Shared Life

Since we are a conversation and can hear from one another
— Hölderlin[1]

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It is well known that Gadamer's project of a philosophical hermeneutics entails a transformation of hermeneutics beyond the framework of methodology—beyond Dilthey and the issue of a methodology for the *Geisteswissenschaften*—for the sake of the broader experience of understanding and interpretation that is found in experience itself. Although Gadamer derives the impetus for this transformation from Heidegger, his own position in fact moves through Heidegger and the issue of Dasein's interpretative disclosure to the issue of communicative understanding that roots itself in the fundamental sociality of existence. This movement through Heidegger can in part be traced to their common reading of Aristotle's practical philosophy in which one finds a shift of emphasis on Gadamer's part. Whereas Heidegger draws from Aristotle's practical philosophy the notion of the interpretive enactment of life in which *phronesis* is a mode of being-true and from which he can then derive "existential concepts" such as *Befindlichkeit, Entschlossenheit*, and *Augenblick*, Gadamer sees this and more. As a point of emphasis, Gadamer also sees that for Aristotle *phronesis* is not simply a judgment with respect to the particular situation; it is a judging-with, a judging informed by what is held in common.[2] What is held in common is a function of *logos* in which words are not only already disposed toward the unity of a sense, but also toward communication and common validity. Gadamer thus sees that for Aristotle there is a fundamental connection between language and sociality. In human discourse (*logos*) we do more than communicate prior discovery; we engage in an effort to share something, which is of the essence of communication. For Gadamer, the character of hermeneutics, which remains tied to the interpretive enactment of life, is decisively shaped by this configuration of communication. It is in this context that one can say that Gadamer's hermeneutics is concerned with the opening of shared life in which one is able to hear the voice of the other.

But it is precisely this formulation of Gadamer's project that is often mis-understood or subject to misplaced criticism. Since understanding (*Verstehen*) is a coming to agreement in understanding (*Verständigung*) where what is foreign becomes one's own, the shared life in understanding necessarily erases the externality, alterity, and difference in the voice of the other; hermeneutic sharing thus amounts to a kind of ownership that turns the sharing in upon itself. All coming to agreement in understanding, in other words, is an assimilation into one's own such that the voice of the other becomes in effect one's own voice. Although Gadamer at times makes use of the language of assimilation (*Aneignung*) to indicate the character of "mediation" in the recovery of meaning in communal life with others, the claim that this entails a reduction of the other to the same is by no means evident. As a case in point, in his exchange with Derrida in 1980 Gadamer asserts

that the ability to understand sustains communal life with others while at the same time insisting that understanding is an understanding differently and that the otherness of the other is not overcome in understanding.[3]

This critical reading of hermeneutics with respect to shared life is often carried over into a misreading of Gadamerian dialogue. It has been argued that hermeneutic dialogue is simply a matter of Hegelian self-recognition in the other; that is to say, in Gadamerian dialogue the dialogical partner cannot be preserved as other in understanding, but becomes the recovered counterpart to the coherent unity of one's own understanding.[4] But this interpretation of hermeneutic dialogue, which places Gadamer closer to Hegel than to Levinas, errs precisely because it does not situate dialogical understanding, as Gadamer would insist, in a notion of shared life that is at once a form of encounter. Shared life as a form of encounter has little to do with the propriety of one's own—as if dialogue were identical to dialectic—but rather, as is appropriate to the event character of hermeneutics, has to do with the spacing of (our common) language in which words are able to speak again. At one place Gadamer writes: "understanding draws out the thread of meaning in all directions, beyond the limited horizon of the individual so that [in the case of historical understanding] the transmission of history will speak."[5]

Having said this, it is not yet clear how we are to understand in its full extent this sociality of existence that informs the task of understanding for Gadamer. It is not yet clear, in other words, how Gadamer might in fact embrace a notion of sociality that would place him in close proximity to Levinas rather than Hegel. What remains to be seen is precisely how shared life is to be understood and can be considered to be an apt description for Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.

We can best approach this issue of shared life by expanding our initial indication of the way in which it configures the very character of understanding. When we look to Gadamer's writings for this configuration we see that it is most evident in his writings that follow *Truth and Method*. In his "Reply to My Critics," an essay from 1971 containing Gadamer's response to criticism from Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Gadamer first repeats what he had said about his hermeneutics in *Truth and Method*, namely, that philosophical hermeneutics makes a claim to universality that rests on the view that understanding and coming to agreement are not primarily and originally a way of behaving toward a text acquired through methodical training. Rather, they are—in a formulation made with his audience in mind—"the form of enactment [*Vollzugsform*] of human social life that in its final formalization is a speech community."[6] Although this formulation is made with his audience in mind, it does not depart from Gadamer's earlier reading of Aristotle that informs his project. Social life is the "there" of hermeneutic existence by virtue of human *logos*. What is most explicit here is Gadamer's contention that coming to agreement in understanding is the "exercising" of this life in common; that is to say, Gadamer regards coming to agreement in understanding—hermeneutic performance—as a form of "practice" with respect to life in common. Life, then, is communal from the outset in accordance with the life of human discourse, and the

task of understanding is the enactment of that community of the *logos* that unites one to the other.

In his essays throughout the 1970s Gadamer begins to use a particular word for this community of the *logos* that unites one to another. He calls this community of the *logos* solidarity (*Solidarität*). But his use of the word is not without ambiguity. At a symposium on philosophy and social theory held at Boston College in 1974, Gadamer introduces the idea of solidarity without any explanation of its meaning. "Where," he asks, "can we find an orientation ... for a scientific and critical effort which shares the modern ideal of method and yet which does not lose the condition of solidarity with and justification of our practical living?"[7] In this context solidarity is coextensive with practical living and seems to indicate only that practical wisdom should take place from the mutual exchange of views of those who constitute the community. This idea is repeated in "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task" where he tells us that hermeneutics "has to bring everything knowable by the sciences into the context of agreement in understanding [*Verständigungszusammenhang*] in which we ourselves exist."[8] In an earlier essay, however, Gadamer introduces the idea of solidarity as the countermeasure to the technical and specialized condition of the social and suggests that solidarity constitutes something like Arendtian plurality: "What we truly have in common and what unites us thus remains, so to speak, without a voice. Probably we are harvesting the fruits of a long training in the perception of differences and in the sensibility demanded by it.... In my view we could only gain by contemplating the deep solidarities underlying all norms of human life."[9]

In the same collection of essays in which we find this earlier essay there are at least three other passages suggesting that solidarity consists precisely in the relating of one to another. In his answer to a question concerning the future of the European humanities, Gadamer writes in one of the essays that such a future entails "risking of one's own for the understanding and the recognition of the other. The authentic task of the human future which has truly gained global significance lies in the area of human coexistence."[10] Then, in "Citizens of Two Worlds," Gadamer defines practice as "the primary belongingness of all who live together,"[11] and concludes the essay with the statement, "The science of humans in their complete diversity becomes a moral and philosophical task for us all."[12] Finally, in "The Diversity of Europe," Gadamer speaks about the need "to live with an other, to live as the other of the other,"[13] and concludes the essay: "We may perhaps survive as a humanity if we would be able to learn that we may not simply exploit our means of power and effective possibilities, but must learn to ... respect the other as an other, whether it is nature or the grown cultures of peoples and nations, and if we would be able to learn to experience the other and the others, as the other of our self, in order to participate with one another."[14]

With such a range of statements it is difficult to see precisely what Gadamer means by solidarity. On one hand, Gadamer uses the term descriptively to indicate the inherently social character of our practical living which implies the

acknowledgment of each other. On the other hand, Gadamer suggests that solidarity has a normative force insofar as it is a task and goal that accomplishes that practical living. The normative force of solidarity becomes increasingly obvious when one looks carefully at the passages just cited. From these passages, however, one sees that the normative force of solidarity is not simply about the *demand* for a fundamental being-with (one another) in which the boundaries of individuality, of what is *simply* own's own, are broken. The normative force of solidarity also entails a non-equivalence in the relating relative to a care and regard for-the-other. When one considers in connection with this particular description of solidarity Gadamer's comment in his autobiographical reflections that the orientation of understanding in general—the issue of hermeneutics—is to "preserve the otherness of the other in understanding,"[15] and Gadamer's actual description of the event of understanding in *Truth and Method* as an experience that goes beyond the struggle for mutual recognition,[16] one can only regard this feature of solidarity, namely, participating with the other without equalizing the other in terms of one's own, as the essential one.

With respect to the issue of shared life, then, we can at least put aside certain notions that are often configured within the idea of solidarity, but would not be applicable to the Gadamerian understanding of it. For Gadamer, although solidarity involves exchange—the stranger can only be encountered ultimately when this other crosses the threshold—solidarity is not reciprocity; it is not a mutual relating as a cooperative interchanging of what is each one's own. Nor is solidarity for Gadamer simply intersubjectivity as the doubling of one's own.[17] The evidence for these claims is given directly by Gadamer in his analysis of experience in *Truth and Method*. Only the third form of hermeneutic experience accurately describes what is at stake in hermeneutic experience. This form of experience is an encounter with the other that is precisely not a form of self-relatedness. In Gadamer's words:

> Without ... openness to one another there is no genuine human bond. Belonging together always means being able to listen to one another. When two people understand each other, this does not mean that one person 'understands,' i.e., looks out over at, the other.... Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one forces me to do so.[18]

The hermeneutic encounter of being with-the-other that issues in the task of understanding is not a simple common agreement, and certainly it has little to do with arriving at consensus, but a displacing within one's relating to the other in order to hear what the other has to say.

By maintaining that the shared life of Gadamerian hermeneutics has a regard for the other in which the other is not annulled in the unifying element of being-in-common, we are in a position to develop the idea of shared life in a more thoroughgoing, critical way. For this I would like to pursue the initial indication that

Gadamerian sociality has a certain proximity to the notion of sociality in Levinas. Despite the language of unity, Gadamerian solidarity is above all a form of participation that puts my spontaneity into question, a position that is mirrored by Levinas. Levinas does not speak of community, but he does speak of fraternity, sociality, and solidarity. The distinction is, of course, crucial for Levinas. Community would be the establishing of what we have in common—a relation of reciprocity that allows for a "we"—whereas solidarity is a relation of non-reciprocity that is constituted on the basis of responsibility. The "we" can never adequately account for this responsibility,[19] which is always a responsibility for the other, a responsibility issuing from an originary communication in the face of the other, and which constitutes the first fact. Accordingly, from the imperative for responsibility there arises a sociality that is understood along the lines of an I/you relation, which Levinas radicalizes in terms of the lexicals same/other. In radicalizing the relation Levinas goes beyond all earlier formulations of the relation,[20] including Buber's, which Levinas regards as maintaining a relation of reciprocity as well as a relation of intimacy along the lines of a spiritual friendship.[21] For Levinas, the other as non-ego, as stranger, precedes any relation of the ego with itself, and in the relating with the ego is given invincible priority—a condition that Levinas calls "highness" to indicate the character of this other that is not a familiar "you" (*Du*). The ego, under this form of relating, is in a condition of being held hostage. "The unconditionality of being hostage," Levinas writes, "is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity."[22] Thus, for Levinas solidarity is constituted not simply by the relation of one to another, but by the asymmetrical relation of being for the other. The radicality of this asymmetry lies not so much in the one way direction of the relating as such, but in the fact that the relation of one to another is constituted as an unbridgeable abyss. In effect, solidarity is always a solidarity with otherness "that refuses to admit of presence and simultaneity." The character of this refusal is precisely what Levinas means by transcendence. Such transcendence is paradoxical in the sense that it does not stand outside all immanence, and yet it is transcendence: the other remains other, the other is constituted as "eternally" other, as infinite. The infinite, Levinas tells us,

> ... in its absolute difference withholds itself from presence in me; the Infinite does not come to meet me in a contemporaneousness like that in which noeisis and noema meet simultaneously together, nor in a way in which interlocutors responding to each other may meet. The Infinite is not indifferent to me. It is in calling me to other men that transcendence concerns me. In this unique intrigue of transcendence, the non-absence of the Infinite is neither presence, nor re-presentation. Instead, the idea of the Infinite is to be found in my responsibility for the other.[23]

The character of Levinasian solidarity is unmistakable. It is fundamentally a relation of responsibility such that the condition of being one's own is put into question.

Although this idea of being placed in question by the other is ultimately the essential point of contact between Gadamer and Levinas, in passages such as the one from Levinas just quoted it is difficult to see the clear proximity with Gadamer, for whom the response to the interlocutor is essential for social life. For Levinas the issue is not simply that solidarity is constituted in the relating for-the-other, but that solidarity itself is conditioned on a responsibility that is inaugurated from the other. Put differently, solidarity for Levinas is a condition arising from ethics as first philosophy, and to this one must immediately add that ethics and understanding are not on the same level.[24] In this context it is difficult to establish much of a proximity between Levinas and any philosopher. That is to say, when it is a matter of securing the priority of responsibility over response,[25] the priority of ethics over understanding, Levinas in effect "argues" for non-philosophy over philosophy, which here encompasses not just the work of Hegel and Heidegger—Levinas's main foils for an ethics of alterity—but the project of thought as a whole. "Every philosophy," Levinas tells us, "is an egology."[26] Levinas seemingly regards thinking in whatever form, including the thought of Being in the later Heidegger, as a representing, and as such a form of transcendental constitution.[27] Even if it would be possible to leave the Husserlian context of egology aside by insisting that the life of reason is not coextensive with a form of subjectivity, this would not be sufficient for Levinas. There is no philosophy that can free itself from the order of the same and the condition of being one's own because every philosophy engages in the reach of thought that in the end reaches only to return to itself. All return compromises the alterity of the other. Thus, Levinas regards the use of reason as appropriation and power. Only with Plato and Descartes—and here only regarding the aspect in which a Levinasian notion of infinity is introduced—do we find an exception to philosophy as a form of conquest.[28] From this perspective Gadamer's hermeneutics is apparently tied to the order of the same.

Yet the proximity between Gadamer and Levinas is indirectly suggested by Levinas himself at the beginning of his essay "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity." Here Levinas briefly discusses the character of truth that is not a function of autonomy as the reach of being into its own, but is implied by experience.

> [E]xperience deserves its name only if it transports us beyond what constitutes our nature.... Truth [implied by experience] would thus designate the outcome of a movement that leaves a world that is intimate and familiar, even if we have not yet explored it completely, and goes toward the stranger, toward a beyond as Plato put it.[29]

This movement is of course the encounter with infinity, which Levinas goes on to describe as

> ... experience in the sole radical sense of the term: a relationship with the exterior, with the other, without this exteriority being able to be integrated

> into the same. The thinker who has the idea of infinity is *more than himself*, and this inflating, this surplus, does not come from within, as in the celebrated *project* of modern philosophers, in which the subject surpasses himself by creating.[30]

One must assume that in any discussion of infinity Levinas still has in mind a category different from the theoretical, but what cannot be overlooked here is that he describes the structure of the *relation* between one and another in the same way that we find it in Gadamer.

For Gadamer the experience of play, which is central to the character of hermeneutic experience, is foremost an experience with a reality that surpasses the players.[31] Play is the very experience of surplus, an experience of experience, "which stands in ineluctable opposition to knowledge and the kind of instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical knowledge. The truth of experience always implies an orientation to new experience."[32] But one can only have a new experience to the extent that one is able to experience the other's claim to truth, an experience that always fails at the level of the struggle for mutual recognition where one, in effect, reflects oneself out of the very relation. The crucial passage in *Truth and Method* reads:

> By understanding the other, by claiming to know him, one robs his claims of their legitimacy. In particular, the dialectic of charitable or welfare work operates in this way, penetrating all relationships between men as a reflective form of the effort to dominate. The claim to understand the other person in advance functions to keep the other person's claim at a distance.[33]

Gadamer then turns to a consideration of the proper character of hermeneutic experience. Expanding the passage we quoted earlier, Gadamer writes:

> In human relation the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the Thou truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him really say something to us. Here is where openness belongs.... Without such openness to one another there is no genuine human bond. Belonging together always also means being able to listen to one another. When two people understand each other, this does not mean that one person 'understands,' i.e., looks out over at, the other.... Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me.[34]

From passages such as these it is difficult to ascribe to philosophical hermeneutics the egology that Levinas ascribes to philosophy generally. To the contrary, what we find in Gadamer's analysis of understanding is a structure parallel to Levinas's own insistence to think "the Other-in-the-same without thinking the

Other as an other Same." This non-assimilation happens when "the Other disturbs or awakens the Same" such that the Same is not "at rest" and the disquiet in the unrest is not regarded as an insufficiency. In an interview from 1975 Levinas tells us:

> In my essays, the dis-quieting of the Same by the Other is the Desire that shall be a searching, a questioning, an awaiting: patience and length of time, and the very mode of surplus, of superabundance. Searching, this time, not as the expression of a lack, but as a manner of carrying the 'more in the less.' These are the veritable terms toward which all my research, which on first sight might appear as purely ethical, theological, or edifying, is incessantly returned.[35]

For Gadamer as well there is a "carrying the more in the less" that occurs in the encounter with the other who is superior, with an experience of the strange that divests constituting selfhood of its power. For Gadamer, the (hermeneutically) experienced person is fundamentally open to what is alien and other, that is to say, to what refuses my framework, and in this encounter does not remain who one is. Gadamer's sociality thus stands in close proximity to the Levinasian sociality that lies beyond the egological representation of the other.

Yet for Gadamer there is the return; the communicative event is the gathering of alterity into presence. There is the exchange through a reason that is universal from the start, producing presence in understanding. In contrast to Levinas, shared life for Gadamer issues not from justice but from this communicative event, and thereby from the quality of belonging and the peculiar ownership of the *logos* (the *logos* as common to all). As a final consideration we need to attend to this feature of hermeneutics that in the end separates Gadamer from Levinas with respect to the issue of shared life. In the form of a question: How can we understand solidarity as a regard-for-the-other that at the same time stands under the *logos*? How, in other words, can such solidarity avoid the slippage that would turn the strange out of its element, domesticating the strange under the condition of living in agreement?

Within a consideration of the social as such we see that this issue has been encountered before. The issue of the relation of the foreign to one's own was a distinctive problem for Hellenism. Because of technical and other advances, the geographical distances in Hellenic Greece were lessened, and with it there occurred a greater intermixing of people. The idea that the homeland no longer establishes the borders of identity, the idea in other words of the cosmopolitan—the *polis* of the encompassing whole—emerges here for the first time. It emerges in particular with the Stoics, who envisioned the cosmopolitan as a utopian ideal of a multitude of people living together under one law.[36] For this idea the Stoics relied on a fundamental principle that distinguishes Stoicism from Epicureanism, namely, the principle "to live according to nature (*physis*)." Each particular thing, especially the human, comes to be in accordance with universal nature and its *logos*. The funda-

mental character of this *physis* was indicated by the Stoics with the term *oikeiosis*, which is derived from *oikos*, the household, and is related to the verb *oikeiōo*, to familiarize. *Oikeiosis* is a complex notion that entails not only a constant tendency to appropriate its own being, but also to feel an attachment, an endearment, for itself and things.[37] To live in conformity with nature, then, would be to enact this appropriation for one's being, to familiarize myself with myself in the sense of coming into agreement with myself. More importantly, this coming into agreement with oneself is understood expansively such that it entails a concern for others. Thus, strictly speaking *what is one's own is never coextensive with what is mine*. This impartial concern for the interests of others is the beginning of justice and communal life; we are pushed by nature to benefit as many people as we can.[38] In this original conciliation we bind ourselves to the whole of humanity such that no one can present oneself to another as someone completely alien. Thus the Stoics held to a cosmo-political ideal that went beyond "the ancient myths of blood-based nobility and superiority of race, as well as the claims of slavery" that were maintained by the city-states.[39] In the end, however, Stoicism could not maintain its best intentions and reverted to an individualism that privileged reason. But in its best intention, Stoicism would expand the Greek idea of friendship, as the condition of being related to one's own, into a cosmopolitanism in which the integration of difference introduced by the foreigner becomes surplus, not assimilation.

Returning to our question, Gadamerian solidarity appears to be a contemporary version of Stoic cosmopolitanism, a solidarity that is conditioned not by the strict demand for justice, but by friendship. In response to the tendency to isolation in modern life, Gadamer remarks that life together can be established on no other basis than binding solidarities that "always already presuppose what [Aristotle] called 'friendship with oneself.'"[40] Of course, such friendship with oneself is not to be confused with self-love and egoism; and if friendship with oneself for Aristotle prefigures the idea of self-sufficiency, Gadamer insists that Aristotle knew well "that when someone is wholly sufficient unto himself, something essential is missing from true perfection. What is lacking is precisely the increase that friendship signifies."[41] Friendship with oneself is inseparable from the with-structure—communal human life—where there is an encounter with the other that is not a demand but a fulfillment. Can we not say, under this rubric of the cosmopolitan, that friendship with oneself is the friendship with the neighbor, as the other one who lives near?

It is interesting to note that it is Levinas who speaks most about the neighbor. In an interview Levinas is asked the following question: "Cannot moral experience be translated as an experience of the other as identical to oneself? In my view, this corresponds to the imperative, which is in any case biblical: 'Love your neighbor as yourself.'"[42] In his critical response to the question, Levinas offers an interpretation of the translation of the biblical command. Instead of translating the "as yourself," which implies agreement with oneself, Levinas notes first that Buber and Rosenzweig translated it "love your neighbor, he is like you." But Levinas wants

to translate it yet otherwise to read "it is this love of the neighbor which is your-self."[43] This interpretive translation is made in order to reaffirm his position that the other always comes first, which again is precisely what he means by the asymmetry of the interpersonal relationship. He concludes his response by saying "only a vulnerable I can love his neighbor." Such vulnerability is the subject as passivity, a subject that is not for itself.

Our question ultimately comes down to this: Can we understand the Gadamerian friendship with the neighbor in this way? Certainly we have sufficient indicators to suggest that, for Gadamer, in coming to agreement the subject is not for itself. In coming to agreement in dialogue—that is to say, in a structure in which the common of speech precedes speaking and thus turns speech into a middle voice between passivity and activity—the subject is for the other. To say this in yet another way, what is in the midst of speech is not *mine*. This argument can best be made by emphasizing, as Gadamer himself does, the role of *sunesis* in practical reasoning.[44] *Sunesis* is not so much an individual's ability to be united with the other through sympathetic knowing, that is to say, *sunesis* is not an understanding *of* the situation of the other in which the subject can say in a way that mirrors the Biblical command "I can understand the other, the other is like me." *Sunesis* is rather understanding *for* the view of someone else, which is possible only if one and the other are bound together from the outset.[45]

Such solidarity, though, is ultimately not Levinasian, for the vulnerability in which one stands in relation to the neighbor is not a vulnerability of accusation; it is not a vulnerability of submission in the name of justice. In friendship I do not relate to the neighbor as accused, but, relative to the character of hermeneutic experience, as exposed. It is from this exposure to the neighbor—an exposure that engenders not the response of responsibility but the responsibility of response—that hermeneutical shared life is enacted. To the extent that hermeneutical shared life is constituted in relation to a responsibility of response, there appears to be a certain moral force at work in this shared life. This moral force, I would argue, takes the form of a promise (of response)—a promise generated from the peculiar character of the vulnerability of exposure. This is the vulnerability that is tied to our finitude and to the experience that all things escape us. Accordingly, what is recovered in communicative understanding, that is to say, in the midst of speech, is just the fleeting recovery from what escapes us, which includes what the other has to say to me. In the present context let us say that such recovery—this fleeting enacted shared life—occurs as the fulfillment of a promise (of fulfillment).

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Notes

1. This is a line from Hölderlin's *Friedensfeier* that Gadamer quotes but is actually misquoted. The line actually reads *"Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören voneinander."* Gadamer inserts *können*. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Culture and the Word," in *Praise of Theory: Speeches and Essays*, trans. Chris Dawson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 3.

2. This is not to say that Heidegger failed to see that *phronesis* is social in character. For a discussion of this point see my "Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Question of Community," in *Interrogating the Tradition: Hermeneutics and the History of Philosophy*, eds. Charles E. Scott and John Sallis (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000).

3. See Gadamer, "Text und Interpretation," in *Hermeneutic II*, Gesammelte Werke Bd. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993).

4. See Hans Herbert Kögler, *The Power of Dialogue*, trans. Paul Hendrickson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

5. Gadamer, "Replik zu 'Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik,'" in *Hermeneutic II*, 272; English translation, "Reply to My Critics," in *The Hermeneutics Tradition*, eds. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 291.

6. "Replik zu 'Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik,'" 255; "Reply to My Critics," 277.

7. Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Science," *Cultural Hermeneutics* 2 (1975), 311.

8. Gadamer, "Hermeneutik als theoretische und praktische Aufgabe," in *Hermeneutic II*, 318; English translation "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task," in *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 137.

9. Gadamer, "The Limitation of the Expert," in *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History*, eds. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), 192. This essay was written in 1967.

10. "The Future of the European Humanities," in *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History*, 207.

11. "Citizen of Two Worlds," in *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History*, 217.

12. *Ibid.*, 219.

13. "The Diversity of Europe," in *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History*, 234.

14. *Ibid.*, 235–6.

15. Gadamer, "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey," in *The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, The Library of Living Philosophers, ed Lewis Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 41.

16. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Donald Marshall and Joel Weinsheimer (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1989), 358–62.

17. In an interview Gadamer is asked to comment on an interpretation of conversation as the capacity for rational intersubjectivity. Gadamer replies: "Wenn Sie mir den ganz irreleitenden Begriff der Intersubjectivität, einen verdoppelten Subjectivismus ersparen würden!—Ich mache da gar keine kühnen Konstruktionen." *Hans-Georg Gadamer im Gespräch*, ed. Carsten Dutt (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1993), 41.

18. *Truth and Method*, 361.

19. Levinas does acknowledge the "we" in relation to the formation of a society of freedom and respect. Such a "we," however, is not the plural of I. See Emmanuel Levinas, "The Ego and the Totality," in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 43.

20. The idea of the I/you relation owes its origin to Herman Cohen, not Martin Buber. For a discussion of the formation of this idea as it relates to Levinas, see Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Chapter 8.

21. See Levinas, *Proper Names*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 33. For a discussion of this relation between Buber and Levinas, see Robert Bernasconi, "Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue Between Buber and Levinas," in *The Provocation of Levinas*, eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988).

22. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 117.

23. Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality," in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 113.

24. "Ethics and comprehension are not on the same level. I substitute for comprehension not other relations, which would be *incomprehensions*, but rather that by which the comprehension of another alone begins to count for an I: it is not the knowledge of his character or his social position or his needs, but his nudity as the needy one; the destitution inscribed upon his face; it is his face as destitution, which assigns me as responsible and by which his needs can only count for me. I have told you that this counting-for-me is not a *vocative* that is a *reciprocal hello* and maintains me in my 'for itself'. The vocative is not enough! Ethics is when I not only do not thematise another; it is when another obsesses me or puts me into question. This putting in question does not expect that I respond; it is not a question of giving a response, but of finding oneself responsible." Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 99.

25. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Levinas describes the responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment as "being called into question by no prior questioning, responsibility over and beyond the logos of response." *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, 102.

26. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 50.

27. See Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 38.

28. See "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity."

29. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," 47.

30. *Ibid.*, 54.

31. See *Truth and Method*, 109.

32. *Ibid.*, 354.

33. *Ibid.*, 360.

34. *Ibid.*, 361.

35. *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, 81.

36. See Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 57.

37. See S. G. Pembroke, "Oikeiōsis," in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long (London: Athlone Press, 1971).

38. See Cicero, *De finibus* 3.19.62ff.

39. Giovanni Reale, *The Systems of the Hellenistic Age*, ed. and trans. John R. Catan (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 283.

40. *Praise of Theory*, 111.

41. Gadamer, "Friendship and Self-Knowledge," in *Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 136.

42. *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, 90.

43. *Ibid.*

44. See *Truth and Method*, 323–34.

45. See P. Christopher Smith, *Hermeneutics and Human Finitude* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 86.