Ian Angus’ ambitious book traverses a daunting landscape of thinkers as he attempts to provide an account of the barriers to unity found in Canada. Through the lens of postmodern thought, Angus focuses on both Harold Innis and George Grant in an effort to provide a ground for the unity of Canadian identity in the notions of wilderness and ecology.

By setting the problem of unity within an historical context, Angus argues that the difficulty in understanding the problem of Canadian identity is deeply complex and we should not expect it to be easily solved. For this reason, he engages in a critique of Innis’ and Grant’s dual laments concerning the failure of Canada and its intellectuals to rescue the identity of Canada as a free and independent state. The dominance of the mechanized, industrialized state over the modes of communication for Innis, and of technology over the particularity of individual life and nationhood for Grant, would appear to confront these thinkers as intractable barriers, allowing only for a sense of fatality and resignation. Left at this point, there remains little else but to lament the loss of national and, indeed, personal sovereignty, identity, and freedom.

Turning first to Innis, Angus describes how original oral modes of communication engaged the whole person in acts of communicating, requiring response in the immediacy of the act. With the onset of the written word, and the later development of technological means for facilitating such communication, Innis argues that the immediacy of oral communication surrenders to detached analysis and consideration. His concern is that modern modes of communication that focus on the written and intellectual, fragment and shatter the original unity of a person. This transition results in what McLuhan considered to be the twilight of humanism.

In his examination of Grant, Angus considers the debate between Hegel (via Alexandre Kojève) and Leo Strauss, on the possibility of recovering philosophy, to be a necessary step in the recovery of individuality. As a
Straussian, Grant accepts that such a recovery is impossible in light of the inevitable dominance of the state. The Hegelian doctrine, through which philosophy is to be recovered, is simply wrong, and acts more as a homogenizing force of the modern technological state. Thus, Grant sees no escape from the contradiction in the modern state, since reliance on reason to give grounding for ethics and individuality turns out to be a reliance on the very source of technological dominance which subordinates the individual to the demands of homogenization. Modernity turns in on itself as it seeks to ground its vision and identity in reason, a conclusion that leads Grant to find a foundation in the Christian God through faith. Grant then can abide in the contradiction that reason evinces.

Angus’ rejection of this leap into faith is motivated by the fact that the leap solves nothing in the end and indeed fails to reconcile the need to overcome technological dominance. He adopts a stance which juxtaposes the phenomenological tradition with this recognition of the inescapable contradiction. Taking his lead from the notion that reason moves to find a universal ground (in reason) for ethics and political life, and that this inevitably leads to a technological subjugation of the individual, Angus shows that, so conceived, reason renders ethics and politics nothing more than management tools of respectively, human behaviour and administration. Where Innis is resigned to the inevitable overcoming of immediacy in oral communication, Angus sees the possibility of understanding rational movement toward universality differently. If universalizing tendencies can be understood as behaviours of communicators, and if those communicators ‘embrace’ the local and immediate, it need not be the case that invoking reason will inevitably lead to a domination of the universal over the particular or a subjugation of the individual by the state and technology.

The notion of the hermeneutic circle is invoked at this point to show how the interpretation of the individual according to universal categories remains open in such a way as to ensure the mutual influence of universalizing and particularizing tendencies. Learning how to operate within this openness, on the one hand, makes determination of an origin or end impossible, but also avoids the swallowing of the particular by the latter, which allows particulars to retain their identity as individuals. Angus sees this mode of communication as critical for confronting the problem of multiculturalism. By living within the tension that is created when calls for multiculturalism are faced with demands for a particular cultural identity, new universal forms of multiculturalism can emerge as modes of mutual understanding rather than as the swallowing up of one identity by another. What is sacrificed, however, is a clear and formal defining concept of multiculturalism.

Dichotomies between the particular and the universal are wrong-headed from the start, Angus argues. What we need to do is to take a ‘step back’ and see that every human is a relation between particularity and universality. In feeling the sameness and difference of one another, we engage in the construction of a common culture. Being engaged in this process is more akin to the experience of caring and loving which, when engaged, are understood. There can be, after all, a mutual construction of Canadian identity amidst uncertainty generated in the tension between particularity and universality. Angus utilizes the term ‘tension’ here to distinguish the act of engagement between two poles of humanity from the ‘contradiction’ that Innis and Grant see between the particular and the universal. In this tension, respect is the key element allowing for the embracing of the tension, rather than a rejection of otherness.

How does this relate to ecology and wilderness? For Canada, unlike European or American societies, facing the wilderness was the key factor in shaping identity. With its garrison mentality, in contrast to the American frontier mentality, Canada developed its identity through the creation of borders (forts and later cities) distinguishing itself from the vast primal expanse. This primal wilderness represents a kind of homelessness against which identity is to be constructed through drawing a border. It represents a kind of chaos and indeterminacy, the context for Canadian intellectual reflection on what it means to be a Canadian civilization.

But wilderness, as ecology or the complex of environmental factors and processes, is also that from which we derive; it is the source of our values and so cannot be treated with the same anthropocentric ‘for humans only’ ethic as has been the rule in industrialized civilization. Hence, there is a creative tension to be found also in the embracing of wilderness and civilization just as there is in the embracing of individuality and universality. Angus relates this embracing to the type of conservatism advocated by Innis and Grant. This re-casting of the Tory ethic, then, provides a reason to understand the process of forming a Canadian identity as in fact an environmental ethic to be gentler on nature.

While I am sympathetic with many of Angus’ critical remarks and have indeed enjoyed the many penetrating insights he offers, I find the synthesis he attempts - through re-casting contradiction as tension and by employing an ethic of respect - leaves me to a large extent even more worried about the possibility of solution than I was with Grant and Innis. It is owing not to a rejection of an ethic of respect, but to what amounts to a failed promissory note. After addressing profound metaphysical and axiological problems, Angus delivers an ethical solution that produces resolution through concrete interactions between people.

The metaphysical discussion leads one to hope for a resolution or at least the structure of what would count as a resolution based on some understanding of how the world works and what it means for people to be in relationships. It promises some hope of a formal ground for understanding and resolving the tension between the universalizing tendency and the need
to protect the particular. Living within such tension may be possible in small
groups where knowing the members of the community and dialogue with
them is possible. But in larger contexts, let alone national ones, neither is
possible. For this reason we look to such devices as law and constitutions to
provide determinacy in setting out the terms of reference for relationships
between individuals. Angus’ approach seems then to suffer from the same
malaise as his existentialist influences, Grant and Innis, in not being able to
account for large-scale organizational needs.

Developing strategies for national identity must include an understanding
of how we can deal with anonymity and the impossibility of genuine dialogue
between the players across the nation. It must also deal with the fact that,
after developing to a certain size, communities inevitably fracture into smaller
units whose identity needs to be protected. Angus sees this tendency clearly,
as he prescribes the setting of borders, but he does not seem to deal
adequately with the demand at large-scale community or national levels for
a more formalized, universal conception of identity.

BRUCE MORITO, Athabasca University

**Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader**

WALTER JOST and MICHAEL HYDE, Editors


This collection gathers contributions from an impressive list of scholars,
including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and David Tracy to name a
few. Many of the contributions are reprints of previously published essays,
while some are published here for the first time. The two essays by Gadamer
appear here for the first time in English translation. The editors provide a
thorough index to accompany the essays, and they offer both a Prologue and
an Introduction to the collected essays.

The aim of the collection is “to show the novice and expert alike what some
versions of contemporary rhetoric and hermeneutics look like and to propose
how the two can be thought of together, for each not only presupposes but
extends and corrects the other”(xii). While both rhetoric and hermeneutics
have experienced a rebirth in contemporary thought, these two fields have yet
to enter into a fruitful dialogue. In order to generate dialogue, the editors
intend to avoid the imposition of strict definitions and delineations on either
field. Instead, they offer an open-ended exploration that encourages the
novelty that a dialogue between the two fields can generate. In their view, the
importance of this coupling of rhetoric and hermeneutics is that it can
germinate inventive ideas within the sphere of praxis (xx).

The essays in the collection are structured around four sites (topoi) where
rhetoric and hermeneutics intersect. Part I, “Locating the Disciplines,”
provides an impressive examination of the capacities of each field, as Ricoeur
puts it, for “arguing, fashioning, and redescribing” (71). Part II, “Inventions
and Applications,” presents a somewhat unfocused examination of the role
of prudence in both rhetoric and hermeneutics. Through investigations of a
number of different contexts, Part III, entitled “Arguments and Narratives,”
provides a fine discussion of how the notion of “the text” can establish an
interrelation between the treatment of argument by rhetoric and the treatment
of narrative by hermeneutics. The essays grouped in Part IV, “Civic
Discourse and Critical Theory,” aim to show what the intersection of rhetoric
and hermeneutics can contribute to ethics, but as a whole, they do not meet
the full potential of this suggestive theme.

As a consumer, it is advisable to be cautious about volumes of collected
e ssays, especially when the title contains the conjunction ‘and,’ since they
often merely seek to accomplish some combination of the following goals:
the widening of sales markets, the satisfaction of publication demands for
contributors seeking tenure, and the proliferation of culture as a production
industry. So, the following question must always confront such a collection:
Does the volume reflect the conjunction ‘and’ in the sense of its function to
signify parts joined into a whole or in its function to signify independent parts
joined in a numerical series? This question pertains to two aspects of a
collection. First, the question is whether the terms of the title — here the
fields of ‘rhetoric’ and ‘hermeneutics’ — are truly investigated together in	hese essays. Second, the question is whether the individual essays in the
collection are truly joined together by a common theme. Basically, this text
successfully responds to the former question, but falls short with respect to
the latter one as a result of unsuccessful editorship.

This collection faces the question of the relation between rhetoric and
hermeneutics in a straightforward and insightful manner. It is noteworthy that
each essay in this collection both possesses a high degree of scholarly
sophistication and still remains easy to follow. Moreover, each contributor
provides a graceful and unique articulation of his or her view of the relation
between rhetoric and hermeneutics. This provides the reader with a clear
understanding of the interrelation between these two fields. In particular, I
would single out Gadamer’s insightful conclusion that rhetoric and
hermeneutics are not activities performed only by specialists, but “belong to
human beings as such,” (58) as a highly provocative claim that merits further
exploration.

The shortcomings of this collection are not due to the contributors, but to
the editors. In both the Prologue and the Introduction, the editors misrepresent
the focus of the essays that appear in the collection. For example, the
Introduction treats the connection between rhetoric and hermeneutics in such
thinkers as Heidegger, Lévinas, Gadamer, Vico, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. However, the works of Vico, Wittgenstein, and Lévinas are not significant for any of the contributions in the volume. A more preferable approach to this Introduction might have been to introduce the volume either through a brief sketch of the historical neglect of the fields of rhetoric and hermeneutics or through a discussion of the influence of a single thinker who is central to all the essays (e.g., Aristotle or Gadamer). As it stands, the editors do not provide a sufficient unity to the collection as a whole.

The disjunction between the editors' discussion and the contributions appears most sharply with regard to the investigation into the ethical dimension of the intersection between rhetoric and hermeneutics. The Introduction suggests that the ethical concept of conscience provides a "Atopical 'first principle' for both disciplines" (2) that underlies all rhetoric and hermeneutic activity. Insofar as Part IV of the volume is introduced as the section that treats the ethical dimension of rhetoric and hermeneutics, one would expect to find this claim to be elaborated there in greater detail. For the reader, it is then quite disappointing to find that while the contributors indeed deal with the ethical dimension of rhetoric and hermeneutics, none of them mention the concept of conscience at all. The thematic disjunction between the Introduction and the essays leads the reader to conclude that the editorial efforts were misplaced. In the Prologue and Introduction, the editors are more concerned with developing their own ideas than with their editorial duties, in particular, the duty to introduce the essays by providing an appropriate contextual background for the reader. The collection could have been very significant, either if the editors had chosen articles to fit their personal interests, or if their efforts were spent in the interest of unifying the essays into an organic whole.

SCOTT C. DAVIDSON, Duquesne University

Working Through Derrida
GARY B. MADISON, Editor

Over the last decade Rodolphe Gasche, Christopher Norris, and David Wood have published books that attempt to illustrate the philosophical seriousness and rigor of Jacques Derrida's work. Such publications have sparked a renewed interest in the philosophical significance of Derrida's writings. Despite the initial rejection of his work in much of Anglo-American philosophical circles, Derrida's thought has indeed proved to be an enduring inspiration for contemporary continental thought. Whether one is a critic or supporter of Derrida, it is becoming increasingly clear that his work is worthy of serious attention, and this requires rising to the challenge of "working through Derrida". In this volume, Gary Madison has gathered together several of the most important essays written on Derrida over the past several years. The contributors range from significant philosophical thinkers in their own right to some of Derrida's most knowledgeable and severe critics. For the newcomer to Derrida, this volume serves as a helpful guide through the confusing maze of Derrida's oeuvre. For the advanced scholar, this book brings together several key, but hard-to-find and out-of-print, essays in one volume.

The essays can be divided into roughly two categories: (1) sympathetic elaborations, and (2) incisive critiques of various aspects of Derrida's writings. The former grouping includes pieces by Barry Allen, Richard Kearney, Drucilla Cornell, Robert Bernasconi, Richard Rorty, John D. Caputo, Richard J. Bernstein, and David Hoy; the latter is made up of essays by Nancy Fraser, Dallas Willard, John Searle, and M. C. Dillon. I begin here with the latter grouping.

Nancy Fraser's 1984 essay, "The French Derrideans," does not directly address Derrida's writings, but those of his two most important French 'disciples,' Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, both of whom have since become quite well known in Anglo-American philosophical circles. Her essay focuses on papers presented at a colloquium held in 1980 at Cerisy, France around Derrida's essay "The Ends of Man." Her particular interest lies in the "Political Seminar" directed by Heidegger scholar Christopher Fynsk, and Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe's contributions to this seminar. Fynsk's essay calls attention to what he sees as a 'retrait' of the political in Derrida's work. This retrait is a double gesture: it is an avoidance, or withdrawal from, direct engagement with political questions on the level of politics (la politique), but is at the same time a praxis on the level of the political (le politique), a questioning concerning the essence of the political. This distinction was echoed by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe at the seminar and during subsequent meetings at the Center for Philosophical Research in France. Fraser finds this use of Derrida's work important but limiting. She applauds the critical analysis of politics from a deconstructive standpoint since it allows social theorists to raise a number of important questions concerning links between politics, economy, and larger social justice issues. Fraser argues, however, that there are limits to this form of political praxis, challenging Derrida and his followers to leave their 'transcendental safe house' and join the ranks of those engaged in a form of more direct political praxis.

The most disappointing essay from Derrida's critics is John Searle's "The World Turned Upside Down," in which he criticizes Derrida through Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction (a move reminiscent of Habermas in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity). No matter how useful Culler's book may be, it is not a substitute for engaging with Derrida's actual writings. Fortunately, this deficiency is remedied by two excellent essays that critique Derrida's work from an informed and balanced position. Dallas Willard performs a phenomenological critique around the theme of intentionality in Derrida's earlier writings on Husserl. M. C. Dillon's "The Metaphysics of Presence" presents patient and meticulous readings of Derrida's essays "Ousia and Gramme" and "Differance" in order to locate an alternative phenomenological conception of time, language, and presence that avoids Derrida's criticisms of Husserl and the larger phenomenological tradition. While more orthodox Derrideans will likely take issue with Willard's and Dillon's critical remarks, these two essays clearly pose strong challenges to Derrida from within the phenomenological tradition that are worthy of a careful and considered response.

One means of formulating a response to such challenges is to return to Derrida's earliest writings on phenomenology and language (Introduction to the Origin of Geometry, Speech and Phenomena, and Of Grammatology) and offer charitable readings of them. Anyone familiar with these texts will know that they are some of Derrida's most difficult writings to decipher. Barry Allen's essay eases this task considerably by cogently tracing the linguistic heritage of Derrida's earlier works on language. He explains the importance of Saussure's and Heidegger's theory of language, and takes elements from Derrida's 1988 "Afterword" to Limited Inc. to clarify some of the stickier issues in his theory of language.

In "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?," Richard Rorty takes up his by now familiar position of de-philosophizing and paring down Derrida's more 'serious' philosophical efforts. Rorty's response to criticisms such as those of Willard and Dillon is to stop taking Derrida's early work so seriously. Rorty finds that the attempts to legitimize Derrida's work by demonstrating its philosophical significance (and here he opposes not only Derrida's more philosophically inclined critics, but supporters such as Gasche, Norris, and Wood who defend the philosophical seriousness of Derrida's writings) overlook the more playful, private side of Derrida's recent writings that Rorty finds more enjoyable and therapeutic. John Caputo's lengthy response to Rorty's reading of Derrida ("On Not Circumventing the Quasi-Transcendental") demonstrates the limits of Rorty's reading in a fairly convincing way, but it will ultimately be up to the reader to decide for herself which reading of Derrida is the better of the two.

The issue of Derrida's ethics and politics taken up by Fraser in her 1984 essay has since become perhaps the most discussed aspect in studies of Derrida. Essays by Richard Kearney, Drucilla Cornell, and Robert Bernasconi each deal with important aspects of the ethico-political dimension of Derrida's work. In "Derrida's Ethical Re-turn," Richard Kearney detects a shift in Derrida's work after 1972 to more explicitly ethical themes. According to Kearney, this shift is coterminous with a move away from Heidegger's influence to a more Levinasian position. Kearney defends his reading through an analysis of Derrida's "Comment ne pas parler," "Circumfession," and "Force of Law." He finds in these texts an attempt by Derrida to develop an increased and more exacting sense of ethical responsibility, as well as strong evidence against the charge that Derrida's writings lead us into the abyss of moral nihilism.

Drucilla Cornell's extended reading of Derrida's "Force of Law" in her "The Violence of the Masquerade" also takes up a similar line of defense of the ethical and legal importance of Derrida's texts. She applies her reading of "Force of Law" to the legal case of Bowers vs. Hardwick, in which Cornell finds evidence of the force of law, violence, and the aporia of justice of which Derrida writes in his essay. Like Kearney, Cornell maintains that Derrida's writings on ethics do not result in nihilism, but rather a more nuanced conception of justice and the infinite responsibility entailed by undecidability.

Robert Bernasconi continues this type of defense of Derrida's ethico-political writings in his "Politics Beyond Humanism". Bernasconi, who is perhaps best known for his fine essays on the relation between Lévinas and Derrida, turns his attention here to Derrida's politics and writings on the topic of race. Bernasconi deals with two important texts by Derrida that have received little attention in the secondary literature: "Racism's Last Word" and a piece on Nelson Mandela entitled "The Laws of Reflection". Despite the fact that Bernasconi is not altogether in agreement with Derrida's reading of Mandela, and although he worries about the possible debilitating effects of deconstruction on politics, he ultimately supports Derrida's gesture of interrogating metaphysical humanism as a response to the call of the other. Bernasconi notes, however, that there may come a time when political gestures other than deconstruction will be necessary.

The volume concludes with two essays on the Habermas-Derrida debate. To call the exchange between these two important thinkers a 'debate,' however, is somewhat misleading. First of all, Habermas's two essays on Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity show little more than a hasty reading and passing familiarity with Derrida's work. Secondly, Derrida himself has written very little directly on Habermas except for a few passing remarks in a footnote to the "Afterword" of Limited Inc. and The Other Heading. Thus, it has been up to other authors to construct this debate on their own, constructing hypothetical exchanges between the two thinkers. David Couzens Hoy's "Splitting the Difference" takes up this exact strategy, pitting hypothetical Habermasian and Derridean positions against one another on the topics of modernity/postmodernity and the politics of deconstruction. Richard J. Bernstein's "An Allegory of Modernity/Postmodernity" also does much to get this debate off the ground by offering exemplary readings of the
political thrust of both Habermas’s and Derrida’s work. Although Bernstein ultimately weighs in with the Habermasian position, this does not prevent him from presenting Derrida’s work thoroughly and charitably. For readers interested in approaching Derrida through their familiarity with Habermas, there is no better starting place than these two essays.

Overall, Madison’s collection of essays provides a valuable research tool for all those contending with Derrida’s writings. After spending some time working through Derrida, one will appreciate having these essays at hand so that one’s study can continue from a broader, more informed critical perspective. While not intended as a substitute for actually reading Derrida, the essays in this collection go a long way in rendering this often challenging task a great deal easier.

MATTHEW R. CALARCO, Binghamton University

Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics
JEFF MITSCHERLING

The Polish philosopher, Roman Ingarden, is best-known for his work in aesthetics found in The Literary Work of Art. However, as the title of Jeff Mitscherling’s book indicates, we are meant to view Ingarden in a new light. According to Mitscherling, Ingarden should be considered as an ontologist first and an aesthetician second. In fact, it is Mitscherling’s thesis that we cannot understand Ingarden’s work in aesthetics without first grasping how it is meant to ground his realist ontology (1). Mitscherling devotes the first chapter of his book to a brief biography of this little-known philosopher, concentrating on Ingarden’s career and those events which informed it. Ingarden was a student and life-long friend of Husserl who, early in his career, became convinced that Husserl’s phenomenology was committed to a dangerous idealism. Mitscherling paints Ingarden’s entire philosophical career as an attempt to lay bare Husserl’s idealist position only to refute it.1

Ingarden’s interpretation of Husserl is the topic of chapter 2. Mitscherling takes a stand against Ingarden’s critics who claim that Ingarden simply misunderstood Husserl in so far as he incorrectly took Husserl’s transcendental idealism as implying a metaphysical idealism.2 These critics generally believe that Husserl was an epistemological idealist while remaining a metaphysical realist (49). According to Mitscherling, these critics miss Ingarden’s point. While Husserl believes that the world of physical objects exists independently of consciousness, he does not consider this world to be the real world: “For Husserl [...] there exists no autonomous in-itself that remains inaccessible to consciousness. Rather, the in-itself is to be located precisely, and exclusively, in consciousness” (48). Ingarden claims, furthermore, that this conclusion is an inevitable consequence of Husserl’s method. Husserl wanted to set aside a place for philosophy as a rigorous science (of phenomenology). This place was the realm of immanent perception - which, according to Husserl, cannot be doubted (52). Any move from immanent perception to the world of physical objects would introduce the possibility of error and is, therefore, forbidden (53). As a consequence, the “things themselves,” to which Husserl called for a return, become defined as mere “correlates” of intentional consciousness. A thing becomes understood as “a particularly built noema-consciousness” (58). Or to put it another way, Husserl has elevated a methodological scruple (restricting phenomenology to the “certain” world of immanent consciousness) into a metaphysical principle (the real world is no more than a construct of consciousness).

According to Mitscherling, critical interpretations of Ingarden remain skewed because critics have not familiarized themselves with his main work, Controversy over the Existence of the World. Ingarden failed to complete this book, and it had never been translated into English. With this in mind, Mitscherling devotes his second chapter to a summary and analysis of this unique work. Controversy contains Ingarden’s “realist rejoinder” to Husserl’s idealism. His goal is to demonstrate the existential autonomy of both “real” and “ideal” objects (i.e., their autonomy with respect to consciousness, and he does so by attempting to prove three fundamental claims: 1) Existentially autonomous objects are formally distinct from purely intentional objects; 2) The object of perception is transcendent to the act of perception; 3) Not all purely intentional objects have their ontic basis in consciousness alone (84). Each of these claims is, of course, made in opposition to Husserl.

In this chapter, Mitscherling presents a dense and rigorous analysis of such ontological issues as existential autonomy and heteronomy, existential originality and derivation, modes of being versus moments of existence, and so on. I found this chapter to be the most difficult, mainly due to the sheer volume of material presented in a relatively small space.

As I said earlier, Ingarden is best-known for his work in aesthetics, primarily in the art of literature, but also in music, theatre, painting, and architecture. The purpose of his work is not primarily aesthetic, however, but ontological. Mitscherling explains Ingarden’s method in detail with respect to the literary work (in chapter 4), and then briefly for other works of art, calling attention to the different ontological challenges they present (in chapter 5). Central to Ingarden’s theory is the notion of the “aesthetic object” as an entity that is ontologically separate from the reader and the work, yet which has, at the same time, its ontic basis in both. The work, according to
Ingarden, is to be understood as a “schematic formation” containing innumerable “spots of indeterminacy” that the reader is required to fill or “concretize” as he or she reads the work. In other words, there are always aspects of the objects in a literary work which are not determined by the text. The colour of a character’s eyes, for example, may never be mentioned at any point in the work and so remains indeterminate.

Ingarden’s method is shown to be exceptionally clever. The literary work possesses a unique and peculiar kind of existence, one which enables him to demonstrate his points (regarding purely intentional objects) upon which the argument in Controversy depends. The objects within a literary work (characters, setting, and so forth) are purely intentional objects; that is, they do not possess an existence outside of the intentional acts (of consciousness) of the reader. However, they do have an *ontic basis* outside of the reader’s consciousness. This includes the physical text and the “ideal intersubjective” word meanings of the language in which the work is written. This establishes that, *contra* Husserl, purely intentional objects do not necessarily have their ontic bases in consciousness alone. The schematic form of the literary work also allows Ingarden to demonstrate his claim that purely intentional objects are formally distinct from existentially autonomous objects. Objects within literary works are, by virtue of their form, not fully determined in all their aspects. By contrast, *real* or existentially autonomous objects are fully determined in all their aspects.

Ingarden’s analysis of the literary work is revealed as acute and insightful. There is at least one point, however, that may trouble the modern reader. Ingarden clings to the (some might say archaic) notion of “ideal entities” such as concepts, essences, and meanings which possess autonomous existence not only outside of consciousness, but outside of space and time as well. This is a position that very few people today would agree with. However, I think it is possible to reject it and still salvage his argument. For word meanings to possess an existence independent of the reader’s consciousness, it is sufficient for them to be *intersubjective*, rather than ideal. Mitscherling does not call our attention to this problem in Ingarden’s theory, and his oversight is compounded by his conflation of the terms “ideal” and “intersubjective” as is evident when he refers to word meanings as somehow ideal and intersubjective at the same time (154).

It is a flaw of Ingarden’s book *(The Literary Work of Art)* that he does not provide any concrete analyses of actual literary works to ground his claims. Mitscherling repairs this omission by offering analyses of two texts, “The Dead” by James Joyce (140-143), and “The Raven” by Edgar Allen Poe (143-152). These analyses are extremely successful at clarifying Ingarden’s theory through the use of concrete examples. However, Mitscherling offers them as a *verification* of Ingarden’s theory and, as such, they are less successful. Considering the vast number and variety of literary works to choose from, virtually any theory regarding the identity and/or structure of the literary work of art could find at least a few supporting exemplars.

Mitscherling devotes his final chapter to an exposition of Ingarden’s influence on contemporary aesthetics. This chapter in fact details Ingarden’s lack of influence upon contemporary aesthetics, and the extreme abstruseness of Ingarden’s work is cited as the cause. One exception is Gadamer, whose notion of “play,” according to Mitscherling, harkens back to Ingarden’s claim that the work of art is to be understood as a schematic formation that reaches its completion only when it is concretized by a perceiving subject. Mitscherling describes the similarities and differences between Ingarden’s and Gadamer’s position, and proceeds to show why Ingarden’s is the superior.

**Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics** is a fine introduction to the work of a neglected philosopher and is, therefore, a valuable addition to the scholarship of both aesthetics and ontology. This is not to say that it is without its flaws, however. Mitscherling offers less criticism than the reader may like; the book is, in fact, more of a defense of Ingarden than an analysis. Certain parts of it (notably chapter 3) are rather more difficult than is strictly appropriate for what is ostensibly an *introduction* to Ingarden’s work. I also feel that Mitscherling too flippantly dismisses existential phenomenology in the closing of his book. His claim, worth quoting here - that it only leads to “a clearing overgrown with anguish and despair, where all we can do is sit back powerlessly and wait for Being to reveal Itself, or for a God to save us” (208) - may be true of the brand peddled by Heidegger, but does not apply to the works of others such as Merleau-Ponty.

**Notes**

1. In fact, Mitscherling points out that Ingarden is concerned with the idealism/realism problem as a whole, and not only with the form it finds in Husserl. However, he considers Husserl’s work to be the most profound statement of metaphysical idealism offered by any contemporary philosopher. (80)


JOSEPH KEEPING, York University
Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness
ANDREW TALLON

As stated in its Preface, “this book defends the right of feeling — meaning the whole realm of passion, emotion, mood, and affection in general — to be admitted to equal partnership with reason and will in human consciousness” (1-2). Unfortunately, it does a poor job of it. The first 194 pages read like a graduate research paper for a history of contemporary philosophy course. These first seven chapters of this ten-chapter book consist largely of uncritical exegesis of the following twentieth-century figures: Chapter 1 (“Phenomenology, Intentionality, Embodiment”), Levinas, with brief nods to Kwant and Merleau-Ponty; Chapter 2 (“Intentionality of Affection & Emotion”), Sartre; Chapter 3 (“Mood & Affective Tonality”), Heidegger, Langer, Ricoeur; Chapter 4 (“Emotional Presentation & Will”), Meinong, Strasser, Pfänder; Chapter 5 (“Value & Affective Consciousness”), Scheler, Michel Henry, Ferdinand Alquie; Chapter 6 (“Affectability & Affective Response”), Dietrich von Hildebrand; Chapter 7 (“the Structure of Affective Intentionality”), Strasser, Steven Smith. If someone’s looking for an annotated bibliography, this is fine. But the reader will quickly grow tired of such exegesis in a book that’s ostensibly arguing its own thesis, especially when the exegesis is both repetitive and already unduly long. To cite only one example from the above list, in Chapter 4, having heard something of Meinong’s and Strasser’s positions, we find the next ten pages peppered with the following: “Pfänder speaks of” (124), “In Pfänder’s language” (125), “Pfänder adds” (125), “Now Pfänder goes on the clarify” (127), “Pfänder is not saying” (128), “Pfänder says” (129), “Pfänder is describing” (129), “Pfänder gives several examples” (129-30), “Pfänder offers” (130), “Pfänder speaks of” (131), “Pfänder does not suggest” (132), “Pfänder organizes his conclusion, saying...” (132). This kind of exegetical writing does not belong in the text of a book that’s trying to argue its own thesis — it might be fine to have some expository endnotes, but not 194 pages of expository text. The point of such lengthy exegesis becomes particularly puzzling when, having completed it, Tallon proceeds to maintain that it has little relevance, as he does in the case of Pfänder (and elsewhere):

Despite the clear advances realized in this chapter through the contributions of Pfänder, I find his analyses only provisionally and temporarily helpful. They are important stages on the way to a complete theory of triune consciousness. But there is something about locating affectivity too much in embodiment that runs the risk of regressing toward the periphery of consciousness rather than progressing toward the center (133).
consciousness is the basis of the thesis - might win approval from a good many religious inspiration, although both are sources of examples in aid of interpreting experience, as we saw. Rather, a detailed description of consciousness is the basis of the model" (290). Actually, what we saw was not phenomenological description but summaries of parts of texts, for the most part works in phenomenology, that fit into the model of consciousness that Tallon is arguing for. This is not a bad model, and Tallon's thesis itself - or at least something like this thesis - might win approval from a good many hermeneutic and postmodern thinkers. But the book itself doesn't propose a model that's really new. It's Lonergan's, with (more) Aquinas thrown in. And that fact points to the book's major flaw: there's nothing new here. In the Preface, "Restoring Feeling to Consciousness," Tallon writes:

So entrenched is the prejudice against accepting affectivity as part of consciousness that books like Goleman's *Emotional Intelligence* (1995), Damasio's *Descartes' Error* (1994), Turski's *Toward a Rationality of Emotions* (1994), Smith's *The Felt Meanings of the World* (1986), Restak's *The Modular Brain* (1994), and MacLean's *The Triune Brain* (1990), to mention only a few recent works, continue to fight uphill to gain recognition for affectivity as necessary for sound reasoning and responsible decision making. The thesis that no feeling is just as bad as — and probably worse than — too much feeling, is long overdue.

What has been lacking up to now is a single philosophical argument that takes seriously the challenge of integrating head and heart from start to finish on the basis of one consistent principle. That principle is intentionality, the central thesis of any contemporary phenomenology of consciousness...And the thesis would be that insofar as an affection is intentional, it merits being included in human consciousness as a full and equal partner along with cognition and volition. Once affective intentionality...has been established as the best contemporary explanation of feeling (the heart)—and I need seven chapters to do so, constituting the phenomenological "half" of this book—then comes the task of taking this phenomenology and interpreting it (the hermeneutical "half"), that is, of proposing a theory to "cover the phenomena" described in the first seven chapters (2-3).

Unfortunately, as stated above, those first seven chapters simply do not do the job Tallon would like to have them do. What is needed - and what remains necessary for cognitive science in this regard - is a proper phenomenological account of the "heart," or "feeling," that can help to complete the picture of cognition as a whole. In his concluding paragraph Tallon writes: "As long as human consciousness continues to exclude or diminish the heart, it will remain less than fully human" (292). It seems we already know that what we don't know, and what Tallon's book doesn't teach us, is precisely what feeling is, and how the "heart" operates. We need further, proper phenomenological research here.

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**Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty**

RICHARD WHITE


In stark contrast to the recent glut of books devoted to Nietzsche's 'politics', it is refreshing to read a work that focuses almost exclusively on the persistent theme of 'sovereignty' in Nietzsche's texts. As such, Richard White's book not only "fills a niche in Nietzsche studies," as Maudemarie Clark suggests in her merely tepid back-cover endorsement, but it also, I believe, helps wrench Nietzsche scholarship out of its wearisome political groove. But while I agree with White's philosophical focus here and applaud his general approach to Nietzsche's thought, I cannot help but see this book as a useful, interim prolegomenon to a much more comprehensive study of sovereignty that still remains to be written.

White begins his study by opposing the 'deconstructive' approach to Nietzsche's work with his own. The problem with deconstruction, White claims, is that it subordinates "the material concerns" of Nietzsche's philosophy to "the free play of the text" (3). As a result, deconstructive readings of Nietzsche inexorably misconstrue his project, particularly the persistent and fundamental concern with the problem of sovereignty — a problem "which allows us to view categories as diverse as eternal recurrence, will to power, master and slave, and Apollo and Dionysus as the shifting manifestations of a single project" (3). The theme of sovereignty thus links what are often perceived to be the discontinuous early, middle and late periods of Nietzsche's work, and similarly establishes the continuity of his thinking with the central concerns of modern philosophy.

White's reading is also organized around the claim that Nietzsche's writings are 'strategic,' that Nietzsche is primarily a 'performative' writer. This means that Nietzsche cannot be read simply as an astute diagnostician of modern culture who merely works out the implications of the death of God and presents them to us. We must also attend to the fact that Nietzsche's
“primary intention is actually to effect a cure, using his own writing as a means of forcing us to confront nihilism...so that we may escape the sickness he describes” (3). This performative dimension helps to account for the lack of a developed ‘theory’ of sovereignty in Nietzsche’s work, since such a determination would ultimately constrain, and hence undermine, the very condition it is attempting to produce. Getting others to ‘become who they are’ cannot be accomplished by writing yet another moral treatise, or convincing others to align their wills with the will of God, or adhering (Kantian-style) to the commands of practical reason. This is why Nietzsche, in Ecce Homo, “deliberately frustrates all imitation” and warns his readers about the “dangers of all books” (44) — presumably even his own — since any theoretical formulation of autonomy is tantamount to its practical subversion.

As White importantly emphasizes, even though the concern for the individual as an autonomous agent develops within a moral and Christian (as opposed to an ancient Greek) tradition, Nietzsche’s sovereign individual both presupposes and exceeds this historical/philosophical context. Christian and Kantian formulations of autonomy are characterized by a self-relation, but this mode of self-mastery typically involves the removal or disengagement of the self from the material world or the body. Nietzsche’s sovereign individual, on the other hand, is characterized throughout his published works by its relationship to that which is “other,” not in order to oppose the self to what is other, but to show how the individual is “an integral aspect of the world...something embedded within it” (21). White’s ability to show how this latter claim is repeated in different ways throughout Nietzsche’s work is, I believe, the most compelling aspect of his interpretation. One need only recall the frequent charge that Nietzsche is a ‘dangerous subjectivist’ and nihilist whose doctrines actually undermine the self’s relations to ‘horizons of significance’ (as Charles Taylor suggests), to appreciate the task of philosophical reconstruction that White has so adeptly undertaken. White certainly acknowledges that, for Nietzsche, the individual is not a created fact but rather “a canvas that we create in the very act of living our lives,” (20) but he also acknowledges Nietzsche’s seemingly contradictory belief that the radically free, unencumbered self that could accomplish this aesthetic task of self-creation is itself (as we read in Twilight of the Idols) a fiction resulting from a play on words. White’s reconstructive task, then, is to show how this latter emphasis on self-dispersion can be reconciled with Nietzsche’s simultaneous claims of self-appropriation and possession in order to gain a richer appreciation of how sovereignty might be understood in a post-Christian world.

The problem of sovereignty is originally, yet still only implicitly, posed in The Birth of Tragedy. In this early text, we already see Nietzsche’s movement away from Kant in so far as Kant’s moral justification of existence is replaced by Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification. Although White’s reading of The Birth of Tragedy is largely sound, I think at times he interprets aesthetic justification too humanistically in order to reconcile the claims of the text with his account of sovereignty. For example, he takes Nietzsche’s famous remark in section five that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified” to be a claim about the nature of individual sovereignty, when in fact it is a quotation suggesting that it is only the “true author” of the world who justifies life in this way. That aside, White is quite right to emphasize that it is the unity and mutual implication of Dionysus and Apollo that “provides us with a model for understanding the highest form of the individual life” (60); namely, the tragic individual. The Apollo-Dionysus relationship thus “frames the individual life between the two axes of self-abandonment and self-appropriation and suggests an ideal of sovereignty in the very power that maintains the tension between them” (70). The tragic individual, however, does not point us toward individuality as such. Like the figures of the ‘artist,’ the ‘philosopher,’ the ‘saint’ etc., ‘Dionysus’ is a mask designated to express only a type of existence, for as a type the mask cannot represent individuality as such without undermining its complex role in Nietzsche’s philosophical and pedagogical agenda.

In the fourth chapter, “Against Idealism,” White examines the development of the sovereignty theme in Nietzsche’s ‘free-spirit’ trilogy: Human, All Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science. It is here that Nietzsche most rigorously questions the theoretical opposition between free will and determinism. White shows how both of these perspectives strategically emerge and challenge each other in Nietzsche’s writing, which points to the performative overcoming of this opposition in the ideal of the free spirit. Crucial to Nietzsche’s development of this ideal is his parable of the death of God. The free spirit’s cheerfulness and laughter in the wake of this event betokens not only the cognitive recognition of hitherto unknown possibilities and ways of being, but also the sense in which the self is opened up to, and continuous with, the rest of life. This moment of self-loss thus affirms the sacredness of this world by reproducing the Dionysian impulse of dispersion without also relying on the artist’s metaphysics of The Birth of Tragedy.

The theoretical and performative issues involved in Nietzsche’s articulation of individual sovereignty come to a head in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and his later work. White’s reading of eternal recurrence reveals that it cannot be monolithically construed as a singularizing imperative, since this would conceal its important task of opening the self to everything that is, and thereby deny any strict separation between the self and its world. Consequently, our life is a “continual movement of appropriation, dispossession, and empowerment, and it is precisely this that the thought of eternal recurrence seems to embody with its different aspects” (117). The will to power similarly accomplishes this dual task. Because the very structure of
willing suggests an essential multiplicity of the self (recall that for Nietzsche the apparent unity of the ‘I’ is but a deceitful effect of grammar), we must abandon any philosophical account of the self as singular and self-contained. But again, this movement of fracture and de-centering is countered by the appropriative forces of mastery according to which the noble type confirms itself through the very task of creating value. In Ecce Homo, the performative dimension of Nietzsche’s work is especially prominent, for he realizes that he cannot simply affirm himself as a model of sovereign individuality without simultaneously cultivating the very sort of mimetic relationship that would undercut this very ideal. As a result, the “self-celebration is deliberately undercut by his ironic denial, and the text as a whole becomes a manual for sovereignty” (162).

White concludes by pointing to recent work in Continental philosophy that continues Nietzsche’s investigation of the self. Although some interesting parallels with Foucault are drawn, this section is too brief to contribute meaningfully to contemporary debates about autonomy and selfhood. In the end, I believe that brevity is the problem with the entire work, and this is why I think the definitive work on the sovereignty theme remains to be written. To make this point rather crudely, a superficial inspection of the book reveals that if we subtract introductory and concluding material and the helpful background chapter on St. Paul, Kant and Schopenhauer, then we are left with less than one hundred and thirty pages devoted to the full sweep of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings. Although this gives a satisfying, bird’s-eye view of Nietzsche’s work as a whole and focuses our attention on the often overlooked continuities in Nietzsche’s thought, such an approach does not do justice to individual works, especially a rhetorically and thematically complex work like Thus Spoke Zarathustra (as White himself acknowledges). The endnotes are also somewhat lean; White appears content merely to direct the reader to other ‘interesting’ accounts of a particular topic without ever really situating his own work within the context of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship. Furthermore, many important books on Nietzsche that speak to White’s topic are not even mentioned or cited, including recent works by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Maudemarie Clark, Daniel Conway, Stanley Rosen and Julian Young. Such omissions are perhaps not in themselves grounds for criticism, but the cumulative effect of White’s almost “minimalist” approach is a promising work that never quite lives up to its potential. Nonetheless, White’s book is an intelligent and lively read for Nietzsche scholars in particular and Continental philosophers, in general, who desire a break from the ongoing academic obsession with all things political.

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