“By far the greatest obstacle [to development] then and now has been the discovery of oil. ... For most nations the discovery of oil has spurred development and industry, unfortunately in our country... Oil has been a burden, and a source of great pain. ...”

Abiodun Adekunle (April 2004)
Colonial Nigeria

Part 1
Colonial Nigeria

Former British West African Colony:
- British imperialism dates to taking of Lagos (island) as protectorate 1860, earliest formal presence as colonial power
- Experience reflected several ‘issues’ identified characterizing colonialism:
  * early resistance (Islamic)
  * problems with abolition
  * regional inequities/differential development

All shaped Decolonization & Post-Colonialism
Colonial Nigeria

Mahdist Revolt 1905-6:

- British movement into Northern Nigeria triggered ‘Mahdism’
- network stretched into neighbouring French territories as well
- drew on jihad in Sudan where Islamic state had emerged 1880s
- ‘Mahdi’ was purist, returning Muslims to ‘true’ Islam
- but composition followers largely class-based‘
- revolt ‘internal’: followers rejecting Islamic Rule of Sokoto Caliphate (exploitative), withdrew to eastern regions, even Sudan (‘hijra’)
- Sokoto remained ‘loyal’ to British
- but important emirates in Caliphate (Kano, Katsina) considering joining revolt
- Mahdists sought to overthrow all established authority: colonial administrators and local officials who collaborated with Europeans
Colonial Nigeria

- uprising revealed strong class divisions: had almost no support from Fulani (ethnic group dominating Caliphate)
- attracted radical clerics (favouring ‘Mahdism’), disgruntled peasants (over-taxed, exploited), fugitive slaves (seeking promised ‘abolition’)

Colonial Nigeria

Importance:

In revealing underlying dissatisfaction of Hausa (and others – but Hausa predominant among ‘conquered) with Sokoto Caliphate rule, British given leverage to control Emirs:
And now they knew who to ‘reward’, who to remove from power, and who to ‘watch closely’.

Mahdist Revolt shaped subsequent Colonial Rule in Northern Nigeria.
Colonial Nigeria

Southern regions:
- dominated by ‘acephalous’ societies in East, strong states in west (some Muslim)
- imposed ‘Indirect Rule’: Lord Lugard
- Employed by Royal Niger Company (trading company seeking monopoly)
- Lugard charged with creating ‘protectorate’ in south and extending control to north (Sokoto Caliphate)
- both proved difficult for different reasons
Colonial Nigeria

‘Indirect Rule’:

- required indigenous, co-operative infrastructure of ‘emirs’ (north) and ‘chiefs’ (most of south)
- had to agree to end Slave Trade and Slavery, to support British efforts to ‘modernize’ (so had to agree to supply labour and tax payments)
- problem in south-east (Niger Delta): no ‘chiefs’ (ruled by councils of elders)
- solution: create chiefs (who then owed power, potential wealth to British)
Colonial Nigeria

Legitimacy key issue:

- ‘orders’ came through Chiefs, Emirs
- effective in north, ‘Caliphate’ with administration based on ‘emirs’ retained (largely façade)
- less so in south where authority frequently challenged (most dramatic, ‘Women’s Riots’ 1929 – as much challenge to authority of Chiefs as resistance to British)
Colonial Nigeria

‘Law’ central problem:
- in South (increasingly Christianized), British Law imposed
- main problem: slavery
- Native House Proclamation 1912: permitted ‘slavery in household’, prohibited trade

- in North (Muslim), dual system functioned: *sharia* (Islamic), British
- Islamic courts dealt with matters personal status (eg. land disputes, divorce, debt, slave emancipation)
Impression:

- little really changed in the North (British intervention in appointment Emirs, rare)
- taxation, administration former Caliphate continued
- slavery: efforts to end Royal/domestic slavery slow to have effect [see ‘Baba of Karo in Resources for insight into changes under British]
- principal focus tension: law – but even that was ‘contained’ throughout colonial era
Colonial Nigeria

- Sokoto Caliphate strengthened as ‘arm’ of British rule
- early differences between Hausa - Fulani subsumed to growing power Caliphate vis-à-vis other parts of colony
- however: not entirely erased
- diverse ethnic groups, some of them non-Muslim, in the so-called Middle Belt, drawn into ‘Northern’ orbit (not always willingly)
Impression:
- in South combination of indigenous Christianization, appointment of ‘Colonial Chiefs’, urbanization (Lagos), wealth (cocoa in south west, palm oil in south east/Delta) left sense of rapid change
- Chinua Achebe’s work reflects the south
- critical for Colonial Resource ‘exploitation’: received more investment, attention
- region most directly engaged with British education, modernization
Post-War Nigeria

WWII and Post-War Political Activity: rooted in colonial-created ‘regions’

- south west Nigerian Action Group (Awolowo)
- north Northern Elements Progressive Union (Amin Kano);
- 1951 became Northern People’s Congress (Sir Ahamadu Bello)
Post-War Nigeria

Obafemi Awolowo  Nnamdi Azikiwe
Post-War Nigeria

Amin Kano

Ahmadu Bello
Post-War Nigeria

Richards Commission 1946:
- moderate reform (comparable to Gold Coast), responding to slowly changing ideas of colonialism in London
- widely criticized, even by elite it was supposed to please
- led to ‘tribal nationalism’
- Regions galvanized majority ethnic groups into ‘dominant’ ones: North, ‘Hausa-Fulani’; South West, Yoruba; South East, Igbo/Ibo
Colonial Political Economy framed and was then entrenched in Post War Politics.
Post-War Nigeria

Constitution revamped 1951:
- greater devolution power under Federal Government
- regions increasingly identified with ethnic groups “Tribal Nationalism”:
  *Ibo/Igbo (south east)
  *Yoruba (south west)
  *Hausa-Fulani (north)

Potential strongly established for religious divides as well: ‘Christian south’ versus ‘Muslim North’
Post-War Nigeria

Linguistic Groups

Principal Linguistic Groups

- Hausa and Fulani
- Kanuri
- Yoruba
- Ibo
- Efik Ibibo
- Igbo
- Gwari
- Nupé
- Tiv
- Mixed

Map showing the distribution of linguistic groups in Nigeria, with circled areas indicating specific regions.
Post-War Nigeria

1954:
- as ‘Veranda Boys’ consolidating power in Gold Coast, new Nigerian constitution placed more emphasis on role ‘Federal’ government
- but: regional ethnic rivalries, tensions well entrenched

1957:
- South East, West granted ‘self-government’
- 1959 North gained ‘local control’
Independent Nigeria

1960:
- Nigeria gained full independence:
  - Nnamdi Azikiwe: first Governor General (leader in South East)

1963:
- became Republic:
  - Azikiwe first president
  - Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Northern People’s Congress) first Prime Minister
Nnamdi Azikiwe

Young student (above); inspirational leader (right) of southern Nigeria. Economist, advocated domestic economic autonomy, banks, currency.
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (first prime minister) with last British Gov-General, Sir James Robertson
The South: Biafra

Large Muslim population in north meant first government in hands of northerners:
- resented in south: government overthrown by Igbo army officers
- counter-coup six months later killed military leader, 300 officers
- massacres of Igbos in north followed (between 30,000- 50,000 killed)
- massive exodus back to south
- fears among Igbo led to movement for independent state in south east: ‘Biafra’
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

Video Excerpt:
Basil Davidson, “Africa: the Legacy”
[Biafran War]
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

Use of Child Soldiers
Shocked the West
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

Statements of Biafran Nationalism and Independence
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

Many Images of...

War in Biafra
Chief Ojukwu:

“At 33 I reacted as a brilliant 33 year old…At 66 it is my hope that if I had to face this I should also confront it as a brilliant 66 year old.

Responsibility for what went on – how can I feel responsible in a situation I which I put myself out and saved the people from genocide? No, I don’t feel responsible at all. I did the best I could.”

[Interview, Chief Emeka Ojukwu January 2000; http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_596000/596712.stm]
Not all would agree so readily:

“There is no needle without piercing point. There is no razor without trenchant blade. Death comes to us in many forms.”

The Nigerian-Biafran Civil War affected both Nigerians and Biafrans. We all lost loved ones.”

[Dele Chinwe Ukwu, “My memories of the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War”, Readings]
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

June 1967-January 1970: War was devastating for region:

- widespread use of child soldiers
- famine because of gov’t blockade
- lack support other states

Challenge of post war era: how to move on?

- Davidson video celebrates peace, prosperity, reconciliation, oil profits
- few ‘shadows’ on horizon: except beginnings of corruption
But:
- Prosperity for whom?
- Peace for whom?
- Corruption: who would control it?
- Reconciliation: how long would it last?

Davidson, like many others, was still optimistic c.1985 . . .

In fact, there were to be no victors and many victims in post-war Nigeria -- the legacy was a long-lasting one. The reason? Oil.
Nigeria: Biafra 1967-70

Part 2
The Delta & Curse of Oil

In midst of war (1969) federal government acquiring control of oil fields:

- over next ten years south-easterners disenfranchised
- when civilian government took power 1979, number decrees, edicts had transformed Niger Delta into ‘colony’
- inhabitants bore brunt of oil production on which national economy relied
- enjoyed none of the benefits.
The Delta & Curse of Oil

- revenue sharing adjustments: 50% profits allocated it equally among all provinces (since 1967, twelve), giving other 50% to government
- Delta communities in which oil produced receiving about 20%
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Government ineffective, overthrown: new military regime reduced portion oil revenue going to Delta to 1.5 per cent.

- Shell (subsidiary Anglo-Dutch oil giant), other Western oil companies benefited from legislation
- oil companies not required to obtain permission of local communities for mineral exploration or mining: answered only to government
- companies to pay 'compensation' to local people for crops and other valuables destroyed in the course of oil production
The Delta & Curse of Oil

- amount left to discretion companies: minimal

- environmental protection laws breached by all companies: devastated farm lands, fishing creeks communities relied on

By late 1980s:

- decades government neglect reduced Delta to excruciating poverty

- conditions worsened by International Monetary Fund ‘structural adjustment policies’
“By far the greatest obstacle [to development] then and now has been the discovery of oil. …For most nations the discovery of oil has spurred development and industry, unfortunately in our country…Oil has been a burden, and a source of great pain. No doubt a few thoroughly morally bereft elites have used this national resource as a source of personal self-enrichment, and as a consequence currently have the nation by the yoke. …
...The pain of the Ogoni and the reality of environmental degradation is caused by the discovery of oil. The social instability and insecurity of the Niger Delta is caused by the discovery of oil, and if there was no oil in the Biafra, I very much doubt the military orders [back in 1967] would have been given to destroy Biafra.”
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Following decade, situation worsened: difference was international attention.

- well-known writer, poet Ken Saro Wiwa became activist spokesperson for Oguni
- brought plight of people, environment to attention international audiences, governments

[see “The Drilling Fields” (1994 – film transcript, ‘Resources’) ]
The Delta & Curse of Oil
Saro Wiwa frequently arrested, harassed:
- oil companies solicited government support to clamp down on public protests
- successful doing so

1995:
- Saro-Wiwa, 8 others arrested, tried for murder
- sentenced to death
- international outrage, appeals ignored
- ‘The Ogoni 9’ -- all executed
The Delta & Curse of Oil

African Remembrance: The Ogoni 9

Remember Ken Saro-Wiwa?
Shell would have you die.

Ken Saro-Wiwa
Executed November 10, 1995

Shell: branded as a culprit of environmental and social abuses in the Niger Delta region, particularly involving the Ogoni people.
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Land Expropriation (origins in Biafran War):
- re-affirmed in Constitution 1999: “rights to minerals located in any part of the country belong to the Federal Government – expropriation can take place with compensation”
- compensation to communities based on value based on crops, not land itself: inadequate
- Federal Government standards low, companies profited – even companies agreed!
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Oil Pipeline Leaks

Oil & Gas Leak Fires
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Gas Flares… Never Stop Burning

[see YouTube ‘Wikileaks’ site, Readings; ‘Grinding Poverty…’, Resources]
Human Rights issues only beginning with Sara Wiwa, not restricted to Shell:
- repeated examples oil companies engaging with local military to brutalize ‘non co-operating’ villagers

“Parabe Incident” (Chevron):

“According to Bola Oyimbo, who co-led the protest, the protesters sought potable water, greater local employment, medical facilities, and the fulfillment of pledges made by Chevron to provide scholarships to local students....”
Occupied Chevron’s platform:
- agreed to leave after talks
- before that happened, were attacked by helicopters:

“ They started shooting before they even landed, started shooting indiscriminately...The end result was that we lost two of our boys and a lot of them got injured...Some of them jumped overboard and they were later rescued. Then the balance of us, we refused to [leave the barge]. ...
The Delta & Curse of Oil

... So they decided to arrest 11 of us. We were first taken to a Nigerian naval base at Warri. ...Then ...they transferred us to another cell [different town] before taking us to the state security service at the Fort of Ortacuri. Chevron...first accused us of sabotage...then later, [Chevron] asked them to make me sign [a statement] that we destroyed their chopper, vandalized their equipment – which was a lie. I was hanged up by the handcuffs on my wrists on the hook on the ceiling fan. They asked me to sign a statement that I led a team to the Parabe platform but I refused…”

Those who had fired upon them said they had been paid by Chevron.
1999:
- Villagers demanded compensation for oil-related environmental damage
- Military responded: killed people, livestock; destroyed homes, churches, shrines, wells, fishing equipment.

Chevron charged with supplying transport, equipment for attack.
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Return to civilian government under General Obasanjo, 1999: no significant impact
- estimated US$350 billion earned from oil by federal government 1965 – 2000, did not alleviate poverty
- many studies suggest it exacerbated deprivation through opportunities it provided for corruption, abuse [not to mention environmental damage]

End 20th C:
Nigeria among 15 poorest countries in world, 70% of its people live below poverty line.
21st century:

- conditions not changed
- poverty continues
- political situation worsening

[see YouTube ‘Grinding Poverty in Oil-Rich Niger Delta’]
Current situation one of failure of state, absence of law and order in Delta region:
- companies’ policies of benefiting local ‘host community’ exacerbated ethnic differences, ‘have-have not’ rivalries:

"The system of designating some communities as host communities left those not so designated feeling alienated and underprivileged, inadvertently leading to or adding to the causes of conflicts among communities," the company said.

- such host communities now prime targets of attack, destruction.
Oil multinationals pay local ‘troublemakers’ to protect operations:

"Young, unemployed community men were being paid salaries as ghost workers for doing nothing at all, except that some are often found to be involved in threats, extortion and disruption of operations…“

Situation fueled gang violence, thefts of oil “bunkering” (tapping into pipelines, also cause of major accidents, explosions) – huge losses to oil companies
"Annual casualties from fighting already place the Niger Delta in the 'high intensity conflict' category (over 1000 fatalities a year), alongside more known cases such as Chechnya and Colombia. The criminalisation and political economy of conflicts in the region mean that the basis for escalated, protracted and entrenched violence is rapidly being established. This not only threatens [Shell's] (and the oil industry's) future ability to operate, but also Nigerian national security."

[see “Remember Ken Saro-Wiwa: conflict” - website no longer available]
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Political Situation Deteriorated:

- echoes of Biafra: Mujahid Dokubu-Asari led political party (many argue ‘youth gang’) demanding independence for region

“Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra” (MASSOB, 1999)

Policies:

- kidnappings oil workers, managers
- usually demand ransom
- thefts of crude oil continue
The Delta & Curse of Oil

Impact:

- oil production cut by more than a quarter in 2006
- all ethnic groups in Delta fighting together (first time)
- all claiming oil resources for a new independent Biafra (referencing struggles of immediate post-independence era and civil war -- strategy of using passionate past to create new future)
The Delta & Curse of Oil

MASSOB Fighters and Followers

[See ‘Nigeria Haunted by Ghosts of Biafra’, Resources]
December 2010:

Wikileaks – ‘Shell Infiltrated Nigerian Government’

[YouTube video
Full Article in ‘Readings’]
Part 3
The North: Islam and Sharia

Large Muslim population in north meant first government in hands of northerner:

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (first prime minister) with last British Gov-General, Sir James Robertson
The North: Islam and Sharia

Challenges of Independence in North:
- provide Muslims with sense of religious fulfillment
- cater to religious pluralism, equal citizenship for many non-Muslims

“The government of Northern Nigeria [on the eve of Independence] was in a dilemma. Though extremely anxious to preserve the entrenched position of the religion of Islam and Moslem law within its territory, the government was at the same time prepared to conform to the general pattern of legal jurisprudence and development to achieve the balancing of the social order of which the Northern region is an integral part”.

[Associate Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court, Dr. Karibi-Whyte]
The North: Islam and *Sharia*

Nigeria inherited legacy of legal pluralism:

- ‘patch-work’ satisfying neither demands modern democracy nor desires to return to traditional religion and culture.
- Muslims protested integrity of Sharia violated
- Some clerics interpreted proposal as plot by ‘Christian crusaders’ to undermine Islam.
- Opposition continued to mount against what was referred to as ‘policy of Anglicization of Islamic justice’
The North: Islam and Sharia

Nigerian rule oscillated military-civilian government (1960s-1990s):
- each time civilian government returned, constitution revisited question of sharia:

- 1976: northern Muslim delegate to national assembly articulated argued that, “Islam is a way of life. If you take away Sharia [from a ] Moslem, you are taking his religion away”.

- to not create Federal Sharia Court of Appeal is to violate freedom of religion of Muslims
The North: Islam and Sharia

Debates repeated:
- 1979, eve of Second Republic
- 1989, transition to democracy
- 1995, yet another return to democracy (after military rule)

At these negotiations: Key issues were…
- status of the Nigerian nation-state
- place of Sharia in it

Issue of ‘Islam and sharia’ both Northern and National issue
Each time -- political rulers settled on compromise pleasing neither ‘side’.

Dissatisfaction grew significantly among Muslims in the north – but increasingly, not only among the elite.
The North: Islam and Sharia

1999: Nigeria returned to civilian/democratic rule (Obasanjo) after devastating decade of military power:
- Governor Ahmed Sani (Zamfara State, North) campaigned on banner of restoring Islamic justice
- seen as contrast to corruption, violence associated with previous regimes
- he was successful!

[See ‘Nigerian Muslims Welcome Sharia Law’, Additional Readings]
The North: Islam and Sharia

Initiated next decade of instability, violence:
- religious, ethnic conflicts
- now focused on implementation of his ‘Islamic Justice’, namely – *sharia* law.

Why was *sharia* attractive?
- argued that law would check prostitution, drunkenness, stealing, robbery, gambling
- not only what religious elite wanted
- resonated among poor, oppressed, disenchanted with what ‘Anglicized *sharia* system’ (colonial legacy) brought
The North: Islam and *Sharia*

Others, including most populous state Kano, announced intentions to follow:

- week prior to bill in Zamfara, Kano state passed similar bill
- Kano home to many Christian migrants from south
- in Niger state governor announced sharia bill to be presented to assembly
- provoked immediate demonstrations, shutting down shops by Christians
In each case, Governors stipulated law would apply only to Muslims:

- still, Christians fearful as to how it would affect their lives:
- how will police implement?
- What about cases involving Muslims and Christians?
- How would (potential) conflicts with Human Rights legislation be addressed?
The North: Islam and *Sharia*

**Sharia Penal Law, Zamfara State 2000:**

- Sharia courts with full criminal jurisdiction over offences like possession, sale, drinking of alcoholic beverages to prostitution, adultery
- guild of Islamic clerics providing judges
- power to award death penalty (stoning) in case of adultery by a married, divorced woman
- role public prosecutor performed by vigilante group “Hisba” (“Sharia Police”)

Eleven other northern states soon followed.
The North: Islam and Sharia

Responses Immediate:
- Kano: Ethnic rioting
- Hausa locals attacked by southern Yoruba
- gangs then attacked Yoruba shops, burnt buildings
- Yoruba community sought protection in (gov’t) military barracks
- reactions echoed in southern town (Sagamu): Yoruba attacked Hausa, killing at least 50, forcing hundreds of others to flee
The North: Islam and Sharia

[See ‘Kano Tense after Ethnic Riots’, Resources]
Responses Immediate:
- Kaduna: rioting between Christians-Muslims
- more than 1000 people killed
- three months later, conflict drew in extra police, soldiers: 200 reported killed
- poorer neighbourhoods hardest hit: mosques, churches, 100s other buildings burnt down
- streets strewn with bodies
- officials denied this was about ‘religion’
- locals confirmed ‘gangs’ involved organized Christian-Muslim affiliation
The North: Islam and Sharia

[See ‘200 dead in Kaduna Riots’, Resources]
The North: Islam and Sharia

Kaduna became increasingly segregated:

- mixed neighbourhoods where Christians and Muslims used to live together, gradually disappeared

- 1000s Ibos fled to South East in fear (reminiscent of 1960s)

- generated reprisal attacks: Ibo in Aba (major city of region) attacked resident (minority) Muslims

- Aba feared renewed violence

- government feared violence would spread to other regions
The North: Islam and Sharia

Kano (left) 1999,
Kanduna (below) 2000
The North: Islam and Sharia

Jos (Middle Belt): eruptions of ethnic, religious violence:

- 2001, more than 700 people killed Christian-Muslim conflicts (nearby Yelwa)
- 2004 similar conflict: 500 killed
- 2008 Jos: 400 people killed, 1000s fled
- 2010 more violence: 30 killed, 300 injured, 1000s displaced
The North: Islam and Sharia

Jos, January 2010
The North: Islam and Sharia

Soldier guarding Mosque (left)
Jos, 2010

Displaced Flee Violence (right), Jos 2010
The North: Islam and Sharia

Emergence Boko Haram 2009 (Maiduguri):
- name means “Western education is sacrilege” in Hausa
- wants stricter version Sharia law across all of Nigeria
- July: attacked Police Station
- violence (plus ‘crackdown’) = 700 dead, group’s mosque destroyed
- leader ‘died’ in custody: considered execution (ex-judicial)
- group into hiding: even listening to sermon by member led to arrest
'Violence across Northern Nigeria'

[YouTube Video, Resources]
The North: Islam and Sharia

Boko Harem Leader (above left);
Followers Under Arrest (above right)
The North: Islam and Sharia

October 2010:
- anniversary of 2009 attack: bombed central police station (Maiduguri)
- random ‘drive by’ attacks on police, witnesses in 2009 trials
- assassinated local cleric denouncing group’s Islamic ideology
- orchestrated prison break (750-800 prisoners, followers of sect in Sept)
- group believed to be re-armed, regaining strength
Prison set on Fire
(Maiduguri, Sept. 2009)
Abubakar Shekau, ‘deputy leader’
believed killed in 2009; Re-emerged summer 2010.
Current Boko Harem leader
2011 proving ‘beliefs’ to be true:
- January: renewed attacks

Anonymous Member:
“... our target is only the police and traditional rulers.
... We are not after the masses, as such, they should go about their normal business without fear. We are against Sheriff's administration which killed our leader and many of our members.“ ...
The North: Islam and Sharia

Feb. 3, 2011:
- “Boko Haram, yesterday, claimed responsibility for the assassination of Borno State gubernatorial candidate for the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party, ANPP, Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio.”
- followed several killings of police officers
- message delivered: the sect plans a “full-scale war”

[see “Boko Haram - Jan”, “Boko Haram – Feb”, ‘Resources’]
The North: Islam and Sharia

Significance:

- echoes earlier Mahdist revolt 1905-6 to extent it targets traditional leaders and police – those who colonized as well as those who ‘co-operated’

- also resonating with same ‘classes’: those who feel new Islam, new Nation only exploited them further, demoralized their society

- and with youths (especially males) of those classes: unemployed, powerless, lost even ‘control’ of women in families
The North: Islam and Sharia

Significance:
- colonial ‘tribal nationalism’ resurrected in context of so-called ‘religious’ conflict
- brings Nigeria into ‘world watch’ on Islamic terrorism: ‘underpants bomber’ (Dec. 2009)
- complicated real domestic situation in Nigeria now ‘simplified’ by media to fit larger global view of Islam as ‘fundamentalist enemy’
Colonial Legacies: north and south

How do ‘colonial legacies’ from South and North come together to shape contemporary Nigeria?

- two different scenarios as understood/articulated in United States

- (1) a Muslim North re-emerges, takes power and then controls oil resources, holding north America to ransom

- (2) current corruption, poverty, political instability makes Nigeria ‘ripe’ for radical Islamic takeover (Boko Haram now seen as evidence that this is happening)
Both scenarios threaten American oil interests:
- Nigeria once again centre of ‘concern’
- early post-independence grab for resources largely successful (for West – US, European multi-national companies)
- ironic that some of same ‘consequences’ of resource exploitation, cultural ‘compromise’ we saw from Colonialism, now being felt in ‘Post-Colonial’ Nigeria!

[see “Addressing Nigeria's Economic Problems and the Islamist Terrorist Threat (A Cohen & B D. Schaefer, 2004) and "Worse than Iraq?" (Jefferey Taylor, April 2006), Resources]
Post-Scripts

Post Scripts (1):

For an elaboration of a ‘political’ interpretation of the violence – of how Northern Politicians/Political Parties are using religion and ethnicity as ‘tools’ to further their own economic and political power – by a Nigerian journalist, see:

“Riot and Northern Nigeria” (March, 2009)
[Readings]
Post Scripts (2):

Even today, political instability continues:
- Atiku Abubakar (contested presidential primaries January 2011 against President Goodluck Jonathan) petitioning Independent National Electoral Commission to cancel primaries (leading to full country elections, including President) in April

- based on allegations of bribery, coercion, election rigging against President Jonathan, sympathetic state governors