A Conversation with Charles Taylor

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Charles Taylor is Canada's best-known philosopher and one of the world's most influential and prolific philosophers today. He has taught at Oxford, Princeton, and Berkeley. In 1961, he became Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at McGill University, where he is now Emeritus Professor. Taylor has published more than 280 articles and twenty books, including the much-acclaimed *Hegel* (1975), *Sources of the Self* (1989), and *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1991). His works have been translated into more than twenty languages, many books have been published on his philosophy, and several conferences dedicated to his thought have been organized in various countries. He has elaborated his works in dialogue with the major contemporary figures of Western philosophy while also being a key figure in contemporary debates about the self, multiculturalism, the methodology of the social and natural sciences, ethics, artificial intelligence, language, and the problems of modernity. Taylor is a political activist and public intellectual who has been highly involved in the Canadian political scene, running four times for Federal Parliament as a member of the New Democratic Party. In the 1970s he became Vice President of the NDP and today is a member of Quebec's *Conseil de la langue française*. Professor Taylor is the recipient of numerous prizes, including the 2003 inaugural Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Gold Medal for Achievement in Research.

Philosophy

BEAULIEU: To begin, I would like to revisit the important debate between Foucault and Habermas. We know that in 1981 Foucault refused to take part in a seminar on "Modernity" that was planned to take place in Berkeley. In March, 1983 Habermas lectured at the Collège de France in Paris, where Foucault was teaching. The lectures were to become part of the book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, in which Habermas takes a radical stance against "postmodernism" and "poststructuralism," including Foucault's thought. During his stay in Paris, Habermas proposed to Foucault that he take part in another seminar at Berkeley on Aufklärung. I know that in April, 1983 Foucault was interviewed by you, Martin Jay, Leo Löwenthal, Paul Rabinow, Hubert Dreyfus, and Richard Rorty. Due to Foucault's death in June, 1984 the Foucault/Habermas philosophical encounter never took place. You developed many critiques of Foucault. Perhaps you can tell us about your relationship, personal and/or professional, with Foucault.

TAYLOR: Yes, we had this very interesting discussion with Foucault. There were several of us, as you mentioned: Dreyfus, myself, Rorty, Rabinow, Jay, Löwental, who was a very old member, since deceased, of the Frankfurt School. We tried to press Foucault on his political theory, his notion of freedom, and so on, and it was very interesting because plainly he didn't want to endorse any kind of charter of arrangements in society; he was afraid somehow that that would be putting some kind of rigid structure on people. In short, he turned out to be a defender of what you might call negative liberty. I pressed him particularly on what he thought of Hannah Arendt's conception of power. Arendt's conception of power is that you shouldn't think of it as power of A over B, which is how Foucault thought of it, but you should think of it as the way in which, in a self-governing society, everybody as it were increases power because they have more ability to act collectively. He would not have anything to do with that. He felt that was another prelude to domination. I think it was partly the logic of his position; partly I think that he was a little bit burned by his initial favorable reaction to the Iranian Revolution, which was, after all, only five years earlier.

BEAULIEU: Did you expect something new to come from a Habermas/ Foucault meeting in Berkeley?

TAYLOR: I admire Foucault's historical researches; he raises very interesting issues. You know, change of the ... call it "episteme," call it the "structure of understanding." This is important because we tend to have a relation with history that doesn't take account of that, which thinks that the basic understanding of human agency has been the same from the beginning and that we've changed only this or that detail. I'm very much, let's say, a great fan of Foucault's regarding that aspect of his work. But as I think I said in "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," I think he had an inadequate understanding of the development of modern positive theories. The positive thing in the modern West is forms of shared power, forms of self-governing power, which also rely on various kinds of discipline. The development of discipline is a much more ambivalent, multivalent thing than he allowed; in other words the paradigm of discipline is not oppression, that's one paradigm. The other paradigm is, if you like, the model of people being really "impliqués" in a project together and beginning to rule themselves together. He never saw that, and he remained a kind of anarchist, an oppositional anarchist to the end, which is a political position that is possible but intellectually trun- cated. That was my criticism of Foucault and I haven't had any reason to change my mind.

BEAULIEU: Foucault's analysis of power that develops into an aesthetization of existence is often criticized by you (along with Habermas, Fraser, Honneth, and others) for its lack of normativity. Did you see Habermas's politics of deliberation as an alternative to that?

TAYLOR: No. I'm also critical of Habermas. I'm critical of the entire neokantian dimension of Habermas because I don't think that you can develop an ethic of communication or discussion from purely formalistic considerations grounded on a prioris. In terms of the structure of the metaethic, I think Aristotle was much more correct than all these moderns. In other words, there are a certain number of goods, they're not the goods we would now select, they're not the same as the ones Aristotle selected, but I think there are for instance forms of society that are better than others. This kind of, on one hand, responsiveness to what people want, desire, and seek; on the other hand, what you might call commity or amity and ability to work together in society. There's a series of goods we don't always put together, that don't always combine but that we want; I think we should choose them, we should see them as goods of society. Habermas's actual concrete politics are very often generated by a consideration of these goods, but have a completely different foundation and background, the utterly sterile and dead-end neokantian form.

BEAULIEU: Isn't there some kind of search for consensus in your conception of goods? Don't we have to discuss, to talk rationally, in order to define what those goods are?

TAYLOR: No. Each one of us, or maybe each group of us which shares a certain outlook, has a very clear view on what those goods are. This may sound paradoxical, but it's not at all paradoxical. On a political level, we should be willing to live together with people who don't quite share our views, and therefore we're going to live in political structures where the rules of the game will be the object of an overlapping consensus, but we have to be clear on the difference between what it is to think—I think, you think, we think—this is right. On the other hand, the rules of the overlapping consensus which we will find ourselves agreeing with, because although it doesn't completely reflect our notion of the good, in terms of our notion of the good it is a better way of being than simply going to war with everybody who disagrees with us on the smallest details. I think that's how we can see modern liberal societies flourishing. Sometimes it's very difficult to achieve this consensus but that's how societies have to flourish. There is absolutely no a priori argument here at all; it's an argument about what flows from our conception of the good

and the kinds of compromises we'll have to make politically in order to realize our conception of the good. Because if anybody expects to have a hundred percent of what they want and won't take anything less, and they'll just take out the machine guns as soon as it deviates from that, then part of their conception of the good, which involves living in society in a civilized, communal way will be frustrated.

BEAULIEU: One of your first publications ("The Pre-Objective World" of 1958, coauthored with M. Kullman) deals with Merleau-Ponty's study of the complex relationship between human beings and animals. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature tends to equalize the relationships between the realms of living things by saying that man is not simply a rational animal, but that there is an *Ineinander* between man and animals because they share the pre-objective world of perception. We don't find many explicit references to phenomenology in your later works, but you seem to conceive of the self as being thrown into a lifeworld where it is searching for authenticity. You also develop many critiques of naturalism that reinforce a kind of phenomenological attitude. I would like to hear about the role that the phenomenological method of investigation plays in your work.

TAYLOR: I don't think there's an evolution between Husserl, on one hand, and people who are post-Heidegger and post-Merleau-Ponty, like myself, on the other hand. We don't talk about it anymore as a method or as hinging on description. I really said all this in an article in *Philosophical Arguments* called "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments"; the structure of the transcendental argument is to point out certain features of what it is to be a human agent, but we all know because we are all human agents, which undercuts certain false views or theoretical structures imposed by various bad a priori arguments from Descartes to Kant. In that sense there is something that remains of the phenomenological project in the sense that by a more careful account of what it is like to be an agent, we can break through the overlay of theory. Phenomenology is not a program of description in the sense that going on will reveal more; it's a form of argument in which you replace bad views with better views, and that is something I still very much subscribe to, and I think lots and lots of people do. I think that, seen from another point of view—which is what Wittgenstein was trying to do—Wittgenstein assembles reminders; what are they but pointing out certain features of the very nature of agency that are used in an argument. In other words, it's not primarily a descriptive task, as though one suspended all the issues of theorism just described. No, it is, in a polemic sense, overturning certain theories by drawing on what we actually know about our own

experience. That's what I think has remained as the very solid legacy of Merleau-Ponty.

BEAULIEU: Much of your inspiration for thinking about the self comes from the hermeneutical tradition. You borrow, for instance, Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of horizons" to describe the self as a "dialogical self" or as "self-interpreting." What is your relation to Gadamer's thought?

TAYLOR: Gadamer shows that there are always prejudices, but you cannot consider it as something negative because you wouldn't be able to think at all if you didn't take certain things for given. This closely parallels Wittgenstein's argument in *On Certainty* in which he says that cryptomagics are the foundational basis for modern science; you know, the world started five minutes ago and no one ever thought of that, but obviously if you're doing paleontology you're just taking as given that the world stretches back, and you're interpreting these falsehoods extensively, and you can never get to a point where you wouldn't be taking on board something like that, but then something else is there. That's very much Gadamer's argument about the formation of the nature of the flow of time. You can go through Gadamer and see that he's one of the people working in this "post-phenomenological" way of thinking.

BEAULIEU: Some call it the hermeneutical turn of phenomenology.

TAYLOR: Yes, hermeneutical because it's another feature of the point that Heidegger raised, in that we are always operating under a certain interpretation of the human condition, and these interpretations can be challenged and altered by this kind of argument, but we've never doubted some rock-bottom assumptions where we're simply confronting the bare facts, which is what the notion of prejudice as something negative assumes. If you got rid of all prejudices you'd just be facing the bare facts.

BEAULIEU: Your philosophy is one of the major attempts to build bridges between the Anglo-American and Continental traditions. In a recent talk you gave, you mentioned that analytic philosophy makes a blind assumption in thinking that the task of Continental philosophy is to discover the single source of truth. Analytic philosophers, as you said, see Continental philosophers as arguing egotistically among themselves. Do you see the future of philosophy as a reconciliation of these two trends?

TAYLOR: Is it reconciliation or is it just opening things up? I think that I wouldn't say analytic philosophy as such, but many analytic philoso-

phers—not because of the nature of the arguments in analytic philosophy, but because of the cultural background of analytic philosophy as emerging out of Anglo-Saxon philosophy—I think are extremely narrow. They haven't really adopted some of the most interesting arguments. What I'm for is lifting some of these restrictions on thinking, which are not even seen by the people concerned and are taken as given. Along with that, of course, we have to be willing to recognize certain interesting ideas which are sometimes cast in a style totally different from that of analytic philosophy. This is not to say that I don't value analytic philosophy, but it's important to be flexible enough to concede that if you read through this literature there's much that is interesting. I think that it is unfortunately a crippling disability which is inculcated in our students in many analytic departments. I've seen some of them get beyond it, but generally they can't read non-analytic philosophy texts and get something interesting out of it. Of course, the best people even in what we think of as the analytic world, Stanley Cavell and so on, are doing that on their own, but you become crippled from doing that, because you won't consider anything as a philosophical argument or a philosophical idea. It's not to say that it may not gain by being translated—very often it will be—but if you want to think, you've got to pick up ideas where they are.

BEAULIEU: Do you think that there now is a better understanding on each side?

TAYLOR: There are all kinds of cramped, narrow portraits hemming in the discussion in most analytic departments. Why is it that we have moral philosophy where for most people the issue is: are you a utilitarian or a Kantian? As if that exhausted the field of moral philosophy; this is absurd.

Ethics and Politics

BEAULIEU: Communitarians diagnose a crisis in our contemporary liberal democratic world because it is unable to value modes of existence other than that associated with homo economicus. This leads to individualism and disengagement. The new ethical responsibility of the state would consist of minimizing the risks of exclusion and favoring multiculturalism, thus encouraging diverse and divergent expressions of the self. In that sense, the responsibility of the state isn't only to administer a budget and strengten the free market, but also, most importantly, to encourage the reinforcement of common values and the equal valuing of all cultural systems. You insist, against the deconstructionists, on the necessity of constructing such an ideal of authenticity that is rational and universal (e.g.,

modern and perhaps romantic, rather than liberal and postmodern), and you bring the old notions of "virtue" and "common good" back into the contemporary philosophical scene. What is the relation between your "politics of recognition" and communitarianism?

TAYLOR: Yes, that is another example of why philosophy is so narrow. I'm not making another a priori argument about what we ought to do. I'm making a statement that can't be crammed into that notion of philosophy. What we need in political theory is of course a certain amount of moral reflection. But we need moral reflection which takes account of the nature of the predicament we're in. One of the things I'm trying to do is introduce moral reflection into these discussions. Tocqueville is an example of somebody I highly respect; there is something about the structure of modern democratic society that raises certain problems, certain requirements. For instance, democratic societies (and here I'm picking up on something that in one form or another has been there in the civic humanist tradition—be it Aristotle, Polybius, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Montesquieu, a lot of people) require a certain kind of cohesion because they are free societies. If you have a society that is totally divided, it requires a different kind of political culture from the society where people will, first of all, pay their taxes without being hounded, but also people who will become soldiers and go to war, people who will participate in decisions and vote. It requires a kind of identification with the whole, what Montesquieu called "vertu" for instance. It's a functional requirement of democratic society that it have a certain amount of cohesion. It's not something we ought to do, except that as a functional requirement we better do it because if we don't these societies will suffer various kinds of breakdown, including the breakdown where there's so little consensus left that some kind of strong man can take over, or the whole thing unravels, or you have the society falling apart, like Sierra Leone. There are various ways in which this can end if we don't have cohesion. It's not that I am making another moral requirement; we live in this kind of society, and we also value it, and there are certain requirements. That is where communitarianism comes in for me, that many liberal theories completely ignore the conditions of this kind of creation without which you don't have a liberal society, you don't have a democratic society. What is it that stops it all from breaking down? It's a question of seeing what the necessary conditions of survival are in this kind of society; this has to be fed into your political theory. There's no point having a political theory which is entirely normative, saying "it would be good to do this, it would be good to do that." Of course you could do this or that. But do you have a viable answer to the problems of the day? That's what I find missing in Rawls; Rawls never discussed that, or they are raised in the

most unsatisfactory way. He says at various times that this kind of society will tend toward stability because people will be happy. That's not the way it actually works. Here you need a kind of hybrid thinking that involves some understanding of the historical development of the societies, of their conditions, and that feeds its normative reality into that framework. This position has constantly been misperceived by people who think of philosophy as purely normative. I'm not saying that. I'm saying: You want a democratic society, I want a democratic society, we all want a democratic society, so we need a certain amount of creativity. Within that framework let's think of what policies are better and worse, but within that framework.

BEAULIEU: Obviously you are in favor of multiculturalism and the development of different "lifestyles."

TAYLOR: Place that in the context of what we just said and then add the following fact: we've had some success in the West in developing this kind of creativity. How did societies like Norway and Denmark become exemplary democracies? In Quebec, when we speak of "people of Quebec stock," it makes things easier, but does it still square with our reality? For instance, the important summits in Quebec involving Lucien Bouchard, the unions, employers, etc. were made possible by this highly homogeneous culture shared by Québécois stock. However, the population is diversifying. What should we do in this case? One must find common ground. This is a necessity that is not simply of a moral nature. Certainly, there's a moral side to the question, but from the political perspective of a democratic and stable society, these people must be integrated. What does this mean? One will have to find another basis for social cohesion. That precisely is the multicultural challenge. Admittedly, it is also a question of justice, but it is first and foremost a question of the survival of democracy itself.

BEAULIEU: What would you answer to those who claim that your political project is based on some sort of utopia or "grand narrative"?

TAYLOR: I have nothing against "grand narratives." On the contrary, I think that no one can avoid them. But let's forget about this expression. I do not think that it applies to my theory regarding these questions. In my case, instead of a grand narrative, it would be preferable to speak of a small narrative, locally bound. We have inherited more or less successful democratic societies, but all democratic societies are at least "more or less successful." That being said, success was based on cultural homogeneity that is rather closely woven. Nowadays we no longer have such a

society; we are diversified. It is absolutely impossible to avoid this situation resulting in part from immigration, but also because minorities in the past accepted their exclusion on the basis of the "rules of the game." Gays and lesbians, for example, no longer accept these rules, and for two reasons: consensus can no longer be established on the old basis since people demand that their differences be recognized; second, because these differences have increased with the size of the population. One can no longer say: You must be of Québécois stock to do this or that. After the last referendum, Parizeau remained blind to this fact. This is no longer possible. We have to find other solutions that will allow differences to be integrated, and that will give social groups the feeling that they are involved. This is not a grand narrative, it's a small narrative; it is a change that, compared to the past, turns our ways of doing things upside down. Nowadays, in all our calculations or reasoning, normative elements have to be introduced. One could say: We will have our own little society, and it will run smoothly, but such a way of thinking is obsolete. Were we to follow this path, half the population would be older than I within twenty years, and the other half would labor away trying to produce what is needed to provide us with an old-age pension. This path, in my mind, is normatively unacceptable. Granted, with its normative elements, the reasoning is complex, but it is not only a question of normative principles. Some elements relate to the very nature of our present situation and to the choices made possible by this situation. We no longer have the choice to be the society we were twenty years ago in Quebec, where all of us were "tightly knit" French Canadians of stock. That choice does not exist anymore. Either we expel people already living here or we live together. Exclude or open up, these are the only choices available. I don't see any grand narrative here. But in the end if one wants to understand why these developments, this diversification, occurred one must look at the deeper reasons behind them. By looking into this question, one enters into the realm of the grand narratives. The question of the implications of modernization, its nature, etc. then arises. I have nothing against this. I think that it is incredibly foolish to avoid relying on grand narratives, since even those who claim to have done away with them relied on a grand narrative, namely this one: There was a time when everyone adhered to a grand narrative, followed by another era when they were repudiated. There is obviously a grand narrative behind this way of thinking. Let's leave this question aside. Regarding the multicultural politics I am advocating, I don't think it is based on a grand narrative, though the changes it rests on point toward an underlying grand narrative that is responsible for these changes. With these changes, the political reality changed as well. This is the point I'm insisting upon.

BEAULIEU: We now live in times of deinstitutionalization. I personally work, among other things, on the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric care, but similar phenomena are found in the reduction of incarceration time, bed closures in hospitals, etc. The state should have funnelled the amounts saved through deinstitutionalization into the communities, but instead it uses it to absorb the deficit. It seems that your political thought offers a new way to create social links independently from possibilities of the state. Would you say that civil society, first and foremost, should get organized?

TAYLOR: Absolutely. The only way to maintain some of these collective services is to have a strong civil society where people feel a sense of solidarity. Solidarity is an extremely important value, but it tends to weaken in some countries. For instance, in the United States, it is obvious that there is very little solidarity between, on the one side, the majority who voted for Bush and, on the other side, people living in the ghettos and those on welfare. It's a tragedy for a society because they cannot be told: Pay taxes so you can vote for someone like Bush, who will in turn ignore your plight. Therefore, the preconditions of a social agency that is truly efficient and just can only be found outside the state, within civil society.

BEAULIEU: In that sense, civil society is truly the foundation.

TAYLOR: Indeed, the actual foundation. Once again, we come back to the idea of consensus, of solidarity, of cohesion. We have to foster these foundations, or else democratic society will collapse.

BEAULIEU: Many new categories dealing with ethics have emerged over the last several years on the *Jobs for Philosophers* market. I'm thinking here about business ethics, biomedical ethics, environmental ethics, public ethics, animal ethics, etc. Philosophy departments are all searching for specialists in the field of applied ethics. Granting agencies are generously sponsoring new "ethicists," and an impressive number of research centers specializing in ethics (sometimes called "ethics laboratories") have been created over the last few decades. Some philosophers don't agree with this "ethical transformation" of philosophy, saying that it reduces the act of thinking to an instrumental activity. What is your position on this? Do you think that this expansion of ethics can help today's societies develop a "politics of recognition"? Or rather, is the place ethics has today a symptom of the "malaise of modernity"?

TAYLOR: The latter. I've nothing against the idea of there being ethical issues in business or health, of course, but the way in which these other disciplines approach philosophy is based on a deep misunderstanding, and it's very embarrassing because they think that they have a kind of expertise which gives them authority in the most contested area. All you can say is we, as philosophers, train our students to have the best possible arguments for whatever position they are defending, and to understand other points of view, and so on. But it's not as though, say I am a surgeon, I go to an anaesthetist and that anaesthetist is going to have expertise on how to put this patient to sleep without danger, and it's absolutely clear how to do it. It's not the same thing when you go to a philosopher. He'll say this or that, but you're going to get ten different answers. Our highly technocratic society is pressing us to become another technocratic specialist, and we can only do that by de-naturing the subject. This is a very deep problem. We are going to have a kind of struggle going on between people who expect different kinds of results. The philosophers are not looking for instrumental results at all. They are looking for good arguments. So you very often get this real "dialogue de sourds" between applied ethics and philosophy.

BEAULIEU: Aren't the new "ethicists" more concerned with morals than ethics, and with the prescription of values rather than with the description and creation of modes of being? Isn't there a confusion between morality and ethics among applied ethicists?

TAYLOR: We now have this distinction that Bernard Williams and others have made more common, where ethics deals with issues like "what is the good life?" and morality deals with issues like "what do we owe each other?" Issues like bioethics and medical ethics are really medical morality in that sense. They're looking for a moral thing to do.

BEAULIEU: I find it odd that some of our new ethicists are not referring to classical thinkers like Aristotle or Spinoza at all. It seems they often have a limited perspective on what they are doing.

TAYLOR: Yes, that's right.

Current Affairs

BEAULIEU: Perhaps the most important development in twentieth-century philosophy (Continental and Anglo-American) is the focus on theories of meaning and the philosophy of language. Phenomenology and existentialism attempted to define a notion of subjectivity in situation, for

instance. We also find a strong critique of this model of subjectivity (Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, etc.). What do you think will be the main philosophical topics of the current century? What new topics of research do you think will emerge in the next decades? Do you think we're done with last century's fields of investigation, or do you think that the philosophical community has to go farther in these same directions?

TAYLOR: In a sense Merleau-Ponty is still exemplary for me, not that you take off from his work as it actually was, but you take off from his approach. His approach was to look at these issues in close symbiosis with the best scientific or empirical work. So *La structure du comportement* and *La phénoménologie de la perception* incorporate a great deal of child development, neurophysiology, etc. I think that now we're at a point where we're going to see a leap forward in things like philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and so on. Someone like Jerome Bruner is a good example of this. Bruner and others have undercut the whole Cartesian individual subject-matter basis on which all of philosophy works. Ideally philosophy will be pulled out of its basis in this old philosophical tradition and be out swimming in a more interdisciplinary world. But of course this is not going to happen very quickly because of the sociological nature of the development of expertise. But the interesting, exciting relevance will occur in a more interdisciplinary world.

BEAULIEU: The next question deals with the current state of philosophical research. Many philosophers and sociologists are quite pessimistic about today's logic of productivity that is affecting the way research is conducted. Philosophers may become the hostages of granting agencies. What, in your view, is the future of research in philosophy? Is philosophy the victim of normalizing pressures? In more cynical terms, isn't it true to say that the bureaucratized lifestyle of the universities impedes our thinking?

TAYLOR: Yes, definitely, there are pressures to conform. Granting agencies will perhaps have less influence in philosophy than in other disciplines. The interesting thinking will nevertheless be done; it will be done by mavericks, or people who manage to get tenure early, or by those who will be outside the academy. It was not very long ago that major thinkers like Sartre were able to work outside the academy. We may find that happening again. Thinking will be done, the thought will be carried out, but there will be more and more, I think, a disconnection between the university structure itself and independent scholars.

BEAULIEU: I know that you are currently working on a book with Hubert Dreyfus, and you are preparing another book about secularization and the contemporary relevance of religious belief. Could you tell us a little about those projects?

TAYLOR: I'm working on two books. The one with Hubert Dreyfus concerns epistemology, and the other is on the development of modern secular civilization of the West; that I'm doing on my own. The latter book is about the nature of what we mean by secular civilization—it remains very unclear—and it's connected with another issue which is how it arose. It is connected with a third issue, which is, what is the place of religion today? These are three issues that cannot be resolve separately. You have to resolve all three together. I'm trying to do this in a very large and ambitious book. I don't know if I'll ever finish it, but a lot of it is written.

BEAULIEU: Those topics are not entirely new since your investigations on moral theory seem to be closely connected to the foundational role of theism, and your 1999 Gifford Lectures were centered on religion (*Varieties of Religion Today*, 2002).

TAYLOR: Yes, in a sense it's looking at another facet of Western modernity, and *Sources of the Self* is doing that with respect to another facet. I'm doing it in a very interconnected way.

BEAULIEU: I look forward to reading it. I would like to thank you most sincerely, Professor Taylor, for this interview.

TAYLOR: Thank you.

Note

French portions of the section "Ethics and Politics" were translated by Donald Ipperciel. Transcription by Benjamin Moss.