ABSTRACT: In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari think the concept of concept otherwise. In keeping with Deleuze’s professed empiricism, he and Guattari study various concepts and ‘extract’ a new concept of the concept. This constructive method does not illuminate how and why their proposed concept differs from the traditional. This paper considers how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept does differ, as a first step towards arriving at some evaluation of their analysis.

REsUME: Dans Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, Deleuze et Guattari pensent le concept autrement. Tout en s’en tenant à l’empirisme avoué de Deleuze, ce dernier et Guattari analysent différents concepts et en ‘extraient’ un nouveau concept de concept. Cette méthode constructive n’éclaire cependant pas comment et pourquoi le concept qu’ils proposent diffère du concept traditionnel. Après avoir considéré la façon dont le concept de Deleuze et Guattari diffère en effet de l’acception traditionnelle, cet article pourra se pencher sur la question de l’évaluation de leur analyse.

“... one can... think... the concept of concept otherwise...”

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari think the concept of concept otherwise. In keeping with Deleuze’s professed empiricism, he and Guattari study various concepts and ‘extract’ a new concept of the concept. This constructive method does not illuminate how and why their proposed concept differs from the traditional. In this paper I consider how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept does differ, as a first step towards arriving at some evaluation of their analysis.

The nontraditional aspects Deleuze and Guattari’s account are drawn out by comparison with Derrida’s parallel attempt to think the concept of concept otherwise. For Derrida explicitly defines and criticises the traditional concept of the concept. Specifically, he argues that our traditional understanding of concepts as universal descriptions of an object or class of objects, does not explain how and why our concepts alter. And it is in relation to this problem.
of conceptual change that the innovation of Deleuze and Guattari's concept is most strikingly visible. For an altering concept serves to demonstrate Deleuze and Guattari's central claim: that concepts do not simply describe things but, rather, express events.

This expressivist account of concepts is motivated by Deleuze's empiricism and is crucially informed by his analysis of language and events in *The Logic of Sense*. Before turning to this account, and to the analysis of conceptual change that it implies, let me outline the traditional paradigm to which Deleuze's account is opposed, as defined and criticised by Derrida.

1. What is a Concept? Part One: Derrida & Description

Criticisms of the traditional concept of the concept can be found in a number of Derrida's works, notably his early studies on Husserl and his 1968 essay *'Differance'.* This criticism is explicitly formulated in 1988, when Derrida reflects on his published interchange with John Searle. In 'Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion,' Derrida argues that Searle's theory of speech acts exhibits a weakness to which all conceptual analysis is prey, due to what Derrida calls the 'iterability' of concepts. Let me sketch Derrida's account of iterability and the criticism of the traditional concept of the concept which he frames on the basis of this idea, in order to introduce the non-traditional alternative proposed by Deleuze.

In his general theory of speech acts, Searle aims to define the concept of a speech act by specifying the conditions which are necessary and which suffice to make any utterance a performance of that act. Searle's idea is that although no two utterances are identical, different utterances can achieve the same effect: different utterances can be recognised, for instance, as acts of promising. This is because certain conditions or conventions are repeated in each case, and it is these which Searle aims to define. Now Searle acknowledges that these conditions can also be repeated to different effect. This occurs, for instance, when a stage-performer enacts the conventions of promising without seriously intending to fulfil the incurred obligation. For in this case a serious promise has not been made. But, like Austin, Searle views such nonserious acts as a secondary issue, to be dealt with once the conditions which define the serious act have been analysed.

Derrida, in contrast, takes this possibility of nonserious repetition to demonstrate that the basic feature of all speech acts is, first and foremost, simply their repeatability. For it is only possible to achieve serious and nonserious effects because the conditions or conventions of an act are in the first place repeatable, regardless of whether this repetition then achieves the same, or a different, effect. In confining his analysis to serious repetitions, Searle does not consider this basic fact of repeatability as such, and indeed, Derrida argues, Searle does not in fact explain how nonserious repetitions are even possible (L.118).

Derrida coins the concept of iterability in order to account for this possibility of nonserious repetition. He says of the concept: "'iterability' does not signify simply... repeatability of the same, but rather alterability of this same idealized in the singularity of an event, for instance, in this or that speech act" (L.119). Iterability thus signifies, among other things, the alterability of the concept of a promise in the singularity of an actual, occurring promise. This understanding of conceptual change is implied in earlier works by Derrida and indeed in 'Afterword...,' Derrida suggests that his attempt elsewhere to "think a *différence* which would be neither of nature nor of degree" was precisely an attempt to "think or deconstruct the concept of concept otherwise" (L.117). Let me briefly advert to Derrida's discussion of *différence* in order to clarify how iteration alters a concept.

In his essay of that name, Derrida characterises *différence* as a simultaneous differing and deferral (M8). Both of these movements are apparent in the alteration of a concept as Derrida describes it. With regard to deferral, Derrida elsewhere says that an ideality is 'constituted' by the possibility of acts of repetition (SP52), and certainly prior promises constitute our current concept of promising in the sense that it is on the basis of these prior occurrences that the concept is defined, such that an occurring promise can be seen as an instance of the concept: as a promise. Derrida puts this by saying that the occurring promise *defers* to these prior promises. Given this, the occurring promise also *differs* from these prior occurrences. And it is this difference which, as Derrida says, alters the concept in the singularity of the occurring promise.

As regards this alteration, Derrida holds that the concept of iterability "...entails the necessity of thinking at once both the rule and the event, concept and singularity" (L.119). For a concept must be considered not just as a general rule or definition, but rather as a general rule which is being applied to a particular and unique instance: as "this same idealized in the singularity of an event." In being applied to a particular which differs from the prior instances that constituted it, a concept effectively differs from itself. Derrida elsewhere speaks of such a concept being "nonself-identical" (SP68). A concept alters, then, in being applied to a particular, which renders the concept no longer simply a general rule or definition. Beyond this kind of alteration, the application of a concept to a particular can in fact necessitate altering the rule of the concept itself. Derrida's criticism of the traditional concept of the concept hinges on this.

This idea that an instance of a concept can necessitate altering the rule of the concept seems paradoxical. For it would seem that is only by conforming to the rule of the concept that the particular in the first place qualifies as an
instance of the concept: it is only by conforming to our definition of promising that a promise is recognised as such, in which case the promise could not differ from the definition in a way which necessitates its alteration. But in fact it is possible to find counter-examples to a rule. It is possible, for instance, to find an instance of promising which is recognisable as a promise, even while it provokes us to alter our definition of what a promise is or can be. And certainly the converse is the case. For an act on stage can fit the definition of promising yet still not be a serious promise. In this case, also, the definition needs to be altered.

Derrida holds that no concept is immune to the possibility of altering iteration in this sense: any attempt to define a concept, such as Searle’s attempt to define the concept of various speech acts, may be shown inadequate. As Derrida puts this: “for reasons of (altering) iterability, there is no idealization that keeps itself pure, safe from all contamination” (L119). This notion of contamination can be understood in two ways. The application of a concept to a particular contaminates, firstly, the purely general nature of the concept. Beyond this, the rule of the concept is contaminated when an instance of the concept occurs that the concept does not adequately describe, as when the concept of a promise fails to adequately describe an actual, occurring promise. For a concept to avoid this contamination, it would need to adequately describe all instances of its object. Derrida’s argument, however, is that no concept can assuredly do this.

Derrida is arguing, then, against a view of concepts as self-identical idealities, and against the idea that a concept could adequately describe all instances of its object. And it is this demand of universal description which he takes to define the traditional, or as he says the philosophical concept of the concept. For in discussing the logic employed in describing all instances of a concept he says: “It is impossible or illegitimate to form a philosophical concept outside this logic of all or nothing” (L117). To be a philosophical concept, then, is to be intended as a universal description. Again, however, Derrida’s argument is that this universality cannot be assuredly attained.

Deleuze, also, acknowledges this traditional conception of concepts as universal descriptions. In prefacing the English translation of Dialogues, he says:

In so-called rationalist philosophies, the abstract is given the task of explaining, and it is the abstract that is realized in the concrete. One starts with abstractions such as the One, the Whole, the Subject... Even if this means undergoing a terrible crisis each time that one sees rational unity or totality turning into their opposites, or the subject generating monstrosities (Dvii).

Here, as in Derrida’s account, an abstract concept is given the task of explaining its concrete instanciations. Beyond this, Derrida characterises altering iteration as occurring when “a mark marked with a supposedly ‘positive’ value... can be made to carry its other, its ‘negative’ double” (L70), and this is precisely what Deleuze suggests is suffered by concepts such as the One, the Whole and the Subject. In being employed in a comprehensive explanation of some phenomena these concepts ‘turn into their opposites,’ they suffer Derrida’s altering iteration.

Dileuze, however, distinguishes so-called rationalist philosophies from empiricism, and asserts: “the concept exists just as much in empiricism as in rationalism, but it has a completely different use and a completely different nature” (Dvii). Now it is noteworthy that if a concept is not intended as a universal description it is not, on Derrida’s account, a philosophical concept. And indeed Derrida holds that “another name for empiricism” is “nonphilosophy.” Derrida understands empiricism as a typically uncritical appeal to a simple experiential given beyond the order of concepts, as a basis for knowledge claims. We shall see that Deleuze does appeal to the idea of something beyond the order of concepts, but not as a basis for the general knowledge claims made in ‘so-called rationalist philosophies.’ For the aim of empiricism, at least as Deleuze pursues it, is “...not to rediscover the eternal and the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced” (Dvii).

What this enterprise involves, says Deleuze, is “analysing states of things, in such a way that non-preexistent concepts can be extracted from them” (Dvii). Now these non-preexistent concepts would presumably be defined by reemploying old words and concepts in new ways. In this respect Deleuzian empiricism might not look so different from Derridean philosophy. For although Derrida’s philosopher aims to formulate universally applicable concepts, this universality cannot be achieved, which means that in actual practice such philosophy entails continually revising these attempted universals in response to on-going experience. Both practices would, then, involve responding to on-going experience by reemploying old concepts in new ways. Given this similarity, however, the concepts formed in each case must differ. For Deleuze denies that the empiricist concept is an attempted universal description. What then is the nature of this concept and what does it do?

2. What is a Concept? Part Two: Deleuze & Expression

Deleuze’s most sustained account of concepts is undertaken with Guattari in What is Philosophy?. Their discussion of the expressive function of concepts draws on Deleuze’s earlier works, notably The Logic of Sense. Let
me show how this early account of expression informs Deleuze and Guattari’s later account of concepts, in order to clarify how expressive and descriptive concepts differ.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze follows the Stoics in drawing a fundamental distinction between bodies and events: between the knife that cuts and the cutting as an event (LS5). This distinction is motivated by the observation that whereas bodies and their qualities are material items which can exist in the present, events are immaterial and unrepresentable. The Stoics for this reason assign events a different form of time and a different ontological status. They also argue that events enjoy a quite different relation to language than do bodies, and it is this relation which is of interest here. In contrast to describable, denotable bodies, the Stoics speak of events as ‘sayables.’ To say an event is, firstly, not to describe it. For an event cannot be described as a body can be. The event of greening, for instance, can be located by describing the changing colours of a leaf, or by distinguishing its varying degrees of chlorophyll content. This, however, is not strictly a description of the event itself, but rather just of the body transformed by it.

And it is noteworthy that any such description of the circumstances in which an event occurs does not suffice to comprehend the event itself. For an event can occur in an infinite variety of circumstances and in an infinite variety of ways. Given this, the description of some set of circumstances in which an event occurs does not suffice to comprehend the event itself. As an event can occur in an infinite variety of circumstances and in an infinite variety of ways. Given this, the description of some set of circumstances in which an event occurs does not suffice to comprehend the event itself.

As extracted, an event is then sayable, although the Stoics deny that this involves naming or denoting the event in the manner of bodies. Rather, they hold that verbs, and whole propositions, serve to express events. Now when John is running the proposition ‘John runs’ seems to simply name or describe what is occurring. The expression of an event is more clearly exhibited when the event is a potential one whose effects on a body cannot be foreseen. In an example that I discuss in more detail below, Deleuze considers a person who dreams of becoming an Island.

Deleuze accords this expressive function to concepts in empiricism. In What is Philosophy?, he and Guattari accord this expressive function to philosophical concepts as such. They analyse the Cartesian cogito, for instance, as expressing a complex event comprised of three component events: being, thinking, doubting (WP24). As an event of thinking, the cogito is clearly amenable to this analysis. Given this, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that substantive concepts such as the Platonic Idea, also express events. The manner in which they do so is made evident by considering what is occurring when Socrates asks: “is there an Idea... of hair, dirt and mud?” (LS7). Deleuze and Guattari analyse the concept of the Platonic Idea as comprised of three components: the Idea, the thing, and the quality possessed. When Socrates asks if there is an Idea of mud, then, he is asking whether mud incarnates the event of partially enjoying a quality that may, ideally, be perfectly enjoyed.

When understood in these terms, Socrates is, oddly enough, an empiricist in Deleuze’s sense, for he effectively ‘produces’ mud as a new incarnation of the Idea as an event. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari call this the task of philosophy as such: to “give [things and beings] a new event” (WP33). They distinguish this enterprise from the practice of art and science, respectively. In discussing the latter they suggest that scientific language use conditions everyday descriptive language use, and I shall shortly consider how everyday discourse also involves extracting and expressing events.

Deleuze and Guattari hold that philosophy remains distinct from everyday expression, however, due to the distinctive nature of the events it extracts. They say of this: “through concepts, philosophy continually extracts a consistent event from states of affairs – a smile without a cat, as it were” (WP126). They clarify what they mean by a smile without a cat: “The [philosophical] concept is obviously knowledge – but... what it knows is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied” (WP33). This pure event is an event defined by means of its component events, as an entity independent of any of its incarnations. It is this purity which renders the event distinctively philosophical.

This conception of philosophy and its concepts clearly differs from the traditional view criticised by Derrida. For instead of construing Socrates as attempting to describe the actual, underlying nature of all phenomena, Deleuze and Guattari hold that he is extracting and expressing an event, which is not a universal truth of things but is rather a transformation that things incarnate. Now although this evidently does involve a quite different use of language, it is less clear what this difference amounts to in practical terms. Let me conclude this section by considering how these two uses of language interact in everyday discourse, in order to then discuss, in the final section of the paper, the practical consequences of this difference.

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze says of the concept of an Island:

...geographical dramatisation... divides the concept into two types, the original oceanic type which signals an eruption or raising above the sea, and the continental drift type
which results from a disarticulation or fracture. The Island dreamer, however, rediscovers this double dynamism because he dreams of becoming infinitely cut off, at the end of a long drift, but also of an absolute beginning by means of a radical foundation (DR219-20).

Deleuze holds that this dream of becoming an Island entails a movement "...from science to dream and back again" (DR195). This is a movement from descriptive to expressive language use, and back again. For, from a description of kinds of land-formation the dreamer extracts the events of being cut off and self-founding. His dream of becoming an Island does not, then, involve describing himself as an island, or even as like an island. Rather, his propositions express the events of his becoming cut off and self-founding. And although it is not yet determined what sort of being he would become, his incarnation of these events would result in a state of affairs amenable to description.

In being used to express an event the concept of an Island is altered, as indeed is the dreamer’s concept of himself. It is in relation to this issue of conceptual change that the innovation of Deleuze and Guattari’s expressivist account is most strikingly visible. Let me draw this out by returning to Derrida’s account of altering iteration, in order to consider what Deleuze and Guattari have to add on this issue.

3. Alteration & Expression

Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari both think the concept of concept otherwise, albeit in quite different ways. Derrida’s deconstructive analysis assumes the traditional view of concepts in order to demonstrate the explanatory limits of traditional assumptions. Thus we have seen him argue that in being applied to a particular, a concept effectively differs from itself: it is not a self-identical ideality. So too, an instance may always occur that the rule or definition of a concept does not adequately describe. This ever-present possibility of altering iteration means that no concept is assuredly a universal description.

It would seem, however, that a third critical conclusion can be drawn from Derrida’s analysis of altering iteration. The occurrence of a promise which our prior concept does not describe certainly demonstrates that the concept, as a description, lacks universal application. Beyond this, however, if the occurring promise is causing the concept to alter, it would seem that the concept is not, in fact, functioning descriptively at all. For the concept is not functioning as a definition which the promise needs to satisfy in order to qualify as a promise. The concept is not determining the promise as a promise in this sense. Rather, in causing the promise to alter, it is the promise which is in some way determining the concept. Altering iteration in this respect reveals the limitations not just of the assumption that concepts are self-identical idealities, and the assumption that concepts are universal descriptions. Altering iteration also reveals the limit of the idea that concepts function descriptively, it reveals the limit of the descriptive paradigm as such.

To consider how the altering concept is in fact functioning, we can recall Derrida’s claim that the alteration of the concept occurs in the singularity of an event, as our concept of promising differs in an actual, occurring promise. How, then, are concept and event related? A first point with regard to this relation is that the event involved is not reducible to the conceptual alteration or differing that occurs within it, for events in general are not simply conceptual events. Rather, events really occur outside our concepts, and are in this sense outside the text that these concepts constitute. Derrida is still right to say “there is nothing outside the text” (L.136), but only because an event is not a thing, but rather a transformation that occurs to things.

It is this appeal to the idea of events, as these occur beyond the order of concepts, which defines Deleuze’s empiricism. I earlier noted Derrida’s criticism of empiricism as a typically uncritical appeal to a simple experiential given, on the basis of which knowledge claims could be made. I suggested that this criticism is not pertinent to Deleuze, who does not aim to make such claims. Beyond this, we have seen that an event is not in fact the sort of thing which could serve as the basis for such claims. For as the Stoics note, events are not things which occur in a present: they cannot be presented, but only extracted and expressed.

The crucial issue here, however, concerns how an altering concept relates to an event. When a promise occurs which our previous definition of a promising does not describe, the concept nevertheless maintains some relation with this occurring promise. On Deleuze and Guattari’s account, the concept expresses this new variation of the event of promising, and this is what enables us to apprehend this variation as a promise, even though it does not conform with our prior definition thereof. For we apprehend the current occurrence as one variation of an event that has occurred differently before and will occur differently again, for the reason that the event itself is irreducible to these or to any set of its occurrences.

This, then, is the Deleuzian explanation of how an altering concept functions. The explanation is crucially dependent on the idea that there are events, such as the event of promising, which can occur in an infinite variety of circumstances and in an infinite variety of ways. For it is these events, or new variations thereof, which altering concepts are held to express. These events in this respect seem to enjoy a role comparable to universals. Indeed the difference might seem simply terminological: instead of saying that there
is a universal ‘promise’ which accurately defines or describes all promises. Deleuze and Guattari speak of an event that all promises, in their differing ways, express. Now clearly these two ways of speaking entail different metaphysical presuppositions. Given this, what does the difference amount to in practical terms?

The difference seems to bear on the attitude we take towards a concept. This can be brought out by comparing two questions and the answer each invites. When philosophers ask if there are universals, such as a universal promise, they generally seem to want to answer yes or no. If, however, we ask if there is an event of which all promises are occurrences, it would seem that the appropriate answer for us to give would be ‘not yet.’ For, quite simply, all promises have not yet occurred. These answers have different implications. For if there is a universal which describes all and only promises it is presumably possible for us to discover it: to know it and make knowledge-claims about it. If, however, all the possibilities of a concept, all its potential variations, simply have not occurred yet, then we have to take some other stance towards the concept.

With regard to this stance, we have seen the Island dreamer express a new variation of an event in his dream of becoming an Island. He uses the concept as a means of beginning to envision a previously unforeseeable future, and it would seem to be this same envisioning employment of concepts which Deleuze and Guattari enjoin philosophers to undertake, when they assert that the task of philosophy is to “give [things and beings] a new event” (WP33). Let me conclude by considering Deleuze and Guattari’s own analysis as an instance of this.

Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of concepts is not intended simply as a correct description, but rather as a demonstration of the explanatory limits of traditional assumptions. This demonstration responds to the philosophical desire for certainty, and consists in showing the impossibility of attaining such certainty. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis is not intended simply as a correct description, but also as a response to the philosophical desire for certainty. Their response consists in showing that the practice of philosophy can be seen in different terms and hence pursued with a different motivation. Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy involves extracting and expressing events. What they are doing when they say this, is extracting and expressing an event: an event which occurs whenever someone thinks philosophically, and which can simply be called the event of philosophy. In extracting and expressing this event, they enable us to see what we are doing in a new way.

Notes


9. Derrida describes this appeal to a given when he asserts: “Experience’ has always designated the relationship with presence...,” and he declares: “we must... exhaust the resources of the concept of experience... It is the only way to escape empiricism...” (Of Grammatology, p. 60). Derrida’s
idea here is that in order to avoid the uncritical appeal to a simple given implied by the concept of 'experience,' the implications of this concept must be fathomed: its various uses must be exposed and criticised, in order to rehabilitate the concept. This presupposes that the concept functions as a universal description, for this is how Derrida proposes to critically rewrite it: as a concept which applies to all instances of experience but does not invoke the idea of a simple given in doing so.

As regards the uncritical nature of empiricism, Derrida discerns a lack of critical awareness in Benveniste's empiricist analysis of Aristotle (M192), and in the empiricism Lévi-Strauss (Writing and Difference, p. 288). Given this, and while still pointing to difficulties, Derrida admires the critical caution of Levinas's empiricist stance (Writing and Difference, p. 151-2), and admits the necessity of a certain empiricism in his own work (Of Grammatology, p. 162). Marian Hobson elaborates on Derrida's stance towards empiricism in 'Deconstruction, Empiricism, and the Postal Services,' French Studies, Vol. 36, 1982.


11 This is Long and Sedley's translation of the Stoic term ἔλεκτα. In discussing causality these sayables are spoken of as effects. The Stoics, as Long and Sedley translate them, do not speak of events as such. Given this, the Stoic's focus on verbs in the expression of sayables supports Deleuze's construal of sayables as events. (A. Long & D. Sedley: The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge Uni. Press: Cambridge) 1987).

12 In Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, and at greater length in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari locate events in this way, to interesting effect. They speak of various events in terms of their end-state: becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible, etc. However, although people can enact events of becoming animal or becoming imperceptible, they evidently cannot attain the end states of being an animal or being imperceptible. The nature of the events as processes are, thus, not obscured by the attainment of an end. Deleuze and Guattari presumably focus on this kind of event for this very reason. (See Chapter 10 of Deleuze & Guattari: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. B. Massumi (Uni. of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis) 1987).

13 In his studies of Spinoza, Deleuze draws on Dun Scotus's neo-platonic development of the notion of expression. In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (trans. M. Joughin (Zone Books: New York) 1992), Deleuze relates this notion of expression to Spinoza's term 'explication,' and in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, says of this latter term: "Expression is always... a development, an unfolding, a dynamism: the thing explains itself" (Deleuze: Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. R. Hurley (City Light Books: San Francisco) 188, p. 68). It would seem that what is at issue here is the expression of an event, albeit in an explanatory context.

As regards our ability to explain or comprehend events, Deleuze relates explication or explanation to implication, but notes "...a single case [in Spinoza] in which explain and imply are dissociated. ...The inadequate idea implies our power of comprehending, but is not explained by it; it involves the nature of the external thing, but does not explain it" (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 68). It would seem to be this form of inadequacy which is at issue in our apprehension of events as exceeding our comprehension.


15 More precisely, they explain how scientific functions are logically formalised as propositional concepts. These propositional concepts, they explain, condition acts of reference and recognition (WP138-9), and hence also acts of description.


17 Bruce Baugh argues that Derrida's semiotically derived conception of différence "...does not capture the multifarious forms of difference that elude or go beyond signification." (B. Baugh: 'Making a Difference Between Deleuze's Difference and Derrida's Differance,' presented at a symposium on Deleuze held at the University of Western Australia, 1996). Similarly it would seem that occurring events are only explicable in Derrida's semiotically derived terms as events of différences.

18 Ronald Bogue writes: "Deleuze shares a good deal with Derrida... Yet one must conclude that Deleuze, unlike many deconstructionists, believes that there is something outside the text." (R. Bogue: Deleuze and Empiricism, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 26 No. 1, Jan 1993.