That Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze shared a range of philosophical, social, and critical interests while also maintaining an uncommon friendship is hardly open to dispute. Given their strong intellectual and personal bonds, Deleuze preferred to discuss Foucault’s concepts in depth and breadth rather than anecdotally. For Deleuze’s volume on Foucault in fact covers a broad range of topics, many of which fold back into several developed with Parnet both in their 1977 Dialogues and in L’Abécédaire. How the concept of friendship emerges in Deleuze’s reading along the interstices of Foucault’s texts is the focus of this essay.

One might expect that in addressing this peculiar friendship I would commence with the fact that they ended up not speaking to each other for most of the final decade of Foucault’s life. However, besides having already considered the nature of this distanced relationship elsewhere, I also find that their explicit estrangement is not all that different from many of the intellectual relationships among men of the 1940s-1950s generation. As Foucault told the Japanese interviewer Moriaki Watanabe, “I belong perhaps to a rather old-fashioned generation for whom friendship is something at once capital and superstitious.... Friendship for me is a kind of a secret Freemasonry, but with some visible points” (Foucault 1994, 589, my translation). Deleuze was equally drawn to this conception of friendship: already in Dialogues he said that while he could speak of things he and Foucault had discussed, what mattered was “really to encounter this aggregate of sounds hammered out, decisive gestures, ideas of tinder and fire, extreme attention and abrupt closure, laughter and smiles that one senses are ‘dangerous’ at the very moment that one receives their tenderness—this aggregate as a unique combination whose proper name would be Foucault” (Deleuze and Parnet 2002, 11, translation modified). He then says in L’Abécédaire that whereas there are people whom one can never understand or speak to even on the simplest matters, there are others with whom one might disagree completely, but can understand deeply and profoundly even in the most abstract things, linked through this indeterminate basis that he considers so mysterious. He admits that his relations with Foucault were of this
mysterious kind, not needing to speak in order to appreciate and
understand each other (F as in Fidelity). Thus, however illuminating it
might be, the direct approach—through personal biography and even
through chronological review of Deleuze’s writing on Foucault and
reciprocally—seems of less interest than finding an oblique angle into
and through their works. Hence, this search for an alternate entry to
their folds of friendship seems more consonant with the form and sub­
stance of these writings and relations. To provide an illustration for this
search, I submit for your consideration the peculiar drawing that appears
at the end of Foucault in order to suggest that it constitutes perhaps the
most visible, if not necessarily most immediately comprehensible, mark
of friendship possible between the two philosophers. To account for this
graphic as a deliberate mark of friendship, let me recall how this study
itself folds backward from the 1980s and the time of Deleuze’s seminar
on Foucault and commences with two chapters that are significantly
revised versions of essays originally published in the French journal
Critique (1970, on The Archaeology of Knowledge), then five years later
(1975, on Discipline and Punish). Again, my purpose in looking at these
two essays is to find the interstices or seams along which I can trace the
fold of friendship and to lead back to the graphic with which Foucault
concludes.

One such moment comes in the first essay, “The New Archivist.” In
exploring the originality of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, Deleuze
refers to Foucault’s book on Raymond Roussel, suggesting its affinity to
Foucault’s confrontation with the statement and, within it, the repetition of
“something else,” an outside, the new domain “of power and its relation
to knowledge” (Deleuze 1988, 12). Deleuze calls Foucault’s orienta­
tion to these statements as creating multiplicities and claims that the
Archaeology represents “the most decisive step yet taken in the theory­
practice of multiplicities” (Deleuze 1988, 14). Deleuze likens this project to
Blanchot’s commitment to maintaining “the most rigorous links be­
tween the singular and the plural, the neutral and repetition” (Deleuze
1988, 14), and here Deleuze creates what I judge to be the seam, fold,
or doublure that I seek. “Perhaps, in this archaeology,” says Deleuze,
“Foucault offers us less a discourse on his method than the poem of his
previous works, and reaches the point where philosophy is necessarily
poetry, the forceful poetry of what is said, which is also the poetry both
of non-sense and of the most profound sense” (Deleuze 1988, 18,
translation modified).

As a culminating, summative statement, Deleuze can offer no higher
praise given that, for him, philosophy’s greatest achievement is to main­
tain direct and active relations with non-philosophy. But as much as
Deleuze’s praise is its own kind of poetry, a distinct method operates
here. For as Deleuze maintains, Foucault can indeed declare that “he has
never written anything but fiction for, as we have seen, statements re­
semble dreams and are transformed as in a kaleidoscope, depending on
the corpus in question and the diagonal line being traced” (Deleuze
1988, 18, translation modified). Then, describing how multiplicities
abound in Foucault’s work, discursive and non-discursive, traversing di­
verse thresholds—scientific, aesthetic, ethical, and political—all leading to
“the formation of the archaeology-poem,” Deleuze lets loose with a
clarion call to brothers in arms:

[What is essential] is to have discovered and surveyed that un­
known land where a literary form, a scientific proposition, a com­
mon phrase, a schizophrenic piece of non-sense, and so on, are
also statements, but lacking a common denominator, without any
possible reduction or discursive equivalences. This is what had
never before been attained by logicians, formalists or interpreters
(Deleuze 1988, 20, translation modified).

What Deleuze and Foucault share, he argues, is the serial method, at
once to undermine the sequential mode of envisaging history that serves
to glorify the Subject (Deleuze 1988, 21) and to “traverse the different
levels, and cross all thresholds, ... [in order to] form a transversal or
mobile diagonal line along which the archaeologist-archivist must move”
(Deleuze 1988, 22).

The following chapter, “The New Cartographer,” a rigorous study of
Discipline and Punishment, bears many substantive marks of Deleuze’s
ongoing collaboration with Guattari in the 1970s. But Deleuze is frank in
his assessment: “Foucault is not content to say that we must rethink
certain notions; he does not even say it; he just does it, and in this way
proposes ... a different theory, a different praxis of struggle, a differ­
et set of strategies” (Deleuze 1988, 30). To do so, Foucault proposes the
diagram, “no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a carto­
graphy that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract
machine” (Deleuze 1988, 34). Deleuze then follows creatively the means
in which the diagram and machinic assemblages manifest themselves in
Foucault’s reflections on the technologies of power and, indeed, how
“the history of forms, the archive, is doubled by an evolution of forces,
the diagram” (Deleuze 1988, 43).

Were this rigorous analysis all that Deleuze develops in the second
chapter of Foucault, his close reading would already be a stunning ex­
pression of friendship. But the chapter’s final lines produce the seam that
I extend from the initial chapter. For in describing how one diagram to
the next necessarily overlaps serially in the extension of a new carto-
graphy, Deleuze concludes that “there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of creativity, change and resistance,” and thus, through the “style” of the struggles in each age, “we can understand the succession of diagrams or the way in which they become linked up again above and beyond the discontinuities” (Deleuze 1988, 44). For each diagram constitutes a poem as well as a struggle and a mode of resistance, and as such, “each diagram,” says Deleuze, “testifies to the twisting line of the outside spoken of by Melville, without beginning or end, an oceanic line that passed through all points of resistance, pitches diagrams against one another, and operates always as a function of the most recent diagram” (Deleuze 1988, 44, translation modified). From this explicit reference to Melville and the line of becoming, Deleuze creates the bridge between forces of resistance, an implicit poetic register, and the struggles of creativity: “And what a strange twist of the line was 1968, the line with a thousand aberrations! From this we get the triple definition of writing: to write is to struggle and resist; to write is to become; to write is to draw a map: [in Foucault’s words] ‘I am a cartographer’” (Deleuze 1988, 44).

The implicit poetic reference here—to “the line of a thousand aberrations”—is to Henri Michaux’s text Miserable Miracle (in English, “Miserable Miracle: Mescaline”), a text that itself translates a particular line of becoming, the becoming-molecular in microperceptions, particle movement, emissions of haecceities, in short, the means by which descriptions of experiencing drug use reveal the inherently complex powers of perception. As Deleuze and Guattari deploy Michaux’s work in A Thousand Plateaus, such experience would result in “[n]othing left but the world of speeds and slownesses without form, without subject, without face. Nothing left but the zigzag of a line, like 'the lash of the whip of an enraged cart driver' shredding faces and landscapes. A whole rhizomatic labor of perception, the moment when desire and perception meld” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 283). In citing this text, especially the reference to Michaux’s “lash of the whip,” I connect points of the seam that I pursue here—from the “archaeology-poem” to the passages on the line of Ahab and the whiplash and aberrations inherent to Foucault’s cartographic enterprise. For such passages also constitute the microfine perceptions through which the new cartographer maps the diagram and thereby launches writing as resistance and becoming.

The citation to Michaux in the final lines of Chapter 2 of Foucault helps us move forward along this seam thanks to Deleuze’s return to the same image of the whiplash at the end of Chapter 5. One way to situate this seam is with reference to the book’s poetic “outside,” as it were, which also is very much its inside, as we shall see. I refer again specifi-
subjectivation around interlocking modes of seeing, speaking, and thinking.

Yet between the strata is a horizontal relation and movement, "a diagram of forces or particular features which are taken up by relations: a strategy" such that, Deleuze claims, "if strata are of the earth, then a strategy belongs to the air or to the ocean" (Deleuze 1988, 121). Let us not forget Melville's contorted line, with its threat of sweeping us out to sea, thus demanding integration and differentiation, that is, organization, through "the relations between forces [that] ignored the fissure within the strata" (Deleuze 1988, 122). Here again the particular features return on the strata, features "taken up by the relations between forces, but [also] particular features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the unstable diagram" (Deleuze 1988, 122). The vertical ascending and descending movement, then, links to the horizontal tensions and torsions at and around the core, and one needs to imagine this graphic as throbbing, pulsating, with the violence that must occur when the creative processes engage necessarily with resistance through the whirlpash of thought. For at the core is located the seam to which the poetic citations refer, that "terrible line that shuffles all the diagrams, above the very raging storms" of the informal outside. Yet however terrible are the movements of Melville's line, "whose two ends remain free, which envelops every boat in its complex twists and turns," or of Michaux's line "of a thousand aberrations' ... which is the 'whiplash of a furious charioteer,'" they constitute "a line of life that can no longer be gauged by relations between forces, one that carries man beyond terror," to the "center of the cyclone where one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence" (Deleuze 1988, 122).

This "inside space but coextensive with the whole line of the outside" (Deleuze 1988, 123) nonetheless is inherently a space of resistance insofar as it is also a space of creativity. Deleuze cites another Michaux title in calling this most distant point converted into the nearest one "life within the folds" [la vie dans les plis], "the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself" (Deleuze 1988, 123). This process of auto-affection, of the production of "major and perfect accord", is what Deleuze ascribes to Leibniz, in The Fold, as an integration "in a pleasure that can be continued, prolonged, renewed, multiplied [and] that can proliferate, be reflexive and attractive for other accords, that give us the force to go further and further" (Deleuze 1993, 131). This pleasure, Deleuze concludes, is "a 'felicity' specific to the soul; it is harmonic par excellence, and can even be felt in the midst of the worst sufferings, such as in the joy of martyrs" (Deleuze 1993, 131).

The two models in Foucault and in The Fold—the "sonic echo of the battle raging above" the strata surrounding subjectivation in the former,
the monad straddling several worlds and now open to world forces in the
latter—become the struggle with chaos in What Is Philosophy? in which
the scientist, the artist, and the philosopher must engage each in his or
her own way, casting planes over the chaos, but also to defeat chaos
only at the price of "tear[ing] open the firmament and plung[ing] into
the chaos" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 202). This struggle is waged in
philosophical thought by bringing together its concepts in friendship
"traversed by a fissure that leads [concepts] back to hatred or disperses
them in the coexisting chaos where it is necessary to take them up
again, to seek them out, to make a leap" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994,
203). This is the locus at which thought, creativity, and resistance are
conjoined, poets and artists "tear[ing] open the firmament itself, to let in
a bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that
appears through the rent" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 203), a process
to which science and philosophy correspond in their own ways: "what
would thinking be," Deleuze and Guattari ask, "if it did not constantly
confront chaos?" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 208).

Thus, in Foucault, Deleuze attempts to situate the confrontations of
inside and outside, of creativity and resistance, within the relatively more
accessible framework of his friend's philosophical project, to map the
confrontation in a work that is not just a tribute to a friend but also a
"book of philosophy ... [in which] I was claiming that [Foucault] never
turned into a historian but always remained a great philosopher" (Deleuze
1995, 162). To Foucault's "archaeology-poem," Deleuze responds with
his own "diagram-poem," and identifies it directly with his friend
since, in the French edition (omitted from the English translation), the
caption under his graphic reads "Diagramme de Foucault"—at once
Foucault's diagram and a diagram of Foucault. The nexus of subjectivity
and thought developed by Deleuze's "diagramme de Foucault" conjoins
friendship and intercessors to creativity, forces of creativity to resistance,
and resistance itself to thinking.

To those who might object that Deleuze does violence to Foucault's
thought in such a creative reading, let us recall that for Deleuze, "the
question of friendship is intrinsic to philosophy, because the philoso-
pher isn't a sage, but a 'friend'.... Is that what friendship is, a harmony
embracing even dissonance?" (Deleuze 1995, 162–3). But as regards
Foucault himself, Deleuze was unequivocal about the importance of his
friend's work, describing its impact in the strongest possible terms: "The
fact that Foucault existed, with such a strong and mysterious personality,
the fact he wrote such wonderful books, with such style, never caused
me to feel anything but joy.... Using [Foucault's] definition, my relation
to him was some sort of passion" (Deleuze 1995, 85, translation modified).
Deleuze's "diagram-poem" is explained, then, as a song of joyful

passions, the highest pursuit possible, since "following Foucault ... is not
just a question of intellectual understanding or agreement, but one of
intensity, resonance, and musical harmony" (Deleuze 1995, 86, trans-
lation modified). The "diagramme de Foucault," then, would constitute
not just the map of this understanding, intensity, and resonance, but
above all, the score that renders the note of this harmony, embracing
even dissonance.

ad4928@wayne.edu

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