“... he suffered from ... suicidal obsessions. The critical date was that when on instructions from his organization he had placed a bomb somewhere. ...This militant, who never for a single moment thought of repudiating his past action, realized very clearly the manner in which he himself had to pay the price of national independence”

[Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.206]
Case Studies: Algeria and Mozambique

Algeria:

- Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria: north African extensions of France
- ‘Algerie Francaise’ since 1830 – that is, colony considered ‘part of France’
- French settlers: ‘pieds noirs’ and ‘colons’
- by 1950s, indigenous (Berber, Arab) Algerians struggling against two ‘layers’ of colonizers who would not negotiate
- war for independence lasted 1954-1962
- Algeria’s battle critical to struggle of West African French colonies
Mozambique:

- like other Portuguese colonies (Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Angola) considered an ‘overseas province’
- knew several migrations ‘settlers’, large group in post WWII era
- while Algeria negotiated independence during end of war (1960-62), Portugal dug in for duration with support of West
- armed struggles began in territories, including Mozambique, between 1961 and 1963
- closely tied to war in Rhodesia late 1960s
Wars of Liberation and Ideology

In both colonies, resistance led to full scale civil wars, direct intervention metropolitan country

Key Common Issues:

- ideology played key role
- international involvement (or potential involvement) key
- ‘colonial war’ played key role in ‘domestic’ politics
Wars of Liberation and Ideology

Focus in comparing Algeria and Mozambique:

- how ideology shaping/supporting war of liberation functioned in practice
- how ‘nature’ of ideology influenced international intervention
- how nature of ‘war itself’ shaped social and political societies in post-colonial state
- how legacy of war shaped/continues to shape metropolitan society
Wars of Liberation and Ideology

Case Study Mozambique:

- ‘ideology’ is ‘socialism’: poses same questions for regional African Response (in this case specifically Rhodesia, South Africa)
- and ‘West’
- ‘how war was fought’ refers to civil war that followed almost immediately upon independence (rather than ‘war of liberation’ itself, as in Algeria): main issue, child soldiers
- ultimately, contemporary issues similarly tied to ideology and ‘nature of war’
Portugal was itself poor and underdeveloped; 40% of the population was illiterate, the result of over twenty years of fascist dictatorship.

The regime could not afford to be flexible, nor did it have the power to force compromise from African nationalists.
Regime had Nazi-like Youth movement, to which Church closely allied through State.
Mozambique & Portugal c. 1950

Portuguese policy Post-WWII opposite to decolonization everywhere (except South Africa):

- colonial policies intensified
- large emigration movement encouraged
- settlers provided with land through program
  land alienation (as in Rhodesia, Kenya)
Mozambique c. 1950

Groups affected:
- African peasants (lost land)
- local mulattoes and assimilados

*Mulattoes:* descendants generations of Portuguese-African ‘mixed’ marriages

*Assimilados:* Africans adopting Catholicism, speaking Portuguese, moving into middle social ranks
- older ‘settlers’, new elite both lost social, economic position vis-à-vis newest settlers
- new ‘settler regime’ created
- held racist views, enacted repressive policies
Forced Labour

Forced labour continued to be underpin Settler Economy under new emigration of 1950s.

Not until early 1970s was system reformed.
Reborn, Renewed Racism

Picture from 1960s could have been taken 30 or even 40 years earlier!
Mozambique: the Struggle

Under the circumstances:
- resistance to be expected
- Africans being ‘re-colonized’
- local settler society ‘displaced’ and disadvantaged

Between 1961-63, struggle became armed warfare (not only in Mozambique but Portugal’s other colonies Angola and Guinea Bissau)
Liberation forces FRELIMO:

- central issue: how to unify?
- Mozambique large, comprised many ethnic groups, languages
- central divide: Zambesi River (created north and south)
- Leader Eduardo Mondelane used ideology and language to address divisions:
  
  Socialism
  Portuguese
Wars of Liberation and Ideology
Mozambique and FRELIMO

Portuguese reactions:

- as in Algeria, colonial power infiltrated liberation groups with informers
- 1969: Mondelano assassinated
- revealed/exacerbated internal ‘divisions’
FRELIMO
Mozambique and FRELIMO

As in Algeria, Mozambicans not all in favour of independence won by war:

- death of Mondelano: FRELIMO almost split definitively
- right wing in favour working with Portuguese, seeking more opportunities
- left wing arguing for full-scale social revolution, anti-colonial war

Left wing emerged as predominant, Samora Machel as new FRELIMO leader
Battle against Colonialism, not ‘whites’ *per se*. 
Battle for Independence and ‘new society’.
Machel/FRELIMO strength principally in the south, among heavy rural populations

- (largely) opposed in north
- taking of large northern province of Tete major victory
- FRELIMO crossed Zambesi
- position allowed for attacks on critical Beira railroad:
  - led to Rhodesia
  - transported materials for Cabora Bassa Dam
Mozambique and FRELIMO

Cabora Bassa Dam:
- project funded by South Africa, various European countries
- aimed to provide electricity to SA Rand (gold mines)
- huge international significance
- dam employed many Africans
- target (symbolic and real) of FRELIMO’s struggle
- FRELIMO strategies effective
Discrimination at Work

Cabora Bassa Dam: workers in the canteen.

Differences between African service (top), ‘Whites’ (below) evidence of new racism. Whites paid up to 6X more than Blacks.
Beira Railroad Targeted

FRELIMO successful bombing, derailing trains on Beira railroad.

Disrupted delivery supplies to Cabora Bassa Dam; Rhodesia.
‘Derailing the Dam’
Supplies had to be carried overland; it took weeks to transport needed goods to the Front lines.
FRELIMO: Preparing Ambush

Tactics: basic guerilla warfare
‘Liberated Areas’: collective agricultural projects undertaken for subsistence and export.
In all ‘Liberated Territories’ schools educated those ‘cheated by colonialism’.
Education Central to Liberation
Education Central to Liberation

Liberation Armies developed own textbooks.
Hospitals Part of War
Impact on Metropole:

- Portugal drained by costs of war
- early 1970s, almost half national budget spent on colonial wars in Africa
- no development taking place in Portugal itself
- young men migrating to France (ironically) in search of work
- reminiscent of economic/military ‘impact’ of Algeria on France decade earlier
Impact on Portugal

Army:
- often seen as ‘out’ for poor with no education, few skills, no future
- Portuguese army no exception
- this war affecting recruitment of any with other ‘choices’ (including out-migration to France)
- draft enacted
Army:
- many appalled by reality of war in Africa
- in 1970s, pictures (like following) distributed internationally
- as in Algeria, tactics of guerilla war when seen ‘up close in photos’ put ‘new image’ on protecting overseas province

Not only recruitment but desertions became major problem.
Portuguese Soldiers: Africa is Hell
Portuguese Atrocities
Portugal faced other problems:

- rural population tended to support FRELIMO, helped compensate for logistical difficulties of transporting supplies
- “Liberated Zones” with schools, agricultural projects, hospitals desirable, protected
- attracted even those who initially opposed FRELIMO
Challenge: how to ‘compete’?

- Portuguese tried to convince people there were more opportunities to be gained by supporting them (controlled resources)
- Also threatened them with retaliation if they supported liberation forces: moved them into villages to control contact with FRELIMO
Portuguese Tactics...

The ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach, backed up with offering ‘opportunities’. It sometimes worked.
Portuguese Threats

“DO NOT let ‘the enemy’ cross the river.

Anyone on river may be the enemy.

Therefore, DO NOT CROSS THE RIVER OR YOU WILL BE KILLED!
Portuguese Tactics...

Challenge: how to ‘compete’?

- perhaps most effective: established militarily guarded ‘resettlement camps’ which contained 100s of 1000s (also policy in Angola)
Resettlement Camps
Resettlement Camps
Impact on Portugal

Portugal: some government reforms

- reduced forced labour (cited by ILO in 1972 for contravening Geneva Accord against use of forced labour)
- abolished the status of *assimilado* (about 5000, total population more than 8 million)
- opened up Angola to non-Portuguese investment: aim to give West bigger stake in *overall* Portuguese victory

Not Enough!
Foreign Aid and Support

Plane given by the US (see “US Air Force on the nose). Note Portuguese symbol on Tail: “Cross of Christ”
Impact on Portugal

1974:
- Armed Forces Movement seized power in military coup
- supported African Liberation Movements
- men sympathetic to decolonization put into influential offices

1975:
- FRELIMO recognized as government in Mozambique
Most other colonial powers resolved issues arising from decolonization intact:

- closest comparison, Algeria: France survived War of Liberation with scars but ‘more or less’ intact
- Portugal unique in that its wars in Africa, including Mozambique, actually led to collapse of state itself!
Video
Basil Davidson
“Africa… The Legacy”
(excerpt on Mozambique, including interview with Samora Machel)
Independence: challenges

Challenges:
- optimism of video short lived
- within two years, Mozambique embroiled in war that would last 17 years

Debate:
- Civil War?
- War of Aggression?
Independence: challenges

Exodus Portuguese:
- in spite of FRELIMO’s non-racialist ideology, Portuguese fled following independence
- constituted professional, managerial class
- administrative, economic structures came to standstill
- FRELIMO was left to run bankrupt country with no trained people
- illiteracy rate over 90 percent
- fewer than 1000 black high-school graduates
Independence: challenges

FRELIMO itself part of Problem:
- small elite, urban based, drew heavily on *assimilado* class
- committed to idea of creating ‘new Mozambique’, ‘new man’
- needed to modernize to be able to compete with Rhodesia, South Africa
- emphasis on creating ‘modern’ agricultural base to support industrialization
- replacing ‘traditional’ custom, culture with ‘modern’ administration, education
Independence: challenges

Why was this a Problem?

- overall lack educated, trained personnel: led to rapid creation FRELIMO party network – anyone who could assist in the ‘national project’, led by FRELIMO vanguard, became part of favoured elite
- excellent opportunities for some, left many alienated, marginalized and resentful
Why was this a Problem?

- FRELIMO’s policies included restrictions on property holding and collectivized agriculture

- ‘vision’ of new Mozambique and ‘new man’ was ideology shared by very few: most had fought war to be rid of Portuguese and have better life
Why was this a Problem?

- Property: no one could own more than one house, third-party rentals prohibited
- State confiscated ‘extra’ buildings
- Those who moved into these buildings paid rent to government
- Alienated many middle-class property owners, landlords
- Even new tenants disappointed that freedom from Portuguese didn’t bring free housing
Independence: challenges

Why was this a Problem?

-Agriculture: traditional farming seen as ‘backward’
- massive programme collectivization
- worked in some areas but mostly very unpopular
- groups, families with no ties forced to live, work together: tensions, conflict
- opened door to corruption and exploitation on part of those ‘chosen’ to manage land, labour
Why was this a Problem?

- Ideology: argument was that peasants had been introduced to ‘communal agriculture’ during the war (liberated zones)
- actually, very few people had experienced this
- many associated process with Portuguese strategy of bringing peasants together so that they could not support FRELIMO guerillas, to be subjected to Portuguese ‘propaganda’
Independence: challenges

Nevertheless:

- 1975 – 1983, 97% rural investment channeled towards massive state farms
- coincided with collapse rural shops, trading posts due to Portuguese exodus
- soon saw ‘goods famine’ in countryside: even necessary basic implements such as hoes almost impossible to find
- many peasants soon stopped selling surpluses, little for them to buy: created food shortages
Independence: challenges

Other complications:
- Mozambique (especially the south) had long history migrant labour to South Africa, integrated with traditional agriculture
- collectivization ‘cost’ families in earnings
- contributed to class differentiation in rural areas:
  * those who did well from state farms and FRELIMO became staunch party supporters
  * the rest became potential support for RENAMO
Independence: challenges

Question of ‘backwardness’ - multitude decrees issued:

- traditional leadership abolished
- lobola (bride wealth) outlawed
- polygamous men denied party membership
- ceremonies were banned
- religious institutions were suspect
- practitioners sorcery to be ‘re-educated’
- efforts to move peasants from scattered hamlets to communal villages: ‘cities in the bush’

Effort to combat ‘superstition’, replace with ‘scientific socialism’!
Independence: challenges

Failure FRELIMO leadership:
- cultural insensitivity
- also, party did not have strength, sufficient cadres, inclusive enough vision
- could not offer population coherent replacement for structures FRELIMO destroying
- to extent peasantry incorporated into state, often coercive

When hostile foreign powers entered volatile situation, FRELIMO lost control large sections of country
Foreign Intervention
Foreign Intervention:

- FRELIMO upheld UN sanctions against neighbouring Rhodesia
- also allowed bases of guerilla army in Mozambique territory
- quickly initiated response: Rhodesia ‘hired’ Mozambican soldiers, worked as auxiliaries to Rhodesian army, known by acronym RENAMO
- goal: to destabilize Mozambique, discredit FRELIMO
Foreign Intervention

- situation changed with fall of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and ZANU government
- Mugabe’s ‘leftist-leanin’ government feared; FRELIMO now had independent, sympathetic neighbour
- US strongly against ‘threat of Communism’ (government under Reagan)
- South Africa revived role as ‘bulwark against Communism’ in southern part of continent: targeted Mozambique
Foreign Intervention

- South Africa: new ‘patron’ of RENAMO
- war intensified and spread
- RENAMO now struggling to establish base within Mozambique
- two main strategies: co-option and coercion
- both preying on those alienated by FRELIMO and increasingly, those tired of war
- in areas sympathetic to RENAMO, recognised *regulos* who would support them, appointed new ones where necessary
- also re-created local police force, answering to *regulos*
- as with Portuguese colonialism and *assimilados*, *regulos* in practice lowest level RENAMO authority - collected taxes, kept local order
- RENAMO developed an ideology to rival FRELIMO: claimed it supported ‘tradition’
Foreign Intervention

- where population not accepting, brute force, coercion, massacres used to intimidate peasantry into compliance
- as war expanded, so did need for soldiers, porters, ‘domestic help’
- practice of forcing children, boys and girls, into army became principal means of recruitment
- also had impact of demoralizing communities, removing much-needed labour
- original goal destabilization now one of winning
What Kind of War?

Civil War or War of Aggression?

- probably both
- initially, war generated by ‘foreign forces’ (Rhodesia, then South Africa)
- as RENAMO began to root itself in local communities, drawing on and cultivating widespread (and growing) resentment of FRELIMO – especially in areas where collectivization most predominant – came to be more ‘civil war’
What Kind of War?

Civil War or War of Aggression?

- large sections population caught in the middle
- survived best they could
- if settled in communal villages, would be attacked by RENAMO
- if in scattered hamlets, FRELIMO soldiers would burn them out, herd them into communal villages.

There is a Mozambican saying: ‘When elephants fight it’s the grass that gets trampled’
1984: Nkomati Accord

- intensifying war forced FRELIMO to negotiate with South Africa
- treaty: both parties pledged neither would support internal enemies of the other
- FRELIMO banned all ANC operations outside token representation
- South African military did not do the same
- RENAMO received massive arms shipments, supplies before signing accord; regular shipments weapons, supplies after it
- rather than buying breathing space, accord increased pressure on FRELIMO
1986:

- Samora Machel ‘killed’ in plane crash near South African border
- believed to have been sabotage by SA
- some also accused Mozambicans who saw the Nkomati Accord as betrayal
- by late 1980s, both sides struggling
- Tanzania and Zimbabwe offering assistance to FRELIMO
- one point, 10,000 Zimbabwean soldiers fighting alongside FRELIMO [many guarding Beira Railroad – crucial to Zimbabwe]
RENAMO:

- South Africa facing domestic ‘state of emergency’ (from 1986)
- decreasing aid and support available for RENAMO
- turned to ‘economy of plunder’: stripped villages of all goods – consumed or sold them in SA or Malawi
- involved in illegal smuggling of ivory
- basically countryside stripped of most resources
Impact on Mozambique

Impact on Mozambicans:
- continual process of ‘displacement’ by one or the other army (estimated around 3 million)
- many sought refuge in South Africa and Swaziland (in total at least 1.5 million)

Late 1980s:
- FRELIMO held control most cities, not easily dislodged
- RENAMO had rooted itself in many rural areas, including city hinterlands, also not easily dislodged
- war reached stalemate!
FRELIMO makes move:

- 1989 FRELIMO Congress abandoned socialist single-party state
- created liberal democratic, free-market constitution that appealed widely to western governments, World Bank
- pulled ideological rug out from under RENAMO
- FRELIMO also insisted on ‘winner take all’ power structure – no collaborative ‘power sharing’ such as Rhodesia had attempted
- war was over
Peace at Last

October 15, 1992:
- FRELIMO, RENAMO finally signed peace agreement that brought 17 years war to an end
- peace greeted with guarded optimism but...
- country devastated:
  - at least a million people died due to conflict, associated diseases, starvation
  - another million and a half in exile
  - small improvements of late 1970s (schools, hospitals) destroyed: population back at pre-independence level
- need for massive investments to rebuild infrastructure, industry
Peace at Last

1994 Elections:

- RENAMO accepted peace agreement because it allowed for full political participation based on strong peasant base it had built during war (that ‘base’ had same votes to cast as FRELIMO strongholds)

- FRELIMO able to draw on long history of unity, strength as ‘vanguard’ capable of leading Mozambique past this (second) war of liberation: won presidency

- no one contested election results, no one wanted to return to war

But: FRELIMO, RENAMO governing together?
Peace at Last

Equally important:
- how did Mozambican population ‘understand’ what had just happened?
- what did it mean to be citizen of capitalist democracy?
- referendum on implementing multi-party democracy rejected for fear it would cause conflict
- one region, UN’s peace mission seen as ‘re-colonization’, reinforced by UN troops publicly disarming FRELIMO soldiers
Peace at Last

- others voted because they were told to: just another duty required by the government or RENAMO
- most cast vote for whichever force strongest in their area
- at least initially, elections were mostly about placating the most powerful force in the near vicinity
Peace at Last

-in 2000, law passed enabling *regulos* to hold public office: many do so as extensions of colonial authority – complete with uniforms, as this is the only ‘concept’ of government authority they know

-FRELIMO holds influence in some areas only because local leaders understand that if ‘the other’ power wins the elections, they will lose their jobs!
“To campaign for FRELIMO means to secure our jobs. As we saw in 1975, the upcoming independence meant the destruction of the colonial administrative machine and state functionaries ended up without jobs. If RENAMO gets into power it will not be different”

[Local Gov’t Official, quoted in ‘Strong Party, Weak State’ in Resources. n/d]
... but not without challenges!

Key Problems faced post-war society:

- how to integrate RENAMO not only as political force but ‘community member’?
- how to ‘normalize’ life when forced to live with soldiers (of both sides) who may have terrorized your village, killed your family?
- how to ‘transition’ from life of fear, flight and violence to peace and democracy?
- how to reintegrate ‘young adults’ who were children when kidnapped/coerced into RENAMO?
... but not without challenges!

Have included News Clippings from 1997-2000 in ‘Readings’ [also choice for Documents Analysis]

- although only excerpts, highlight how these problems began to play themselves out during 1990s

Article ‘Swords and Plowshares’ (2005) speaks to legacies half-a-decade later:

- written by Canadian CBC correspondent who knew the country in the midst of the war, claims Mozambique is ‘modest success story’ in spite poverty, natural disasters and political fragility
Want to end with focus on problem not unique to Mozambique but which Mozambique was the first country to have to address: child soldiers and the long-term consequences for post-war society

- scale upon which RENAMO depended on child soldiers unique in 1980s
- attracted international attention
- Mozambique set model for ‘DDR’
- repeated elsewhere (eg Sierra Leone, Uganda)
- remained ‘issue’ for Mozambique as recently as 2005: child soldiers remain international concern, legislation still debated
... but not without challenges!

Video Excerpt:
“Stolen Children” (1994)

[see ‘Readings’: full video 30 min.]