Habermas and the Specificity of the Aesthetic

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Although not its focal concern, it is noteworthy that the specificity of the aesthetic is a recurring theme in Habermas' work. While the question of the possibility, or even the necessity, of a communicative theory of aesthetic experience is left unanswered both by the "transformation of philosophy" (Apel) and by critical theory's linguistic turn, Habermas describes the specificity of the aesthetic and of artistic phenomena in terms of two closely related dimensions: the historical-sociological and the philosophical. The former concerns the relations between art, culture, and society as analyzed in the context of late capitalism and the project of modernity while the latter treats the specificity of the aesthetic by means of the pragmatics of language. Both dimensions converge in the systematic horizon of The Theory of Communicative Action, yet are already touched upon in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere as well as in essays on Bloch, Adorno, and historical materialism, all dating from the 1960s. These approaches, however, are fully incorporated in Habermas' thought only in his Legitimation Crisis as well as in an essay on Benjamin published shortly prior. The unitary way of addressing the problem of the specificity of the aesthetic and of artistic phenomena in general is apparent in these writings, in discussions between Habermas and Marcuse, and in two essays in Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism. In each case the relevance of aesthetic experience for discursive will formation is especially emphasized. In a text published a few years later, "Modernity: An Unfinished Project," Habermas sketches the first time the bases of the systematic integration of the historical-sociological and philosophical approaches to the specificity of the aesthetic. Given the importance the aesthetic dimension assumes in this text, particularly in its attempt to rehabilitate the enlightening power of works of art within ordinary life, it might have been expected that Habermas would then pay more attention to the domain of art and perhaps advance a philosophical position regarding the foundations of aesthetics.

This was, for instance, the response of Gérard Raulet. He very properly observes that Habermas develops a central motif of Adorno's reflections on aesthetic modernity—the autophagic dynamics of its development as a myth turned against itself—while at the same time rejecting another of Adorno's (as well as the later Marcuse's) central motifs: the somewhat one-sided emphasis on the esoteric work of art, against which Habermas recovers Benjamin's hope in a "profane enlightenment":

In approximating the failure of modernity and the rehabilitation of conservatism, he seeks a connection between these two phenomena which correspond with the disqualification of the project of the Enlightenment. On the one hand, Habermas sketches an aesthetics which up to now was missing in his work; on the other hand, this aesthetics directly intervenes on the "political and intellectual debate," that is, on the sociological analysis and in the political project.
If an aesthetics is indeed sketched out in this text, its first traces are found in a work that Habermas published in the following year: The Theory of Communicative Action (hereafter TCA).

I begin by discussing the place of aesthetics within TCA, and proceed to examine Habermas’s reply to a criticism by Albrecht Wellmer regarding the former’s attempt to determine the specificity of the aesthetic. This examination will highlight what I see as Habermas’ (and Wellmer’s) principal contribution to a communicative theory of aesthetic experience. Finally, I shall indicate some of that theory’s more important tasks.

TCA offers a normative foundation for the critical theory of society. In its last chapter, Habermas addresses the philosophical tasks of a theory of modernity. Unlike Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, whose critique of ideology seeks to comprehend the “normative content of bourgeois culture, of art, and philosophical thought,” and to lay the foundations of a critical theory of society founded on an emphatic conception of reason, Habermas reformulates the program of a critical theory of society and the normative bases of communicative reason. This new normative foundation not only still demands a philosophy, but also places before it “systematic tasks”: “The social sciences can enter into a cooperative relation with a philosophy that has taken up the task of working on a theory of rationality” (TCA 2, 397).

The theory of rationality does not offer a philosophical foundation to cultural modernity in axiological spheres and autonomous complexes of knowledge and practices.

These magnificent ‘one-sidednesses,’ which are the signature of modernity, need no foundation and no justification in the sense of a transcendental grounding, but they do call for a self-understanding regarding the character of this knowledge. Two questions must be answered: (i) whether reason that has objectively split up into its moments can still preserve its unity, and (ii) how expert cultures can be mediated with everyday practice (TCA 2, 397–8).

Habermas is reminded that the first chapter of TCA 1, on the “problem of rationality,” as well as its first “intermediate reflection,” represent a provisional attempt to address these questions. This attempt puts in question the philosophical basis of a critical theory of society founded on communicative reason.

With that as a basis, the theory of science, the theory of law and morality, and aesthetics, in cooperation with the corresponding historical disciplines, can then reconstruct both the emergence and the internal history of those modern complexes of knowledge that have been differentiated out, each under a different single aspect of validity—truth, normative rightness, or authenticity. The mediation of the moments of reason is no less a problem than the separation of the aspects of rationality under which questions of truth, justice, and taste were differentiated from one another. The only protection against an empiricist abridgement of the rationality problematic is a steadfast pursuit of the tortuous

routes along which science, morality, and art communicate with one another (TCA 2, 398).

It is here that the problem of the specificity of the aesthetic reappears, now projected against the theoretical background to which the systematic position of aesthetics in the architectonics of communicative reason pays special attention. All thinking around the specificity of the aesthetic now occurs within the context of a philosophy that is no longer metaphysical, as indicated at the outset of TCA 1:

In contemporary philosophy, wherever coherent argumentation has developed around constant thematic cores—in logic and the theory of science, in the theory of language and meaning, in ethics and action theory, even in aesthetics—interest is directed to the formal conditions of rationality in knowing, in reaching understanding through language, and in acting, both in everyday contexts and at the level of methodically organized experience or systematically organized discourse. The theory of argumentation thereby takes on a special significance; to it falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicitly rational behavior (TCA 1, 2).

The role played by the theory of argumentation corresponds to modernity’s internal differentiation of the concept of reason. Replacing a metaphysical conception of reason is a formal conception whose unity is expressed in processes by which claims to validity are justified for theoretical, moral, and aesthetic judgments. The philosophical disciplines are therefore oriented toward a reconstructive work, applying themselves to

formal pragmatic analysis, which focuses on the general and necessary conditions for the validity of symbolic expressions and achievements. I am referring to rational reconstructions of the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and action, who are credited with the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing, at least intuitively, between valid and invalid expressions. This is the domain of disciplines like logic and metamathematics, epistemology and the philosophy of science, linguistics and the philosophy of language, ethics and action theory, aesthetics, argumentation theory, and so on. Common to all these disciplines is the goal of providing an account of the pretheoretical knowledge and the intuitive command of rule systems that underlie the production and evaluation of such symbolic expressions and achievements...

Rational reconstructions have a critical function and a constructive role, laying at the same time the grounds for a theoretical knowledge by means of weak transcendental arguments.

Insofar as rational reconstructions explicate the conditions for the validity of utterances, they also explain deviant cases, and through this indirect
Habermas assimilates Wellmer’s criticism as follows:

These arguments were first developed in the context of an attempt to establish a thoroughly accepts Wellmer’s criticism, and makes use of it in his response to a work that was the first dedicated to a broad exposition and commentary on his aesthetic not conform to any of the three classes of illocutionary acts, just as works of art cannot be understood by analogy to any kind of speech act with its respective validity claim. At this level, weak transcendental arguments make their appearance, arguments aimed at demonstrating that the presuppositions of relevant practices are inescapable, that is, that they cannot be cast aside. 7

Habermas’s effort to determine the specificity of the aesthetic by means of the pragmatics of language is criticized by Wellmer, for whom aesthetic judgments do not conform to any of the three classes of illocutionary acts, just as works of art cannot be understood by analogy to any kind of speech act with its respective validity claim. These arguments were first developed in the context of an attempt to establish a pragmatic-linguistic reformulation of the concept of “artistic truth” in Adorno. Habermas thoroughly accepts Wellmer’s criticism, and makes use of it in his response to a work that was the first dedicated to a broad exposition and commentary on his aesthetic ideas: Martin Jay’s “Habermas and Modernism.” 8 Habermas identifies what allows us to refer to an aesthetic-practical rationality:

There is an unmistakable indicator for the fact that a certain type of ‘knowing’ is objectified in art works, albeit in a different way than in theoretical discourse or in legal or moral representations: these objectifications of mind are also fallible and hence criticizable. Art criticism arose at the same time as the autonomous work of art; and since then the insight has established itself that the work of art calls for interpretation, evaluation and even “linguistification” (Versprachlichung) of its semantic content. Art criticism has developed forms of argumentation that specifically differentiate it from the forms of theoretical and moral-practical discourse. As distinct from merely subjective preference, the fact that we link judgments of taste to a criticizable claim presupposes non-arbitrary standards for the judgment of art. 9

Habermas assimilates Wellmer’s criticism as follows:

As the philosophical discussion of ‘artistic truth’ reveals, works of art raise claims with regard to their unity (harmony: Stimmigkeit), their authenticity, and the success of their expressions by which they can be measured and in terms of which they may fail. For that reason I believe that a pragmatic logic of argumentation is the most appropriate guiding thread through which the ‘aesthetic-practical’ type of rationality can be differentiated over and against others types of rationality (QC, 200).

Habermas remarks that Wellmer formulates this argument “in such an ingenious way” that it suffices “to refer to his treatment” (QC, 203). Accepting Wellmer’s objection, Habermas alters his notion of “aesthetic criticism” toward one that allows the recognition of works of art as bearers of a specific validity claim, which could admit the legitimacy of the term (aesthetic) discourse, til then restricted to the theoretical and practical spheres.

The fact that we can dispute the reasons for evaluating a work of art in aesthetic discourse is, as we said, an unmistakable indication for a validity claim inherent in works of art. The aesthetic ‘validity’ or ‘unity’ that we attribute to a work refers to its singularly illuminating power to open our eyes to what is seemingly familiar, to disclose anew an apparently familiar reality. This validity claim admittedly stands for a potential for ‘truth’ that can be released only in the whole complexity of life-experience; therefore this ‘truth potential’ may not be connected to (or even indentified with) just one of the three validity claims constitutive for communicative action, as I have been previously inclined to maintain. The ono-to-one relationship which exists between the prescriptive validity of a norm and the normative validity claims raised in regulative speech acts is not a proper model for the relation between the potential for truth of works of art, and the transformed relations between self and world stimulated by aesthetic experience (QC, 203).

Similarly, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (hereafter PDM), Habermas points out that “communicative action finds its criteria in the argumentative procedures for directly or indirectly redeeming claims to propositional truth, normative rightness, subjective truthfulness, and aesthetic harmony” (PDM, 314), and adds in a note: “Albrecht Wellner has shown that the harmony of a work of art—aesthetic truth, as it is called—can by no means be reduced, without further ado, to authenticity or sincerity” (PDM, 416 n. 18). Habermas reiterates how Wellner’s and Seel’s arguments led him to “correct” the “reductions of an expressivist aesthetic at least suggested by the Theory of Communicative Action.”

Such statements reveal the ambiguities and difficulties of Habermas’s attempts to determine the specificity of the aesthetic in both its normative and expressive dimensions. Habermas suggests an “expressivist aesthetic” in TCA while tending to understand the validity both of aesthetic judgements and of the play between authenticity of expression and normative adequation:

Questions of taste introduce new complications having to do with the relation of evaluations to normative sentences on the one side, and to expressive sentences, on the other. The adequacy of standards of value has something in common with the rightness of norms of action; on the other hand, the authenticity of works of art, in connection with which standards of value are formed and authenticated, has more in common with the sincerity of expressions.
If TCA suggests an aesthetics it is a “normative-expressivist” aesthetics insofar as the aesthetic sphere is described as a field of experience in which normative and expressive elements intertwine. In a way, Wellmer simplifies Habermas’s arguments. That Habermas came to modify his arguments as set forth in TCA can be seen from some passages in PDM. This reformulation is subtly connected to what Habermas describes as the “specific contribution” of exemplary works of art, since the possibility of freeing the semantic potential so as to make this intersubjectively available depends on the capacity of language to open the world for us.

Habermas’s contributions to aesthetics are both historical and methodological. In the preface to PDM, Habermas observes that modernity’s elevation to the status of a philosophiical category dates from the late eighteenth century, and that the philosophical and aesthetic discourses of modernity frequently coincide. He remarks, however, that it was necessary to limit the scope of his investigation to exclude the problematic. The need to compare and relate different standards of rationality calls philosophical and aesthetic discourses of modernity frequently coincide. He remarks, but of its remaining a persisting question still to be dealt with. While some passages in the aesthetic sphere is described as a field of experience in which nonnative and expressive elements intertwine. In a way, Wellmer simplifies Habermas’s arguments. That Habermas thus limits his work to the question of the specificity of the aesthetic ought not to be dismissed, being found instead at a different level: that of the history of the aesthetic critique of modernity which develops from Schiller to Marcuse, and that includes the young Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin, Schlegel and the first Romanticism, Nietzsche and Adorno, to mention some of the main authors to whom Habermas refers.

Habermas’s main methodological contribution to the foundations of aesthetics consists in the introduction of the pragmatic logic of argumentation as the most appropriate guiding thread through which the aesthetic-practical type of rationality can be differentiated over and against others types of rationality. On this question, Wellmer and Seel have offered a more rigorous formulation, arguing against Habermas that the specificity of discourses is not determined by a specific type of validity claim. Theoretical, practical, and aesthetic discourses can so permeate each other that distinguishing among different validity claims and their validation modes can be highly problematic. The need to compare and relate different standards of rationality calls for communicative reason to act as a “faculty of inter-rational judgment,” or the capacity to carry out the necessary mediations and transitions among the different dimensions of rationality in the search for adequate solutions to theoretical, practical, and aesthetic problems. Aesthetic discourse, says Wellmer, “is concerned neither with the validity of statements nor with the correctness of actions, but with the meaning of aesthetic objects and whether they are successful or not, i.e. with the aesthetic validity-claims” of these objects. This is the central point in Wellmer’s critique of what he takes to be the one-sided, subjective-expressivist nature of Habermas’s concept of aesthetic validity. Wellmer breaks with this subjective-expressivist impulse insofar as he disengages the concept of “validity claim” from its original scope (the analysis of speech acts), and takes aesthetic objects themselves as bearers of specific validity claims:

I shall not address the problem of the specificity of aesthetic discourse as it relates to art works’s specific validity claims, which would more fittingly be treated in connection with Seel’s arguments against Habermas, and instead focus on Wellmer’s conclusion regarding the multiple possible constellations formed by discourses, for it is on these grounds that he rejects Habermas’s model of universal pragmatics as one-sided and schematic.

Theoretical, practical, and aesthetic discourse are interrelated in many ways, but each is concerned with something different. Theoretical discourse aims at valid statements, explanations and interpretations; practical discourse at correct actions, attitudes and decisions; aesthetic discourse at appropriate ways of perceiving aesthetic objects. But within each of these forms of discourse too, the various forms of argument are always—potentially at least—interlinked in many ways, because the sense of particular arguments is derived from the presence of perspectives and premises which can make it necessary in a case of doubt for the discussion to move to a different form of argument. But precisely these internal links between different forms of argument are not capable of explanation by means of a typology of validity-claims (propositional truth, moral correctness, truthfulness) grounded in universal pragmatics. To put it another way, distinctions based on speech-act theory are not in themselves sufficient to render understandable either the difference between ‘spheres of validity’ or the internal connection between them.

Wellmer’s conclusion seems too influenced by Seel’s criticism of Habermas. Elsewhere, Wellmer proceeds more moderately when analyzing concrete problems and takes up an intermediary position between Seel and Habermas. Wellmer’s interesting conclusion regarding the play of discourses pertains more to the dynamics of a somewhat schematic typology of speech acts than to a straightforward abandonment of the basic intuitions of universal pragmatics, of which Seel is more skeptical. Wellmer’s criticism of discourse ethics and the theory of truth (and of validity in general) as consensus as well as his attempt to reformulate in pragmatic-linguistic terms the concept of “artistic truth” in Adorno are examples of such moderation.

In reply to a work by Rainer Rochlitz, Habermas justifies his parsimony when addressing the problems of the arts and aesthetic theory: “my late fragmentary address to aesthetic questions,” he writes, was due to “the feeling that I have not yet awoken to the complexity of such questions.” Despite having written on some of the most important aesthetic questions in the works of Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin, about the critique of art as one of the “institutions of the public sphere,” and about the meaning...
of modern art as pertaining to late capitalism's "motivational crises," despite his positions on the modern and postmodern architecture debate, his analysis of the neoconservative critique of culture and art in the United States and Germany, or the problem of distinguishing philosophical and literary genres, Habermas does not formulate an aesthetic program, nor are his contributions to aesthetics comparable to those he offers to the philosophy of science and to ethics, despite what lengthy passages on the specificity of the aesthetic in TCA and PDM may suggest. It is possible, however, to indicate at the very least some of the central tasks of the theory of aesthetics.

These include, first, a reconstruction of the genesis and internal history of the aesthetic sphere as an axiological sphere and a complex of knowledge in the larger context of the dissolution of traditional worldviews and the specification of science, morality, and art. Habermas's point is that such autonomous developments, characteristic of cultural modernity, are not linear developments but learning processes inherent to the internal history of science, morality, and art. They also include a reconstruction of the formal conditions of aesthetic rationality and the mode of argumentation appropriate to it. Aesthetic theory must give an account of its relations with specialized aesthetic criticism and with the reception of particular art works. In both cases the problem of the double necessity of mediation between cultural spheres made autonomous and between the set of these spheres and everyday communicative practice reappears under the demand of a reflection about the nature of the contribution of an aesthetic theory to the project of modernity. The nature of this contribution could be elucidated through the analysis of the potential of the moral, ethical, and existential dimensions of aesthetic experience. These dimensions constitute what Jauß has called "catharsis"—the communicative function of aesthetic experience understood as its founding potential and in its role of granting legitimacy to action norms. What is at stake here is the nexus between aesthetics and the entire spectrum of practical reason.

In his discussion of aesthetic experience, Jauß establishes this nexus by way of Kant and against Adorno and Habermas, with whom, however, he shares the same support of the Aufklärung.19 I believe, however, that Jauß's argument can be formulated only in shifting to a communicative theory of aesthetic experience. One final task of aesthetic theory is the reconstruction of the ontogenesis and the development of aesthetic competence as the faculty of judgment analogous to theoretical and moral competence. These three tasks converge on the problem of the unity of reason as well as on the status of aesthetics as a reconstructive theory. While I shall not resolve these problems here, I would like to conclude by examining a possible objection against the first and last identified tasks.

Habermas admits Wellmer's and Seel's criticism to have led him to the "correction" of the "reductions of an expressivist aesthetic," as suggested in TCA. Yet, as is stated in PDM, it is in opposing Derrida's thesis of philosophy as literature that Habermas considers the problem of the specificity of the aesthetic under the aspect of the linguistic-poetic function of world-disclosure. However, this text appears to contain a contradiction. Its first paragraph sees Habermas referring to the autonomy of art as a learning process, consistently with what he had stated about the project of modernity in TCA and in answer to Martin Jay's and Thomas McCarthy's objections. After discussing Max Weber's point about the specificity of western rationalism and highlighting the nexus between the deconstruction of religious worldviews and the establishment of a profane culture, Habermas writes: "With the modern empirical sciences, autonomous arts, and theories of morality and law grounded on principles, cultural spheres of value took shape which made possible learning processes in accord with the respective inner logic of theoretical, aesthetic, and moral-practical problems" (PDM, 1). This argument is later restated, but in altered form. Habermas no longer refers to learning processes at the level of art made autonomous, nor to aesthetic problems. He relies no longer on Piaget's view, but on Austin's and Searle's arguments about the differences between the normal and derivative uses of language. Based on these arguments, and on Jakobson's linguistics, Habermas states that the literary use of language is that in which the poetic function predominates over language's other functions. The latter—the constative, regulative, and expressive functions—are analyzed within a pragmatic-linguistic reformulation of Bühler's semiotic model. According to this perspective, Habermas asserts that the specific function performed by art, now an autonomous sphere, is that of world-disclosure:

In communicative action the creative moment of the linguistic constitution of the world forms one syndrome with the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and expressive moments of the intramundane linguistic functions of representation, interpersonal relation, and subjective expression. In the modern world, 'value spheres' have been differentiated out from each of these moments—namely, on the one hand, art, literature, and a criticism specialized in questions of taste, around the axis of world-disclosure; and, on the other hand, problem-solving discourses specialized in questions of truth and justice, around the axis of intramundane learning processes. These knowledge systems of art and criticism, science and philosophy, law and morality, have become the more split off from ordinary communication the more strictly and onesidedly they each have to do with one linguistic function and one aspect of validity.... From the viewpoint of individual cultural spheres of value, the syndrome of the everyday world appears as 'life' or as 'practice' or as 'ethos,' over against which stands 'art' or 'theory' or 'morality' (PDM, 339-40).

This characterization of cultural modernity is not only an expression of the skepticism that, in his answer to Jay and McCarthy, Habermas voiced regarding Piaget's genetic psychology in the analysis of what he even then understood to be a process of artistic learning, and the level of learning achieved by aesthetic modernity. Although Habermas does not clearly state why he no longer treats artistic development as a learning process, his tendency to see this development as belonging to the linguistic function of world-disclosure appears to be an answer to that skepticism. With McCarthy, Habermas speaks of aesthetic learning as "the progressive constitution of a particular domain of autonomous art and aesthetic experience purified of cognitive and moral admixtures," and the "expanding explorations that illuminate more and more of this realm of experience" (QC, 207). Further:
Art becomes a laboratory, the critic an expert, the development of art the medium of a learning process—here, naturally, not in the sense of an accumulation of epistemic contents, of an aesthetic ‘progress’—which is possible only in individual dimensions—but nonetheless in the sense of a concentrically expanding, advancing exploration of a realm of possibilities structurally opened up with the autonomization of art (QC, 207).

While skeptical of using genetic psychology to characterize such learning, a process of aesthetic learning remains and does not contradict the newer analysis of autonomous artistic development. The realm of possibilities opened up by the elevation of art to a position of autonomy, a realm where subjectivity is made sovereign once freed from theoretical and moral constraints, is the domain in which the linguistic function of world-disclosure reigns, predominating over other functions and exerting its structuring power.

Habermas’s arguments, then, do not invalidate what I indicated to be the fundamental tasks of a communicative theory of aesthetic experience. His skepticism, however, must be re-thought in light of an interesting suggestion by Wellmer. At the conclusion to his essay, “Adorno, Advocate of the Non-Identical,” Wellmer refers to the “post-conventional” character of modern art.” This characterization accords with what Adorno called the “nominalism,” the “constructive principle,” or the “opened form” of modern art. Its post-conventional character would thus be in its “emancipation from tradition’s signification, stylistic and formal schemes” (DMP, 162), or, in Adorno’s words, in its “struggle for majority (Mündigkeit).” The “opened forms” of modern art project a new image of the subject, insofar as they break with the “harmonic unity of the bourgeois art work and the repressive unit of the bourgeois subject.... The opened forms of modern art are, according to Adorno, an answer to the aesthetic conscience emancipated from the apparent and violent character of such traditional totalities of meaning” (DMP, 163). To this “emancipated aesthetic consciousness,” to this “autonomous aesthetic subjectivity that struggles to organise the work of art in freedom and from out itself” (Adorno), corresponds the image of a subject emancipated from the conditions of bourgeois subjectivity—a subject whose individuality and identity have become fluid (DMP, 163). I believe this emancipation of aesthetic consciousness by modern art, this aesthetic Aufklärung, can be analyzed as a learning process, not unlike the developmental stages of moral consciousness and aesthetic competence. Wellmer refers to the post-conventional character of modern art, suggesting an evolutionary line in which bourgeois art figures as a dominantly conventional (traditional) art. A reconstruction of the genesis and internal history of the aesthetic sphere as an autonomous value sphere and complex of knowledge, undertaken in the scope of the evolution of worldviews, must not exclude this hypothesis.

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Notes

2. Habermas, “Bebubtmachendre oder rettende Kritik” in Philosophical-Political Profile.


7. Ibid., 31–2.


16. Ibid., 229.

17. Ibid., 229–30.


Translated by Pedro Rocha de Oliveira