In 1952 in *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*, Frantz Fanon wrote: “Freud, par la psychanalyse, demanda qu’on tient compte du facteur individuel. À une thèse phylogénétique, il substituait la perspective ontogénétique. On verra que l’alienation du Noir n’est pas une question individuelle. À côté de la phylogénie et de l’ontogénie, il y a la sociogénie […] disons qu’il s’agit ici d’un sociodiagnostic” (8). Over fifty years later, in both psychoanalytic theory and practice, we continue to attribute the causes of psychic affects narrowly to the individual and family histories of subjects, rather than examine their sources in the social oppression of specific groups. This is despite telling statistical indications of, for instance, higher rates of depression and feelings of shame among groups such as blacks and women than among whites and men. Kelly Oliver’s project in *The Colonization of Psychic Space* is the important one of developing a psychoanalytic theory that explores experiences of alienation (Chapter 2), depression (Chapter 7), and shame (Chapter 6) as direct consequences of social oppression, as well as to theorize in novel ways the paths toward psychic healing through processes such as sublimation and idealization (Chapter 8), individualization (Chapter 9), and forgiveness (Chapter 10). In her study Oliver diagnoses society rather than individuals as pathological.

As Oliver points out in her Introduction, while other theorists have applied psychoanalytic theories to social phenomena, and have often noted the limitations of this approach, they have either ended up simply pointing out the insufficiencies of psychoanalytic theory or have combined psychoanalysis with social theories such as Marxism and feminism. In either case psychoanalytic theory is not fundamentally revisioned. Moreover, such approaches still fail to move beyond the most proximate relations of the individual, such as the family. While these theorists may consider influences on children such as the gender of caregivers, they still do not take into account the larger social and economic context in which subjectivity is formed. Oliver’s undertaking is hence more radical in that it seeks to transform rather than to apply psychoanalysis so that it is adequate to the task of explaining and healing the affects of social oppression, and also to develop a new model of subjectivity, one grounded in sociality, forgiveness, and ethics rather than in oppression.
and alienation.

Parts I and II of The Colonization of Psychic Space focus on racial oppression, drawing largely on the philosophy of Fanon, while Parts III and IV attend predominantly to sexist oppression, elaborating mainly on the feminist psychoanalytic theory of Julia Kristeva. With this division between the first and second halves of her book, and with some points of exception, Oliver does not always adequately account for the complex overlapping of race and gender, nor for the manners in which racial and sexist oppression differ. Not everything Fanon says of the lived experience of blacks, for instance, can be grafted onto the experience of white women, as seems to be frequently assumed, and so a more complex awareness of the ways that sexual and racial oppression differ as well as overlap would have been advantageous.

In the first and most powerful chapter in the book, Oliver demonstrates that Continental philosophers have concealed the racial- and gender-specific affects of social oppression by developing universalizing theories of psychic domination, alienation, anxiety, and shame, and a model of human subjectivity for which these states are necessary. At a time when postcolonial and feminist critiques of oppression were being voiced, these were immediately undermined by European philosophies that theorized oppression, domination, interhuman antagonistic relations and their psychic effects, as integral to the human condition and to the formation not only of the subjectivities of oppressed groups but to all human subjectivity. Oliver problematizes this trend as it arises in the works of Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Heidegger, and Lacan. Each of these prominent Continental thinkers, Oliver argues, has subverted accounts of domination and suffering on the part of postcolonial and feminist movements by universalizing the experiences of estrangement which those groups described, while simultaneously putting forth theories of subjectivity that reflect the white male subject and his privilege. In turn, the tendency of commentators to see Fanon’s theories of racialized alienation and oppression and the psychic effects of domination on blacks as making him a “Hegelian,” “a Sartrean,” “a Marxist,” or a “Lacanian” philosopher repeat this gesture by generalizing the racial experience of oppression Fanon describes into mere instances of the universal theories of these more mainstream thinkers. As Oliver shows, all forms of suffering are thus leveled, and we forget, as Fanon accuses Sartre of doing, that “the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man” (16). In particular, by situating Fanon in the tradition of Hegel, Sartre, Marx, or Lacan, as merely applying their philosophies to racial and colonial experience, philosophic commentators generalize forms of estrangement and anxiety over nothingness and freedom which are in fact white male privileges, masking racially specific alienation and psychic suffering, while simultaneously failing to distinguish between levels and types of domination, oppression, and alienation.

While Chapter 1 is compelling, Oliver’s suggestion in Chapter 2 that philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre theorized a generalized human experience of anxiety, and in particular anxiety caused by the gaze (in the case of Sartre), because they were made personally anxious by the accusing gazes of women and colonized others, is perhaps less so. One would at least expect Oliver to address Fanon’s claims in Peau Noire, Masques Blancs that the gaze is white, that only whites have the gaze ("les regards blancs, les seuls vrais" [93]), that the black man cannot reverse the gaze on the white other, as Sartre supposes ("c'est faux. Le Noir n'a pas de résistance ontologique aux yeux du Blanc" [89]), as well as feminist claims that the gaze is male (“men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at” [Berger 1977, 47]). So far as blacks and women look (at themselves), this look is argued by Fanon, Berger, and feminists such as Laura Mulvey to be an internalization of the white, male gaze by blacks and women, and they do not look at their oppressors and thus make them anxious with their gazes, but look at themselves being looked at through the eyes of racism and sexism. Oliver may validly reject these arguments, but she should at least address them.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5, concluding the first half of the book, continue to offer strong readings of the philosophy of Fanon with respect to topics such as the transmission of affect, humanism, property, and power. The second half of the book, which deals with the oppression of women, is in general less persuasive than the first half, which focuses on race. This is partly because the racial model of oppression already developed is transposed onto the experience of sexism, and because it depends largely on overly categorical claims that women are silenced and that there exist no positive images of women and no social meanings for women within mainstream Western culture which are not dehumanizing.

In Chapters 6 and 7 Oliver considers shame and depression, and the ways they are related to oppression such that they seem to affect women and racial minorities far more than white men. While the analysis of female shame versus male guilt is important and persuasive, the analysis of depression raises several questions. With respect to the higher diagnosed rates of depression among women than men, it would be useful to consider to what degree this reflects not only the social oppression of women, which I do not doubt, but also the social conditioning of men which leads them to seek help for emotional and mental (as well as physical) health problems less frequently than women, as well as the internalization of social expectations on the part of doctors such that they might be more inclined to diagnose one sex with depression.
than the other.

The analysis of depression also depends on assumptions regarding women's abjection and silence in society. Oliver writes of women in Western societies as being "without social support and positive self-images available in culture" (149), and asks "What happens when the only readily available meanings for a particular experience are either nonexistent, prohibited, or abject and inhuman?" (142). The experience of maternity, for instance, and the emotions associated with it can only be articulated in mainstream culture, according to Oliver, "through denigration or not at all," and are thus "so profoundly repressed that they are nearly foreclosed from the social" (142). The consequences for women of their social abjection and negative social meaning are said to be "repression and ultimately depression" (143).

Regarding the supposed absence of any positive images of women or mothers in mainstream culture, the closest Oliver comes to proving these assertions is when she lists titles of American films in which mothers are represented negatively, as cruel or abusive or as the sources of their children's psychological problems (106). Yet one could compile similar lists of films in which strong mothers appear, others in which mothers are represented stereotypically but sympathetically, and others in which mothers are romanticized and idealized. Oliver does not explore the ways that women not only experience sexism as denigration and abjection but also, and perhaps more frequently, as idealization and romanticization or through preconceived notions of women as nurturing and beautiful. Today we are surely more bombarded with (and oppressed by) images of the female body as beautiful and ideal than by images of the female body as abject, and more by representations of mothers as self-sacrificing than by depictions of mothers as cruel. The suggestion that there exist no positive meanings for women in culture (even in mainstream culture) presents a homogenous view of society and denies the accomplishments of decades of feminism. Although I am far from wishing to say that our society is no longer patriarchal or that media and popular-culture representations of women are unproblematic, Oliver's categorical claims simply do not reflect a reality, including a reality of oppression, that is far more complex. Although parenthetically and in passing Oliver mentions Oprah's book club and hip-hop music (151), she does not pause to note that such examples of positive images of women (and, in perhaps more circumscribed ways, of blacks) could be proliferated and should cause her to qualify her repeated categorical claims that no such images and meanings exist.

Finally, the claim that women and mothers and their experiences are silenced in mainstream culture also simply does not reflect the reality even of mainstream American media. These claims regarding women's silence and repression bring to mind Foucault's ironic analysis of the "repressive hypothesis" in *La volonté de savoir*. Here, Foucault describes the manners in which the modern subject "speaks verbosely of its own silence, [and] takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say" (8). While, like Foucault, I am not denying that any silencing or repression occurs, and although I have found compelling Oliver's analysis of the manner in which Continental philosophic theories of a generalized alienation and oppression would have worked to silence the voices expressing racially and sexually specific forms of alienation and oppression within philosophic discourse (as can be seen in the reception and marginalization of the philosophy of Fanon as a mere application of Hegel, Sartre, Marx, and Lacan), Foucault is also convincing that in general silence is not our problem, and we have to consider instead the problems of what we do (prolifically) say. Similarly, when Oliver calls for "continual self-interrogation" (xxii, xxiii), a Foucaultian would point out that the modern subject is already defined by its introspective tendencies, as well as by the permanent verbalization of what it "discovers" about itself. What we need is not more talk, or more introspection, but to talk and to think differently about ourselves as well as others, to transform rather than augment our speech and thought. Oliver is arguably pursuing a similar point when she declares that psychic revolt is necessary for social revolt (149), and yet she is wrong to think that this revolt is always and only against silence, repression, and abjection.

Despite her extensive use of *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* in the first half of the book, Oliver chooses not to explore in equal depth Fanon's arguments in *Les damnés de la terre*, in which he arguably reverses the order of the revolts of which she speaks, claiming it is social revolt that is the prerequisite for psychic healing. In particular, Fanon argues that the colonized person will regain self-respect and psychic health not through more talking but only if he avenges himself against and frees himself from the colonizer through his own actions. Although, as mentioned, Oliver has said that psychic revolt is necessary for social revolt (and ultimately that the two should coexist), and though concerned with social forms of oppression, her interest and diagnosis are first and foremost sought through individualized psychological work and not through social change. Oliver is interested in psychic healing through therapy, for instance, rather than transformations of society or more immediate attacks on oppression. Accordingly, while in her Introduction Oliver criticizes psychoanalytic theorists for focusing on the individual and not taking the social into account, she also briefly criticizes critical theory because, although it *does* deal with the social and the ill effects of social oppression on individuals, it thinks that the only solution to these problems is social change, and does not recognize individual solutions such as
therapy (xvii). Oliver, in contrast, privileges introspection, speech, and therapy as solutions to the harmful effects of oppression rather than taking actions which end that oppression. Following Foucault and Fanon, we might doubt this privileging of introspective talk as well as any claims that our society lacks it, and even argue that this tarrying with the inner self delays our acting for social change as well as change in our individual lives.

The final part of The Colonization of Psychic Space is a consideration of the manners in which the effects of social oppression can be healed. Oliver argues that the effects of oppression are healed through sublimation and forgiveness. Sublimation in turn requires the ability to idealize images with which one can identify (so, in this chapter, of idealized images of women). In this context Oliver argues for the need for images of female genuises. Oliver does not pause to consider feminist critiques of the notion of genius but rather turns to Kristeva’s series of studies of Hannah Arendt, Colette, and Melanie Klein. While Kristeva’s female genius series reflects a traditional understanding of genuises as exceptionally intelligent and creative persons, Oliver argues that in addition to these figures women need a more everyday notion of genius, or must be able to see genius in their everyday talents and activities. This chapter becomes especially troubling when Oliver argues that women are more attuned than men to sensory experience due to their care of bodies and that we can consider such sensory attunement as a form of genius. Moreover, she argues, women manifest maternal genius and genius in their abilities to create and transform not only children but also food and clothes. Oliver does not pursue examples of women’s “everyday” experiences that occur outside the household, such as in the workplace or in studios, despite the fact that many women leave their houses to go to work every day. Although she is aware that women’s greater abilities in domestic areas are a result of traditional gender roles and patriarchal oppression, Oliver does not dwell on these facts and instead valorizes these roles as sites of “female” (rather than “feminine”) genius.

We might think that women’s domestic and maternal skills are already nurtured and presented positively in Good Housekeeping magazines, and women have hardly been abjected for their abilities to cook food for their families. Remaining with Kristeva’s examination of intellectual and artistic female genuises might have been more promising, even though we might also question the concept of genius on feminist grounds, as has been done in feminist scholarship in disciplines such as literary studies and art history. Moreover, Oliver’s position seems dangerous: idealizing traditional domestic roles as “female,” congratulating women for being good at cooking and caring for children in ways that men are supposedly not, has worked in the past as a way of reconciling women to circumscribed social roles, of pacifying them to accept their restriction to these realms. Oliver simply goes further than nineteenth-century and 1950s’ romanticizations of female domesticity and maternity by saying that these are sites of “female genius,” and her claims seem like a particularly exaggerated and outdated case of reinforcing sexist stereotypes. Moreover, these claims once more do not seem to acknowledge that feminism has had any success thus far since women still seem limited in their genius to the domestic realm, for Oliver, nor do they reflect an awareness that women (such as Oliver herself) already have roles in society other than maternity and domestic work which they (and other women looking at them) might find value in and idealize. Needless to say, it is surprising to be making these points in 2005.

In the final chapter, Oliver returns to her critique of theories (Hegel, Sartre) that see interhuman hostility and alienation as necessary to the formation of subjectivity, and offers instead a theory of the interhuman experience of forgiveness as the basis for subjectivity. Oliver considers accounts of forgiveness in the writings of Hegel, Derrida, and Kristeva, drawing on each in order to develop her own psychological model of forgiveness. Oliver argues that this model of forgiveness is presupposed by subjectivity, but has been refused to those who are abjected by society. Although one could question certain aspects of her readings of Hegel and Derrida, Oliver’s model of forgiveness as a primary and ethical inter-relatedness with the other, offered as an alternative to the masculinist model of subjectivity as grounded in antagonism, is of great interest.

On a final note, to readers of Lévinas (and to some degree of feminist care ethics), the theorization of a subject that is always already engaged in ethical relations with others is nothing new, and Oliver mentions only in passing her indebtedness to Lévinas. In response, Oliver would argue that what her model of subjectivity offers that is new, or not adequately explored in either Lévinas or care ethics, is psychoanalysis, or its account of and extension of ethics to the functionings of the unconscious. Given the nevertheless Lévinasian nature of her project (despite the fact that he is mentioned very rarely), it would have been interesting for Oliver to respond to the ways in which her project also diverges from Lévinas, in that for Lévinas the forgiveness of the other cannot be “presupposed” (“Toward the Other,” Nine Talmudic Readings, 1990), and moreover the ethical relation which precedes the ontology of the subject is frequently described as an antagonistic one, once again. For Lévinas, ethics and our primary interrelatedness must be thought without assuming the other’s acceptance and forgiveness.

The ultimate goals of Oliver’s book—the theorization of a model of subjectivity that is grounded in an ethics of forgiveness rather than in the
need to dominate and oppress others, and the transformation of psychoanalytic theory such that it can account for social oppression—are certainly valuable ones. *The Colonization of Psychic Space* is as a whole to be recommended, despite the unevenness of some of its chapters.

CHLOÉ TAYLOR, University of Toronto

---

*Hiddenness and Alterity: Philosophical and Literary Sightings of the Unseen*

JAMES RICHARD MENSCHE

Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005; 270 + x pages.

I wanted to like this book because of the importance of the questions Mensch raises about self-knowledge and what “the hidden aspect of ourselves” implies for morality (2). The Introduction (1–17) provides an intriguing discussion of self-knowledge, and the issues Mensch frames are persistent and central: otherness as an element of selfhood, self-knowledge’s fundamentality to morality, the danger reflexivity poses for self-deception, the mental life of others.

Though *Hiddenness and Alterity* is presented as a sustained treatment of the topic of otherness, and its parts are designated “chapters,” as the Acknowledgments suggest and the subtitle hints, the book really is an anthology of papers, some “reworked” (ix), and most only tenuously related to one another. The book begins with a consideration of the role and nature of self-knowledge and, in particular, of the question of how we can know that we do not know things about ourselves. Mensch then supposedly applies his “unified theory of alterity” to a number of issues, showing how “sightings of the unseen” enable better understanding of those issues (back cover). The issues include logic, imagination, political perception, shame and guilt, literature and evil, prayer and metaphysics.

Unfortunately, the alleged “unified theory” fails to hold together the various chapters/papers, some of which are independently of genuine interest. The reason for this failure is that Mensch’s “theory” of otherness or alterity is neither a theory nor convincing. The fundamental problem has two aspects. The first is a basic conceptual difficulty, in that what Mensch proposes about otherness rests squarely on his misconceived attempt to offer a phenomenological account of temporality. Regarding temporality, Mensch attempts to describe the indescribable by indirect means. But the indescribable here is not like, say, the taste of a fresh peach or taking an instant dislike to someone; it is not something that only resists or defies articulation. The indescribable Mensch tries to describe is conditional, or “transcendental” in Kantian terms, and so is in principle inarticulable by direct or indirect means.

Following a somewhat tendentious discussion of Kant in Chapter 1, Mensch offers his phenomenological account of temporality, an account entailing “that nothing less than the totality of time would be an adequate representation of the subject in its status as the origin of time” (30; emphases in original). I certainly wondered, along with Mensch, whether we “can grasp such a totality,” but I thought inadvertently ironic his concession at the end of Chapter 1 that consideration of the question “requires its own chapter” (30).

“The Alterity of Time” begins with the admission that “[t]here is a certain paradoxical quality to the claim that when we take the self to be the origin of time, its manifestation requires the whole of time” (31). “Paradoxical” is here grossly inadequate; “incoherent” would be better. This brings me to the second major problem with Mensch’s book. The treatment of temporality in the first chapter poses the question of the extent to which language can be bent productively, and whether it retains its coherence when bent to the degree that Mensch bends it. Much of what he says in his attempted phenomenological treatment of temporality, as well as what he says about otherness, too frequently consists of exasperating remarks that fall just this side of parodic. For instance, I was not enlightened about our grasp of the totality of time by being told that “[t]his giving of itself as not being able to be given occurs through the given (the momentary appearance) referring beyond itself to a new appearance” (30; emphases in original).

This bending of language is even evident in section headings, for instance, “The Phenomenology of the Noumenal” (45). Mensch asks whether we can give “a phenomenological sense to [the] nonrepresentable other” (45). He admits that according to Lévinas, whom he often invokes, we cannot do so, but nonetheless proceeds to try to do just that, but what he offers is strained expressions. Readers immersed in and comfortable with Lévinas's and Derrida’s idioms may disagree with me, but others will concur that starting with part of the subtitle—“Sightings of the Unseen”—Mensch trades far too much on coherence-challenging use of language. In context his remarks may have a certain fluency for some readers, and I am certain some will find them profound, but after a hard look they emerge as devoid of clarificatory substance.

The point I want to stress here is that the ultimate emptiness of the sort of language-bending in question becomes clear when one tries to convey Mensch’s ideas to others. In talking about the book, and in preparing this review, I realized that I could not paraphrase Mensch’s putative assertions or indirect descriptions; all I ended up doing was
repeating them. I strongly believe that philosophical claims that defy effective paraphrasing lack genuine content. It is not good enough, if one is philosophizing, to trade in unique metaphors and the like.

The conceptual issue that effectively precludes effective application of Mensch’s ruminations on self-knowledge to the various issues he addresses is more diffusely present. The trouble here is that Mensch deals with the otherness inherent in our selfhood as if it were determinate. There can be no question that otherness or alterity is elemental to being a self, but it is highly questionable whether that otherness is as stable as Mensch’s treatment of it seems to assume. Our otherness is only psychically or psychologically accessible, and then only partially so, and this is in part because it is dynamic. Mensch himself makes much of how our “mental life is intersubjectively determined,” but largely ignores the resultant volatility of the self’s otherness consequent on the diversity of external and internal influences (5). In this connection, I thought it a serious lack that Mensch fails even to mention Foucault.

The more literary elements of *Hiddenness and Alterity* are much better than the philosophical ones. I thought the treatment of *Benito Cereno* and Freud, for instance, in Chapter 8, provided interesting insights into the interplay between literary presentation of a character and Freudian theoretical understanding of the individual.

C. G. PRADO, *Queen’s University*

---

In this review, I feel privileged to be welcoming three excellent works, destined to satisfy fastidious researchers and ordinary readers of Deleuze alike, works that attempt to fill a void with well-crafted charts of the archipelago of difference that he bequeathed to us.

In *Le Vocabulaire de Gilles Deleuze*, Robert Sasso and Arnaud Villani, with the help of nineteen seasoned readers of Deleuze from France and Belgium (philosophers, linguists, epistemologists, and writers), index and analyze fifty Deleuzean concepts, supplementing their catalogue with thirty-seven additional entries and their brief, lexicographic definitions. The author of the volume *La Guêpe et l'Orchidée; Essai sur Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Belin, 1999) and scores of essays on Deleuze’s philosophy, Villani is one of the most established, faithful, and insightful readers of Deleuze. Sasso is honorary *maître de conférence* in philosophy at the University of Nice–Sophia Antipolis. Among the fifty concepts analyzed in this *Vocabulaire*, one finds key Deleuzean notions, like “actual/virtual,” “body without organs,” “becoming,” “difference,” “smooth space/striated space,” “lines of flight,” “micropolitics,” “multiplicity,” “repetition,” and “univocality.” Each concept receives a brief definition, followed by tracking its history and trajectory in the texts of Deleuze (and Guattari); its transformations are clearly marked and accompanied by the reasons, whenever applicable, for the concept’s modification or eventual abandonment by its creator.

Two examples of entries in this vocabulary will, I hope, serve as helpful illustrations of the conceptual analyses at work. Anne Sauvagnargues is the author of the entry “actual/virtual,” whose central role in Deleuze’s ontology is by now well known. Sauvagnargues begins with the date of the first occurrence of the concepts in Deleuze’s work: 1956, in his essays on Bergson. She then offers a brief definition or characterization of the concept as follows: actual and virtual are “ontological categories replacing the couples, sensible/intelligible, essence/existence, possible/real. Both are real but they exclude each other. Deleuze’s univocality depends on this point: Being is said of both the virtual and the actual in one and the same ‘voice.’ The actual refers to material and present states of affairs; the virtual refers to incorporeal, past and ideational events. Their interchange defines the dynamism of becoming, in its differentiating and creative act” (12). We are told that essential to Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming is the intersection of the ontological and the temporal axes—an intersection that could easily lead one to the conclusion that the virtual must be the actual that has been. Deleuze, however, manages to prevent this misunderstanding as he borrows Bergson’s idea of the pure past that has never been present. The virtual is this pure past. In Proust’s words, it is real without being actual, ideational without being abstract. The distinction between virtual and
actual corresponds to a bifurcation of time, that is, of the virtual durée that proceeds by differentiating itself as it follows two different routes: it makes the present pass and it conserves the past. The preeminence of the virtual in Deleuze therefore rests on the fact that only it can account for the flow of becoming.

The "Critique" section that follows informs us that Deleuze's virtual rests on Bergson's severe critique of the possible. The possible is shunned because it gives rise to a number of problems: an ontological problem built into the assumption of the anteriority of non-being to being; a modal problem because it makes existence a derivative of the possible; and finally a temporal problem because it transforms time into the realization of successive, linear processes. With this critique in mind, Deleuze refuses to think of the virtual as a reserve of being, anterior to the actual. He also refuses to think of the actual as the development of the virtual or its suppression.

One wishes that the section devoted to "Critique" had incorporated some critical questions about the workings of the actual/virtual apparatus for the purpose of elucidating the perplexing ontological claims that this apparatus sustains. But Ms. Sauvagnargues has no room for them. This is not the case, however, with all entries. Take, for example, Philippe Mengue's entry for "micropolitics," the critical section of which is a condensation of Mengue's denunciation of Deleuze's politics, given in a detailed manner in his Deleuze et le problème de la démocratie (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003). In its historical section, Mengue traces the transformations of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept "schizoanalysis" to its replacement by the concept of "micropolitics" and offers this definition of the latter: "Micropolitics is the analysis of the flows of desire's cathexes and of the central role played by minorities and the 'minor,' in the context of groups and individuals. Micropolitics presuppose a war machine—individual or collective—turned against the grand, majoritarian and stable institutions—the State, for example" (251). In the critical part of his entry, Mengue goes on to bring the following charges against Deleuze: first, to the extent that not every minoritarian struggle is legitimately revolutionary, one should think that criteria are required to decide which are and which are not. Deleuze does not have any. Second, the public spaces that democracy requires to hold discussions and debates necessary to sustain the aims of political liberalism are denounced by Deleuze as futile and bloodless. This, in Mengue's assessment, makes Deleuze the enemy of democracy and defeats the purpose of his "politics," that is, the establishment of as many connections among heterogeneous elements as possible. Deleuze overlooks the fact that democracy is the sole guarantor of such connections. Mengue therefore concludes that Deleuze has no politics; what, in his work, pretends to be a discussion of the political is only an ethical stance: "On the hic and nunc, concrete decisions, in view of public spaces, open to debate and aiming at the common good, micropolitics has nothing to tell us..." (257). Its usefulness, Mengue concedes, lies rather in its very presence which reminds us that "no authentic and living democracy (can exist) without a permanent guerrilla force turned against the established powers and their (juridico-moral) norm of regulations" (258).

François Zourabichvili's Le Vocabulaire de Deleuze is organized around twenty-four entries, presented alphabetically and ranging from "arrangement," "aion," and "complication" to the "univocity of being," "non-organic life," and the "virtual." At the end of the book, the reader will find a list of twenty-one additional concepts, with a page reference to the entry or entries (one or more of the twenty-four) that mention or briefly elucidate the designated concept. Zourabichvili is a very careful reader of Deleuze—meticulous in his conceptual analyses—and his entries are insightful mini-essays that contribute seriously to our understanding of Deleuze. He is the author of Deleuze, Une philosophie de l'événement (Paris: PUF, 1994) and of two ambitious books on Spinoza: Spinoza, Une psychologie de la pensée (Paris: PUF, 2002) and Le Conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza (Paris: PUF, 2002). His essays on Alain Badiou on Deleuze and Toni Negri on Deleuze are worth reading for their subtlety and their fidelity to the letter and the spirit of Deleuze.

In the first three pages of his Vocabulaire, Zourabichvili finds it necessary to justify his decision to compile a lexicon, reminding us that Deleuze himself has done it already three times—in his little book on Nietzsche, in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy; and in A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze's concepts must be taken à la lettre, as he himself repeatedly suggests; they are never metaphors. But this does not absolve us from the task of pursuing the analysis of these concepts (exposer le concept), because "each concept participates in an act of thinking that displaces the field of intelligibility and modifies the conditions of the problem..." (5). Conceptual analysis is therefore indispensable, the best guarantee that one is ever going to encounter Deleuze's thought. The alternative between "explaining" a concept and "using" it is demonstrably false. Zourabichvili concedes that concepts require affects and percepts to sustain them, but he denies that they can be reduced to them. One has the impression in reading these pages that Zourabichvili conceives of his own work—that of a conceptual analyst—as "displacing the field of intelligibility" and "modifying the conditions of the problem," according to the lines of flight that Deleuze himself has already either plotted or anticipated.

To give the reader a taste of Zourabichvili's Vocabulaire, I chose the concept "event" as one example from among the twenty-four entries of
the book; after all, our lexicographer is also the author of the book that proclaims Deleuze as the thinker of the event. As with all his entries, Zourabichvili begins with two quotations from Deleuze’s texts (in this case, The Logic of Sense) that set the tone for the conceptual analysis that follows. He then reminds us that in articulating his theory of the event Deleuze borrows from the Stoics the distinction between events and states of affairs. The actualization of events in bodies is responsible for the “before” and “after” of succession. Language, on the other hand, ties differences between states of affairs in the instance of their disjunction. “As Alice grows,” we remember Deleuze saying, “she becomes bigger than she was before and smaller than she will be—at the same time.” But in order to avoid our temptation to make events strictly an affair of language, Zourabichvili suggests that we must follow Deleuze in tracing a line of demarcation, not between language/event and language/world, but rather between two interpretations of the relation between language and world. For logicians, the distinction is between propositional form (language) and the form of states of affairs (world). But for Deleuze the paradox of the event is in its identity as both the affair of the “expression” and also an attribute of states of affairs. The event subsists in language and belongs to the world. This sheds a better light on the vexing question that hangs over the relations between the virtual and the actual in Deleuze’s ontology. The virtual event actualizes itself without ever permitting the actual to exhaust it. The plain signification of the early phenomenologists, as well as the successful intuitive fulfillment of our intentions, are therefore out of the question. Neither “the expressed” of language nor the attribute of states of affairs can exhaust the virtual. This is why, in the ethics of Deleuze, for the recommended counter-actualization—recommended, for the sake of reaching behind the states of affairs toward the event itself, and for becoming ethically worthy of it—it is possible to draw on the “unrealizable” aspect of all actualizations.

At this point, Zourabichvili pauses to raise the question whether we are entitled to pitch the thought of the event against the thought of being. Is Deleuze’s theory of the event an ontology? Zourabichvili seems satisfied with issuing a few cautionary remarks to those of us who speak lightly of Deleuze as an ontologist. Later, his “Introduction inédite: l’ontologie et le transcendental” (Zourabichvili et al., La Philosophie de Deleuze [Paris: PUF, 2004], 5–12) will be more severe with the vulgar and sophisticated attempts to peg an ontology on the backside of a reticent Deleuze. In the Vocabulaire he advises caution to those who ascribe an ontology to Deleuze, reminding them that Deleuze himself uses “being” as little as possible. But if one insists on seeing a transition in Deleuze’s works from critical philosophy to ontology, one is advised to remember, first, that Deleuze disengages the pure given from the sovereignty of the subject and, second, that Deleuze’s search is for a heterogenesis that has nothing to do with the usual talk of engendering or constitution. A gulf exists between the Deleuzean événement and the avènement of the phenomenologists. Neither the beginning of time nor the genesis of historicity fuels Deleuze’s preoccupations; the event, for Deleuze, is given in the strange inclusive disjunction of the “still here” and “already past” and of the “yet to come” and “already here.”

A careful reading of Zourabichvili’s insightful mini-essays in his Vocabulaire reveals folds and rhizomatic connections within Deleuze’s thought that may not have been previously detected. This alone should make the reader overlook her occasional irritation with Zourabichvili’s tendency to style himself after the guardian of orthodoxy—the one and only who can take Deleuze’s concepts à la lettre.

Finally, in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, Charles Stivale, the author of The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari (New York: Guilford, 1998) and one of the first comers to the field of Deleuze studies, has brought together sixteen scholars, most of them with long-standing credentials in Deleuze scholarship, and put them to work in the elucidation of concepts central to Deleuze’s thought. Unlike the two works discussed above, Stivale’s collection is not a dictionary in its inception or in the ample room provided for its subjects. Each essay in this collection attempts to explicate (in Deleuze’s sense of “épistémé”) one concept by putting it to work (or showing how it works) in a domain (philosophical, political, literary, cinematic, painterly) of the author’s choice. In his Introduction, the editor reveals the principle that presided over the selection of essays: “The contributors to the volume are well aware,” he says, “of the pitfalls of wasting the ‘generative activity’ of concepts and show this awareness in their efforts to prevent the closing off of the text, and to release key-concepts for the sake of a play in the ‘in between spaces.’”

Eight among the sixteen essays captured my attention, either because they reveal new insights or because they are written with clarity and sure-footedness. Kenneth Surin’s “Force” displays the central role that the notion of force plays in Deleuze’s “libidinal materialism” and attributes this to the formative influence that Spinoza and Nietzsche had on his work. Surin is particularly helpful with his quick but accurate sketch of recent French politics. His demonstration shows that the echoes of this politics decisively influence the space that Force occupies in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. Gregg Lambert’s “Expression” tackles a concept both difficult and indispensable for our understanding of Deleuze, and does a good job of it. Given that any discussion of this concept requires a relentless struggle with Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense...
and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (both notoriously difficult texts), the occasional obscurity in Lambert's writing is pardonable. Among the strengths of his essay I count the pages on indirect discourse. In a limited space, the author successfully elucidates how indirect discourse displaces subject and author from the center of our literary-philosophico-political attention, and thereby replaces old intentions with never-ending intensities. Eugene Holland's "Desire" traces the roots of Deleuze's affirmative and productive desire back to Kant and Marx, shows what revisions must be made to the positions of Kant and Marx in order for desire to be conceptualized as the producer of the real, and contributes valuable notes on the function of the body without organs—a condensed version perhaps of what Holland has already given us with his Introduction to Schizoanalysis, but valuable nevertheless.

Patty Sotirin's "Becoming-Woman" revisits one of the often contested concepts of Deleuze and Guattari and places it in the context of the many Deleuzo-Guattarian becomings. She briefly discusses the reluctance of some feminist philosophers to adopt it as well as the admiration lavished on it by others, and concludes with an ambivalent gesture that will put the concept "becoming-woman" to use, provided that proper precautions are taken. The essay also makes room for a discussion of the "becoming-girl" that Deleuze and Guattari advocate, but regretfully it does not benefit from John Protevi's recent discussion of the Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming-girl, with his not-to-be-missed reminder that in order to be understood correctly, this particular becoming presupposes the reading of the French syntagm, "jeune fille," in its double denotation, as a girl but also as a young lady. (See his Political Physics and his essay "Love" in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. John Protevi and Paul Patton.) Christa Albrecht-Crane's essay "Style/Stutter" takes the reader through the relevant chapters of A Thousand Plateaus, in an attempt to assess the revolutionary potential in Deleuze's advice to the minor writer to make language itself stutter. "Through the concept style/stutter," Albrecht-Crane writes, "Deleuze articulates a revolutionary, political aspect, one that links style and artistic creation to resistance" (130). Deleuze, of course, did not easily embrace resistance as a political gesture, and usually writers on this topic do not display the required prudence in discussing it. It is to the credit of this writer that she chooses to talk of resistance (and therefore of style and stuttering as resistance) the way that Deleuze preferred, that is, in terms of "resistance manifested in becomings."

Gregory Seigworth's essay, "From Affection to Soul," is also exceptional. In fact, if this essay had done nothing but underscore the three different senses of "affect" in Spinoza, and caution us to read Deleuze with all three senses of Spinoza's notion in mind, I would have thought it a success. But the essay does even more: it discusses the differences between Deleuze and Lacan, offers fine insight into the often misunderstood scope of the virtual, and includes a helpful discussion on points of diffraction between Deleuze and Foucault. The collection concludes with Daniel Smith's essay, "Critical and Clinical." Smith is the translator of Deleuze's Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) and, for this reason, coupled with the fact that Smith is one of the best philosopher-readers of Deleuze in North America, the reader would be right to expect an insightful paper. Smith does not disappoint; with his usual meticulous scholarship, he shows us how Deleuze's critical and clinical project moves from its early incarnation in Coldness and Cruelty to its Anti-Oedipus phase, and then to its encounter with literature. Although less centrally than in his previous works, Smith undertakes the task of revealing that the answer to the question, "What difference does Deleuze's difference make?" lies in Deleuze's distinction between morality and ethics.

Limited space allows me merely to make mention of the other fine essays included in the volume: Melissa McMahon's "Difference and Repetition," Judith Paxon and Charles Stivale's "Sense, Series," J. Macgregor Wise's "Assemblage," Karen Houle's "Micropolitics," Ronald Bogue's "The Minor," Jennifer Daryl Slack's "Logic of Sensation," Felicity Coiman's "Cinema: Movement-Image-Recognition-Time," and Tom Conley's "Folds and Folding." Stivale's volume is a multifaceted to which those interested in Deleuze will want to have access should they need a more elaborate and informative conceptual analysis than the one that the vocabularies of Sasso/Villani and Zourabichvili have provided.

CONSTANTIN V. BOUNDAS, Trent University

Gadamer's Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics
BRUCE KRAJEWSKI, Editor

This latest volume of essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics demonstrates both the significance of Gadamer's work and the breadth of its application to many facets of philosophy. It also provides further proof that Gadamer's legacy is dialogue—dialogue with the text as well as with each other—as most of the writers are answering each other's comments or those of other critics. This collection allows the reader to experience many varied interpretations of Gadamer's work, and thus
engage in new avenues of dialogue with his texts as well as reconsider prior interpretations of his work. This book also clearly shows how much debate exists over Gadamer’s work and its interpretation, and also a true need for critical assessment of Gadamer’s key ideas. The only downside to this book is that it is not for the general reader; many of the volume’s articles, including those comparing Gadamer’s thought with Plato, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Heidegger, or Strauss, require that the reader have a relatively advanced understanding of each philosopher, and to a novice this can be a tall order. However, one can claim that Gadamer’s texts are not intended for a general audience either, as he assumes the reader to have an extensive background in philosophy and hermeneutics. Krajewski’s book can be seen as an extension of this, and is for an audience that has already done their homework with Gadamer.

The book begins with a piece by Gadamer, translated by Richard E. Palmer, titled “From Word to Concept: The Task of Hermeneutics as Philosophy,” which dates from 1995 and was originally given at the Bramberger Hegelwochen, where Gadamer received an honorary degree. It is an appropriate beginning, since in the essay Gadamer discusses his central ideas of language, dialogue, and understanding, all with a touch of philology and reference to Plato—ideas that most of the authors in this collection reconsider and reevaluate. The book then divides into three sections: “Gadamer’s Influence,” “Gadamer and Dialogue,” and “Gadamer in Question.” In the first section, Gadamer’s work is critically discussed in connection with historicism, metaphysics, ethics, romanticism, law, and aesthetics. Here one can see how far Gadamer’s thinking extends into new debates. The second section covers Gadamer’s theory of dialogue in three different and most interesting ways. The first article covers the critics of dialogue, the second discusses Gadamer’s dialogue in the context of postmodernism (asking if he is or is not a postmodernist), and the third questions Gadamer’s dialogue and esotericism. This section is a great resource for the critical assessment of Gadamer’s conception of dialogue, showing again how varied are the interpretations of Gadamer’s work. This section allows one truly to see Gadamer’s ideas put into play.

The last section of the book is a dialogue between Geoff Waite, Teresa Orozco, and Catherine H. Zuckert concerning Gadamer and the politics of National Socialism. This last section clearly demonstrates the need to apply Gadamer’s ideas of dialogue and the essential openness that accompanies it. It often seems that when we engage one another in philosophical debates we argue in a manner in which inconsistencies are pointed out and the theory is dismissed. As Waite points out in his response to Zuckert, when we argue in this style we essentially get nowhere, for the dialogue is nonexistent: “[L]ittle or nothing has ever been achieved by attempting to point out inherent contradictions (let alone ideological interference) either in Gadamer’s (and perhaps Plato’s) theory of dialogue or (rather a different thing) in his use of it.... This *tu quoque* argument gets none of us anywhere beyond where we all already are, which is a state of relativism and mafia-like combat without appeal to a metadiscourse” (260–1). Throughout the book, but particularly in this last section, one can see traces of the paradox of talking about open dialogue while closing off the dialogue in thinking that one’s interpretation of Gadamer is the correct one. An underlying point of this collection seems to be that we must reconsider Gadamer when doing philosophy, as the repercussions of not doing so are a lack of progress in philosophy and a lack of understanding between persons.

Overall, this collection clearly demonstrates not only that Gadamer truly deserves to be among the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, but that his work will continue to be debated and applied for decades to come.

KIMBERLY JARAY, Wilfrid Laurier University