosophy.

A review of a collection such as this one must begin with an awareness of its location in the author’s oeuvre. This is necessary because Paul Ricoeur is not usually identified as a ‘political philosopher’. Most often those who know his work are familiar with it because of their interest in other philosophical areas such as phenomenology and hermeneutics, or--given the wide-ranging project of Time and Narrative--history, literary criticism, and action theory. However, political philosophy has never been far from Ricoeur’s most explicit concerns. A proper appreciation of The Just starts with this recognition. For example, to draw on a theme that is explicitly raised within this collection, the “political paradox” was already a subject of concern for Ricoeur in 1957 when he published an essay by that name in Esprit.2 Throughout his career and, finally, in the text that represents the climax of that distinguished career,3 the same concern for politics, ethics, and morality is present. Thus, The Just demands to be read as the most recent advance in Ricoeur’s life-long project of rigorous political reflection.

While all of what has been said above about Ricoeur’s political concerns remains true, it needs to be pointed out that the particular kind of advance that is marked by this collection is specified by its explicitly juridical theme. Along with the fine explanation of the so-called ‘little ethics’4 of Oneself as Another, Ricoeur’s own Preface provides his rationale for taking up philosophy from a distinctly juridical perspective. He argues that, because of the great terrors of the twentieth century, political philosophy has become preoccupied with a philosophy of history that is overwhelmed by questions of political evil (viii). As a result, the juridical (and with it the question of justice) has been neglected (vii). As a corrective to this, he argues that “[t]he juridical, comprehended through the features of the judiciary, could provide philosophy the occasion to reflect upon the specificity of right and the law, in its proper setting, midway between moral philosophy... and politics” (ix). This, then, is Ricoeur’s foremost concern in The Just.

The first two essays—“Who Is the Subject of Rights” and “The Concept of Responsibility”—draw on the philosophical anthropology developed most specifically in Oneself as Another. For readers well-versed in Ricoeur’s arguments from his most recent philosophy, these essays provide both
familiar ground and new developments. For example, by focusing on the concept of 'imputation' the essay on responsibility provides a restatement of many of Ricoeur's pivotal claims about action and initiative (see, particularly, pages 3-19). In light of this, we find a very interesting assessment of the Walzer's arguments. Further, Ricoeur's engagement of these two American authors is made more interesting by his intention to set their arguments in conversation with pertinent European thinkers. For example, his first essay on Rawls includes a very interesting reference to Jean-Pierre Dupuy, a student of René Girard, who argues that Rawls' position works on an "anti-sacrificial principle" and, for that reason, provides a profound critique of utilitarianism (39, 48). Likewise, his essay on Walzer is actually an essay on both Walzer's book, Spheres of Justice, and Luc Boltanski's and Laurent Thévenot's book, De la justification: les économies de la grandeur. Finally, one wonders, why Rawls and Walzer? Readers familiar with Ricoeur's work of the 1980s will be aware of his inclusive interests in American philosophy. One could, therefore, attribute his interest in Rawls and Walzer simply to this more general philosophical inclusivity. It seems, however, that there is more to it than that. In fact, if one is going to make Ricoeur at his word and seek a kind of political philosophy that is not preoccupied with the 'philosophy of history,' figures such as Rawls and Walzer make for worthwhile interlocutors.

The next essay--"Aesthetic Judgement and Political Judgement According to Hannah Arendt"--provides the turning point in the collection. In this essay Ricoeur takes up Arendt's claim that one can construct a theory of political judgement on the basis of Kant's notion of 'aesthetic judgement' developed in his Critique of Judgement. The key move, which allows this essay to serve as a philosophical transition into the following studies that deal specifically with matters of a juridical nature, comes in the final pages. After considering the important role of reflexive judgement in two of Kant's later texts on the philosophy of history, Ricoeur takes up Arendt's refusal to follow Kant in his path from a philosophy of history to a political philosophy. Noting the advantages of such a refusal, Ricoeur argues that Arendt's contribution lies, first, in her formulation of the relationship between a "spectator" (corresponding to one with aesthetic 'taste') and an "actor" (corresponding to the aesthetic 'genius') within the political realm and, second, in her location of that relationship within a dialectic between "retrospection" and "prospection." He is, however, critical of Arendt's project to the extent that he asks "[i]s not the required place for active and prospective citizens, as in a text like Perpetual Peace (1795), better defined by the "Doctrine of Right" (1796) than by an extrapolation from the judgement of taste?" (107). In agreement with Arendt, Ricoeur argues that political judgement will not be best understood in terms of a philosophy of history. In disagreement with her, however, he also argues that it will not be any better served by appeals to aesthetic judgement. The way ahead, he claims, is through a philosophy of law.

The four remaining essays in the collection deal more explicitly with questions of the philosophy of law and the judicial process. "Interpretation and/or Argumentation" addresses the question of the relationship between interpretation and argumentation through an analysis of the work of Ronald Dworkin and two European philosophers, Robert Alexy and Manuel Atienza. Ricoeur's purpose in this essay is to show that the judicial process--from the uncertain beginning of the trial to the establishment of the verdict--is in need of a dialectical understanding of interpretation and argumentation in the same way as a dialectical understanding of explanation and understanding is needed in the human sciences (109-110). This essay provides an excellent example of the applicability of Ricoeur's hermeneutical studies to his current studies in the philosophy of law. Both legal philosophers who are unfamiliar with Ricoeur's earlier work and readers familiar with his hermeneutical theory will find this essay to be very rewarding.

"The Act of Judging" takes up and develops two important notions from the 'little ethics' portion of Oneself as Another. First, in the analysis of institutional life which one finds there, Ricoeur locates 'conflict' at a basic level of human existence by connecting it to the inherently tragic dimension of action: "The tragedy of Antigone touches what, following Steiner, we can call the agonistic ground of human experience." Such conflict, according to Ricoeur, takes the form of violence when the power of an individual or group is manifested as 'power-over' another. In the present essay, Ricoeur returns to these notions of conflict and violence and thereby accounts for that which lies behind the trial process: "Behind the trial process lies conflict, differences of opinion, quarrels, litigation -- and behind conflict lies violence" (130). It is for this reason that the judicial actions of a State manifest its "choice of discourse over violence" and, as a result, make a decisive break between justice and vengeance (130). Thus, as Ricoeur introduces early in his Preface, a political philosophy that finds is bearings in a philosophy of law will take as its referent "social peace" rather than war (ix). However, another important concept from Oneself as Another must be appealed to in order to give substance to this notion of social peace: "recognition". Ricoeur's appeal to social peace is not to be mistaken for a tender-hearted yearning for reconciliation, love and pardon. Instead it is has to do with both parties (i.e.,
the winner and loser of the case) being able to recognise the rationality of their opponent and, particularly in the case of criminal law, the rationality of the verdict. Thus, as well as bringing to a close the uncertainty of the actual trial process, the act of judging also performs a social role by renewing the equilibrium that was upset by the initial act of violence.

In the final two essays—"Sanction, Rehabilitation, Pardon" and "Conscience and the Law"—Ricoeur continues his reflections on the judicial process. In the first of the two essays he develops his notion of "just distance" (134) by elaborating his distinction between justice and vengeance through an account of the "third party" (134-136). The last of the two essays makes clear what, for Ricoeur, is his own genuine contribution to moral and legal philosophy. In the Preface, Ricoeur notes the "tendency to limit [his] contribution [in Oneself as Another] to the discussion of the moral problem, to the opposition between a teleological and a deontological approach" (xxi). This, he says, is a mistaken reading. Instead, he continues, "the two studies in Oneself as Another devoted to the two levels of moral judgement governed by predicates of the good and the obligatory (Studies 7 and 8) are merely preparatory exercises for the confrontation that gives me the most difficulty, the confrontation with those situations I place globally under the heading of the tragic dimension of action" (xxi). Essential to this recognition is the awareness that it is in actually applying the law to particular cases wherein the circumstances are far from predictable or 'normal', that both teleological and deontological perspectives are gathered up and transcended. Thus, a notion like "conviction"—as it is developed in Study 9 of Oneself as Another—must be articulated so as to enlighten the judicial process. The essay, "Conscience and the Law", is an attempt to further elaborate such a notion. Concerning this essay, Ricoeur writes in the Preface:

"[T]he thesis outlined above that the deontological point of view cannot eclipse the teleological point of view on the level of a general theory of justice finds a complement in the thesis that the just in the final analysis qualifies a unique decision made within a climate of conflict and incertitude. The search for justice ends with a heartfelt conviction, set in motion by the wish to live in just institutions, and ratified by the rule of justice for which procedural formalism serves to guarantee impartiality (xxi)."

Overall, The Just is a collection of diverse yet coherent essays by a major philosophical mind of our time. It will appeal to Ricoeur scholars, political and ethical scholars, and legal scholars alike. While some of the ideas could certainly have been expanded upon (the important final essay is only nine pages in length) they are presented in a clear and readable fashion that has come to be expected of Ricoeur's work.

DARREN DAHL, University of Guelph

4 The so-called 'little ethics' of Oneself as Another refers to Studies 7, 8, and 9 (169-296).
5 Oneself as Another, 243.
6 Oneself as Another, 220.
7 Oneself as Another, 190.