Recent Papers and Reviews

 

Here are some papers and reviews written or published in the past 7-8 years.  In some cases the published version differs from that posted below, so you should check the published versions where it might matter (e.g., when quoting). Most of these can also be found, often in final, published version, at philpapers.org searching for me by name, Robert A. Wilson, along with most of my publications; see also my CV on my webpage.

 

in press, Primary and Secondary Qualities, in Matthew Stuart (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Locke.  Completed in 2008.  General article on primary and secondary qualities in Locke, and discussions thereof.

2015, Extended Mind and Identity (with Bart Lenart), for Handbook of Neuroethics, Jens Clausen and Neil Levy (eds.), Springer.  General overview article at the intersection of work on personal identity and the extended mind thesis for a neuroethics audience.

2015, The Role of Oral History in Surviving a Eugenic Past, in Steven High (ed.), Beyond Testimony and Trauma: Oral History in the Aftermath of Mass Violence.  Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.  Thoughts about the roles that survivor oral history plays in our understanding of the history of Canadian eugenics, especially in Alberta.  

2014, Ten Questions Concerning Extended Cognition, special issue of Philosophical Psychology edited by Thomas Sturm and Anna Estany.  Poses and responds to ten questions about extended cognition and the extended mind thesis that have arisen in discussions over the past five years or so.   

2013, Group Mind (with Georg Theiner), Byron Kaldis (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.  Short general encyclopedia article on group minds.  

2013, Embodied Cognition (with Lucia Foglia), WIRES Cognitive Science.  Concise overview of embodied cognition for an interdisciplinary cognitive science audience.   

2012, Biological Notion of the Individual (with Matt Barker) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Substantial revision of original 2007 article for SEP that discusses organisms, groups, and other things that might be considered biological individuals.

2012, Review of John Dupre, Processes of Life:  Essays in the Philosophy of Biology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 350 pp, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2011, Embodied Cognition (with Lucia Foglia), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Extensive overview of embodied cognition for a philosophy of mind / cognitive science audience.  

2010, Extended Vision, in N. Gangopadhyay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action and Consciousness.  New York: Oxford University Press, pp.277-290.  Argues that some visual processing is extended (sensu "extended mind thesis").

2010, Cohesion, Gene Flow, and the Nature of Species (with Matt Barker) Journal of Philosophy, CVII (2), pp.59-77.  Examines the often-employed notion of cohesion in the context of discussions of species and identifies some confusions in the literature.

2010, Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist in Richard Menary (editor), The Extended Mind.  MIT Press, 2010, pp.167-188.  Rearticulates the classic problem of intentionality, given the assumption that the mind is extended, and introduces the argument from meaning making.

2010, Review of Robert Rupert, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind.  New York: Oxford University Press.  Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

2010, The Primal Path to Kinship: A Critical Review of Bernard Chapais, Primeval Kinship (Harvard University Press, 2008), Biology and Philosophy 25 (1), pp.111-123.  

2009, How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take its Course (with Andy Clark) for Murat Aydede and Philip Robbins (editors), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated CognitionArticulates and defends a conception of situated cognition as cognitive extension, using the extended mind thesis to make sense of situated cognition and respond to several recent attacks on that view. 

2009, The Transitivity of Material Constitution  Nous.  Examines the assumption that material constitution is transitive and the work that it does in simple arguments about what constitutes what. Draws some parallels with the concept of realization in challenging the assumption.

2008, A Puzzle About Material Constitution and How to Solve It: Enriching Constitution Views in Metaphysics, Philosophers' Imprint Vol. 7, No. 5 (July 2007), pp.1-20. Argues that there are two concepts of material constitution, the recognition of which not only solves an intuitive puzzle about constitution but enriches the space of possibilities for constitution views in metaphysics.

2008, The Drink You Have When You’re Not Having a Drink, Mind and Language 23 (3), June 2008, pp.273-283.  Critical discussion of Peter Carruthers' book The Architecture of the Mind (Oxford University Press, 2006).  

2008, A Conceptual and Empirical Framework for the Social Distribution of Cognition: The Case of Memory, Cognitive Systems Research, 9 (1-2) March 2008, pp.33-51.  Co-authors: Amanda Barnier, John Sutton, and Celia Harris, Macquarie University.  An empirical investigation of shared remembering using the framework sketched in chapters 11 and 12 of Boundaries of the Mind.

2007, When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds (with Matt Barker and Ingo Brigandt), Philosophical Topics 35 (1 and 2): 189-215. A defence of the homeostatic property cluster view as a general view of biological natural kinds.

2007, Constitution and the Many-Many Problem, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Argues that a range of approaches to material constitution, including that of Lynne Baker, face what I call the many-many problem, and that one prima facie plausible way to address it doesn't work.

2007, Social Reality and Institutional Fact: Sociality Within and Without Intentionality in Savas L. Tsohatzidis (editor), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology (Dordrecht: Springer). Critically explores Searle's views of sociality and its relationship to institutional facts. The last five pages are here