In most countries which have recently converted to democracy or, more precisely, where western democratic methods have been imported without proper preparation within the country, there we find a pseudo-democracy, or a corrupted democracy, because there is no real creative tension between the social power and the political power, only the manipulation of pseudo-democratic institutions by the holders of social power. In such a case, there is no possibility for the representatives of new social classes to come to power. At which point, there is revolution.
[Raymond Aron, Introduction à la philosophie politique, Paris: Fallois, 1997, p. 108.]
When it comes to Bosnia’s complex and often contradictory post-war history, those who claim to “know” what’s good for the much maligned country, are— more often than not—quite simply wrong.
The brief episode in February 2014, euphemistically termed “Bosnian spring”, was not followed by a democratic summer. There was, to be sure, no visible impact on the results of the October elections. On the contrary, these have brought more of the same. The old political guard was mostly re-elected, albeit at smaller margins.
The deep socio-economic crisis, that has been eating away the very soul of the country for over a decade, knows no seasons. The violent social upheavals in Tuzla, Sarajevo and other Bosnian towns, spontaneously organized by a new generation of disillusioned and desperate youth have—for a brief moment— generated world-wide attention. The Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia has put an end to the post-Cold War era. The ripple effects can be noticed in Bosnia and Herzegovina whose Serb entity—the Republika Srpska—is firmly in Putin’s camp.
Gladni smo na tri jezika
By a quirk of fate, the return of the Yugoslav self-management, embraced by the protesters, appeared to out-perform both the nationalist parties and the many western-sponsored “civil society” programs. The chronic state crisis has given rise to an NGO culture at times more self-referential than interested in the common public good. In spite of a shock wave, that temporarily paralyzed the political class, a truly citizen-centered policy alternative, real concern for bread-and-butter issues as expressed in the brilliant slogan “gladni smo na tri jezika”, has not materialized.
We would better understand what is now being heralded as a new social movement by some, if we were to look back at the April 1992 pacifist movement or to the war-time Citizens’ Forum in Tuzla which united some ten thousand citizens in proactive solidarity for peace. This same forum was to serve as the kingpin of the Citizen Alternative Parliament (GAP) of Bosnia, founded in August 1996, which went on to form the umbrella for more than thirty different citizen initiatives across the country. Hot on its heels, the Sarajevo Law Center initiated a critical appraisal of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which at that time everyone expected would within a three-year period be amended, updated, or even alltogether abolished. Today, on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of Dayton, we know better. While in the immediate post-war years round after election round ethno-nationalist parties were swept to victory, the state-centered democratic opposition forces, supported by the international community, made only small inroad.
It took them until the elections of 2000 that they succeeded in cobbling together a nine-party coalition of mostly multi-ethnic, social-liberal forces. Alas, due to the Dayton-decreed two-year intervals between general elections this unwieldy coalition proved too fragile to succeed in 2002. Ever since nationalist parties are back in power and thus responsible for the imminent Bosnia disaster.
Here we shall close our list of democratic initiatives that have been tried out over the past two decades; virtually without success.
There is another truism: This civic expertise and engagement on the part of local players was never of sufficient scale to compete with the economically entrenched local political nomenklatura; a closed political class to this day – more corrupt than nationalist – knew all along better how to use and abuse the presence of an “international community” that was at times as naïve as it was obliging.
Today, it is all too obvious that the political antics have run out of steam, hence the harsh criticism being levelled at the corruption of the political class as a whole, regardless of regional origin and allegiance. Even so, at a more fundamental level, it is the country’s political architecture, negotiated in Dayton that now finds itself in a state of collapse.
The “international community” bears as much responsibility for this lamentable situation as does local politics. Not only has the externally devised transition to democracy been undermined. Too many initiatives have failed (the latest – the “Butmir package” – in 2010). Washington and Brussels have contributed to the country’s Kafkaesque state. Bosnia’s long stalled EU integration has exposed the sad reality of a total lack of political creativity and will on the part of Europe.
Will the new EU leadership do a better job? To recall Machiavelli’s adage: “It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” (Machiavelli, The Prince, VI).
To those who are still pleading that change must come from outside the country, that reform must be imposed, need to understand that democracy cannot be imposed. A more viable alternative is possible: one that resolutely empowers local stakeholders. It so happens that Bosnia has experience in such exercises, limited though they are. In the wake of the creation of the Partnership Forum and the Civic Forum in July 2001, by the then High Representative, these two new set-ups were able to kick-start the process of constitutional reform in the two entities. The wide-ranging reform—the only such successful exercise—was concluded on 27 March 2002 with the Sarajevo-Mrakovica Agreement. In these negotiations, which in its carefully devised preparatory phase included civic stakeholders, local political actors of all parties led the process, assisted by international experts, primarily from the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Further substantive agreements have been reached in the years up to 2007, notably on military reform and the status of Brcko district.
Admittedly, what is at stake now is of considerably larger scale. Should the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina survive, a complete overhaul of its Dayton system is unavoidable. Lets be realistic and ask for the impossible.
It has become all too obvious by now, that a home-grown and EU/US supported replacement of the overly complex constitution must be found. Its aim is to put in place a functional institutional architecture that will both strengthen the core capacities of the state and introduce a smart de-centralisation process at the level of organic regions. This in turn presupposes an end to the two-entity division of the country and the abolition of the Cantonal system in a Federation that has been bankrupt since 2003.
Whilst the evidence of Bosnia’s dysfunctionality is overwhelming, Bosnian experts have already formulated such political alternatives as far back as 1996. The “international community” has thus far refused to open what they call the “Pandora’s box” thus displaying both historical misjudgement and scorn with respect to local politics. To the detriment of the affected citizens, Western policy makers seemed to have given up the most ambitious post conflict state building project long ago.
Let’s be more specific. Already back in 2007 when the current disaster of the Dayton-implementation was looming on the horizon, Milan Kucan, the former President of Slovenia and one of the proponents of Yugoslvia’s break-up, had called for Dayton II to be drafted under the aegis of the signatories Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, with international representatives as mentors. This scenario has the merit of reaching beyond the alternatives external imposition or internal solution. Each party would be assigned a clearly defined role and responsibility. It is worth mentioning that the Sarajevo Foundation Public Law Center (CJP) has been engaged since 2012 in a state-wide public debate with a view to drafting a new constitution. The expertise required is very much present in the country itself.
An alliance between local expertise and the new civic forces—as the Citizens’ Plenum in Tuzla—could very well create a public space that could seriously challenge the reform-resistent nomenklatura.
To conclude: Bosnia’s social movement needs to transit from a state of powerlessness to resolutely open up new possibilities. That said, a different Bosnia needs a different Europe. Brussels surely wants to avoid finding itself in Sarajevo in a situation tomorrow, as it is in Kiev today.
-Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch was High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1999–2002; he is the President of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation and the Schumpeter Fellow 2013–14 at Harvard University
-Christophe Solioz is author and political commentator.