

## PHENOMENOLOGY AS DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE MUNICH INTERPRETATION

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*Is phenomenology nothing else than descriptive psychology? In the first edition of his Logical Investigations (LI), Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a description and analysis of the experiences of knowledge, unequivocally stating that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology.” Most interestingly, although the first edition of the LI was the reference par excellence in phenomenology for the Munich phenomenologists, they remained suspicious of this characterisation of phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the reception of descriptive psychology among Munich phenomenologists and, at the same time, to offer a re-evaluation of their understanding of realist phenomenology.*

“one might really question whether proper phenomenology,  
as it is pursued in Munich, has its roots in Husserl.”  
– Reinach to Conrad, 1907<sup>1</sup>

It is now well known that shortly after their publication in 1900–01, and thanks to their early discovery by Johannes Daubert<sup>2</sup>, Husserl’s *Logical Investigations (LI)* received a particularly enthusiastic reception among the students of Theodor Lipps. Through their discussion of Husserl’s work in the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*, an academic circle for psychology founded by Lipps, the Munich students were soon led to develop their own phenomenological circle, trying at the same time to find a position liberated from what they recognised,

<sup>1</sup> “...man [könne] eigentlich bezweifeln..., ob die eigentliche Phänomenologie, wie man sie in München betriebe, bei Husserl ihre Wurzeln habe.” Quoted in Reinhold Nikolaus Smid, “Münchener Phänomenologie’ – Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffs,” in *Pfänder-Studien*, (ed.) H. Spiegelberg and E. Avé-Lallemant, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 109–54, here 116.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 72.

thanks to Husserl, as Lipps’ psychologism, but also to contrast their own position with Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. The excerpt from a letter from Reinach to Conrad, quoted above, provides an eloquent illustration of their somewhat ambivalent attitude toward Husserl’s phenomenology.

Interestingly, although the Munich phenomenologists were well aware of the influences of Franz Brentano’s descriptive psychology upon Husserl’s phenomenology, they never quite agreed with Husserl upon the identification of phenomenology with descriptive psychology as formulated in the first edition of the *LI*. There are good reasons to believe that Husserl’s discussions with the Munich phenomenologists in 1904 played a significant role in his abandonment of the label of “descriptive psychology” in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgement, attended by many Munich phenomenologists.<sup>3</sup> Expanding on these reasons will show that Husserl’s rejection of “descriptive psychology” as a label for phenomenology was differently motivated than the Munich phenomenologists’ rejection, as we will see in the first two sections of this paper.

What, then, were the motives that led the Munich phenomenologists to reject descriptive psychology? Building on case studies, in the last sections of this paper I will investigate in more detail the way the Munich phenomenologists conceived specific issues traditionally belonging to descriptive psychology, namely, the analysis of judgement, perception and sensation. This should show us not only that the Munich phenomenologists understood the key concepts of descriptive psychology in a different sense than Husserl, but also that they considered the casting of the analysis of these key concepts as descriptive psychology to be a commitment to a form of psychologism of which not only Lipps, but also Brentano, to some extent, was guilty. As I will try to show, their relation to descriptive psychology can be seen as paradigmatic of the strong realist position they soon endorsed regarding the nature of phenomenological descriptions.

### 1. Husserl’s Account of Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology between the *LI* and the 1905 Lectures

Husserl’s first published works in philosophy were conceived as contributions to the descriptive psychology outlined by Brentano in many of his Vienna lectures, which Husserl attended between 1884

<sup>3</sup> See Edmund Husserl, *Urteilstheorie. Vorlesung 1905* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002). Hereafter referred to as UV.

and 1886.<sup>4</sup> *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* and *Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic* are maybe the most illustrative examples of these early contributions.<sup>5</sup> It is quite understandable in this context to read the following presentation of phenomenology in the first edition of the *LI*: “Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is therefore in essence psychology, or at least only capable of being built on a psychological basis. Pure logic therefore also rests on psychology....”<sup>6</sup> (*LI* I, 176)

In the second edition of the same work, he adjusted the latter statement significantly:

If our sense of phenomenology has been grasped, and if it has not been given the current interpretation of an ordinary ‘descriptive psychology,’ a part of natural science, than an objection, otherwise justifiable, will fall to the ground, an objection to the effect that all theory of knowledge conceived as a systematic phenomenological clarification of knowledge is built upon psychology. (*LI* I, 175)

The clash between the first and second editions of the *LI* concerning descriptive psychology can be traced back to different articles written by Husserl in that period, for instance, in his review of Theodor Elsenhans’ *Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie* (1903), but also to some of his lectures between 1902–03 and the *Urteilstheorie* of 1905.<sup>7</sup> Still in

1902–03, Husserl considered phenomenology as descriptive psychology, but this view changed drastically in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgement.<sup>8</sup> What, then, happened that made Husserl change his mind in that summer semester of 1905? Of course, there are earlier texts in which Husserl expressed some doubts about the adequation of phenomenology with descriptive psychology, his review of Elsenhans being perhaps the best example, but the first clear statement of his rejection of descriptive psychology as a characterisation of phenomenology is to be found in the *Vorlesung E*, a supplement written by Husserl for his lecture on *Urteilstheorie* in 1905, which was attended by the Munich phenomenologists Fritz Weinmann, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach and Alfred Schwenninger.<sup>9</sup> Although these Munich phenomenologists already had a good knowledge of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was aware that he was facing a demanding audience whose background was definitely psychological, thanks to Lipps.<sup>10</sup> A year earlier, in 1904, Husserl had written to Lipps about his position against psychologism (*Meine Stellung zum Psychologismus*), in answer to Lipps’ comment that Husserl’s terminology was “too psychologistic” and in order to make clear that, in the *LI*, he considered pure logic as a theoretical science, independent of the practical science of psychology.<sup>11</sup> For a psychologist such as Lipps, the arguments against psychologism in the *Prolegomena*, the first volume of the *LI*, were simply incompatible with the descriptive psychological analysis of the second and third volumes. Lipps’ complete misunderstanding of the arguments of the *LI* was then a further reason for Husserl to distance himself from the label of “descriptive psychology,” a term also used by Lipps in Munich to characterise psychological analysis. It is easy to

<sup>4</sup> Husserl also had a good knowledge of many of Brentano’s other lectures, as he had copies of lecture notes taken by other students. Many of these lecture notes on psychology, metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, etc., are still available at the Husserl Archive in Leuven.

<sup>5</sup> See Edmund Husserl, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003) and Edmund Husserl, “Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic,” in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, (ed.) P. McCormick and F. Elliston (South Bend: University of Notre-Dame Press, 1981), 126–42. In his abstract (*Selbstanzeige*) of the latter work, Husserl presented these studies as such. See Edmund Husserl, “*Selbstanzeige*,” *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. 3 (1897), 225.

<sup>6</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*. Vols. 1 & 2 (London: Routledge, 2001). Henceforth referred to as *LI* I and *LI* II.

<sup>7</sup> See Husserl, “*Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895–1899. Dritter Artikel*,” *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. 9 (1903), 395ff. In his lectures on the theory of knowledge (*Erkenntnistheorie*) of 1902–03, Husserl still considered phenomenology as descriptive psychology: “After all, phenomenology of knowledge is pure immanent description or just an analysis of the essences of mental experiences of thinking and knowing. Insofar it is descriptive psychology. [*Die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis ist doch reine immanente Beschreibung oder vielmehr Wesensanalyse der psychischen Erlebnisse des Denkens und Erkennens, und insofern ist sie deskriptive Psychologie.*]” See Husserl, *Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesung 1902/03* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 77. Hereafter referred to as *AEV*.

<sup>8</sup> In 1902–03, Husserl attributed a foundational role to descriptive psychology: “Descriptive psychology is for sure the foundation of theory of knowledge. [*Gewiss ist deskriptive Psychologie das Fundament der Erkenntnistheorie.*]” In 1905, he changed this sentence and added a question mark: “Is descriptive psychology the foundation of theory of knowledge? [*Ist deskriptive Psychologie das Fundament der Erkenntnistheorie?*]” For both quotations, see *AEV*, ix, 69.

<sup>9</sup> The date of redaction of *Vorlesung E* is confirmed in *UV*, xiii.

<sup>10</sup> Husserl’s own report to Hocking about this summer semester confirms this quite clearly: “My *Logical Investigations* provoked a profound movement especially among the young generation. Felicitous and gifted young philosophers are now coming to Göttingen in increasing number. I need all my energy to satisfy them. [*Meine logischen Untersuchungen haben eine tiefgehende Bewegung besonders in der ernsteren jungen Generation hervorgerufen. Treffliche, ja hochbegabte junge Philosophen kommen jetzt in immer steigendem Maße zu mir nach G(öttingen). Ich habe alle Spannkraft nötig, um ihnen zu genügen.*]” Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 3 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 157.

<sup>11</sup> See Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 122ff.

understand that, in 1905, Husserl's abandonment of the label "descriptive psychology" was then inevitable, as it appeared in the 1905 supplement to the theory of judgement, written specifically for the attention of the Munich phenomenologists:

We distinguished phenomenology from descriptive psychology.... This is a nuance, but a nuance of fundamental importance.... While the phenomenologist describes the essence of sensory contents, he distinguishes essentially different kinds and genres thereof, like colour, sound, etc.... This all comes into question for the psychologist but still isn't psychology. That colour, sound etc. enter in a concrete empirical natural order as facts of nature, this is an issue for psychology. But it falls completely outside of phenomenology. What is determined phenomenologically concerns the redness in general, colour or extension in general, presentation and judgment in general, etc.... It holds transposably for every non real-empirical, i.e. every possible consciousness. The psychological-objectifying concern transforms phenomenology in descriptive psychology. All phenomenological determinations step into descriptive psychology only with a nuance, with a change of prefix so to speak. But phenomenology can and should be considered as pure doctrine of essences. According to its idea, it is not psychology, even not a descriptive one. If one doesn't understand this distinction at the outset, one will never understand the essence of an objective theory of knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> UV, 43–45: "Von der Phänomenologie...haben wir unterschieden die deskriptive Psychologie.... Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Nuance, aber eine Nuance von fundamentaler Wichtigkeit.... Beschreibt der Phänomenologe das Wesen der sinnlichen Inhalte, scheidet er wesentlich verschiedene Gattungen und Arten derselben, wie Farbe, Ton, usw.... So kommt all das für die Psychologie in Frage und ist doch noch nicht Psychologie. Dass Farbe, Ton u.dgl.,...als Tatsachen der Natur...in eine konkrete empirische Naturordnung einreihen, das ist Sache der Psychologie. Das fällt aber ganz außerhalb der Phänomenologie.... Was phänomenologisch festgestellt wird, das betrifft Rote überhaupt, Farbe überhaupt, Ausdehnung überhaupt, Vorstellung überhaupt, Urteil überhaupt usw.... Es gilt also in Übertragung auf jedes nicht empirisch wirkliche, sondern mögliche Bewusstsein. Das psychologisch-objektivierende Interesse verwandelt die Phänomenologie in deskriptive Psychologie. Alle phänomenologischen Feststellungen treten, nur mit einer Nuance, sozusagen mit einer Veränderung des Vorzeichens, in die deskriptive Psychologie. Aber Phänomenologie kann und soll als reine Wesenslehre betrachtet werden. Der Idee nach ist sie keine Psychologie, auch nicht deskriptive. Und wer diesen Unterschied nicht zuerst begriffen hat, wird auch nie das Wesen einer objektiven Erkenntnistheorie verstehen."

There were therefore contextual reasons that led Husserl to abandon the label of descriptive psychology to characterise phenomenology. But one shouldn't read this passage simply as a rejection of descriptive psychology in general. This *Vorlesung E*, conceived specifically for the Munich phenomenologists, objected to descriptive psychology as it was practised in Munich. The rejection doesn't necessarily imply the rejection of Brentanian descriptive psychology as well, since Lipps and Brentano have two different conceptions of this discipline. According to Lipps, descriptive psychology is a description of the experiences of the empirical I which is given as the pole of all perceptions.<sup>13</sup> This conception of descriptive psychology has to handle heavier ontological commitments than the Brentanian, which is a science of *acts* or *functions*. According to Brentano, there is simply no "I" that is given empirically, and therefore no need to postulate such an I in the external world.<sup>14</sup> According to Brentano, psychological descriptions are metaphysically neutral, and it is precisely the same neutrality that we find in the characterisation of phenomenology presented in the *Vorlesung E*. In short, Husserl had good reasons to abandon the label of descriptive psychology, but these reasons weren't directly related to the Brentanian conception of descriptive psychology as such, but, in the first instance, with the conception of descriptive psychology advocated in Munich by Lipps.

## 2. Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology? The Reception in Munich

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Theodor Lipps, "Die Wege der Psychologie," *Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Psicologia*, (ed.) S. de Sanctis (Rome: Forzani, 1905), 60. Lipps' student Pfänder goes in a similar direction in refusing to reduce the I to a "bundle of perceptions," in Alexander Pfänder, *Einführung in die Psychologie* (Leipzig: Barth, 1902; 1904), 304ff.

<sup>14</sup> This doesn't mean that Brentano thought the I was "unrettbar." His Würzburger lectures on metaphysics are clear on this point. But Brentano's "I," the inner perception, is only an incomplete self-consciousness. His position on the I lies somewhere between Ehrenfels' and Lipps'. For Brentano on the I, see Wilhelm Baumgartner, "Franz Brentano: 'Großvater der Phänomenologie,'" *Studia Phaenomenologica*, vol. 3 (2003), 42, in which parts of the Würzburger lectures on metaphysics are reproduced. On Ehrenfels, see Christian von Ehrenfels, *Kosmogonie* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1916), 63–64. This passage has already been noted in Kevin Mulligan, "Exactitude et bavardage. Gloses pour une opposition paradigmatique dans la philosophie autrichienne," *Philosophiques*, vol. 26, n. 2 (1999), 192.

Since the first discussions of Husserl's *LI* in the *Akademischer Verein*, many different orientations had come to be represented among the Munich phenomenologists. At the time of the "Munich Invasion of Göttingen"<sup>15</sup> in 1905, at least two different groups must be distinguished: on the one hand, those who, to a large extent, remained faithful to Lipps, such as August Gallinger, Aloys Fischer, Fritz Weinmann and Max Ettliger.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, another group of philosophers from the *Akademischer Verein* was, in 1905, already showing more than a mere interest in phenomenology and it progressively abandoned most of the Lippsean conceptions after 1906. Notably among them were Theodor Conrad, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach and Moritz Geiger.<sup>17</sup>

Again, these two groups shouldn't be confused with a third group, namely Husserl's own students in Göttingen, who found themselves literally invaded by the Munich phenomenologists in the summer of 1905: among them, we find Wilhelm Schapp, Karl Neuhaus, Alfred von Sybel, Alexander Rosenblum, Dietrich Mahnke, Heinrich Hofmann, David Katz and Erich Heinrich.<sup>18</sup> Remembering the encounter between

the members of these three groups in the summer semester of 1905, Wilhelm Schapp sketches an interesting picture of the "Munich Invasion":

One day, it must have been in 1907, the Munichers were there, the Munich invasion of Göttingen. I think it was a summer semester. They were Reinach, Conrad and the young Hildebrand. Geiger appeared occasionally. We used every opportunity, day and night, to engage in philosophical discussions with the Munichers. In our opinion, they were much ahead of us in every aspect. They did not have the devoutness that we had. Reinach blamed Husserl for his turn to the Marburg School, a turn that was already noticed in Munich.... We formed at that time a phenomenological association, which met every week and which was led for a while by Conrad. I remember that he tried to get more clarity on things by investigating the "meaning" of words, certainly in connection with the Munich investigations. Again and again, we were investigating word complexes, such as red wine, a wine being red, the wine is red. We looked for the relationship between word and meaning, concept and object. Sometimes, a word was said about the Munich standpoint, about the way they focussed on the platonician doctrine of *metexein*, the doctrine of participation in concepts, about the way they advanced the keen doctrine, in continuation of Husserl, that there is not only the "two" as ideal object, as Husserl taught at that time, but that there must be many, infinitely many twos.

The Munichers did not believe anymore in the sensation as constituent of perception and declared all such statements as constructions; they still believed in acts and psychology, those weren't called into question.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> See Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 157.

<sup>16</sup> On August Gallinger (1871–1959), see Claudia Schorcht, *Philosophie an den bayerischen Universitäten 1933–1945* (Erlangen: 1990), 134ff.; on Aloys Fischer (1880–1937), see Karl Kreitmair, *Aloys Fischer. Leben und Werk* (Munich: Bayerischer Schulbuch-Verlag, 1950); on Fritz Weinmann (1878–1905), see Karl Schuhmann, *Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie. Husserl über Pfänder* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 130; on Max Ettliger (1877–1929), see Reinhold Nikolaus Smid, "Münchener Phänomenologie" – Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffs," 115.

<sup>17</sup> Theodor Conrad (1881–1969) was one of the first of the Munich phenomenologists to go to Göttingen. He published very few articles. Among them, see Theodor Conrad, "Über Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung," *Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leipzig, Barth: 1911), 51–76, which was well received in the Munich circle. On Conrad, see Gabriele Scaramuzza, "Theodor Conrad and Phenomenological Aesthetics," *Axiomathes*, vol. 9 (1998), 93–103. As we shall soon see, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947) was definitely considered as the Husserl-man in Munich (see the letter of Otto Schultze to Aloys Fischer from 17 July 1903, quoted in C. Leijenhorst and P. Steenbakker, eds., *Karl Schuhmann: Selected Papers on Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 291. Hereafter referred to as KS. Further information on Daubert is collected in many essays included in that book. On Adolf Reinach, see Kevin Mulligan, ed., *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). On Geiger, see, among others, Robert Zeltner, "Moritz Geiger zum Gedächtnis," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, vol. 14 (1960), 452–66. I leave aside here the case of Max Scheler, which would need a treatment of its own.

<sup>18</sup> For recent works on Wilhelm Schapp (1884–1965), see Karen Joisten, ed., *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps. Perspektiven für unsere Zeit* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber,

2010). Karl Neuhaus was Husserl's first doctoral student. He completed his degree in 1908. According to Theodor Conrad, he was the *Leiter* of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* in Göttingen from 1910 to 1912, but very few things are known about him. See Eberhard Avé-Lallemant and Karl Schuhmann, "Ein Zeitzeuge über die Anfänge der phänomenologischen Bewegung: Theodor Conrads Bericht aus dem Jahre 1954," *Husserl Studies*, vol. 9 (1992), 77–90. On David Katz, see Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 42–52. Dietrich Mahnke was an early follower of Husserl, but got his PhD only later in the twenties. On Mahnke's later works, see Gerhard Biller, "Mahnke, Dietrich," *Neue deutsche Biographie*, vol. 15 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987), 691–92. On von Sybel, Rosenblum, Hofmann and Heinrich, see Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl*.

<sup>19</sup> Wilhelm Schapp, "Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl," *Edmund Husserl 1859–1959* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 20–21: "Eines Tages, es muß wohl 1907 gewesen sein, waren die Münchener da, die Invasion aus München. Ich meine, es wäre ein Sommersemester gewesen. Es waren Reinach, Conrad und der junge

Schapp underlines here three important aspects of Munich phenomenology: its specific manner of philosophical investigation, wherein the analysis of meaning, of what we *mean* (*meinen*) by an expression, is put at the forefront<sup>20</sup>; its particular conception of ideal objects and,

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Hildebrand. Geiger tauchte gelegentlich auf. Wir benutzten jede Gelegenheit, um mit den Münchnern Tag und Nacht philosophische Gespräche zu führen. Sie waren uns nach unserer Meinung in jeder Beziehung weit voraus. Sie hatten nicht die Gläubigkeit, die wir hatten. Reinach warf Husserl seine Wendung zur Marburger Schule vor, die damals in München schon bemerkt war.... Wir hatten damals einen phänomenologischen Verein gegründet, der wohl wöchentlich zusammenkam und in dem Conrad zeitweise die Leitung der Diskussion übernahm. Ich entsinne mich, daß er wohl im Anschluß an Münchener Untersuchungen versuchte, über die «Bedeutung» eines Wortes zu größerer Klarheit zu kommen. Wir prüften immer von neuem Wortgefüge, wie roter Wein, rotseidender Wein, der Wein ist rot. Wir suchten nach dem Zusammenhang von Wort und Bedeutung, Begriff und Gegenstand. Zuweilen fiel dann auch ein Wort über den Standpunkt der Münchner, wie diese die Platonische Lehre vom *metexein*, die Lehre von der Teilhabe an den Begriffen in den Mittelpunkt stellten, wie sie ferner im Anschluß und in Fortführung von Husserl kühn die Lehre aufstellten, es gäbe nicht nur als idealen Gegenstand die 'zwei,' wie Husserl damals wohl lehrte, sondern es müßte viele, unendlich viele Zweien geben.

Die Münchner glaubten nicht mehr an die Empfindung als *constituens* der Wahrnehmung und erklärten alle entsprechenden Aussagen als Konstruktion; sie glaubten aber noch an Akte und an Psychologie, diese waren noch nicht in Zweifel gezogen."

<sup>20</sup> Compare Schapp's report with Daubert's notes on phenomenological and critical investigation methods (*Phänomenologische und kritische Fragestellung*) from December 1905 in MS A I 1/34: "in der phänomenologischen Fragestellung kehrt immer wieder die Frage: 'Was meinen wir damit' oder 'Was meinen wir, wenn wir sagen....' The importance of MS A I 1/34 was already shown by Reinhold Nikolaus Smid, "Münchener Phänomenologie" – *Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffs*," 140. Besides his reflections on the topic in his published words, Reinach's focus on the *Meinen* is also apparent in a letter to Conrad on 14 April 1904, quoted here in Schuhmann and Smith's translation: "[t]he question: how does the child know that grown-up people 'mean' something by their words, is answered by Lipps thus: it sees how they point to something and simultaneously hears a complex of sound.... [But] the problem was: how does the child come to understand an expression, and more specifically the expression of words? To this one surely cannot give an answer which involves appeal to another form of expression, to 'pointing.' For then of course the question still remains: How does the child know that by moving the arms etc. something is meant?" See Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, "Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography," in *Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, (ed.) Kevin Mulligan (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 7. Another good example can be found in August Gallinger's study on objective possibility, which begins with the following question: "What does it mean, something is possible, what do we mean, what is the meaning of this, when we describe an object as possible? [*Was heißt es, etwas ist möglich,*

finally, its conception of perception, in which sensations are considered irrelevant to phenomenological analysis.

The first two aspects may be set aside so that we may focus on the third aspect, which directly relates to our present preoccupations. If sensations are said to be irrelevant to phenomenological analysis, it is easy to see that the Munich phenomenology of perception, at its core, opposes one of the basic tenets of Brentanian descriptive psychology, but also, to some extent, that it conflicts with Husserl's conception of sensations in the *LI*, as we shall see below.

What were the motives that led the Munich phenomenologists to discard sensations from the realm of phenomenological analysis and therefore to dissociate phenomenology from descriptive psychology? At first glance, it is hard to understand how they were led to do so, for not only did the Munich phenomenologists have a good knowledge of descriptive psychology, but its method was to a large extent compatible with their own.

Indeed, Munich had one of the rare German universities in which the philosophy of the school of Brentano was to some extent present. Georg von Hertling, Brentano's cousin and student, taught in Munich at that time, as did another of Brentano's students, Carl Stumpf (between 1889 and 1894), both of whom lectured in the Brentanian manner on psychology, ethics, logic and metaphysics. As a matter of fact, the eldest of all the Munich phenomenologists, Alexander Pfänder, attended many of Stumpf's lectures in 1893 and can thus be seen to have gained important insights on what was meant by "Brentanian descriptive psychology."<sup>21</sup> As is evident in his 1900 *Phänomenologie des Wollens*, published some time before Husserl's *LI*, Pfänder shared an important conviction with Brentano, considering as the main object of psychological analysis the "inner directedness towards something

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*was meinen wir, was bedeutet es, wenn wir einen Gegenstand als möglich bezeichnen?]*" See August Gallinger, *Das Problem der objektiven Möglichkeit. Eine Bedeutungsanalyse* (Leipzig: Barth, 1912), 18.

<sup>21</sup> If we rely on Pfänder's posthumously published "*Selbstanzeige*" of his 1933 book *Die Seele des Menschen. Versuch einer verstehenden Psychologie*, Stumpf's lectures didn't make a good impression on him: "The book has its origin in the deep disappointment I experienced in 1893 when I became acquainted with the so-called scientific psychology. Under psychology I expected...to find something completely different than what I was offered. [*Das Buch hat seinen ersten Ursprung in der tiefen Enttäuschung, die ich im Jahre 1893 erlebte, als ich mit der so genannten wissenschaftlichen Psychologie bekannt wurde. Ich...erwartete als Psychologie etwas ganz anderes zu finden, als mir nur geboten wurde.*]" See Pfänder, "*Selbstanzeige*," in *Pfänder-Studien*, 282. Pfänder's notes on Stumpf's 1893 lectures are deposited at the *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek* in Munich.

[inneres Gerichtetsein auf etwas].”<sup>22</sup> Taking this early shared conviction with Brentano and his knowledge of Brentanian methods into account, it is indeed puzzling that Pfänder and the other Munich phenomenologists soon after rejected descriptive psychology as a characterisation of phenomenology.

If not the most determinant motive, certainly one of the most determinant motives for their rejection of descriptive psychology lies in their reception of Husserl’s critique of psychologism in the *LI*, especially in the *Prolegomena*. For many of the Munich phenomenologists who read the *LI*, *psychologism* quickly became the battle cry against every sort of philosophy that considered logic as a part of psychology—not only against Brentano’s philosophy, but first and foremost against the philosophy of their own teacher, Lipps. This was the case with all of the Munich phenomenologists from the second group; Pfänder, Reinach, Daubert and Geiger all considered the critique of psychologism as one of Husserl’s greatest achievements in the *LI*.<sup>23</sup>

But the question regarding how they came to consider descriptive psychology as a sign of a commitment to psychologism still remains. In this respect, Husserl himself may have played a prominent role with his letter to Lipps of 1904, titled *Meine Stellung zum Psychologismus*. On a visit to Göttingen in 1904, Daubert discussed the content of the letter with Husserl and made a copy of it before it was sent to Lipps.<sup>24</sup> Along with those of Husserl’s materials that came to Munich through Daubert, other such materials came in the hands of other Munich phenomenologists as well.<sup>25</sup> In his letter to Lipps, Husserl establishes the connection between descriptive psychology and psychologism:

<sup>22</sup> See Alexander Pfänder, *Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse* (Leipzig: Barth, 1900), 5.

<sup>23</sup> See Alexander Pfänder, *Logic* (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2009), 20; Adolf Reinach, “The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law,” *Aletheia*, vol. 3 (1983), 106; Moritz Geiger, “Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses,” *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. 1 (1913), 567ff.; many of Daubert’s manuscripts deal with psychologism, such as MS A I 4/23, “Der transzendente Psychologismus bei Lipps.”

<sup>24</sup> According to Schuhmann, these discussions took place in Göttingen in mid-January 1904. See KS, 292.

<sup>25</sup> Among Husserl’s other materials that came to Munich via Daubert, the 1894 manuscript on intentional objects (*Intentionale Gegenstände*) is certainly the most prominent. See Karl Schuhmann, “Husserls Abhandlung ‘Intentionale Gegenstände.’ Edition der ursprünglichen Druckfassung,” *Brentano Studien*, vol. 3 (1990/91), 140. We even find an indirect echo of this manuscript in Adolf Reinach, “Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant,” *Kant-Studien*, vol. 16 (1911), 224. See also KS, 126.

If “descriptive psychology” means description of the psychological, of the I-experiences, etc....it has to be distinguished from phenomenology. Descriptive psychology describes the data related to the empirical consciousness as related to it as such, and so applies this data to the I, which is itself no datum, but rather something which is meant in supplement (*Hinzugemeintes*) through empirical-transcendent apperception. The existence of an I, even of my own I (empirical object) remains an open issue for phenomenology: Enough that it is here, this moment of red, this presenting, this judging, etc.; that it is then taken as it is given in adequate perception, and that it serves furthermore to provide the fulfilling intuition and thus clarity to the conceptual intentions of words like proposition, truth, state of affairs, concept, object, being, necessity, etc. If we go back to the “proper meaning,” to the “origin” of concepts, then the temptation of psychological empiricism disappears.<sup>26</sup>

Here, according to Husserl, descriptive psychology describes the data of the empirical consciousness as belonging to an actual empirical consciousness and has to postulate the existence of an I as substratum of these determinations in order to validate these descriptions. This is what Husserl calls “the temptation of psychological empiricism [*die Versuchung des psychologistischen Empirismus*].” Following Husserl’s point, phenomenology avoids this temptation by describing the red moment, or the presentings and judgments, independently of the actual experiences of an empirical subject, and by providing the fulfilling intuition to our conceptual intentions.

This line of thought, which contains the central idea for the Munich phenomenologists, according to which phenomenology is a description of essences and not of actual empirical experiences, was all that

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 125: “Sofern ‘deskriptive Psychologie’ Deskription des Psychologischen, des Icherlebnisses usw. besagt, ist es...von Phänomenologie zu scheiden. Die deskriptive Psychologie beschreibt die dem empirischen Bewußtsein eingeordneten Data als ihm eingeordnete, und so bezieht sie diese Data auf das Ich, das selbst kein Datum, sondern durch empirisch-transzendierende Apperzeption Hinzugemeintes ist. Die Existenz eines Ich, selbst meines Ich (empirisches Objekt), bleibt für die Phänomenologie offen: Genug, daß dieses da ist, dieses Rotmoment, dieses Vorstellen, Urteilen usw.; daß es dabei so genommen wird, wie es sich in adäquater Wahrnehmung gibt, und daß es weiterhin dazu dient, den begrifflichen Intentionen der Worte Satz, Wahrheit, Sachverhalt, Begriff, Gegenstand, Sein, Notwendigkeit usw. die erfüllende Anschauung und somit die Klarheit zu verschaffen. [G]ehen [wir] auf die ‘eigentliche Bedeutung’, auf den ‘Ursprung’ der Begriffe zurück, so verschwindet die Versuchung des psychologistischen Empirismus.”

the Munich phenomenologists needed to depart from Lipps' descriptive psychology.

The sessions of the *Akademischer Verein* in the winter semester of 1904 provided the opportunity to thematise the Husserl-Lipps dispute. Although a complete and exact list of the 1904 meetings of the *Verein* is not available today, we know that Husserl was invited to a small conference at the *Verein* on 27 May 1904.<sup>27</sup> This meeting with the Munich circle of phenomenologists was undoubtedly a central precipitating element of the Munich invasion of Göttingen. Indeed, plans were made for the Munich phenomenologists to come to Göttingen in the winter semester 1904–05.

The break with Lipps was, then, already palpable in 1904. But in 1906, "Lipps' psychologism" became, for the Munich phenomenologists, an insurmountable obstacle to a mutual understanding with their teacher. Returning to Munich from a short trip to Göttingen in early 1906, Daubert reported to Husserl:

It is strange, [Lipps'] old idea of a Munich school of psychology has been realised, but not as he imagined it. For the whole development happened here much in opposition to him, an opposition which he challenged. Because of this, the relationship to Lipps in seminars and in the association (*Verein*) is becoming quite unpleasant. When Lipps is there, the whole front of the polemic goes against him, against his psychologism and his vague attempts to get out of it....<sup>28</sup>

The situation quickly deteriorated in the summer semester of 1906, when it came to a head between Lipps and his students.<sup>29</sup> It was then

<sup>27</sup> Though only Daubert, von Aster and Husserl himself presented papers, the conference started at 8:00 a.m. and concluded the following day at 3:00 a.m. See Daubert's letter to his mother, quoted in KS, 293.

<sup>28</sup> Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 47: "Es ist merkwürdig, [Lipps'] alter Gedanke der Münchener Psychologenschule hat sich verwirklicht, nur nicht so, wie er es sich dachte. Denn die ganze Entwicklung geschah hier viel im Gegensatz zu ihm, den er herausforderte. Dadurch nun hat sich in den Seminaren und im Verein das Verhältnis zu Lipps recht unerquicklich gestaltet. Ist Lipps da, so geht die ganze Front der Polemik gegen ihn, seinen Psychologismus und seine unklaren Versuche, da herauszukommen...."

<sup>29</sup> Reported by Reinach to Husserl in a letter of 24 July 1906: "Too bad that the tension between Professor Lipps and us seems to be getting always bigger. At the very end of the semester, there was even a small incident.... In a lecture, I tried to show that there is not only a predication of the moral value in ethics, but that one must distinguish there between two basic categories.... The first is always referring to objects, the second to states of affairs. Lipps attacked these...positions very

clear for the Munich phenomenologists that in order to practise phenomenology as they intended to do, especially since the "invasion of Göttingen," they had to abandon descriptive psychology as promoted by Lipps in Munich.

In fact, in 1905–06 two factors combined: on the one hand, Husserl dissociated himself from descriptive psychology mainly because he wanted to avoid any misunderstanding coming from the Munich phenomenologists. On the other hand, the Munich phenomenologists rejected Lipps' descriptive psychology because they saw in it a commitment to psychologism. Husserl, for his part, insisted on preserving Brentano from this accusation.<sup>30</sup> Although the Munich phenomenologists too, at least publicly, seemed to exempt Brentano from this accusation, they nevertheless remained profoundly critical of central issues of Brentanian descriptive psychology, as we will see in the following case studies.

### 3. Case Study I: Daubert on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology

violently in a session of our private seminar. All these distinctions are not objectively well-founded, we are intoxicated by words, etc.... There then followed a few fruitless personal discussions where it became clear, however, that these questions were about fundamental oppositions. [*Schade nur, dass die Spannung zwischen Professor Lipps und uns immer grösser zu werden scheint. Ganz am Schlusse des Semesters kam es sogar zu einem kleinen Ausbruch.... Ich hatte in einem Vortrag zu zeigen versucht, dass es in der Ethik nicht nur die eine Prädikation des sittlichen Wertes gäbe, sondern dass man dort zwei Grundkategorien unterscheiden müsse.... Die erste beziehe sich stets auf Gegenstände, die zweite auf Sachverhalte. – Diese...Positionen griff Lipps nun in einer Sitzung des intimen Seminars...sehr heftig an. Alle diese Unterscheidungen seien sachlich durchaus nicht begründet; wir berauschten uns an Worten etc.... Es folgten dann noch ein paar resultatlose persönliche Diskussionen, bei denen es aber klar wurde, dass es sich bei jenen Fragen um prinzipielle Gegensätze handelte.*] See Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 189ff. In Daubert's manuscripts, we can find later reports on this event in his notes on the sessions of the *Verein*. See, for instance MS A I 11/63v.

<sup>30</sup> This was one of the points Husserl wanted to make clear when he visited Brentano in March 1907. For details about this visit, see the letter from Brentano to Bergmann of 27 March 1907, reproduced in Hugo Bergmann, "Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 7 (1976), 94ff. See also the Brentano-Husserl correspondence of 1905 in Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 30–40. During his visit to Brentano in Munich in June 1907, Daubert confirmed that the accusation of psychologism wasn't directed toward his psychology. See Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, 54ff. An echo of this visit is also to be found in Bergmann, "Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann," 96ff.

Let's return to Schapp's remark, quoted above: "The Munichers did not believe anymore in sensation as constituent of perception and declared all such statements as constructions; they still believed in acts and psychology, those weren't called into question." What was the motive of the Munich phenomenologists in discarding sensations as constituents of perception? In the first two parts of this paper, we have shown that their rejection of Lipps' descriptive psychology was based on its commitment to psychologism, which they recognised in it, thanks to Husserl.

But the claim reported by Schapp is much stronger than the simple rejection of descriptive psychology on the basis of its psychologism. In order to understand the link between the thesis about sensations and the rejection of psychologism, we have to reconstruct the Munich phenomenologists' position on the constituents of perception.

This reconstruction begins with Daubert. Already in 1902, Daubert had noticed the difficulty that will be raised later by Reinach concerning Brentano's concepts of existence and acceptance (*Anerkennen*).<sup>31</sup> Daubert's starting point for his PhD dissertation was Brentano's concept of judgement. He disagreed with Brentano about the sense of "acceptance" (*Anerkennung*) because, according to him, the being of objects is an irreducible datum upon which our acknowledgement is built, while for Brentano, we acquire the concept of being through reflection upon our actual judgments.<sup>32</sup>

Soon after he introduced Husserlian phenomenology in Munich, Daubert worked out a distinction between psychology and phenomenology: according to him, descriptive psychology concerns the different types of thinking, and not the different types of thought, which is the task of phenomenology alone.<sup>33</sup> According to him, the conflict between phenomenology and descriptive psychology emerges from

the opposition between two standpoints: from the phenomenological standpoint, we attribute to contents of consciousness a certain mental being (*psychisches Sein*), while from the standpoint of descriptive psychology, contents of consciousness are only mediators for the external objects they represent. The conflict arises when research in descriptive psychology aims at results that can only be obtained from a phenomenological approach: according to Daubert, the descriptive psychologist simply cannot phenomenologically describe contents of consciousness as objectually given (*Bewußtseinsinhalt als Gegebenheit*), since there is nothing psychical in what is immediately given.<sup>34</sup> In other words, my feeling of happiness has an object that is as real as the object of my feeling of a headache, or the object of my seeing of a house or even the object of my judging that A is greater than B. Phenomenologically considered, none of these objects are psychical and they are all given with the same immediacy. Sensations are thus completely left outside phenomenological analysis. Moreover, according to him, they are neither accessible nor conscious from the phenomenological standpoint.<sup>35</sup> In one of his numerous drafts of his PhD disser-

<sup>34</sup> See here, especially, Daubert, MS A I 4/109: "I may say, the contents of consciousness have mental being, they always have psychological elements even when I have them. Whether I'm aware of it or not is all the same, and this is quite right. But [this] only from the standpoint of a specific consideration.... They [the contents of consciousness] present objects to me and it is in their nature that they are not conscious as something and as something in itself. They are not contents of consciousness anymore when I reflect on them, but rather mental objects, objects of a specific class of reality, namely the mental being. Therefore: phenomenology and descriptive psychology are not the same, provided that there is nothing mental in the immediately given. [Ich darf wohl sagen, die Bewußtseinsinhalte haben psychisches Sein, psychische Elemente allemal auch, wenn ich sie habe. Ob ich mir dessen bewußt bin oder nicht, ist einerlei, und dieses ist ganz richtig. Aber nur vom Standpunkt der Betrachtungsweise,...die Frage, was sie schon in einem bestimmten Sinn stellt, einem Sinn, der merkwürdigerweise jenem Standpunkt und über Betrachtungsweise ganz heterogen ist, welche ich anwende, wenn ich sie aktuell habe. Sie [the standpoint of descriptive psychology] repräsentieren mir Gegenstände und in ihrer Natur liegt es, daß sie nicht...als etwas und als etwas für sich bewußt sind. Reflektiere ich darauf, dann sind es nicht mehr die Bewußtseinsinhalte als solche, sondern psychische Gegenstände, Gegenstände einer bestimmten Wirklichkeitsklasse, nämlich des psychischen Seins. Darum: Phänomenologie und deskriptive Psychologie nicht identisch, sofern unter den unmittelbar Gegebenen auch noch nichts von Psychischem steckt.]"

<sup>35</sup> See, for instance, Daubert, MS A I 4/27: "By having them [i.e., contents of consciousness], I am aware of them neither as contents of sensations nor as thing-like parts or features (for their interpretation as contents of sensation presupposes that we consider them as mental beings, as elements of a connection, a connection which, in function of its specificity distinguishes everything physical, etc.)"

<sup>31</sup> See the drafts to Daubert's unfinished PhD dissertation, especially the parts one one-term judgement (*eingliedrige Urteile*) in MS A I 6 (here especially A I 6/10r).

<sup>32</sup> See Daubert, MS A I 6/12r: "What cannot be the *sense of acknowledging*. It makes no sense to acknowledge an object as to its existence or being as such, if this all is obviously given.... What has to be given, so that I can acknowledge something (in the sense of judging)? [Was kann nicht der Sinn von Anerkennen sein. Es hat keinen Sinn, einen Gegenstand anzuerkennen hinsichtlich seines Daseins oder Soseins, wenn dieses alles selbstverständlich gegeben ist.... Was muß gegeben sein, damit ich etwas (im Sinn des Urteilens) anerkennen kann?]"

<sup>33</sup> See Daubert, MS A I 8/181: "Descriptive psychology.... The analysis doesn't concern here what is thought in its forms, but the thinking itself. Description and analysis of the different types of thinking. [Deskriptive Psychologie.... Die Analyse betrifft hier nicht mehr das Gedachte in seinen Formen, sondern das Denken selber. Beschreibung und Analyse der verschiedenen Arten des Denkens.]"



tation, Daubert assumed that it is a contradiction to say that my experience is constituted by contents of sensation and modes of consciousness at the same time that we assume that our experience gives us the consciousness of an external object, with three dimensions, etc.<sup>36</sup> Contents of sensation belong to concrete experience, but they become qualities of perception only through their interpretation. To illustrate his position, Daubert gives the following example: I see my house from the street. From this perceptual experience, I can only distinguish my contents of sensation through psychological analysis, but these are not identical with my consciousness or with my perception of my house. Contents of sensation are two-dimensional: therefore, seeing a window, a brick wall, etc., implies that I am seeing more than what I actually feel through sensations.<sup>37</sup>

Basically, Daubert's thesis is that perception implies at least the interpretation of sensations, but from the phenomenological standpoint, these sensations as such are a construction, they are not the proper elements of perception. When I say "I see the table right there," I am describing an experience that is itself constituted by the interpretation of my sensations. And, so to speak, when I say "I have a red sensation," this description, taken literally, doesn't have any meaning. For a Munich phenomenologist such as Daubert, sensations, unlike objects, are not and cannot be given in themselves. In this context, we can easily understand why, for Daubert, descriptive psychology accomplishes quite the opposite of what phenomenology aims to do. Phenomenolo-

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[Indem ich sie [i.e., contents of consciousness] habe, sind sie mir als Empfindungsinhalte ebensowenig bewußt wie als dingliche Teile oder Merkmale. Denn die Auffassung als Empfindungsinhalt setzt voraus, daß wir sie als psychisches Sein, als Element eines Zusammenhanges betrachten, eines Zusammenhanges, der sachlich seiner Eigenart nach spezifisch von Physischem usw. unterscheidet.] See also A I 6/4. Pfänder had a very similar conception of sensations: "Sensing is a particular mental experience which cannot be decomposed further; one can only indicate it, although everyone who can remember his seeing of a colour or his hearing of a tone knows that experience. [Das Empfinden ist ein eigenartiges psychisches Erlebnis, das sich nicht weiter zerlegen und beschreiben läßt, auf das man nur hinweisen kann, das aber jeder kennt, der sich an sein Sehen einer Farbe oder sein Hören eines Tones oder Geräusches erinnert.]" Pfänder, *Einführung in die Psychologie*, 212.

<sup>36</sup> See Daubert, MS A I 6/19: "How can it be that what is present is at the same time mental? For sensation and presentation elements are not given in isolation. It belongs to their characteristics that they stand in a particular function. [Wie kann das, was gegenwärtig ist, zugleich psychische sein. Denn Empfindungs- und Vorstellungselemente sind nicht isoliert als solche gegeben. Au ihren Eigentümlichkeiten gehört es, daß sie in einer bestimmten Funktion stehen.]"

<sup>37</sup> See Daubert, MS A I 6/26.

gy aims to describe our experience to the extent that it gives us objects, and not sensations.

But at the same time, Daubert's thesis is not quite the same as the thesis endorsed by Husserl in the *LI*. Husserl simply says that our contents of sensations are present, real contents, interpreted through perception—what he calls the interpretative form of perception (*Auffassungsform der Wahrnehmung*). For Husserl, unlike for Daubert, contents of sensation are real contents and therefore constitutive of perception, although they are not what is meant in perception. Daubert, on the contrary, seems to believe that perception is exclusively constituted by meaning (*Meinen*).

Understanding "meaning" (*Meinen*) under "perception" appears, at first glance, to be quite similar to the Brentanian notion that defines perception through judgement, i.e., through the acceptance/rejection of a presented object. After all, both positions attribute to intentionality a central role in perception. The major difference between the two views is that, according to Brentano, perception is nothing other than an attitude of acceptance or rejection toward a content, while, according to Daubert, it is a *contradictio in adjecto* to say that we "mean a content." What we perceive or mean is always an object.

But this is not the only difference between the two positions. As we shall see in our second case study, the Munich phenomenologists also rejected the Brentanian thesis that every perception, being a judgement, involves a belief. They held, and Reinach most prominently, that the belief moment is not constitutive, by itself, of judgement: it is necessary to distinguish an assertive moment as well.

#### 4. Case Study II: Reinach's Critique of Brentano's Theory of Judgement

Reinach's "On the Theory of Negative Judgments" is known as an apology for states of affairs in ontology, but it also contains a critique of Brentano's theory of judgement, which deserves to be discussed here. The basic idea of this critique is summarised in the following paragraph:

I hear, say, the judgment "a is P" expressed; I understand it, reflect upon it, and then I utter a consenting "Yes." In this "Yes" lies a consent, an acceptance; but even here the acceptance is not a judgement. For which judgment should it be? The judgment "a is P"? Certainly not. For this judgment evidently relates to the being P of a, to this state of affairs, but the acceptance which we now have before us relates rather to the judgment "a is P." And that the state of af-

fairs is not the same as the judgment which posits it requires no special emphasis. I can even bring in the original judgment alongside, and say: "Yes; a is indeed P." Here we have consenting acceptance and judgment next to each other, as evidently different.<sup>38</sup>

As noted earlier, according to Brentano, the judgement itself constitutes an acceptance or rejection of a presented object. In expressing my judgement through the statement "a is P," I accept *a* being P. In his critique of Brentano, Reinach defends the propositionalist standpoint and takes the form "a is P" as fundamental and irreducible, whereas Brentano reduces this form to an acceptance. According to Reinach, if the sentence is an acceptance or rejection, it has to be an acceptance or rejection of an articulated judicative content (e.g., the being P of a, etc.), for an object, simple or complex, cannot be accepted or rejected as such, and it doesn't have a meaning as such.<sup>39</sup> The least one can say of an object is that it exists, or that it is real. According to Reinach, and unlike Brentano, the content of the judgement "a is" is that a exists. It is this relation between a and its existence that is accepted and affirmed, not a itself.

The strategy developed by Reinach allows him to distinguish between two different meanings of "judgement": judgement as conviction or belief and judgement as assertion. In an assertion, an object is meant, while in a conviction, a content is presented. According to Reinach, these two levels in judicative acts are fundamentally distinct:

...the term "judgment" is to be understood in two senses, on the one hand as assertion, which relates to its objectual correlate in acts of meaning which may or may not be accompanied by intuitions, and on the other hand as conviction or belief which develops out of more or less intuitive acts of presentation. This implies that we must speak also of the negative judgment in two senses, and thus already the problem of the negative judgment has been raised up onto a new level.<sup>40</sup>

In the first meaning of judgement, we understand an affirmation. Intensity doesn't play any role here: I assert P—or I don't; there is no in-between. Besides, assertions have meanings, they mean (*meinen*) something. These two features are not involved when we speak of judgement in the second sense, namely, as conviction or belief. I may

judge that there is water on Mars, and that I am the author of the present paper. These two assertions vary strongly in degree of conviction, the first having a degree of conviction much weaker than the second. If Reinach agrees partially with Brentano about the fact that judgements understood as convictions are based on presentations, he doesn't think that this holds for judgements understood as assertions. Assertions have meaning (*Meinung*), not presentations, as presuppositions.<sup>41</sup>

In short, Reinach's critique of Brentano's theory of judgement aims to show the lack of a distinction between two phenomenologically different moments in every judicative act: the conviction and the assertion, which are, to speak in the realistic spirit of Munich phenomenology, two different essences. Reinach's critique of Brentanian descriptive psychology moves in the same direction as Daubert's point on perception and meaning: one simply cannot describe what belongs to the realm of meaning (*Meinen*) and assertion in terms of conviction or from the standpoint of descriptive psychology.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

We have seen that there were contextual reasons that led Husserl to abandon the label of descriptive psychology as characterising phenomenology, although this abandonment meant neither the rejection of the discipline as such nor a rejection of Brentanian descriptive psychology in particular. In abandoning the label, Husserl wanted to distance himself from the works of Lipps, who considered descriptive psychology a description of the experiences of the empirical I, given as the pole of all perceptions. In short, Husserl's reasons for abandoning the label were directed not against the Brentanian conception of descriptive psychology, but more specifically against the conception of descriptive psychology advocated in Munich by Lipps.

In order to understand the effects of the Munich invasion of Göttingen in 1905–06, we have to consider two factors: the first is Husserl's dissociation from descriptive psychology in the *Vorlesung E*, in order to avoid misunderstandings coming from the Munich phenomenologists, and the second lies in the fact that the Munich phenomenologists rejected Lipps' descriptive psychology because they saw in it a commitment to psychologism. This explains, in my view, their deeply critical attitude toward the central issues of Brentanian descriptive psychology. And, in fact, as we have seen in our two case studies, the

<sup>38</sup> See Adolf Reinach, "On the Theory of Negative Judgment," in *Parts and Moments*, (ed.) B. Smith (Munich: Philosophia, 1982), 316.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 330.

realist position developed by the Munich phenomenologists was not only connected with, but also depended on the association they established between descriptive psychology and psychologism. According to Daubert, descriptive psychology and phenomenology, as two different standpoints, necessarily involve two different ontological realms (mental experiences versus objects) that are exclusive to each of them. In this context, sensations and judgements understood as beliefs must be ruled out of phenomenological investigation, since, according to the Munich phenomenologists, the phenomenology of perception has only to do with objects. When they analyse acts of judgement, they don't need to rely on abstraction, as does Brentanian descriptive psychology; rather, they simply grasp the essences of these acts, which are objects of phenomenological investigation.<sup>42</sup>

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