Deleuze’s Nietzschean Revaluation: The Image of Thought/Thought Without Image

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The importance of Nietzsche for the work of Gilles Deleuze is no secret.¹ This importance goes far beyond mere influence or inspiration, however. In Nietzsche, Deleuze finds the provocation to engage in a nomadic, anarchic mode of discourse that runs counter to the sedentary mode of discourse characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. Deleuze considers himself a member of a generation “that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy” (N, 6). Trapped within the cognitive confines of the tradition’s repressive framework, Deleuze was “extricated” by Nietzsche (N, 6). Thus extricated, Deleuze—rather than merely parroting the insights of this philosophical provocateur—puts Nietzsche to work, engaging in a series of experiments and explorations that employ various Nietzschean devices (such as the will to power, the eternal return, the ubermensch, and the genealogical method) as their launching pads.²

Deleuze’s dealings with Nietzsche range from relatively conventional (by Deleuze’s standards) expositions of Nietzsche’s thought (in Nietzsche and Philosophy) to radical experimentations which are more characteristically “Deleuzian” than “Nietzschean.” In a sense, Nietzsche owes as much to Deleuze as Deleuze does to Nietzsche, maybe more so; for with his experimentations Deleuze extracts from these Nietzschean notions their full effect, telegraphing them on lines of flight that animate them and reveal the range of their power and fecundity. Rescued from the naïve, hyperbolic, and ill-conceived introductions they often receive from Nietzsche, these revitalized notions are the leitmotifs in Deleuze’s exposition of the “chaosmos” in which thought is active, productive, and problematic rather than passive, sedentary, and repressive.

Central to Deleuze’s communication of the chaosmos—with its planes of immanence whereupon points of intensity, multiplicities, and pure difference weave, intersect, and explode in the play of nomadic thought—is his critique of what he calls the “dogmatic image of thought.” In the following discussion, I will focus on this critique and the crucial role it plays in Deleuze’s work. The notion of the “dogmatic image of thought” first appears with Deleuze’s exegetical ruminations on Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy and receives perhaps its most penetrating elucidation in the pivotal third chapter of Difference and Repetition. Indeed, Deleuze himself, reflecting upon Difference and Repetition, declares that it is this
chapter "which now seems ... the most necessary and the most concrete and which serves to introduce subsequent books up to and including the research undertaken with Guattari" (DR, xvii). It is not surprising, then, that liberation from the dogmatic image of thought is a recurring concern in later works such as What Is Philosophy? (with Felix Guattari).

My discussion will focus on the seminal passages in Nietzsche and Philosophy where Deleuze first introduces this notion into his thought and on the all-important third chapter in Difference and Repetition. I agree with Schrift that we can use Nietzsche as a "portal" into the labyrinth of Deleuze's thought. My contention, however, is that we can be even more specific: the most effective entrance into the Deleuzian matrix is through an examination of his discovery, via Nietzsche, of the dogmatic image of thought and the subsequent Deleuzian-Nietzschean revaluation this discovery prompts.

The Dogmatic Image of Thought

The first intimation of the forthcoming unveiling of the dogmatic image of thought comes early in Nietzsche and Philosophy with Deleuze's reference to the "new way of thinking" sought after by Nietzsche. A new way of thinking "means an affirmative thought which affirms life and the will to life, a thought which finally expels the whole of the negative" (NP, 35). Deleuze's remarks here presage Difference and Repetition's focus on the inadequacy of conceiving difference in terms of negation. Moreover, they anticipate the pivotal section, titled "New Image of Thought," that appears later in Nietzsche and Philosophy.

In this section Deleuze characterizes the dogmatic image of thought in terms of three theses: (1) the thinker values truth above all else, that thought qua thought contains certain a priori concepts, and that thought is equivalent to a universally shared good sense; (2) we are led into error or falsehood by external forces that oppose thought; and (3) all that is required to think truly is a method. Deleuze points out that "the most curious thing about this image of thought is the way in which it conceives of truth as an abstract universal" (NP, 103). Thought is not active and affirmative; it is reduced rather to the static consideration of an empty universal. Equally curious is the presumption that truth is valued above all else, that its value is not called into question. Deleuze finds in Nietzsche's questioning of the value of truth the first real attempt to contest the authority of this image of thought.

The combination of these two presumptions or conceptions reveals that which this image of thought conceals: the work of established forces that seek to subordinate thought to the mere exposition of certain predetermined universals. This concealment is underpinned by the second thesis. What the thinker must avoid is error, i.e., all that which is opposed to the "truth" as articulated in universal good sense. What is "good sense," what is "true," is determined a priori; thought receives its objects of contemplation and reacts against that which conflicts with this received truth. The result, one fastened upon by Nietzsche-Deleuze, is that "we are never referred to the real forces that form thought" (NP, 103). We are already on the other side of thought; it is conceived of as formed and reactive rather than creative and active. The forces that actually power thought are thus concealed and, insofar as they are subordinated to this image of thought, neutralized.

The persistence of this image of thought is thus in large part attributable to the fact that the very forces in thought that might rebel against such an authoritarian construct have already been sublimated. Thought, subdued by the image of thought, is unable to deploy the active forces that would free it. The neutralization of the active forces of thought is ensured and maintained precisely by the requirement of a method (the third thesis). The goal of thought is to avoid error, and the means by which such avoidance is to be achieved are prescribed by this method. On such a conception, the only misadventure that can afflict thought is error, i.e., that which opposes truth as an abstract universal. Thought is thus restricted to a logic of opposition: truth versus falsehood. The goal is to avoid that which is external—what is in opposition—to truth. The method ensures that the formative, active elements of thought will be effaced by the preoccupation with oppositional thinking.

Theses (2) and (3) thus support and perpetuate the fundamental conception of thesis (1). Hence overcoming this image of thought means dislodging the heretofore-uncontested primacy of "truth": "A new image of thought means primarily that truth is not the element of thought. The element of thought is sense and value" (NP, 104). Along these lines, Deleuze points out that, for Nietzsche, the binary logic of truth-falsity is not the decisive category of thought. Rather, the categories of thought are the noble and the base, the high and the low. Moreover, forces beyond falsehood can accost thought. Stupidity, nonsense, imbecile discourse—these and other forces confront active thought and are elements of thought as such. What we might find absurd about a superstition, to cite one of Deleuze's examples, cannot be reduced to the element of error that lies at its core. Something beyond mere error is at work here. Teachers will attest to the fact that the problems afflicting the homework submitted by their students cannot be characterized simply in terms of "error" or "falsehood." In addition, their homework is beset with irrelevant remarks, nonsensical sentences and "banalities mistaken for profundities." The cumulative nonsense of a radio station scan is another telling instance. Hitting the "scan" button on one's car radio, one is privy to a
string of sound bites, individually often comic or bizarre, collectively forming an absurd discourse. The terms "true" and "false" are simply inapplicable to this discourse; what is distinctive about it cannot be captured by this limited binary logic. The same phenomenon presents itself with "channel-surfing"; indeed at present this kind of bowdlerized discourse seems to be ubiquitous. It may be that even this sort of discourse can yield results, prove productive. Yet whatever active, emergent elements might be contained in this discourse cannot be accounted for—cannot even be acknowledged—by an image of thought that remains mired in the categories of true and false. At any rate, whatever the "misadventure" encountered by thought here, it is not merely error. To seek error here would be as misguided as to seek truth, and yet something is at work that compels us to think.

In unmasking the limitations of this image of thought that enthrones truth as the sovereign value, Nietzsche is the first to render thought active and affirmative, the first to glimpse the prospect of new values for thought. This is precisely what Deleuze means by a new image of thought. Insofar as this new image exposes, explodes, and expels the categories of the old image, it is for all intents and purposes no image of thought at all, at least not one that could be recognized in terms of the old one. An image that is dynamic to the core, constantly at play with an infinity of movements, ultimately escapes all attempts to capture it in any one image. This mercurial nature of thought informs (directly or indirectly) all of Deleuze's writings (we see it, for example, factoring into a later work such as What is Philosophy?). But clearly, it is with these initial reflections upon Nietzsche that the issue of the dogmatic image of thought first explicitly enters and instills itself at the heart of Deleuze's work.

Many of the elements of Deleuze's later extended examinations of the image of thought are already encountered in embryonic form in the three theses of Nietzsche and Philosophy, however Deleuze here achieves a richer, more revealing exhibition of the structure of the image of thought. While these postulates are interrelated and operate in conjunction with one another, we can nonetheless highlight certain postulates in order to draw attention to Deleuze's central concerns.

Postulates (3) and (4), for example, substantially advance the elaboration of the "method" indicated in the third thesis of Nietzsche and Philosophy. Recognition (3) "may be defined by the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object" (DR, 133). It is the same object that is perceived, imagined, touched, and recalled, as with Descartes's example of the piece of wax. All these faculties are united in the subject; this, Deleuze maintains, is the fundamental meaning of the Cartesian cogito. There is a concordance and unity of all the faculties in the subject; these faculties as a composite relate themselves to the principle of identity as applied to the object. Hence recognition relies upon the collaboration of all the faculties in the "I think," a collaboration that is for "everyone." The identity of the Self, for Descartes as for Kant, is the basis for the concordance of all the faculties and their collective directedness towards the form of the "Same object." A universal "common sense" is thus established. What is key in all this is that all that can be recognized, obviously, is the recognizable, the same object. Moreover, "what is recognized is not only an object but also the values attached to an object" (DR, 135). The focus is upon recognizing these received values rather than upon creating them.

Nietzsche's importance emerges yet again. In questioning the most basic presuppositions of philosophy, Nietzsche arrives at "the distinction between the creation of new values and the recognition of established values" (DR, 136). Thought's ability to establish new values is a sign of the force of difference—the active, productive elements—at work in thought. Burdened with the model of recognition, thought loses the ability to wrest itself free of the forces that oppress it and render it stagnant. The net effect of the model of recognition is that "philosophy is left without means to realize its project of breaking with dogma" (DR, 134), with authoritarian, dogmatic thinking in all its forms. Rather than emerge from the dark cave of dogma, the forces of thought "remain imprisoned by the same cave or ideas" (DR, 134).
This is the case with the world of representation (4) in general. The cogito is the decisive category of representation. Representation and recognition are inextricably linked, for what is represented is that which is recognized—the same object. To represent the object is to locate it in the "I think." Representation is defined by the elements of identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance. The principle of identity governs the generation of concepts; relations of opposition between concepts control their determination; judgments regarding concepts proceed by way of analogy. The prefix "re" is significant in this context: resemblance, recognition, and representation govern thought. Identity presides over all of these. Thought is rendered myopic, slave to the biconditional that asserts the indiscernibility of identicals, the identity of indiscernibles. But what of the different in itself? It is sacrificed at the altar of identity. Again, this is why the ego cogito is decisive (and why Deleuze is so preoccupied with it), for all of these qualities of an object of thought require the unification of the faculties of thought in the ego. The ego cogito is the cement that binds and hardens the image of thought. Thought is unable to break free of this model; the active elements of difference are suffocated and subdued. Because "the world of representation is characterized by its inability to conceive of difference in itself" (DR, 138), it "crucifies" difference. The active, productive forces in thought are buried beneath the edifice formed by the forces of recognition and, more generally, representation. Nietzsche mocks Hegel and Kant precisely because their philosophical activity consists of nothing more than the buttressing of this edifice. Deleuze, for his part, implies that the phenomenological investigations of someone like Husserl, for example, do not escape criticism on this score. Platonism (specifically the doctrine of recollection) too, setting much of the agenda for Western philosophy, is "a refuge for the recognition model" (DR, 142). The history of philosophy in general, then, is afflicted with an adherence to this model of representation, and it is not until Nietzsche that a genuine attempt at a break is found.

Finally, a note on postulates (7) and (8) is in order. Under the dogmatic image, "problems are to be evaluated according to the possibility of ... finding a solution" (DR, 160). The model of representation calls for the identification and elucidation of the problem at hand. This focus on "solvability," however, obscures the positive character of problems. "Something in the world forces us to think" (DR, 139), Deleuze points out, and this something is precisely the encounter with the problematic per se. Thought, at its core, is problematic. "Problems" have a positive, productive aspect; they engender interrogative activity and stimulate the forces of affirmation in thought by signaling new paths to be taken, new courses to be charted. For Deleuze, problems are not something to be dissolved. To conceive of problems in purely negative terms, to posit them simply as obstacles to be removed, or solved, is to neutralize that which animates thought and renders it productive.

This seventh postulate has a corollary in the eighth: "Knowledge designates only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of rule enabling solutions" (DR, 164). Learning, by contrast, signifies the subjective activity undertaken upon encountering problems. To learn means to enter into commerce with the myriad differential relations that constitute an idea. Hence "it is from 'learning,' not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of thought must be drawn" (DR, 166). Learning is an active, dynamic process that employs the productive, affirmative forces of thought, whereas "knowledge," i.e., the preoccupation with its acquisition, renders thought passive, sedentary, and merely receptive. Deleuze considers the Hegelian search for absolute knowledge as perhaps the finest example of this deification of knowledge. The dialectic of the dogmatic image threatens to lose sight of its relationship to ideas in the form of problems. It "traces problems from propositions," dissolving them by solving them, or moving to the next stage in the propositional dialectic. This represents a "perversion" of thought which, Deleuze tells us, "begins with the dialectic itself, and attains its extreme form in Hegelianism" (DR, 164). Given that Deleuze seeks to emancipate thought from this negative dialectic, it is not surprising to find him criticizing Hegel in this context. Absolute knowledge as the telos of thought—the culmination of the Hegelian dialectic—is the crowning feature of the dogmatic image of thought. Again, this is not to be considered a great achievement. As Deleuze declares later in What Is Philosophy?, "we have no reason to take pride in this image of thought" (WP, 55), which renders thought sedentary and impotent. We should take these adjectives in a quite literal sense. Thought is rendered sedentary in that it remains attached to a solid foundation (the dogmatic image), rendered immobile. It is not migratory, does not chart out the lines of flight revealed by the problematic. It is impotent in the most fundamental sense (setting aside the sexual connotation) of lacking any force or power.

While the change from the three theses of Nietzsche and Philosophy to the eight postulates of Difference and Repetition reflects, on one level, a desire on Deleuze's part to exhibit more precisely the structure of the dogmatic image of thought, there is a much more important development to recognize, indeed perhaps the most significant development to be found in Difference and Repetition. Notable by its absence is a concern with (any discussion of what might constitute) a "new image of thought." For Deleuze now recognizes that what is required is the revelation of "a thought without image" (DR, 132). This development, as we shall see, represents one of the most crucial stages in the movement of Deleuze's ongoing Nietzsche experiments.
Thought Without Image: Deleuze’s Nietzschean Revaluation

The critique of the dogmatic image of thought, the rejection of a model based on representation and binary opposition, leads to “the terrible revelation of a thought without image” (DR, 147). This revelation is “terrible” in that it signifies the utter dissolution of the conventional image of thought and points us towards the dizzying realization of “new ways of thinking.” The critique of this image thus represents the negative expression of a thought without image. Thought without image will not employ the representational model and it will reject identity as a governing principle. In short, it will elaborate “the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented” (DR, 147).

At the same time, however, the critique of the dogmatic image of thought indicates a positive characterization of the new way of thinking. Thought without image will exhibit difference as pure difference, i.e., difference freed from the category of mere negation. It will not only reject the general but will also embrace the singularity of the diverse. It will embrace multiplicity as pure multiplicity, not multiplicity merely as opposed to unity. As Daniel Conway puts it, the business of the dogmatic image of thought is “to misplace relations of difference behind relations of binary opposition.” It is precisely this signature prejudice of traditional metaphysical thinking that Deleuze eschews. Negatively construed, thought without image rejects the postulates of the dogmatic image of thought; positively, it reveals the relations of difference and repetition that empower nomadic thought. For example, “problems qua problems [not problems qua solvability] are the real objects [of thought]” (DR, 169). This is what Deleuze means by “nomadic” thought: thought is not enclosed by the rigid categories of the dogmatic image; it is restricted to no fixed location but wanders and roams, restless following the problematic. But this restlessness is precisely that which empowers it. Nomadic thought embraces the positive problematic character of thinking and accepts no dependence upon principles of identity or resemblance. Negation, one of the central features of the dogmatic image, is difference, but difference viewed from its underside: “seen from the right way up, difference is affirmative” (DR, 55). Thought without image is pure affirmation, repudiating the reactive “no” with an active “yes.” Moreover, it indicates the nomadic distribution, the crowned anarchy, of multiplicity. Multiplicity, difference itself, is the transcendental condition of all that appears. Operating in this “inspired chaos,” thought no longer remains anchored in relations of binary opposition. Multiplicity is refractory to the dualist categories of the representational model. The logical fork of true and false cannot spear the different in itself. When we recognize that error is no longer the only misadventure that might afflict thought, we also recognize that truth is not the governing value. The logic of difference is a polyvalent logic: the noble, the base, the affirmative, the active, the reactive, the creative—these are now the values for thought. Truth-value is no longer sovereign, and thought is no longer dependent upon the categories of representational thinking.

I cannot offer here anything like an exhaustive characterization of this new thought without image. What is crucial in the present context is the recognition of the nature of the revolution that overturns the traditional dogmatic image. Deleuze, as Philip Goodchild points out, “does not aim to construct a ‘true’ or ‘universal’ concept of philosophy; instead, he creates a new sense and value for philosophy.” The critique of the dogmatic image of thought does not lead to the erection of a new “image” of thought (in the same sense of the term). The thought born of this critique is a thought without image. No longer is philosophy conceived as a closed system. The central values of thought are no longer solvability, propositional truth, and the various postulates of the representational model. Multiplicity, singularity, diversity, and pure difference, to name a few, emerge as the new values of a thought without image. What Deleuze effects here, then, is a revaluation of the sort effected by Nietzsche himself.

Such a Nietzschean-Deleuzian revaluation seems the natural outcome of Deleuze’s Nietzschean experiments. Indeed the very presentation and critique of the dogmatic image of thought proceed along somewhat Nietzschean lines. For example, are the three theses of Nietzsche and Philosophy and the eight postulates of Difference and Repetition not reminiscent of the “four great errors” of Twilight of the Idols? With the four great errors, Nietzsche launches just one of his many attacks on the prejudices of traditional metaphysical thinking. The four great errors, recall, are the error of confusing cause and effect, the error of a false causality, the error of imaginary causes, and the error of free will. Together these errors constitute what Nietzsche calls “the real corruption of reason” (TP, 492). Deleuze’s own reference to the dogmatic image’s “betrayal of what it means to think” is certainly more than a passing nod to Nietzsche’s remark here. Moreover, Deleuze’s attempts to outline the various assumptions constitutive of the image of thought provide us with a fine example of the way he puts Nietzsche to work.

Nietzsche’s and Deleuze’s aims are much the same: Nietzsche seeks to reveal the assumptions that underpin the traditional metaphysical scheme, a scheme that subordinates the active, productive forces in thought in a repressive matrix of static categories. The error of false causality, for example, is conditioned upon the adherence to the notion of a substantial subject or self. This self is posited as being causally efficacious; with the will of the subject causality is caught in the act. This no-
tion of a Cartesian ego, causal in the act of willing, underpins the entire realist metaphysic: "we created the world on this basis as a world of causes, a world of will, a world of spirits" (TI, 495). It is not enough to have a "doing" (or an event, as Deleuze would say), a doer had to be added. From the doing we create the doer, the ego; from the "I" we create the concept of "being" (TI, 495). Thus we have (in the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled "How The True World Finally Became A Fable") "the true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man" (TI, 485). The codification of this ontological construction is the source of the "habitual acceptance of a particular causal interpretation" (TI, 496). Nietzsche takes issue not with the "creation" of this metaphysical framework, but with the fact that we have forgotten that it is indeed a creation, a fable, a result of the active, productive powers of thought. We have forgotten that the postulates of this image of thought are a collective interpretation. These postulates have been enshrined as absolute truths, and the dogmatic faith in truth as the ultimate value has replaced and suppressed the active forces in thought. Thought has become sedentary, subservient to an artificial framework of rigid categories. The values of this metaphysical framework are creations, but the act of creation, and the fact that thought is dynamic and creative, has been forgotten. Clearly, this is an insight that informs Deleuze's own critique of the dogmatic image of thought; he seizes upon this Nietzschean view that "what is needed, that is, is a revaluation leaves all that happens (TI, 495). Free will is one of the defining characteristics of the subject; because we act freely, we are responsible for our actions. Persons are considered free so that they might become guilty, and hence be judged and punished. Nietzsche cites this as the root of the Christian "metaphysics of the hangman": "The true world—attainable for now, but ... for the sinner who repents" (TI, 485). Most importantly, we have "taken the concept of being from the concept of the ego" (TI, 495). An entire ontological framework has been constructed around the cogito, around the notion of the self-contained, free subject in which all the faculties are united. Deleuze as well, as we have seen, takes aim at this axial feature of the dogmatic image of thought. Difference and Repetition's vivisection of the metaphysical subject results in the emergence of the "larval self," "the fractured I and the dissolved self" (DR, 257), of a thought without image. The ego cogito, the "I," is no longer the decisive category of thought.

Lurking behind Nietzsche's specific critique of the four great errors are the will to power and the eternal return, notions that figure, explicitly or implicitly, into all of Nietzsche's work. Deleuze uses these Nietzschean devices to great effect in his own critique of the dogmatic image of thought. Nietzsche, as Nehamas puts it, "wants to show that world has no ontological structure." The traditional metaphysical framework is misguided in that it seeks to impose a rigid set of ontological categories onto the monster of energy that is the "world." Liberation from this framework represents the "end of the longest error, [the] high point of humanity" (TI, 485). Nietzsche's complaint is not that this framework "gets it wrong"; he objects rather to the very attempt. Stock metaphysical terms such as "true," "false," "substance," and "cause" are simply uninformative when it comes to describing the world. The "world" (a term that is itself burdened with metaphysical connotations) is refractory to descriptions of this sort. The world is nothing more than will to power. Deleuze employs this Nietzschean insight, but not before putting it to work in his own way. Where Nietzsche's reevaluation leaves us, one might say, with only chaos, Deleuze's Nietzschean revaluation unveils the "Chaosmos" of difference and repetition. The Chaosmos is the "identity of the world and Chaos" (DR, 299); it is the cosmos infused with and inspired by chaos, with the infinite movement of thought that shatters the hegemonic order of the dogmatic image. Will to power and eternal return unite to form the central principle of a thought without image. No longer are we operating with the postulates of the dogmatic image of thought. Even the concept of an "end," a telos that governs the structure of the world and all that happens within it, is inapplicable: "We have invented the concept of 'end'; in reality there is no end" (TI, 500). Rather than an "end," there is only eternal return. Eternal return, however, is not the return of the same, of the identical: "only affirmation returns—in other words, the Different" (DR, 299). Again, we can see core Nietzschean motifs, reconfigured, propelling Deleuze's experiments in Difference and Repetition.

For Nietzsche, the revelation of the prejudices of the traditional metaphysical framework indicates the need for a "revaluation of all values" (TI, 493). All of Nietzsche's writings, in one way or another, are devoted to the fulfillment of this need. I have tried to show that we can profitably interpret Deleuze as engaged in an effort to effect just such a revaluation. What is needed, according to Deleuze, is a wholesale revision of our conception of what it means to think, of what it means to engage in philosophical activity. What is needed, that is, is a revolution. Bringing about such a revolution "is the aim of a theory of thought without image" (DR, 276).

I have traced out one stage in the evolution of Deleuze's Nietzschean experiments with the dogmatic image of thought. But these experiments, it should be pointed out, do not cease with Difference and Repetition.
Deleuze's thought, mirroring thought itself, is constantly undergoing elaboration, constantly shifting, leaping from problem to problem in a continually active state. We should not be surprised, then, to find Deleuze (along with Guattari) referring to an "image of thought" much later in What Is Philosophy? In apparent conflict with the objective of Difference and Repetition (the revelation of thought without image), here he endeavors to articulate an image of thought to supplant the old dogmatic image. Yet this does not represent a sudden reversal of his position or abandonment of his earlier concerns. He is still concerned to seek out and expose ossified concepts ("concept mummies," as Nietzsche would say). Concepts, if that is what we must label them, are not rigid absolutes; they are rather the outcome of "throws of the dice" (WP, 34). A concept is an event, something that happens, and so is fluid and dynamic. Thought does not rest in concepts, it moves with them and on them. While Deleuze does invoke the phrase "image of thought" in his later work, we must bear in mind that what "constitutes" this image of thought "is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite" (WP, 37). Thought is still nomadic and active, propelled by the forces of difference and repetition. This image thus bears the hallmarks of both Difference and Repetition's "thought without image" and Nietzsche and Philosophy's "new image of thought." The underlying concerns that animate each work remain consistent; what has changed is the manner of expression. Thought is protean, and so Deleuze's thought takes on many shapes. Thought itself is restless, and so Deleuze's work is characterized by movement. One way of appreciating this movement is by following out the manifestations of his negotiations with the "image" of thought.

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Works Cited


Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, June 2, 2003. I thank my commentator Alain Beaulieu for his insightful comments and constructive criticism.


3. See Schrift, 60. Daniel Conway echoes this sentiment when he suggests that we might begin to understand the work of Deleuze "by charting his uses and abuses of Nietzsche." See Daniel W. Conway, "Tumbling Dice: Gilles Deleuze and the Economy of Repetition," in Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson (New York: Routledge, 1997), 73.

4. See NP, 103.

5. This is by no means Deleuze's final attempt to elucidate the presuppositions of the dogmatic image of thought. For example, much later, in What Is Philosophy?, he devotes considerable attention to the "attempt to set out the features of the modern image of thought" (WP, 54; also see
6. See Deleuze's summary of these eight postulates in DR, 167.


8. Deleuze points out that "Kant seemed equipped to overturn the image of thought, [however] Kant did not want to renounce [its] implicit presuppositions" (DR, 136). Difference and Repetition is riddled with references to Kant's "falling short" in this regard.

9. See DR, 137.

10. Indeed, if it were suggested (as it has been) that the destruction of the Hegelian dialectic is the foremost aim of Deleuze's unveiling of a thought without image, I would have no objection. What I am concerned to show at present, however, is simply the manner in which Deleuze's experiments with Nietzsche underpin and effect this destruction.

11. See DR, 166.

12. The phrase "Nietzsche experiments" is intentionally ambiguous. Deleuze's activities at this stage are both experiments with Nietzsche's ideas of eternal return, will to power, etc., as well as Nietzschean experiments, i.e., wholly original, radical excursions which might be described as 'Nietzschean' in spirit.

13. Conway, 74.

14. Smith rightly points out that "one of Deleuze's philosophic aims is to show that the singularity and individuality of the diverse can only be comprehended from the viewpoint of difference itself" (Smith, 38).

15. See DR, 54.

16. Schrift recognizes that one of the key results of Deleuze's critique of the dogmatic image of thought is that "it would no longer be possible for understanding to proceed according to a model that operated in terms of a simple binary logic" (Schrift, 65).


18. See, for a further example, DR, 163. Deleuze's remarks on this issue, at least in Difference and Repetition, give us reason to question Patton's claim that Deleuze attempts "to constitute a new image of thought" (Patton, 6). True, certain terminology employed by Deleuze in later works such as What Is Philosophy? seems to suggest that his aim is to construct a new image of thought. For example, Deleuze tells us that the finite categories of thought having been rejected, it is the movement of the infinite that "constitutes the image of thought" (WP, 37). The dispute, however, is more likely simply terminological. For the very notion of "image" has been so overhauled that it is clearly not being used in the same way when referring to the new way of thinking that emerges with the toppling of the dogmatic image.

19. My claim is not that Deleuze explicitly bases his analyses in Difference and Repetition upon Nietzsche's in Twilight of the Idols. The point, rather, is that we might read Nietzsche's elucidation of the four great errors as a provocation for Deleuze's own original articulation of the structure of the dogmatic image of thought, and that Deleuze's activities in this respect can constructively be described as peculiarly "Nietzschean" in spirit.


21. See T/5, 500. It should be noted that by rejecting the notion of "free will," Nietzsche does not propose to substitute a notion of the subject as determined. His point is that all such conceptions—determinism, free will, indeterminism, etc.—rest upon an ill-conceived and dogmatic realist framework. He takes aim at the framework as a whole, though he obviously reserves his fiercest criticisms for the Judeo-Christian tradition's exploitation of the conception of the free subject.

22. Nehamas, 96.

23. As Nehamas puts it, Nietzsche "denies that logic or language reflects adequately the structure of the world" (Nehamas, 95), precisely because it has no "structure" to be adequately reflected.

24. See DR, 299. We must recall that Deleuze does not glean the term "chaosmos" from Nietzsche. The term itself is a neologism of Joyce's from
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*Finnegan’s Wake.* As indicated, we see here one more instance of Deleuze “putting Nietzsche to work,” taking the Nietzschean text on a previously uncharted course.

25. Again, even the most casual reader of Nietzsche’s texts will recognize the inventive nature of Deleuze’s “interpretation” of the eternal return. After all, Nietzsche himself refers to it as the “eternal return of the same.”

26. Conway suggests that “Deleuze’s writings ... tend to romanticize the extent of Nietzsche’s achievements,” in resisting the various postulates of the dogmatic image of thought (Conway, 75). This may well be the case. Even so, it only underscores the degree to which Deleuze himself sees this (attempted) resistance as a springboard for his own work.