Every four years a celebration of the cotton harvest is held in the regional town of Tambacounda (Eastern Senegal). It receives considerable attention throughout the country and is widely covered by the press. The festivities are sponsored and organised by the state-owned cotton company Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles (SODEFITEX). During the festival held in April 1992, the presidential couple was present to witness a long march headed by 50 carts, pulled by donkeys. Each cart contained a quantity of cotton that symbolised the record production of 50,000 tons of cotton that year. A large carriage that carried a class who had taken a course in one of the national languages of Senegal followed the march. The most prominent part in the festivities was played by the so-called ‘king and queen of cotton’, i.e. the most productive couple of cotton producers that year. Both were dressed in white and seated in an enormous cotton capsule, surrounded by professional praise-singers (griots) who honoured the hard-working couple in typical Senegalese fashion. No less majestic was the reward, handed over personally by the president to the ‘king of cotton’: a (sponsored) pilgrimage to Mecca at SODEFITEX’s expense.

Similar rituals with a strong Islamic imprint can be discerned in many other state-sponsored celebrations throughout the country. They point to the increasing interest in Islam in social and political life in Senegal, a country with a secular constitution. However, the SODEFITEX celebration described above contains definitely new themes and elements, which are pertinent to the transformation of political realities in contemporary Senegalese society. In my view these themes, which I will discuss in this paper, are characteristic of a new phase of nationalism in Senegal, one in which Islam has a greater effect than before on the policies of national identity applied by the national state. My
purpose is to unlock these themes and to place them in the wider context of economic and political change in contemporary Senegal.

Most studies of Islam and the state in Senegal tend to concentrate on the involvement of the Sufi orders, and their saints (wali) generally referred to as 'marabouts', in national politics. Unlike their counterparts in, for instance, Tunisia and Morocco where the construction of the postcolonial state led to a serious decline in the importance of these orders, or Mali where the Wahhabi movement criticised the religious practice of the Sufi orders, 'maraboutism' is very much alive in Senegal. Much has been said about the politicisation of the orders, their impact on the political and economic life, and the enormous electoral weight of their leaders. However, the connection between religious and national identities, and the extent to which the authority of the state is legitimised by a religious referent has not been similarly discussed. This paper explores how and the conditions under which the process of formulating a nationalist religious identity, or what Vatikiotis (1987) has called a 'jus religionis', has taken place in Senegal.

From the 1970s onwards, the state coped with an increasingly assertive religious community in general and powerful marabouts in particular. One of the strategies applied by the state to counterbalance maraboutic power was to give greater prominence to the capacity of Islam to promote a sense of national identity. Until the 1980s, the policies of the secular state did not leave much room for national identities to be derived from religious faith. As elsewhere in Africa (Otayek & Toulabor 1990, Ruedy 1994, Olukoshi & Laakso 1996), however, attempts to make secularism or non-religious policies (African socialism, Négritude, or Francophonie) for that matter, the accepted ideology of the country proved unsuccessful. This failure was due in no small part to the fact that in a society more than 90 per cent of which is Muslim, religious conviction—which in Senegal implies a personal bond with a religious leader—tended to override senses of (supra-) national belonging. I suggest that these and other considerations, discussed below, motivated the state to reconsider the problem of national identity and to inject it with a new, religious meaning.

The focus in this paper is on the specific incorporation of religious ideas and practices into nationalism. I expand on the discussions of Anderson (1983) and Kapferer (1988) on what they call the 'religion of nationalism' and the way in which it transforms the religious ideas and themes it incorporates into its own ideological schemes. It is important to note that religions of nationalism often contain ideas and arguments that are far from reducible to the religion (Islam, Christianity,
Hinduism, etc) it subsumes. In nationalism, religious themes may gain new or different meanings through the historical and political circumstances in which they are inscribed. Here my aim is to denote some of the relevant issues at stake in Senegalese nationalism, the reasons why and the manner in which they are subsumed into the ideological schemes of contemporary discourse on national identity.

The exploration of the specific manner in which the state tries to appropriate the basic tenets of Islam in its policy of national identity requires a closer look at the specific features of religious practices in Senegal, and the historical role played by the Sufi orders in the colonial and postcolonial circumstances. As I will suggest, the state has tried to incorporate the model of master/disciple (shaykh/murid), a relationship that, as in most Sufi orders, lies at the heart of the institutional organisation of the maraboutic orders in Senegal, into new models of state-nationalism. The state-owned cotton company SODEFITEX is taken as an example to illustrate the specific way in which religious themes, and the work ethic in particular, are promoted by the state. The exhortation of the farmers to work hard echoes the authoritarianism and particular logic of submission characteristic of the master/disciple relationship. However, it is also suggested that new dimensions be added to it since the proliferation of the state through the vocabulary of Islamic faith is also a response to the new requirements of the transformed economic circumstances.

_Sufi Saints and the State_

Recently, a number of scholars have expressed criticism of the view that Sufism belongs to what is called 'the golden age of sincerity and devotion' and not to the contemporary world marked by struggles between Islamic fundamentalist and nationalist movements (Hoffman 1995, Ernst 1997). Sufism is seen as something that belongs to the past, not to contemporary settings. African history has shown, however, that Sufism and secular politics were closely linked (Westerlund & Rosander 1997). In many countries where Sufi orders and movements emerged, the state authorities, and the colonial and post-colonial authorities in particular, felt the need to tame this powerful force or to incorporate the Sufi orders into the political system. The extent to which these attempts actually succeeded or not is a complex subject that requires a full-length study. I will limit myself to some major considerations, which, I think, are relevant for an understanding of the various attempts to incorporate Sufi ideas into new forms of state-nationalism in Senegal.
From the beginning of the eleventh century, lodges or hospices were created as residential centres for Sufis. The first enduring centres that emerged in Iran, Syria, and Egypt assumed several forms, ranging from a large learning circle of several hundred residents to a simple dwelling connected to the private home of a master (Ernst 1997, 125). The Sufis themselves saw the order not as a sociological institution but rather as a spiritual method and practice, *tariqa* (plural *turqa*), a ‘path’ or ‘way’ to attain spiritual refinement, that gives the order a specific identity (Brenner 1988). The master, whether imam or Sufi saint (*shaykh*) occupied a central position as an intermediary link to the Prophet and God. Much of the authority of the Sufi saint, both religious and political, derived from his ascribed *wakaya*, a term often translated as ‘sainthood’ though a more appropriate meaning of the word is ‘nearness to God’. The saint’s closeness to God, seen as a gift from God, was demonstrated by extraordinary *baraka* (grace, blessing, divine power) which permitted the performance of miracles (*karamat*) like thought-reading, healing the sick, reviving the dead, flying or walking over water. Because of their elevated status and their direct access to divine intervention, the Sufi saints were often seen or portrayed themselves as opposed to political authority.⁴

The first important Sufi circles came into existence at the time when the early Arab empire of the caliphate was at the peak of its wealth and power. The stress on asceticism and its condemnation of the world was to some extent a response to the luxury and corruption that went with political power. Though the relationships between Sufis and rulers created ambiguities, they had to interact with each other: rulers needed the Sufis to legitimise their authority, while the latter often sought to influence rulers to make decisions based on ethical and religious considerations. From the twelfth century onwards, the Sufi orders established close relationships with rulers throughout the central Islamic lands. Naqshabandi masters, followers of Baha’ al-din al-Naqshabandi (1317-1389), for instance owned vast stretches of land and played key roles in worldly politics (Ernst 1997).

By 1920, every Muslim country (except Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and parts of Arabia) had been conquered by foreign powers, mostly European. In a number of cases, Sufi orders were the strongest local institutions that remained when local rulers were overthrown. Some of them were transformed into anticolonial movements. In other cases, the Sufi orders lost most of their popularity because their leaders chose to co-operate with the colonial regime (Tunisia, Morocco). In West Africa, the theocratic states of the Futa Toro and Futa Jallon in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century were illustrations of the potential of Sufi orders to function as a basis for anticolonial resistance (Trimingham 1959). In Algeria, the French colonial regime soon realised that their invasion and conquest had actually strengthened the powerful Rahman-iyya Sufi order, which they regarded as the Algerian national church (Ernst 1997). In Egypt as well as in Mauritania, attempts were made to incorporate the Sufi orders into the structures and institutions of the state. The Nasser regime in particular, although appearing to encourage a revival of Sufism, sought to subordinate and control it. The first initiative to control the orders was the establishment of a Sufi council (1903), which exercised direct control over the activities of the Sufi orders and appointed its main leaders (Hoffman 1995).

Whether the Sufi lodges developed into a large, hierarchical institution depended to a large extent on the socio-political environment in which the orders operated. In Senegal colonialism undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of the loosely organised orders into a more or less institutionalised hierarchy of spiritual leaders and adherents. This is in particular true for the Mourides, initially a small group of disciples of the charismatic Cheikh Amadu Bamba, who rapidly developed an institutional order. This was partly due to a colonial policy that promoted the movement whose leaders were regarded as viable intermediary agents of government. In the words of Cruise O'Brien: 'the French were in a position to make a political reality of their initially misguided judgement, i.e. the assumption that Sufi tariq were corporate organisational entities' (1975, 191).

The earlier distrust of Amadu Bamba, which led to his exile to Gabon (1895-1902) gradually gave way to a close interaction between the French administration and Bamba's successors (Robinson 1991, 2000). Similar close relationships had been established with important leaders of Tijani movements. It was in the 1920s that the specific patterns of interaction, so typical of Senegalese political life, were established. The early ambivalence was replaced by a firm belief in the compatibility of interests of the colonial state and the marabouts (Villalón 1995). Nevertheless, the colonial administration remained suspicious; the Mourides were believed to be in touch with panIslamic movements of the Arab world, and to be sending money to the Rif warriors in Morocco. In addition, the large financial contributions of Bamba's followers were felt to compete with colonial taxation. But such accusations were soon muffled due to Paul Marty, an Arabist and colonial ethnographer who published a series of books on Muslim movements in West Africa. Marty dismissed the threat of a Mouride rebellion and
found no serious links between the Mourides and the Arab world. He suggested that the complaints about Bamba that the colonial administration received were motivated by jealousy or rivalry (Cruise O'Brien 1971).

Marty's work is an example of the significant role ethnography played in the administrative policies towards religious movements. Marty was well aware of the fact that Mouride religious practice was grounded in the Sufi traditions of Islam. Nevertheless, he portrayed the Mouride order as an unusual religious phenomenon while Amadu Bamba's doctrine was in his eyes a sort of new religion born of Islam, 'en plein vagabondage islamique' (ibid.). Notwithstanding the links that undoubtedly existed between its spiritual leaders and its followers throughout the Arab world, he downplayed the movement's foreign elements. Marty's work was therefore a major step in the process of making the Mouride order into a national phenomenon. In doing so, it discriminated against other, so-called 'rival' religious orders: Tijani and Qadiri. The courting of the marabouts, which reached its peak after 1936 when De Coppet was named governor-general of French West Africa, further contributed to the 'senegalisation' of the Mouride order.

On the eve of independence the marabouts manifested their loyalty to De Gaulle and their support for the French community. This was the first indication of the crucial role they were about to play in political life in the postcolony. However, the marabouts were not able to maintain their cohesion, despite the creation of the Conseil Supérieur des Chefs Religieux du Sénégal in 1958 'to defend the interests of Islam' (ibid., 271). The Tijani marabout Ibrahim Niassé protested against the new constitution, which the Senegalese government proposed for the Mali federation. Other marabouts continued to challenge the political élite, and created a political party, along with other secular leaders who had reasons to oppose Senghor's Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS). When Senegal achieved full independence, it was clear that the marabouts were divided. Nevertheless, they had shown their ability to influence national policies (Villalon 1995).

The Social Contract in Peril

Only three months before the elections of 1998 the main opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, resigned from his post as minister of state. His first move was to get into his car and drive to Touba, the 'religious capital' of Senegal (Ross 1995), in order to inform the Mouride xâlifa-général Serigne Saliou Mbacké of his reasons for resignation. During
this visit, which was widely covered in the press, the Secretary General of the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) stated that the ‘spiritual masters’ of Touba had given him their blessings so that he would obtain support and win the next elections.\(^6\)

This is just one example of the strong personal bonds that exist between state officials and the marabouts in Senegal. As Villalón has pointed out, these bonds play an important role in the relationship between politics and religion in Senegal. Coulon has provided an excellent description of the exchange of services between the religious élite and the postcolonial state (Coulon 1981, see also Villalón 1995). This laid the basis for the famous ‘social contract’ between the marabouts and the Senegalese State. In the early days after independence, the marabouts served as a source of legitimisation for a political élite lacking strong support from civil society. As a consequence, the state had to rely on the maraboutic authority in implementing policy goals. The state, on the other hand, returned this support by facilitating and protecting the material interests of the marabouts. The frequent courtesy visits to the religious leaders served among other things to reinforce the positions of the leaders. Moreover, the state facilitated and protected the material interests of the marabouts (Coulon 1981).

Despite this close collaboration, extensively explored by scholars of Senegal’s politics, real tensions were evident from the start. These tensions accelerated after independence, which brought about a change in the goals pursued by the political élite. The colonial interest in collaboration with the marabouts was conditioned by pragmatic short-term goals. In the words of Cruise O’Brien: ‘Reciprocal affection may have been in short supply, but shared interest could stand in for love.’ (1991, 3). The new leaders of the independent state, however, were driven by more ambitious goals. They strove for a more direct control over their subjects without, or at least with as little as possible, support from the marabouts (Villalón 1995).

Marabouts’ opposition to the Code de la famille (1970) which regulated marriage (Creevey 1996), polygamy, and divorce was just one example of the many tensions that marked the attempts of the state to exercise direct control over its subjects.\(^7\) Other reminders of what Villalón (ibid.) has called the ‘isolationist potential’ of the Sufi orders and, thus, the limited control of the state over the marabouts, were the advice of the latter to their disciples to concentrate on consumption crops, rather than the cash-crops (peanuts, cotton) controlled by the state, the frequent discrepancy between official announcements and the actual date of religious celebrations, and the tremendous importance
of the advice to vote (the famous ndiguel, ‘decree’). The parallel market centred in Touba and contraband activities with the Gambia presented other examples (Cruise O’Brien 1988).

The Mourides appeared to be particularly creative in setting up an extended international network of disciples, who, settled in metropolises like New York, Paris, London, Milan, and Hong Kong, extended their commercial activities and created religious centres of learning (daa’ira) and secured a steady flow of money to Touba. In the home country they extended their commercial activities in the informal sector and established enterprises in commercial, industrial, and transport sectors. In other orders as well, commercial activities were expanding quite rapidly. Successful businessmen went abroad, securing a steady flow of income to the community and thus to its leaders. International relations have always been vital for the Sufi communities but today, they seem to have become even more important. This enabled the community to reinforce its autonomy vis-à-vis the Senegalese state for the sums of money pouring into the community from abroad clearly by-passed the state, in contrast to the income generated by cash-crop cultivation which was sold directly to the state-controlled companies (Van Hoven 1999). Hence the orders depend less than before on the agencies of the state. This affects, of course, their willingness to cooperate with the public authorities, a trend which accelerated in the case of the Mouride order with the appointment of the actual xalifa-général, Serigne Saliou Mbacké in 1990, who is depicted as an intellectual with less interest in worldly matters.

The year 1993 marked an important change in the relationship between the orders and the state for it was the first time that a large majority of the religious leaders did not make a public statement in support of the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS) (Cruise O’Brien 1993). It was the time when the state-controlled communal sources were gradually drying up, which led to a weakening of Diouf’s power and the party’s losing more and more of its share of the votes. At the same time, the multiplication of political parties and manifold dissidence within the party in power gave rise to a profound restructuring of the old alliances between the maraboutic families and the public authorities (Diouf 1999). This has caused local marabouts to become more involved in electoral politics to the extent that the ndiguel from them have replaced those of the national marabouts (Patterson 1999).

Diop and Diouf have pointed out that one of the strategies applied by the state to counterbalance the maraboutic power was to encourage rivalry between the major orders, i.e. Tijani and Mouride (Diop
& Diouf 1990). Even more important in this respect were perhaps the state policies towards the so-called ‘reformists’: a segment of the religious community that consisted mostly of returned students (‘Arabisants’) who had been sent abroad to study at the famous universities in the Arab world and who were critical of the established maraboutic system (Zuccarelli 1987).11 Their critique of the maraboutic practice, and the ‘un-Islamic’ nature of the ties with a spiritual master like a marabout, has served the state as a means of offsetting the power of the marabouts. However, the reformists have remained a small group of usually urban Muslims with little support among the majority of the Senegalese population. Most of these groups have become part of the maraboutic system or have been incorporated by state institutions.

A serious challenge for the maraboutic bastion was the emergence of groups influenced by reformist ideas that arose from within the maraboutic movement. The best-known example is the Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty (DMWM) of Moustapha Sy that emerged in the 1980s as a mass movement of urban youth. Afraid of losing control over a large segment of the urban population, the state immediately embraced its leader, whom Diouf publicly denoted as his ‘son’. But things went wrong in 1993 when, just before the much-debated elections, tensions escalated between the Diouf regime and Moustapha Sy who strove to re-establish his role as spokesman of the dissatisfied urban youth (Villalón 1995). In 1994, accused of being at the instigation of the riots of February 1994, Moustapha Sy was imprisoned for a year (Diouf 1999). After having proclaimed support for Diouf in 1997, Sy’s next move was the creation of a political party for the presidential elections of the year 2000.12

*The ‘Nationalization’ of Islam*

When Diouf was appointed head of state he tried to win the support of the Muslim population in Senegal by bringing about some changes of policy. His decision, just weeks after taking office on 1 January 1981, to attend the meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Saudi Arabia was extremely popular. To further strengthen Senegal’s image in this regard, Diouf presided over the OIC meeting held in Dakar in December 1991. This was the first time that the OIC was held in sub-Saharan Africa since its foundation in 1973.

It was under the Diouf administration that Senegal achieved prominent international status as a Muslim country (Schraeder 1997). Efforts were made to construct a new (read: Muslim) image of Senegal’s head
of state.\textsuperscript{13} Diop and Diouf (1990) regard this development as a way to give a new elan to the second republic and to relieve Diouf of the heavy burden of Senghor’s heritage. Magassouba (1985) feels that Diouf was driven by more pragmatic reasons. After all, an explicit proclamation of faith was necessary after his critical remarks about the Senegalese religious leaders whom Diouf depicted as ‘feudal lords’. However, there are other ways to interpret the Muslim politics applied by Diouf.

Only three months after the OIC summit in Dakar, Diouf presided over the official inauguration of the Islamic Foundation Ben Abdel Aziz, created in 1989 by El Hadj Djily Mbaye, one of Senegal’s most successful businessmen. Several delegates of prominent Arab countries witnessed Diouf’s eloquent speech in honour of this ‘national hero’. Diouf portrayed Djily Mbaye, the entrepreneur responsible for the construction of the Cité Baghdad and Muhammed in his native town of Louga and the Cité Fayçal in Dakar, as a faithful and humble man whose life was dedicated to work and prayer.

In his speech Diouf stressed the work ethic and pious character of the honourable man:

\begin{quote}
Notre regreté frère et ami feu El Hadj Djily Mbaye, qui contribua très largement à la réalisation de ce grand événement, n’a pas pu y assister, Dieu l’ayant appelé à lui. Et nous voici aujourd’hui encore réunis sans lui pour inaugurer une oeuvre qui, parmi toutes ses contributions au rapprochement entre les peuples de la Ummah, et au mieux être de ses concitoyens, incarne le plus son génie, sa générosité et sa vision de l’avenir.

Notre foi en Dieu et notre acceptation de ses décrets nous aident à supporter cette absence. Notre tristesse est, par ailleurs, atténué par cette parole du Prophète Muhammed (PSL) qui dit que: ‘Quiconque trace une bonne voie en sera rétribué et partagera à ceux qui la suivront leur récompense.’

C’est qu’il [Djily] était un musulman convaincu, un défenseur de l’Islam dont il avait bien assimilé le message de progrès. Répondant à sa vocation d’homme d’action, feu El Hadj Mbaye s’investira corps et âme dans le commerce pour contribuer son pays du sous-développement [. . .].\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Diouf’s speech, in which no less than three \textit{ahadith} (sing. \textit{hadith}, Prophetic tradition) were cited, is one of the many examples which indicate that, since Diouf’s appointment as head of state, efforts have been made to give his administration a profoundly Islamic image. In contrast to his predecessor, Senegal’s first president Léopold Sédar Senghor who is a Catholic, Diouf is a Muslim and we should not rule out the possibility that he used his religious conviction as an instrument to gain support from the population. Because of the many financial contributions from the Arab world, as well as Diouf’s leading role in the OIC, it is
no surprise that the president qualified Mbaye's work as a contribution to the development of the ummah, the community of believers. However, the stress laid on the idea of development and progress is, I think, more than a representation of the generous offerings of the Arab nations.

Let us consider the following phrase in which Diouf underlines El Hadj Djily Mbaye's numerous efforts to save his country from the ghost of underdevelopment: 'Il [Djily Mbaye] compris assez tôt que seul le travail ennoblit l'homme. La voie qu'il choisit ainsi est, au demeurant, celle que recommande le Prophète dans ce hadith: L'homme n'a pas consommé une nourriture plus licite que celle qu'il a gagnée à la sueur de son front'.15 Here, Diouf seems to suggest that, because of his religious devotion to work, Mbaye deserves to be considered as a national hero. For Mbaye, work was a personal form of religious observance. '(...) l'homme qui faisait du travail son seul credo', added the editor of the official newspaper Le Soleil.16 Diouf ended his speech with the following phrase: 'Aussi, puisse Dieu, dans son infinie miséricorde, accepter l'oeuvre de feu El Hadj Djily Mbaye comme une oeuvre pieuse et accueillir le cher disparu dans son immense Paradis. Amen.'17

The religious valuation of work, of which Diouf's speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the Islamic Foundation Ben Abdel Aziz is an example, is one of the core themes of the new approach applied by the Diouf administration. It is what Diop and Diouf (1990) have called 'le retour à la tradition': a re-evaluation of Senegal's cultural and religious heritage.

Though the religious value of work does have importance in Islam in general, it is said to go back to the ideological repertoire of the Mouride order. 'Work is part of religion' is but one of the many exhortations to the disciples to work in service of their spiritual masters. Some say that work can even be a substitute for the normal ritual observances of Islam.18 Agricultural work is accorded a particular merit. Cruise O'Brien cited a Mouride disciple who stated that: 'he who works the soil has other benefits beyond his harvest: the work of the soil is the only work that is completely free of sin. While the disciple who works on his own behalf is of little religious importance: '(...) work in service of a saint is the key to paradise.' (1975, 79)

The emphasis on work as a religious value is also connected to the way in which outside observers have portrayed Mouridism (Copans, Couty, Roch, Rocheteau 1972). The colonial authorities were the first to see the economic potential of the order and the enormous influence
its leaders exercised over the thousands of disciples. By promoting the work ethic of the Mouride, the colonial ideologues thought they had found a notion that could bridge the gap between Islamic thinking on the one hand and development ethics of the official state programme on the other. After independence, efforts were made to stress the compatibility between Mouride economic ethics and those proclaimed by the postcolonial state. During a Mouride ceremony in 1963, President Senghor posed the following questions: ‘What is socialism if not, essentially, the socio-economic system which gives priority to work? And who has done this better than Amadu Bamba and his successors?’ (cited in Cruise O’Brien 1975, 78). There is perhaps no better example than, again, Abdoulaye Wade to illustrate the manner in which the political élite strove to incorporate the work ethics of the Mouride doctrine into nationalist discourse. In 1972 Wade, by then a prominent member of the Club Nation et Développement, Senegal’s most outstanding think-tank, published an article entitled ‘La doctrine économique dumouridisme’. The article is basically an effort to ‘africanise’, so to speak, the notion of development, by then seen as a purely Western concept that, according to many development theorists, was alien to the socio-political realities of many African states. On the basis of a series of interviews with the xalifa-général of the Mourides and his own ideas and interpretation of Bambaïsm, Wade argued that the tendency to regard expressions of religious forms of consciousness (and Islam in particular) as essentially incompatible with the goals of development, is mistaken. Rather than suppress these religious values in the name of progress, the development theorist, he argued, should take into account the potentials of Islamic movements like the Mouride because of its religious devotion to work and its willingness to develop the nation.

It is worthwhile, I think, to elaborate on Wade’s argument because it illustrates why the core issues of the Mouride doctrine are thought to be relevant to state discourses. Given the fact that Wade’s article was written just after Senegal gained its independence, it is no surprise that the author stresses the originality and ‘Senegalese character’ of Bamba’s oeuvre. The fact that Bamba received much of his education from his Qadiriyya masters in Mauritania is thought to be irrelevant. Like the colonial ethnographer Marty, Wade emphasises that Bamba was an original (read: Senegalese) thinker. His repertoire, Wade argues, has its origins in Senegal’s ancestral traditions and it is ‘national’, not ‘panIslamic’. ‘La force de la tradition est poussée à tel point que le mouridism, contrairement aux autres sectes, le tidjanisme par exem-
ple, refuse toute hiérarchie arabe et est foncièrement nationaliste'. (ibid., 204)

Because of the centrality of its work ethic, Wade labels the Mouride doctrine as 'scientific' that has nothing to do with the mysticism characteristic of so many other Islamic movements. In so doing, the Mouride doctrine has more to do with Protestant ethics than Islamic values. 'Le mouridisme et le protestantisme sont ainsi les deux seules religions qui définissent une telle attitude à l’égard de l’économie.' (ibid., 204) While Islam has little to say on the religious value of work, Bambaism regards work as a way to 'sacralise, liberate and realise human existence'. Wade also cites thinkers like Thomas Aquinas to point to the key role of the work ethic as the guiding principle of the monastic life of European brotherhoods. However, Amadu Bamba’s Islamic doctrine is revolutionary, Wade continues, in the sense that its work ethic is not just limited to the adepts alone but is seen as a guiding principle for all human beings. 'La doctrine mouride fait du travail la liaison entre Dieu et la création [. . .].' (ibid., 209)

Wade’s effort to promote Bambaism is profoundly nationalistic not least because it is selective and discriminates against other manifestations of forms of religious experience. Wade argues that Amadu Bamba’s doctrine, in contrast to many other Islamic movements, is peaceful and that it condemns violence and the holy war. Amadu Bamba’s methods and dealings with the representatives of the secular powers were based on ‘persuasion’ and ‘moral resistance’. ‘Il faut pardonner aux Blancs’, were the first words expressed by Bamba when he returned to his homeland after having been exiled to Gabon by the French (1895-1902). Unlike many of his contemporaries such as the mahdi’s Al Hadj Umar and Samory who opposed the colonial conquest in the second half of the nineteenth century, Bamba did not engage in violent rebellion against the French authorities. He was convinced of the idea that a kind of ‘shared humanism’ existed, albeit muffled by the harsh manifestations of colonialism (ibid., 205). In that sense, Wade argues, the Mouride attitude differs profoundly from that of the other major ‘sects’: Tijani (too ‘Arabic’, too ‘violent’) and ‘Qadiri’ (too ‘Mauritanian’).20

One might wonder, then, whether the stress on work as a religious value in Diouf’s speech at the inauguration of the Ben Abdel Aziz Foundation could be considered a new phenomenon. I think it is, first of all, since the commitment of Senegal’s head of state to this foundation was more personal than pragmatic. Diouf was designated as the patron of the foundation and together with King Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz,
Hassan II of Morocco and the Emir of Kuwait he had made a personal commitment to an organisation whose objectives are the worldwide spread of Islamic values, the development of Islamic education and science and the promotion of the instruction of the holy Koran. Secondly, Djily Mbaye was above all a businessman who broke with 'the well-established family traditions and went off to devote his life to work', as Diouf remarked subtly during his speech. While Diouf spoke eloquently of Djily Mbaye as a humble and pious Muslim, no mention whatsoever was made of Mbaye's spiritual master. This is a significant fact since in Senegal, as in Sufism in general, the establishment of a relationship with a shaykh, a teacher responsible for the initiation and education of his disciple, is a prerequisite for a religious commitment.

Interestingly, Diouf did not refer to the fact that Djily Mbaye came from an important Mouride family of Louga. And it was the xalifa-général of the Tijanis, Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy, who was asked to conduct the closing prayer session at the end of the ceremony while the Mouride authorities played no particular role. In contrast to the 1963 speech of Senghor, who spoke explicitly about Amadu Bamba, Diouf made no direct reference to the founding father of the Mouride order. The references to the work ethic, supposed to be relevant on this occasion, were explicitly taken from the Prophet's ahadiths and not, and this is new, from the thinking of Amadu Bamba.21

This raises the question of whether efforts are being made by the state to by-pass the orders and directly engage its citizens in the Islamic values of the ummah. Is Senegal entering a new phase of state-society interactions from which new forms of religious nationalism will emerge? On the basis of an example taken from Eastern Senegal, I will try to answer these questions by examining some of the relevant issues at stake in the discourse on national Muslim identities.

The State Turbanized: The Sodefitex-Case

The cotton-festival I described in the introduction was organised by the cotton company called SODEFITEX, one of the few remaining state-owned agricultural companies (société d'intervention). In 1982, the SODEFITEX initiated literacy projects in nearly every village where the company had installed a cotton co-operative, the so-called Association de Base de Producteurs (Abp). Several courses were developed in the languages spoken in the region, first in Pular, spoken by the majority of cotton producers in the regions of Eastern Senegal, and in 1988 in
Mandingo and Wolof. The cotton producers (men and women) were invited to participate and they created local schools (Van Hoven 1995).

The goals of these projects were formulated as follows:

Depuis quelques années la SODEFITEX se préoccupe de l’organisation des cultivateurs qu’elle encadre, dans le but de permettre à ces derniers de prendre en main, progressivement, leurs propres affaires. L’analphabétisme est un frein à la responsabilisation des cultivateurs. L’alphabétisation fonctionnelle contribue à lever cet obstacle. En apprenant au paysan à lire et à écrire dans sa langue maternelle [...] elle permet à celui-ci de mieux comprendre les thèmes techniques [...] de mieux les appliquer et entraîne une augmentation de la production. En lui apprenant aussi à compter suivant le même principe, elle lui donne la possibilité de gérer ou d’exercer un contrôle effectif sur la gestion de ses propres affaires.22

The instruction books used during the courses pay attention not only to the technical aspects of cotton cultivation but also to health and management issues. Moreover, the books contain texts written in the local languages in which issues of a religious nature are discussed. Let us consider just one example in which the work ethic is discussed.

Collègues cultivateurs. Lorsque vous voyez que je vous adresse les paroles suivantes, c’est parce qu’Allah nous a à l’heure actuelle créés égaux. Mes premières paroles concernent [...] le travail [...]. Je vous demande de faire de votre travail votre premier souci. Le travail est le secret de l’homme. A l’époque dans laquelle nous vivons, ne pas travailler signifie ne pas être un homme. La richesse avec laquelle vous travaillez est la sueur de votre travail. Lorsqu’il en est ainsi, je prie pour vous. Qu’Allah vous donne une longue vie. Que les grandes difficultés vous soient épargnées. Saisissez la SODEFITEX à deux mains. Vous devez écouter attentivement tout ce qu’elle vous dit. Mettons-nous au travail lorsque le travail est nécessaire.23

This text advocates the values and benefits of the work ethic in a way quite similar to that in which outside observers (colonial administrators, state officials, and scholars) have portrayed the religious exhortation of the Mourides to work hard. It resembles the famous Mouride proverb that states that ‘it is only through work that one can secure the blessing and the grace of God’ (cited in Cruise O’Brien 1971, 150). Just as work is of a spiritual value when the disciple serves a shaykh, only work carried out in service of the SODEFITEX is endowed with grace. Furthermore, the discourse used by the SODEFITEX echoes the authoritarianism of the Mouride religious practice, in particular the logic of submission characteristic of the master/disciple relationship. The suggestion is made that without submission to a shaykh (here: the SODEFITEX) it is not possible to reach heaven.

This is an interesting effort to incorporate Sufi modes of religious consciousness into a nationalist scheme. But the question is what is actually meant with this portrayal of a cotton producer in terms of a
submissive disciple who must obey the orders of the state (his master). Or, to take another example, the chairman of the National Assembly who declares himself the ‘baye fall’ (disciple) of the head of state (both members of the PS). The Baye Fall, the followers of Cheikh Ibra Fall, hold that hard work and complete submission to the shaykh guarantee a place in paradise.

Mamadou Diouf has already pointed out that the emergence of the ideology of submission, which is not so pronounced in other Sufi orders, coincided with the imposition of the colonial state and the subsequent introduction of the ‘sujet colonial’ in particular. This shows the extent to which the interaction between the Mouride and the (post-)colonial state has affected the religious practice of the order itself. But what the above-mentioned examples express above all, in my view, is an attempt to ‘mouridise’ political culture by applying religious modes of behaviour to non-religious arenas. And this to the extent that political affiliation is moulded in a religious frame of reference in which a relationship becomes an allegiance, a personal commitment not to an ‘imagined community’ like a nation, but to a person (Abdou Diouf in this case). This trend testifies not only to the infiltration of Sufism but also to that of strategies of modern politics.

The specific appropriation of the Sufi model by the SODEFITECH also generates new meanings since it responds to the requirements of the transformed economic circumstances. The moral codes to which the ‘talibés’ of the SODEFITECH must subscribe, are injected with ‘entrepreneurialism’ characteristic of a new approach, based on a ‘partnership’ between the SODEFITECH and the individual cotton producer. Each ‘partner’, instructed and monitored by a so-called ‘encadreur’ who gives technical support during the cultivation process is responsible for the success of his or her own cotton harvest. Hence the stress laid in the texts on individual responsibility. An important effect (or goal?) of the implementation of the partnership-approach is that it by-passed local agencies of control (religious or customary chiefs, local entrepreneurs, heads of compound). Through the contracts signed with individual farmers, women, youngsters, clients, and seasonal workers are each personally responsible for fulfilling the conditions rigorously specified by the SODEFITECH.

However, the bypassing of local brokers gave rise to serious opposition, in particular from the religious authorities. The Tijani order of Medina Gounasse (Region of Kédougou) for instance, protested heavily against the new form of agricultural labour. Like most other orders in Senegal peanut cultivation under the control of the community leaders
is an important source of income. Afraid of losing control over his disciples, Thierno Mamadou Seydou Ba, spiritual leader of this isolated community of believers, banned cotton cultivation in 1975. One of the reasons was that the cotton producer is paid in cash instead of the 'bon d'achat' in the case of peanut cultivation which could easily be gathered by the community's leader. The effect on the community's cohesion was devastating: large numbers of disciples, most of them cotton producers dissatisfied with the rigorous measures taken by their spiritual leader left Medina Gounasse to settle in nearby villages (Magassouba 1985, Wane 1974).

It is interesting to note that the intervention of the community's leader had far more consequences than a rejection of commercial cotton cultivation. Thierno Mamadou Seydou Ba told his followers that the cotton cultivation would lead to a serious reduction in women's fertility. It is not quite clear on what grounds the shaykh based this warning. However, Thierno Mamadou Seydou Ba's threat to impose supernatural sanctions seems to indicate that there is more at stake than just a dispute over economic resources. It raises the question of whether this reaction of the spiritual leader of the Medina Gounasse is a response to the continuing proliferation of the state in domains that were hitherto thought to belong to the religious order.

These examples indicate that tensions arise now the state tends to formulate a discourse through the vocabulary of Islamic faith. Though frictions between the state and the religious authorities were already there right from the moment Senegal gained independence, today's struggles involve different issues, concepts, and strategies. While in the 1970s the conflicts arose over the right of the state to impose rules which were regarded as opposed to shari'a, the tensions that marked the relations between the marabouts and the state in the 1990s may in part be ascribed to attempts of the latter to appropriate elements of the Sufi religious practice. I would suggest, then, that in this particular context Sufism offers a way out for the controversies that reign in many Muslim countries where shari'a cannot become public law under the terms of the secular state.

Conclusion

Already in 1991, Cruise O'Brien raised the question of what alternative possibilities exist in Senegal's religious politics now that the success story of the social contract is drawing to a close. Rumour has it, he stated, of the formation of a (conservative) Muslim political party.
Another possibility would be the emergence of a new charismatic movement which could become, in due course, a new Muslim order. This would fulfil the wishes of the urban youth who are awaiting a new hero and a new religious message. But what about the state itself and its religious message? The SODEFITEX example shows, indeed, that efforts are made in a provocative manner to incorporate religious themes into nationalist discourse. These efforts coincide with the systematic extension of the state’s control over religion since the appointment of Abdou Diouf as president of the second republic. In doing so, the state attempts to marginalise the powerful maraboutic orders of the country.

Until recently, it was common for close co-operation between the government and the orders to be expressed in public ceremonies, for instance during the annual Magal. The placing of xalifa-général and the president on the same platform is a tradition well established in colonial times and continued after independence (Coulon 1999). The official inauguration of the Islamic Foundation Ben Abdel Aziz discussed above already indicated an erosion of this tradition. However, the ceremonial cotton festivals of the SODEFITEX constitute a radical change in this respect: during the festivities of 1992 none of the important religious authorities were present during the ceremony. This is hardly surprising given the overt hostility expressed by the regional religious authorities to commercial cotton cultivation. Further research should bring to light whether the violent protest and rioting that exploded just a couple of days before Diouf’s visit to Tambacounda were in fact nourished by the religious authorities and their adherents’ feelings of discontent.31

The attempts to redefine Sufi ideas, icons, and forms of organisation in terms of a national ideology are not restricted to this ‘chosen land of marabouts’, to use the words of Vincent Monteil (1969). The ‘uniqueness’ of Senegal rather stems from the fact that the reforms and measurements imposed by the state, which have a clear impact on the communal base of the Sufi orders as the SODEFITEX case indicated, does not come from an anti-Sufi attitude as it was the case for instance in Nigeria (Umar 1993). On the contrary, individualistic modes of religious consciousness advocated by the state are in fact created through the incorporation of the master/disciple relationship, i.e. the cornerstone of Sufism. In that sense, it calls into question the view that anti-Sufism is ‘a form of Islam that is better adapted to meeting the modern world’s economic and social requirements.’ (Grégoire, cited in Brenner 1993, 11)
Of particular relevance here is the master/disciple relationship, rooted in Sufi mysticism, re-elaborated in colonial and postcolonial circumstances and transferred to nationalist discourse (Hammoudi 1997). The ‘partnership-approach’ as applied by the SODEFITEX seems to a large extent to be modelled on this organisational principle that structures the Sufi religious practice. This is at least the impression one gets from the manner in which the SODEFITEX demands obedience and the way in which it turns itself into a sacred authority. This echoes the notion of allegiance (the oath of bay’a) which structures the Sufi organisations internally.

However, allegiance does not necessarily lead to legitimacy. A sharifian authority and the legitimacy that goes with it, is not the same as state authority. This is, of course, when socio-economic circumstances are less favourable. No one would deny that allegiance to the sharifian orders still takes precedence over nation-state legitimacy. The recent imprisonment of a group of young talibés declaring that their marabout was the only authority they took orders from is just one of the many examples that testify to the fact that there are indeed no indications that point to a weakening of sharifian authority. Yet another example comes from Dakar University where William Thomas (1997) has observed that the majority of students claim allegiance to an Islamic movement rather than to a political group or authority. Perhaps the best example comes from the political leaders themselves who on the eve of the elections all go east to the holy cities of Touba and Tivaouane in the hope of gaining support from their spiritual masters.

NOTES

1. The fieldwork in Senegal was made possible by a grant from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).
4. It is precisely the intermediary status of saints that is objected to by fundamentalists. They regard the position of authority assumed by the saint as a deviation from Islamic norms. The Sufi practice of saintly intercession and pilgrimage to their tombs was strongly condemned by the Wahhabi movement, founded by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In the early nineteenth century, the Wahhabis demonstrated this by destroying all the tombs of Sufi saints in Arabia and Shi’i Imams in Iraq. But it is often forgotten that the dividing line between Sufism and Islamism is not that sharp. To mention only two examples: the great Persian mystic Al Ghazali, whose works exercised a great influence on Sufis in Africa and elsewhere (e.g. El Hadj Umar, the 19th jihadist who revolted against the colonial conquest in West Africa), was an outstanding jurist who spent much of his life lecturing on law and jurisprudence in Baghdad. This same goes for Abdul
Qadir Jilani (12th century), founder of the Qadiriyya, considered as the oldest Sufi order in Islam, who was above all a teacher and jurist, like Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) whose inspired many scholars adhering to the Wahhabi doctrine.

5. Modern scholars tend to overestimate the uniqueness of the Senegalese case in this respect. In many other parts of the world, Sufi orders were co-opted, whether successfully or not, into the colonial order (Westerlund & Rosander 1997). A number of studies have shown that despite the official policy of neutrality towards religion, colonial administrators strongly supported the Muslim movements with large followers among the populations. In the Indian Punjab for instance, British officials, by recognizing the hereditary peers as local notables, actually increased their authority and even appointed them to positions in the government. In independent Pakistan, Sufi leaders continued to be active in politics due to their strong rural power base and, in colonial times, their close links to British rule (Ernst 1997, 208).


7. Already in 1958, the marabouts united in the Conseil Supérieur des Chefs Religieux protested against various elements of the proposed constitution. In 1970 they expressed opposition to the proposed 'Code de la famille'. Again, Senegal was not unique in this respect for in many other Muslim countries (e.g. Indonesia, Algeria) the religious leaders reacted very strongly against laws regulating marriage, polygamy, and divorce due to their centrality in shari'a. Despite the maraboutic protest the 'Code' was finally adapted in 1972. The marabouts refrained from further protest but nevertheless advised their disciples to question the back on the 'Code' (Villalon 1995, 229).

8. The da'ira is a new form of association that developed in the urbanized settings of the 1940s. It aims to provide mutual aid between disciples or can function as a kind of trade guild. The great majority of these associations are directly linked to the order's supreme leader, the xâlîfa-général, to whom they make annual offerings in cash. More recently, the da'ira has spread to villages where they function most of the time as agricultural labour groups. It is important to note that the da'ira arose in a period in which the colonial authorities implemented agricultural co-operatives on a large scale throughout the colonies. One may wonder then to what extent the rise of the da'ira associations can be considered as a response to the colonial efforts to implement new forms of labour organisations in the colonies.

9. See Salem (1981) on the commercial activities of the Mouriades in France, and the case of the Fall of Sandaga described by Ébin (1992). The latter are Mouriade traders whose power is built on networks linking up the sales outlets in Dakar to the Mouriades immigrated communities in the international centres of commerce. The weekly Jeune Afrique (no. 2005, 199) has recently estimated that no less than 35% of the Senegalese economy is in the hands of traders and businessmen who are affiliated to the Mouriade order.

10. This goes as well for the Niass of Kaolack, a branch of the Tijaniyya that has a large following in Senegal. This branch was popularised by the son of the founder, Ibrahima Niass, that thanks to its Gambian and Nigerian connection flourished in the United States (Diouf 1999). It seems, indeed, appropriate to explore the position of the Mouriades and that of other orders in a broader international context (Brenner 1993). As Clancy-Smith (1994) has put it, baraka is portable and can easily be removed from one place to another.

11. The 'Arabisants' played an important role as intermediary in the quest for aid and support in the Islamic world.

12. The secretary-general of this party (Parti de l'Unité et du Rassemblement) is Khalifa Diouf, formerly member of the PS, considered as the right hand of Moustapha Sy, the moral guide of the Party (The daily Le Sud Quotidien, November 1999).

13. Brenner (1993) has pointed out that in Mali, from about 1980, the Traoré administration had also been seeking ways to reinforce Mali's Muslim identity. The amount of air-time granted to Muslim religious programmes on the state-owned media, the insistence by the President that his cabinet attend Friday prayer in Bamako's central
mosque, the closing of bars and night-clubs during Ramadan, and the government initiative in establishing Mali’s national Muslim organisation all indicate Traoré’s willingness to involve himself directly in Islamic affairs.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. The Baye Fall, an organization led by the descendants of Cheikh Ibra Fall who was the closest adherent of Amadu Bamba’s, even believe that hard work can be a substitute for the normal ritual observances of Islam. Most Mourides, however, do observe Islamic obligations and see work as a valuable complement to these observances. Cruise O’Brien cited the view of a saint, distributed on a printed card among his followers: ‘Devote yourselves to God and to His Prophet, but … WORK!!!’ (1975, 78).
19. The series of interviews with the *xâlîfâ-général* was held in 1966.
20. The comment on the reason why he visited Serigne Saliou Mbacké in March 1998 indicate that Wade’s firm belief in the economic potential of the Mourides is as vivid as ever: ‘Et lorsque j’écrivais en 1965 la doctrine économique du mouridisme, c’est parce que je savais ce qu’on peut tirer du mouridisme, et plus que jamais j’y crois’ (cited in *Wal Fadji*, 23 mars 1998, no. 1807).
21. It is not inconceivable that Diouf also wanted to please his international audience on this occasion.
24. See also the example of a governor who said to consider himself the ‘baye fall’ of the president Abdou Diouf (cited in Monjib 1998, 59-60).
25. Mamadou Diouf, personal communication.
26. The term ‘*talibé*’, in the sense of ‘disciple’ or ‘follower’, is widely employed in Senegal also in non-religious contexts, for instance to denote a militant adherent of a political party.
27. With the introduction of commercial cotton cultivation in the 1960s, peasants entered a new phase of agricultural production. This implied a transition from production largely dominated by local divisions of labour to a system in which producers were personally integrated into the institutional framework controlled by the SODEFITEX. Direct control of the labour process—fixed prices and work schedules, and new technology—were typical for this form of cash-crop cultivation. However, the rigorous way in which this new form of agricultural labour practice refashioned local structures gave rise to various modes of peasant resistance. In 1989 the SODEFITEX refused to buy the cotton harvest of some farmers because the repayment of debts was considered to be insufficient. Due to low prices and high production costs, less than 75 per cent of the farmers were able to repay their debts. This led to a general strike which soon spread out over several villages and eventually led to a complete refusal of the cotton farmers to sell their harvest to the SODEFITEX (Van Hoven 1995). Today, while prices on the world market are declining and foreign public capital forces many African governments to privatise their cotton companies (see the weekly *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1961, 1998 and no. 2026, 1999), the commercial production of cotton is facing serious competition from NGOs like that of ENDA Tiers-monde who successfully implemented alternative forms of cotton production which strive towards a more efficient use of human and technical resources.
28. Magassouba explains: ‘La culture du coton aura, dans une large mesure, “déstabilisé” la communauté en tuant le caractère collectif des travaux et en brisant le monopole sur la commercialisation des arachides, fondement de son [Thierno Mamadou

29. Relevant here is Sanneh’s (1997) view that both national loyalty and religious loyalty appeal to, and have their source in, a commitment that is, in the final analysis, spiritual.

30. I am grateful to Professor Lamin Sanneh for this suggestion.

31. The recent commemoration of Amadou Bamba’s being sent into exile points to the increasing ‘uneasiness’ that marks the interactions between Mouride adherents and the administrative authorities. On September the 5th, the day that the colonial administration decided to send Bamba to Gabon, thousands of Mouride adherents followed the footsteps of their spiritual master to St. Louis where, in 1895, he was accused of planning a ‘holy war’. Not knowing the exact locality from where their Serigne appeared before the Conseil Privé, the adherents went to the Governance where they expressed their wish to enter the building. Unluckily, the regional authorities chose to refuse access to the Governance upon which the Mourides decided to assault the building.

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