A Sense of Self: The Life of Fatma Barka

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Résumé


Introduction

Happy is the slave who, until the moment of drawing his last breath, remains close to his master, with wife and children. He creates thereby a reason for living, a knot of attachment with his place and his people. He clears the way for his offspring, who thusly have roots and will know in the days to come, to take advantage of their origin... For

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the worst and the greatest of solitudes, is to be from nowhere [Ennaji 1994, 211].


Fatma Barka was born someone else, somewhere in Mali, sometime from 1900 to 1910. She died in Goulimine, southern Morocco, in August 1995, living at least twenty years of her life as a slave, and the rest of it as a freed slave. She also lived a large part of that life as a concubine, a wife, a mother, a housekeeper, a cook, a bread vendor, and a factory worker — experiences which were by no means mutually exclusive. For the historian of North and West Africa, her life speaks to several issues addressed in the current literature on slavery.

But when Fatma told her story, she did not formulate it in terms of "enslavement" and "freedom." She did not remember a time before slavery, nor did she begin by speaking of the moment when she was liberated. Rather, her story started with a desert crossing made when she was young, in the caravan of a Timbuktu merchant, Mohamed Barka. At the time, he was her master, and she was his slave. Soon she would become his concubine. Her understanding of these realities and of how they shaped her subsequent life was encoded in that story. This article is an attempt to adjust my understanding to hers.

I was led to Fatma in the course of conducting research on commercial families in Goulimine. As a former slave in, and the only living member of, the household of Mohamed Barka, she was a potentially valuable informant. I was introduced to her by Barka’s grandnephew, Hassan ould Bashir ould Aly Fall, who also facilitated the first interview. It became clear that Fatma had a story of her own worth telling, and we encouraged its recounting both in the course of talking about Mohamed Barka (the first day), and in subsequent interviews. In all, we had three interviews with Fatma from 7 to 10 July, 1994, supplemented with an interview carried out one year later (October 1995) with Hassan and his sister. It was only at this point that we confirmed that Fatma had been Mohamed Barka’s concubine. Finally, my assistant Mohamed Nouhi spoke again with her son in November 1997, prompting the “Epilogue.”
The handling of such interviews raises important methodological issues: the validity of the material and its collection, the legitimacy of the translation and its analysis, the usefulness of the conceptual framework and its application. I believe the points of intersection among these issues hinge on distinguishing, first, between the creation of a written and an oral text and, second, between the construction of a "life history" and a "life-story." The concerns of historians to "order" interview material chronologically, to "verify" evidence with the written variety, and to "fill in the gaps" with material from additional research reflect a methodology born out of working with written sources. Even the emphasis on providing transcribed and translated tapes assumes that the "oral" can and must be made into the "written" before it has historical validity and usefulness.

It is not my intent to argue the already well established literature on the use of oral history in Africa. However, recent work in feminist oral history, "life-history" study, and (female) slave-narrative literary criticism generates some fundamental questions about this last assumption, questions which speak to the unease I feel about the more conventional approach to Fatma’s story. I am convinced of the value of seeking the orality of her testimony. My aim, below, in constructing parallel stories from it is twofold: first, methodologically I want to explore how differences in construction can reveal different pictures of reality, and, second, I want to allow historians access to Fatma’s experiences and Fatma access to history.

**Fatma’s History: The Narrative of a Female Slave**

Fatma was purchased in the former French Soudan (modern-day Mali) as a young child by Mohamed Barka, a wealthy Timbuktu merchant originally from Goulimine. In 1914, three years after the death of his business partner brother, Mohamed Barka returned to Goulimine to take charge of family affairs. Fatma was old enough to remember the events of the trip and young enough to refer to herself several times as "very young." She crossed the desert as part of the Barka household, experiencing a potentially deadly attack by renowned brigands, the Reguibat. The caravan had to be rescued, and Fatma remembers the great celebration that took place when Tindouf was reached safely.

Mohamed Barka’s reception in Goulimine was no less joyous.
Fatma recounts that "everyone was poor ... we found nothing"; Barka's wealth and generosity are remembered as having stimulated the economy of the town and region. Mohamed Barka established a new household in Goulimine with several slaves. While it is unclear what Fatma did initially, she speaks of working in the house garden with other slaves, then later in the kitchen, as a cook. Together with Messoud, she was in charge of cooking for the family and "all of Goulimine's important people." At some point, it seems that "Faytma" — "little Fatma" as she was called by Mohamed Barka — also became his concubine.

The next significant event in her life was his death in 1929. In spite of the fact that he had told his children prior to his death, "Faytma is your mother and not a slave," his wife Moina kept her as an inheritance. Fatma continued to run the household — "it was I who held the keys to the pantry" — but, for the first time, she also made and sold bread in the market and at moussem [annual fairs] throughout the region. She earned enough to buy land on which to build a house. Some time afterwards, she married Kauri wuld Braika, a slave who specialized in retrieving lost camels. He settled in Goulimine, where he became a well digger. Over the next few years, Fatma gave birth to two girls, both of whom died in infancy; in 1936, she had her son. During this period, Mohamed Barka's son Amar Salem liberated her, but apart from the public pronouncement, Fatma was given no proof of her freedom.

Her "liberated" life is difficult to reconstruct. The next memorable event involved her husband; indeed, this is the only time apart from mentioning the marriage itself that he entered her reminiscences.Possibly around 1945-46, he stole the title paper to her land and sold the property. Fatma first went to Barka's daughter Doumah to ask that her brother intervene; he did, unsuccessfully. She then approached Dahaman, the caïd [mayor] of Goulimine (Moina's father, who had married Fatma and Kauri), who convinced the purchaser of her land to restore it. Doumah helped her attempt to pawn some gold jewellery, but the potential purchaser refused to accept it. Instead, he loaned her the money she needed to redeem the paper, 270 Dirham.

At this point, her husband disappeared from the story. We know from other sources that he died in 1956 and that she did not remarry. She had borrowed enough money to leave Goulimine and, with her young son, to go to work in the sardine factory at
Agadir. She left another ex-slave to build a house on her land with the money she had earned in Agadir. Probably in the late 1940s, Fatma voyaged with three other women to Tindouf on a “business venture” involving the sale of contraband tobacco. In Tindouf, she knew the caid [his wife had been a neighbour in Timbuktu], the wife of a prominent Tadjakant, Khadeija mint Abdullah, and an unnamed family from Goulimine. She and the other women stayed fifteen days, built an oven, and baked and sold bread. They were “fed” by local slaves, and Khadeija supplied them with provisions for the return trip to Goulimine. Afterwards, Fatma returned to Agadir and factory work.

By 1955-56, Fatma and her son had returned to Goulimine, and Kauri had been taken into the Liberation Army. Fatma was concerned that her son was not yet married. If we are correct about her age, she may well have been about sixty years old, in need of a daughter-in-law. With the aid of a woman who “housed” army officers in Goulimine, Fatma arranged to have Kauri brought back from where he was stationed. She went ahead with preparations for the marriage, travelling to neighbouring markets, engaging other women’s help, and approaching Amar Salem and Messoud as well. Among other things, the Barka family provided the horse to transport the bride. The marriage was a great event in which there was much drumming; Fatma was “honoured” by the presence of army men eating at the house for a week.

These are the last events Fatma recounts in her life. She said nothing more about her daughter-in-law or her life after Kauri’s marriage. She began to work for wages as well, preparing food for other people’s celebrations in Goulimine and surrounding villages as long as she was able. Fatma still lived with her son in the house she had built from her “fish money” when we met her, and to the extent possible for an aging and ill woman, still participated in the life of the extended Barka family. She helped prepare food for all their feasts and care for them when they were ill. On the occasion of our first interview, she had just come from spending two months helping to care for the granddaughter of Mohamed Barka. But in late summer 1995, she died of old age.

“Fatma’s History” in Historical and Historiographical Context
Fatma’s history represents a unique slave experience, yet one of
many that has been collected and transcribed over the past century or so. As such, it is part of a literature that has strongly influenced the study of slavery in Africa [such as Perham 1936; Curtin 1967; Robertson 1983b; Wright 1983; Alpers 1983; Wright 1984]. What, then, does Fatma’s history “say” about slavery? Convention would have us begin by ascertaining how “representative” the case study is, with imposing a more precise set of criteria against which to measure relevance and “typicalness.” Susan Geiger has argued that looking for the representative in order to understand the group “norms” is inherently contradictory.26 Which study and whose criteria determine historical relevance? To date, we have tended to look to the largest or the most “important” [economically or politically] groups of servile peoples and pro-rate significance accordingly, as if either numbers or influence had an exclusive claim on reality. I propose that Fatma experienced a reality worth understanding, irrespective of such criteria, one that will enlarge the range of experiences and questions with which we can work.27

Fred Cooper once asked: “What is Islamic about slavery in an Islamic society in Africa?” (1981, 271). While there have been studies of slavery in Muslim regions, many of them appearing subsequent to Cooper’s East African work,28 few really address that question.29 The analysis of Martin Klein and Paul Lovejoy [1979] is still the best attempt. They contrasted an “Islamic system” with “lineage structure,” linking the former with the southern Sahara/savanna and the “most intensive exploitation of slaves,” the second with the forest/coastal regions. Exploitation, in turn, was linked to the level of market development: “Islam as such” did not cause more intensive exploitation, it merely coincided with it.30 The central issue for us, and for Fatma, is their discussion of the application of Islamic law (shar‘ia), as it governed two aspects of slavery — concubinage and emancipation.

Klein and Lovejoy [1979] note that the terms of servility with respect to concubinage were clearly defined under Islamic law:31 the children of concubines by masters were to be free, as were the concubines themselves, umm al-walid (mother of the child), after giving birth. Concubines who did not give birth, on the other hand, could be legally sold or inherited, although customarily they were freed on the death of their master [Schroeter 1992, 201]. “Custom” also meant that they were usually exempt from certain kinds of labour and given material gifts (particularly cloth and jewellery).
Klein and Lovejoy (1979, 211) juxtaposed this notion of “Islamic slavery,” which was egalitarian and moved slaves towards freedom, with that of lineage-based slavery, in which slaves were absorbed into the family, enlarging the retinue (and, therefore, power) of the elites. Elsewhere, Lovejoy (1983, 16) argues that it was precisely this Muslim acknowledgement of formal emancipation for concubines and their children (as well as other slaves under a variety of conditions) which differentiated Islamic from lineage-based slavery.

In spite of the fact that concubinage is probably the most frequently identified characteristic of so-called Islamic slavery (Willis 1985, 1: vii, xiv; Fisher 1970, 97-109), the literature is ambivalent on the subject (Mack 1992, 99, 100; McDougall 1998a). In recent compilations on slavery, any discussion of concubines tends to be linked to differences between matrilineal and patrilineal societies or, more frequently, to “women” (Miers and Kopytoff 1977, 30-34; Miers and Roberts 1988; Robertson and Klein 1983, 6-9). The issue is most sensitively treated in Cooper’s (1977, 25, 6) early work on East African Muslim society. He looked beyond the Islamic context to argue that the “laws” and customs were less about Islam per se than about the concept of kinship rooted in Islam. Hence, the factors relating to the “freeing” of concubines and the “legitimacy” of their children derived from the same kinship and group expansion concerns as those integral to lineage based societies. This insight takes us some distance in explaining the anomalies of the West African situation that Lovejoy and Klein (1979, 181-212) had difficulty locating in their model of dichotomous forms of slavery.

It is not easy to see what was particularly Islamic about Fatma’s experience or, indeed, what her story can contribute to furthering our understanding of some generic form of Islamic slavery. Although Mohamed Barka, a wealthy merchant of Timbuktu, was well connected with the international, trans-Saharan economy, his slave holdings were more like Cooper’s East African lineage-based systems than the “Islamic” systems Lovejoy and Klein describe. “Liberated” Fatma remained as closely tied to the family as any assimilated slave in the so-called lineage-based system. In terms of Fatma’s concubine status, the influence of Islamic law and custom was ambiguous: as she did not have Mohamed Barka’s children, his widow Moina was entirely within her legal right to take Fatma as
part of her inheritance. Yet, it was contrary to custom, especially when one takes into account Mohamed Barka's wishes as expressed to his children.\textsuperscript{34}

Fatma's history straddles Islamic slavery and society in West and in North Africa. It brings into the discussion literature rooted in an Arabic-speaking, Muslim society which looked towards the Mediterranean and Middle East. These writings have much in common with studies on East Africa and the Sokoto Caliphate, but there is little, if any, dialogue between their work and that of Africanists (such as Aoud 1987; Ennaji 1987, 1994).\textsuperscript{35} Fatma's history draws together observations about concubinage and status, for example, relevant to all of these areas. While it is true that Islam differentiated between "wives" and "concubines" in several ways [the most important being that a wife could be either slave or free, while a concubine could only be slave, Gordon 1989, 48-104; Ennaji 1994, 61-76], the experience of being a concubine clearly depended on where you were and to whom you belonged. In Morocco, as in the Sokoto Caliphate and East Africa (Zanzibar), being a royal concubine secluded in a harem was entirely different in terms of expectations, status, and experience from being a household concubine treated as a "wife" or domestic servant (Schroeter 1992, 200-01; Ennaji 1994; Cooper 1977, 195-200).

The purpose of being a concubine varied, the question of fecundity being more central in East and West Africa than in the North, at least in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas the life histories that Margaret Strobel (1978) constructed in Mombasa [resembling Fatma's in many ways], underscore the importance of having children, in Moroccan society, this was exceptional [see also Cooper 1977; Robertson and Klein 1983; Lovejoy 1996, 1998; Mack 1992].\textsuperscript{36} The question of "status" is also intriguing. Beverly Mack (1992, 103-04) notes that even today, many women in northern Nigeria do not hide their slave origin, especially when it derives from concubinage. In Morocco, on the other hand, while harem concubines and their descendants may enjoy such status,\textsuperscript{37} those like Fatma celebrate only the relationship slavery gave them to the family, not concubinage itself.\textsuperscript{38} Fatma's history hints at the value we might find in looking more comparatively in time and space at the institution of concubinage, which clearly manifested itself in at least two major ways, the harem and the household, while still within the general framework
of Islamic law and custom.

Finally, Fatma's history adds to the growing body of slave life-histories, especially those of females. While most of those extant were recorded in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries by missionaries and travellers and tend to shed as much light on the abolitionist movement and the process of Christianization as on "slavery" per se, they are important in drawing attention to the significance of individual, female experiences in the broader discussion of slavery. More recently, women have featured in life histories collected by oral historians. But as the work of Strobel (1982) and Geiger (1986, 1990) work together reflects, this emphasis on women, in turn, created an important intersection [methodologically speaking] among "slave case studies," "life-histories," and "feminist oral history" (Mirza and Strobel 1989).

Moving away from the notion that in interviewing "subjects" we are merely collecting evidence and accepting that what we are doing is constructing a text reshapes our analytic framework. Acknowledging that the "subjects" are also active players in that construction opens the door to the realm of "life-history" with its well-developed concerns about voice, ownership, appropriation, and power and privilege in the interpreter/narrator relationship. Here, the historian is also in dialogue with feminist perspectives on oral and life-history. Whereas the former literature tends to focus more on issues of class and culture as explanatory factors, the latter situates them primarily (though not exclusively) in gender. Indeed, Geiger tends to look at the construction of life-histories as a research methodology particularly suited to deepening our understanding of "women's consciousness, historically and in the present." One issue which Geiger raises as especially relevant to slave life histories is "marginality":

... all too frequently, questions that presume or identify the marginality of an oral historian [the "subject"] ... expose the researcher's preconceived notion of the narrator's world and of her own centrality, or at least, the centrality/power of her own place in the world.... [M]arginality cannot be assumed, nor will questions that predict the marginality of the person to whom they are put yield particularly interesting insights into the self-perceptions or life of the oral historian [my emphasis].... Marginality is best understood as a relational concept, the "truth" of which depends on the acceptance or affirmation of
both parties to that characterization of the relationship, and to the context in which the relationship occurs (Geiger 1990, 170-72).

Although formulated in terms of gender, life-histories also elucidate our questioning of slavery with respect to assumptions about what a slave is [in the “subject’s” society] and what it is not [vis-à-vis our own]. Moreover, we are not operating in a culturally neutral set of social relations and are often not in situations of gender equality. Ultimately, the process of construction takes place within a subset of power relations imposed or negotiated by the researcher; the resulting text must be so interpreted [Personal Narratives Group 1989, 201-58].

Slave “life-history” considered within these paradigms leads us to consider the “life story.” Charlotte Linde points out that while “life history is by definition a joint narrator/interpreter effort, ‘life story’ is more the creation of a `self record’” (1993, 20-25, 47-50). Drawing more directly on discourse analysis and linguistics, “life story” construction emphasizes the significance of chronology and causation, the “systems of coherence” [of both a social and psychological demand] that give form and meaning to narratives, the questions of individuality and “the self” and their cultural and gender specificity, and the “reportability” or process by which elements obtain the centrality to endure. There is nothing universal or ungendered about the systems of logic by which informants create the life-history they present. As historians, we must understand that, our intervention notwithstanding, a “life story” is being constructed even within the parameters we set. Given that our sense of chronology is firmly rooted in the structure of our language [English], thereby strongly dictating our presentation [and interpretation] of reality [Linde 1993, 3-12], should we not assume that where another language provides the base, another reality is being presented? When we impose a so-called neutral chronology to “correct” a presentation [as in “Fatma’s History”], we are not merely reordering — we are rewriting. In looking to give “coherence” to the “story,” we are in danger of overwriting with one or more of our own systems, those systems of coherence rooted in religion, education, or, perhaps, gender, which are already embedded in the account.

The issue of “self” is not unrelated. Just as Geiger warns of assumptions of representation and marginality, Linde shows how
relative a concept “the self” as individual really is. She suggests that it is only in “certain specific historical and cultural situations... [that] a person [can] be said to have a self at all.” And finally, in terms of “reportability,” the notion that elements used in self creation move in and out of the process as a function of not only memory or audience, but also cultural or generational convention — “landmarks” recognized within specific systems of coherence — challenges the historian’s usual methods of measuring significance and assigning validity.43

As we delve deeper into the literature dealing with various facets of “orality,” we are [somewhat ironically] moving closer to an appreciation of a particular genre of written text, the female slave narrative. Jennifer Fleischner (1996) applies a combination of psychoanalytic theory and literary criticism to historical texts in the American context. Her approach suggests that we can draw together different perspectives of the “narrative” precisely because it is about constructing identity with reference to audience in an environment of power and gender inequity. Fleischner begins with the assumption that “each slave narrator ... used her narrative as a form of symbolic action with reference to a real world. As such, the narratives cannot be abstracted from their specific historical and cultural contexts” [1996, 3].

While she seeks the symbolism in conventional literary devices, we can locate comparable devices in the structuring of the oral text either as elements of the narrator’s “system of coherence” or as keys to unlock that system. The concept of the “self” is as central to Fleischner’s methodology as to ours. She engages with the current debate in literary criticism over the question of “reality” versus “construction.”44 The insights from Linde, in particular, suggest a compromise which is also an intersection between the written and the oral — the fact that the process of “invention” derives from a particular understanding of the “real.” The “invented self” is a response to the “real” as understood by the subject. Fleischner’s (1996, 19-26) discussion of written testimony bears upon two issues of particular pertinence to Fatma’s oral account: the tendency to compulsive repetition in order to affirm the self, and the significance of the “family” as counterforce to the deprivations of slavery. Further to the latter issue, Fleischner states:
Psychoanalytic theory treats "family" as the site of one's most intense feelings and one's locus of origin; these narratives are invaluable avenues to understanding the complex structure of "family" that emerged under slavery and the complications for identity and identification that were, for the slave, one all-important result [1996, 29].

This is, concludes Fleischner, the pivotal point for understanding the slave's sense of self.45

Fatma's Story: "I am the Mother of a very Large Tribe"!46

Fatma first emphasized that she was not Mohamed Barka's daughter, but that she had been "very young" when he had purchased her. Thereafter, they had lived for some time in Timbuktu. Possibly because Hassan was there, she recounted the story of Mohamed Barka's sending gold to Hassan's grandfather, who had been his partner in Goulimine; the courier had been attacked and killed by Regueibat bandits. She then moved on to his death and Mohamed Barka's return across the Sahara.

The recounting of the desert crossing was a performance, one which had undoubtedly been repeated on many occasions over the years. There was much celebration of Mohamed Barka's stature in the caravan; it was he [along with his wealth and his slaves] who was the initial "target" of the Regueibat attack; it was he who protected them and their wealth (by burying the latter); it was he who was the cause of jubilant celebration and feasting upon the caravan's safe arrival first in Tindouf and then in Goulimine itself. Finally, when he found Goulimine to be in great poverty, it was he who revived the economy with his personal generosity. She confirmed the legends surrounding Mohamed Barka's wealth: "he had everything. He gained it all from his commerce." At this point, she stated again emphatically that she was not his daughter, that she had been bought when she was young, and that he had raised her. She was his servant.

With the prodding of our questions, she talked a bit more about the trip, but had little to add. She reminded us that we had come for information about Mohamed Barka and then repeated, almost word for word, the legend of his gold: little gold chicks, a small gold hand-mill, gold jewellery, and so on. She also repeated that all this had come from his commerce, and she added, "his faith." She made
another reference to his using this wealth to buy slaves, among whom were three other females who had made the desert crossing. Everyone who had came in that caravan, including Mohamed Barka's wife, was dead. "I am," she emphasized, "the only one left." At this point, she continued to talk about all the different family relations, linking them to people we knew. As we were leaving, she mentioned her liberation, the fact that Mohamed Barka's son Amar Salem had freed her.

In the second interview, I wanted her to discuss her liberation. Instead, she began again to recount the story of the desert crossing, word for word. She never again mentioned the actual "freeing." On being prompted, she went back to the death of Mohamed Barka, telling us of how he had requested of his children that "Faymtma" not be included among property to be divided. She then recounted how she had been made part of the inheritance because she "held the keys to the pantry," how she had sold bread in the market and bought land, and finally how she had demanded of Aisha a paper proving that she had been freed. She subsequently went on to speak of the arrival of the Liberation Army.

Next, she related the story of having her land stolen by her husband, and of her efforts to recover it. The story, initiated by our question but now completely in her control, passed on to her efforts to marry off her son, and the arrangements for this important feast. She then returned in time to when her son had been young, to when they had gone to Agadir to work, and to when she had paid to have her house built. "I experienced many adventures," she then proceeded to recount the one about the trip to Tindouft.

The last interview was shaped more by our questions than had been the first two. In her story, Fatma had mentioned a slave named Messoud, about whom we asked. She told how he was a "large and great warrior" who had come with them in the famous caravan and who had been freed as a reward for defending Mohamed Barka from his enemies. This was the same Messoud who, with Fatma, had been in charge of feeding the household and in whom her master "had great confidence." This took her back to her own work in the house. She emphasized that until she bought her land, she had worked in the garden along with other slaves, including Messoud. And that it was only after Mohamed Barka's death that she began to work outside the house.

After I became cook [in the household], I prepared feasts for
guests. I bought the land and built a house for my son. After the death of Mohamed Barka, I learned siyassa ["how to manage for myself"].

At the time the mother of Mohamed Salek's wife [who was the daughter of Mohamed Barka] died, I was with her. Someone came to ask me to prepare the food for a feast at Tiermeurt [a nearby village, for pay] but I explained that I could not leave my family ill — what would that say? Even now, I have just come from spending two months with Doumaha [whose mother Moina, was the daughter of the caid Dahaman, the widow of Mohamed Barka's partner, and ultimately, the wife of Mohamed Barka himself]. I am the mother of a large tribe.

When Abdullah was dead, someone came and got me to prepare the meal. I have not forgotten or abandoned my masters, sidi and mistresses, lalla. In life one must be very astute. If you lower the head to God, he will give you everything you wish. Even now I say sidi and lalla. There is still a relation with Mohamed Salek. Me, I worked. I worked in fish, I made bread, every time there was something in my family, I was there. Only afterwards, when she [Moina] had no further use for me, was I with my son.

The interview concluded with two more stories. The first effectively turned the story full circle, as she recounted how Mohamed Baraka had taken advantage of the presence in Goulimine of some Regueibat tribesmen to arrange a hostage situation in which two Regueibat were held for ransom — the ransom being the gold the Regueibat had so long ago stolen from Mohamed Barka's agent while en route across the desert. The second, which began with Fatma recounting that Hassan's mother had been born "between her hands,"

Fatma's "Lives": A Preliminary Analysis
Bearing in mind that there can be no single interpretation of
"Fatma’s story," and acknowledging that the "story" bears the marks of our intervention in both its telling and its presentation, a comparison of the two texts is still revelatory. The academic distinction that Linde raises between an "approach [which] attempts to use the life history to learn about some reality external to the story, which the life history is presumed to mirror" [1993, 48, the "portal approach"] and one which looks to narrative as "a significant resource for creating our internal, private sense of self and ... [is] a major resource for conveying that self to and negotiating that self with others" [1993, 98] is vividly illustrated here. What I created in Fatma’s "history" was a mirror of a time, a place, and an institution in which Mohamed Barka and the family were the "context."

What Fatma recounted was her story, inseparable from that of the Barka family: "We are a very large tent, the Barka family." Put another way, it represents the development of her consciousness and the mirror into which she stared to form her identity. "The prevailing social order stands as a great and resplendent hall of mirrors. It owns and occupies the world as it is seen and heard" [Linde 1993, 103]. Mohamed Barka, the family, and Goulimine’s Muslim society were that world. The concept of "mirror," however, is not entirely adequate in that it articulates the process of identity creation as passive rather than active. If we look closely at Fatma’s "story," we can see several points where the active negotiating of her "self" with others is apparent.

First, the famous desert crossing. This account is less detailed than many available to historians, and neither Fatma nor Mohamed Barka is particularly "revealed" by it. There is little information regarding the slaves per se. The story, then, seemed of minor importance as measured by my need for information. But when Fatma recounted it in such an animated fashion for a second time, I realized it held a significance for her that was independent of "history." It was a moment of pride and of celebration she wished to relive, but, most significantly, it marked her entry to Goulimine and her public announcement that she was a member of the Barka family. This is the event she chose to repeat "again and again," reflecting her "individual creativity and personal understanding of the salient events" of her life [Linde 1993, 23]. As repeated "performance," it affirmed her identity to herself and confirmed it with the family and community over the years. To the extent that her recounting of
Mohamed Barka's arrival, of his wealth and generosity, of his famous "gold chicks," and of the fact that his wealth had come from his commerce and his faith, became the acknowledged "truth" of his success, Fatma gave foundation to his legend. This great adventure was the defining moment of her identity, as well as that of Mohamed Barka and his family. In her recounting, the two became one.

A second issue emerging from Fatma’s rendition of the trip derives from, "I was not his daughter, he bought me." This was the very first statement she made and the one she repeated in concluding the tale. For me, its significance lay in the confirmation that she was, indeed, a slave, as it was evident she was not Mohamed Barka’s daughter, the assertion seemed redundant. And while it may have been necessary on her arrival in Goulimine to underscore that she was not one of Fodi’s children, why was it so important to continue to emphasize the point? For Fatma, the significance and coherence of the statement lay in the facts both that she was not a daughter and that she was a slave. Her reference point, here, was not the information she had just given us, but rather, her religion. She had been Mohamed Barka’s concubine. As such, she could not be — must not be — other than his slave. Only as a slave was her position legitimate in Islam.

It is worth pushing this identification with Islam further. In an interview my assistant Nouhi conducted elsewhere in the region, he began to touch on what we might term “slave culture”: a conscious desire by slaves to adopt both Arabic as the language of rituals and Islam — through genealogies linked to the Prophet’s black companion, Bilal, as the source of their common, collective origin. In so doing, they were not only defining their own terms of unity, but also reducing their marginality via-à-vis the fully Muslim Moroccan society into which they were integrating. They were also defining terms of "otherness" and "inferiority" which they could apply to blacks of unknown origin ("non-pure" blacks) — the large haratin population (McDougall 1998b).

If we look again at Fatma’s account, we can see several instances where her presentation of Mohamed Barka is consistent with the desire to identify with the “good Muslim”: her reiteration that his wealth came as a reward for his faith, not as a consequence of a materialistic marriage (to a woman of questionable religious credentials); that he had freed Messoud in recognition for an act of
bravery on his behalf (an especially well-rewarded pious act for a Muslim), not merely given him property; that in instructing his children not to treat “Faytma” as inheritable property, he had legitimized the request (in effect a request to free her) in Islamic terms (“she is your Mother”), not merely in terms of personal preference. In the metaphors she used to present him to us, she was adopting important symbols of who she was as well. She was revealing to us — albeit obliquely — something of the slave culture which had been a part of her reality over time.

So we return to the central “truth” revealed by her account: only as a slave was her position in society clear. Not only was she “not a daughter, she was a ‘mother,’” a mother to the Barka family. “I am the mother of a very large tribe,” she said, and she lived her life as that “mother.” My initial response to her insistence on the role of “her family” was to treat it as a kind of wistful gloss to an elderly woman’s story. In wanting to know more about the “real” life which was interesting to me, I almost missed what was important to her. Mohamed Barka had acknowledged her as *umm al-walid*, even though she had never given birth: this was her “real life.” That she was not liberated upon his death seems not to have been an issue; Fatma presented it as “normal” that Moina’s need for her would take priority. While one might attribute this to the fact that we were strangers, or simply to her pride, I believe it reflected her genuine understanding of the situation.

What was at issue was between us — namely, the concept of “freedom.” For Fatma, there was a difference between being free, as she was when Mohamed Barka recognized her as “mother,” and being freed, as she was when she was liberated by his son. Neither the initial failure to honour Mohamed Barka’s request nor the subsequent failure to give written evidence of her “freedom” was as significant in Fatma’s existence as the death of her master. It was his death, not her freedom, which constituted the watershed in her life. It was only after his death that she worked outside the house, bought land, built a house, and learned *siyassa*.

“Managing for herself” did not mean being independent of the family. Quite the contrary. It meant extending her use of *sidi* and *lalla* beyond the immediate family and “lowering her head to God,” thus retaining and extending her identity as a female, Muslim slave of the Barka family. It was that identity which gave her a place in society. All the issues which interest the historian
were, when recounted by Fatma, stories about how the family helped her. With respect to her liberation, it was about a family feast (for which she had undoubtedly prepared the food); with respect to her marriage, it was the fact that she was married by caid Dahaman (Moina’s father and therefore “family”). In the account of her husband’s selling of her land, the story revolves around what various people “in the family” did to help her regain it, down to Douhama’s advice about in whose name she should register the property. Even the marriage of her son was recounted as a Barka “family” affair: the women helping her prepare, Amar Salem and Messoud arranging for the horse, and the marriage taking place “within my family.”

Indeed, even the place accorded Messoud in her account reflects the centrality of family: he is simultaneously the link with Timbuktu, her “companion” in the garden and kitchen, the measure of Mohamed Barka’s “piousness,” and the equal of Baraka’s son in the context of her own son’s marriage. And what she did not tell us (Hassan did) was that Messoud literally became part of the family by marrying Barka’s first wife, Fodi. The representation is even more striking if one accepts Hassan’s memory of affairs, namely that Messoud was “inherited” as an already-freed slave into the family only after Barka’s return to Goulimine.58

As in a proper family, responsibilities were reciprocal [Cooper 1981, 288]. Her statements that she refused paid work in order to be with the family during a death; that whenever there was something happening in the family, “I was there”; and that only when Moina (Barka’s widow) had “no further use for me” was she with her son all underscore the point. Her real family was the one into which she was purchased and to which she became “mother” through her role as slave and concubine.

Fatma’s role in the family continued. She was still related to the Barkas through the prominent Beyruk family [Ahmed Salek ould Mohamed ould Abidine ould Beyrouk, whose current wife is the granddaughter of Mohamed Barka]. And Hassan, Mohamed Barka’s grandnephew, was frequently with her. To the extent that she became part of a slave or ex-slave community, such people remained nameless, with the exception of Messoud who, as discussed above, actually occupied the role of “family” member rather than slave. In fact, the only mention of being with other slaves occurred in the context of Mohamed Barka’s garden, and in
the story of the “adventure” to Tindouf.

The latter is instructive because in that story, her emphasis was on the people she knew when she was Mohamed Barka’s slave — the caid, whose wife had been a neighbour of Mohamed Barka in Timbuktu, Khadeija, married to the Tadjakant merchant (linked to Mohamed Barka’s commerce), and an unnamed person who came to ask after her lalla (mistress). She presented the slaves as “feting them,” just as slaves feted the Barka family on occasion. In the final event, Fatma’s identity, her “life story” to the extent we have glimpsed it, derived from a lived experience. The story of Mohamed Barka and the Barka family was the story of Fatma. She was never a daughter, she was always a slave. But for Fatma, that meant being “mother” to a very large tente indeed.

**Conclusion: “Histories” and “Stories” in Review**

One of my aims was to reveal something of Fatma’s sense of self and identity, as well as the process by which they were developed. A second was to address the meaning of “power” as exercised through slavery in Muslim societies. If we return to the metaphor invoked earlier of the “cultural hall of mirrors” in which Fatma sought her image, we find the issue of privilege and power as well. Using the example of the white male in western culture, Sheila Rowbotham has argued:

Isolated individualism is an illusion. It is also the privilege of power.... Women and minorities, reminded at every turn in the great cultural hall of mirrors of their sex or colour, have no such luxury.... If we express the historic relation between the sexes crudely in terms of master and slave, it is one of the master’s privileges not to have to think continuously about the fact that he is the master, while the position of the slave carries with it the constant reminder of his being a slave. It cannot be overlooked that the woman forgets far less often the fact of being a woman than the man of being a man [quoted in Linde 1993, 103].

Fatma was a woman, a slave, and a concubine. As such, her role was clearly defined by the rules of Islamic law. But it was not defined in isolation. That “definition” was the mirror image of the rules delineating the behaviour of her male master and sexual partner. Yet the “power and privilege” Mohamed Barka enjoyed ensured that these mutually reinforcing roles did not create identi-
cal "mirror images": for Fatma, her role as slave and concubine was the all-defining one of her life; for her master, it was one of many.

Returning to our earlier consideration of "Islamic slavery," what emerged from Cooper’s East African work was a sense that Islamic custom, as much as Islamic law, lent itself to the creation of family-based slave identity(ies), thereby giving legitimacy to a particular kind of "master authority." Noting that, in reality, slaveowners had no choice but to establish relations of reciprocity with their slaves, \(^{59}\) Cooper went on to say:

The people of planter origin ... perceived the behaviour of slaveowners to have been based on benevolence, not reciprocity. And benevolence was a consequence of being Muslim. Such a conception profoundly affected the ethos surrounding personal interaction. To see one's own behaviour in religious terms was to confirm one's own position in the cosmic order: Benevolence was the attitude of a man of authority \(\textmd{[1981, 288]}\).

To the extent that we can see Mohamed Barka through Fatma's eyes and voice, he emerges as the epitome of that "Muslim man of benevolence." And to the extent that she lends tone and depth to that picture or him, she gives shape and permanence to her own role within the creation of his authority — both figuratively, in her oral confirmation of his "legend" and literally, in her real-life experience of having lived it. "To see one's own behaviour in religious terms was to confirm one's own position in the cosmic order." This equation also applies to Fatma's perception of her own social role. From this perspective, we see for the first time how Mohamed Barka's relationship with Fatma constituted a critical facet of his "authority" in the family. Extrapolating further, we may also be hearing a whisper of the negotiations which governed how relationships with slaves in general constituted essential elements of being Muslim and Moroccan.\(^{60}\)

Herein, we begin to see what "history" will allow us to see — and what it will not. Or at least, what it will not easily reveal. In moving towards a greater emphasis on the creation of personal identity, a methodology concurrent with the evolution of "life-history" and feminist narrative study, we begin to see something of the way that slavery worked in practice. Fatma's experiences were those of a slave and freed-slave, whether or not she was "typical." By treating Fatma's life more as an individual "story" than as a slave "case study," and by attempting to be sensitive to some of the
underlying assumptions informing so-called “objective” questioning and historical reconstruction, we have moved away from some of our implicit assumptions about representation and marginality. Geiger’s caution that, “marginality cannot be assumed, nor will questions that predict the marginality of the person to whom they are put yield particularly interesting insights,” proves very much the key to understanding Fatma’s sense of self. It becomes evident in “Fatma’s story” that she, in no way, felt marginal in a society and family where her identity was rooted and confirmed in slavery. As Mohamed Barka’s concubine she became “free”; as a freed slave, she became marginal.

I began by looking for an historical “source” to shed light on Mohammed Barka. I found Fatma. Through trying to understand both her relationship with him and the process of her creating her identity within that relationship, I learned a great deal about him. Unexpectedly, I also glimpsed something about what being “slave” and being “free” meant for one woman. “The mother of a very large tribe” — that is the way I shall remember Fatma.

Epilogue

In February 1994, just six months before her death, Fatma was issued her first ever carte d'identité [national identity card], which every adult must carry, in the name “Faytma Barka.” It states her place and date of birth as Goulimine, 1900; her mother’s name as Aisha bint M’Bark, and her father’s as Uthman hen Barka. “Aisha” almost certainly reflects a memory of Barka’s daughter, and “Uthman,” according to Kauri, was all she had been told of her (real) father. The origin of the family names “Mhark” and “Barka” is evident. As for herself, she officially claimed her relationship with Mohamed Barka in taking his special name for her as her own. “Faytma Barka” made the invented the real.

Notes

1 Seeking Fatma’s “identity” through information obtained ostensibly about her master is problematic. I attempt to address this problem (below), essentially by showing how the two “sets” of information are not, in fact, distinct.

2 At the first meeting, her son Kauri and Hassan ould Bashir ould Aly Fall were present; at the second, only Kauri. Both took place in her house. The
third was in the house of a female friend, both she and Kauri were there. Fatma spoke Arabic, the others Arabic and French.

3 My assistant was Mohamed Nouhi, a professor of history at Ibnou Zohri University, Agadir. Being native to the region, he speaks Berber, Arabic, and French with equal facility, and has been schooled formally in Arabic, French, and English. At the time of these interviews, we had worked for several months together. We discussed the interview prior to the meeting — what it was we were expecting to be able to explore; during the meeting — not only what is being said but what lines we wanted to pursue; and after the meeting — weighing questions of attitude, body language, and “what was said between the lines.” I wrote up notes on the key points, and we determined what we would like to pursue in subsequent interviews. Whenever possible, we arranged for at least a second meeting. Interviews with different people often raised questions that led us back to someone we had spoken to earlier. With rare exceptions [where the informant objected], all interviews were taped.

4 The three Canadian Journal of African Studies reviewers of this manuscript articulated aspects of these issues in their responses. I hope they will see where their concerns have influenced my thinking, even if I have not satisfied them completely.

5 At least one school of methodological thought would argue for the necessity of publishing the transcript in the original Arabic and undertaking a close textual analysis. While this approach must be undertaken to achieve the aims of the researcher in some cases, my aim is to do something significantly different. Where a close “reading” of Fatma’s words was necessary, it was achieved through discussion between Nouhi and myself — remembering that both of us were present to hear and “see” the performance. I would argue that the ability to read the words does not, in this case, compensate for the ability to read the meaning of what was said, something which can be attempted only by someone whose knowledge of the language includes knowledge of the culture and situation in which it was being used. Nor does the after-the-fact reading of the text replicate the power relations negotiated in the “telling” of the text. My aim here is not to push this level of analysis any further than what is necessary to explore the significance of “orality.” Put another way, the very aspects of oral evidence historians have attempted to negate or compensate for over the years are now being recognized as potentially valuable for telling us particular kinds of things. I am not convinced that the kind of textual analysis frequently demanded in contemporary studies can ever reveal “identity” as I am defining and seeking it here.

6 I retain this twofold aim because it was Fatma’s reality which attracted me and my memory of Fatma which drove me to write about her.

7 She had no knowledge of her age when we spoke. She might have been as
young as seven or eight years of age, or as old as fourteen.
8 Fatma mentioned three other women and a male slave, Messoud. Recently, Rita Aouad suggested an “average” number of domestic slaves in the household of well-off merchants (among whom one can certainly count Barka) as being a dozen or so [Aouad 1987, 34].
9 Hassan says Messoud was a freed slave of Barka’s deceased brother, who Barka inherited.
10 Fatma’s experience seems typical of “domestic” (as distinct from “royal”) concubines. Aouad [1987, 35-36] notes that among domestic female slaves, few had clearly circumscribed roles.
11 Fatma did not bear children for Barka, nor is there evidence of miscarriages or infant deaths such as seem to have been so common in the East African context [Mirza and Strobel 1989, 32-34].
12 Mohamed Barka had two wives: Fodi, a black “Tagui” [probably a bella or slave of the Tuareg] who crossed from Timbuktu with him, and Moina, his brother’s widow.
13 She may have been exceptional; Aouad [1987, 48] comments that most slaves stayed tied to the old household because they did not have the means to make an independent living.
14 Kauri belonged to the prominent Saharan Kunta “tribe.” He probably sought his freedom from the French administration in Goulmimine, as Saharan slaves did elsewhere where the French established themselves.
15 When she sought written evidence from Mohamed Barka’s daughter, Aisha, she was assured that she had nothing to fear.
16 The date is a guess. Kauri says he was ten in 1946.
17 He was a local faqih [religious teacher].
18 Hassan says she was married by the local qadi [judge].
19 Aisha may have given this jewellery to her on the occasion of her marriage, or it may have been a gift from Mohamed Barka.
20 According to Kauri, he died in 1956. That she did not remarry is normal, but it undoubtedly added to her concern that her son marry and provide her with security.
21 This is speculative: we know she returned permanently to Goulmimine sometime before 1955-56 and that, following her trip to Tindouf, she returned to Agadir and the fish factory.
22 This may have been related to her husband’s death.
23 The Liberation Army fought against the French. In southern Morocco, there was a fairly lengthy “transition period” in the mid-to-late 1950s. Kauri, as a freed slave in his early to mid-twenties, was probably employed in work of a domestic nature.
24 Daughters-in-law take responsibility for caring for their mothers-in-law. In families without servants, this becomes critical as women age and are no longer capable of chores.
Fatma's history resembles that of Bi Kaje, in Mombasa, as recounted in Mirza and Strobel: "If there was something happening at the main house, naturally she would come.... If there was a funeral, she would come and sit through the funeral with everyone else" (1989, 32-33).

It presumes norms against which the words, position, or experience is measured and against which the validity or significance of the subject or evidence can be judged (Geiger 1990, 167-82).

Aouad comments that what is missing are the voices of the slaves, without which, "no history of Moroccan slavery will be able to reflect truly the reality" (1987, 52). Fatma's voice deserves to be heard; whose "reality" is being reflected remains in question.


Willis (1985, 1: viii) posed the same question, but some of his case studies address the issue better. See also Lovejoy (1983, 15-18, 23-43). Meillassoux (1975, 43-66) has developed a model of slave trade and production in the West African context which emphasized the links among Islam, trade, and the rise of militaristic, aristocratic elites, who, in turn, produced slaves for warfare, production, and export. And Willis (1985, 1) identified the ideology of enslavement as something peculiarly "Muslim." However, the bulk of the studies address slaves and slavery in various texts or question the impact of slavery on Islamization. The question is taken up directly with reference to the broader Islamic world in McDougall (1998a).

Nonetheless, the two systems were linked through networks of Muslim merchants and the Muslim, slave-populated, desert-edge region, which was populated by lineage-based nomadic societies. The situation was further complicated by nineteenth-century Islamic reformist movements [Klein and Lovejoy 1979, 181-212].

See also Lovejoy (1986, 240, 1981, 205; 1988, 245-66; 1996). On the issue of freeing the umm al-walid, Lovejoy takes issue with Allan Christlow. He argues that Christlow is incorrect in stating that a concubine became free "once she had born her master children" (1985, 69) and that this occurred only on the death of her master. According to Daniel Schroeter (1992, 201), with the birth of a child (acknowledged by the master as his own), the female slave was considered free and her master could not sell her; however, she was obliged, in return, to serve her [former] master until his death, when she was automatically freed from service.

As summarized in their conclusion, where reference is made to the "softening" effects of the "assimilationist tendencies of lineage structures
and by the egalitarian principles of Islam.”

33 For Meillassoux [1991], it remains subsumed under the discussion of social as well as physical slave “reproduction”; and, for Christlow [1991, 130-44], part of the broader discussion of women and Islamic law.

34 Having children was not the principal reason for taking a concubine — concerns about offspring were more likely to result in the taking of a slave wife. But had she had children of either sex, her religious status as ummi al-walid would have been indisputable, as would have been her claim to freedom.


36 This is further underscored by the centrality of ummi al-walid to the granting of freedom. In Morocco, black slave women were believed to be more fecund than Moroccan or Saharan women, but when they were taken by a master in order to bear children or sons, they were usually taken as a wife and not as a concubine. Ennaji [1994, 67] draws attention to the widespread use of contraception and abortion among concubines, which would seem both to reflect this difference in perceptions of the purpose of having concubines, as well as the means by which the difference was realized.

37 The politics of the royal harem during the reign of Moulay Ismail [1673-1727] is well presented in Morsey 1977. But apart from ahistorical studies of the “women in Islam” genre, and Ennaji’s work which does not develop the theme historically, no serious attention has been given to the subject which could be compared with work on the Sokoto Caliphate and the East African coast.

38 Le Sommeil de l’esclave, a novel set in Marrakesh, presents concubinage in its most tragic terms [Binebine 1994]. Purportedly based on the author’s childhood in the 1960s, there are echoes of Fatma’s early experience as a slave child, arriving in southern Morocco “from the Sahara” and being taken as her master’s concubine. Unlike the girl in the novel, however, Fatma did not have children and, therefore, was not faced with the circumstances which provide for the dramatic climax of the story.

39 The earliest of this work is Wright [1975, 1984, 1988, 1993]. Wright’s [1993, 1-45] discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of material is excellent. See also Strobel’s introduction in Mirza and Strobel [1989] and Alpers [1984].

40 Margaret Strobel’s work from the 1970s appeared in 1978 and 1982. Three Swahili Women, edited by Mirza and Strobel [1989] includes the story of a daughter born of a Mombasa concubine. Claire Robertson’s research from the 1970s was reflected in her conceptualization of the important work she edited with Martin Klein [1983]. Robertson’s [1983a] monograph includes four life histories; see also Romero [1988]. For larger bibliographies, see the introductions to both Wright [1993] and Mirza and
For example, the assertion of the slave woman's marginality in Robertson and Klein (1983, 3-4).

Some even argue that "this theory of the individualized self is impossible to apply to women's experience of the self" (Linde 1993, 102).

This idea has also been addressed from a different perspective in studies of oral tradition as developed by Jan Vansina and David Henige [especially in the articles published in his edited History in Africa]. This also speaks to Geiger's critique of "representativeness," in the sense of looking for a comparative set of criteria which may well be derived from a different system of coherence [the one giving meaning to the colonial archives].

While not new to the historian, the debate over abstracting from a "real world" — or not — is critical to literary analysis. In many ways, it is the key indicator as to how far literary and historical analysis have been able to intersect.

The American roots of Mastering Slavery are firmly embedded in the "race" and abolition questions of the nineteenth century, questions which should push Africanists to think more about the degree to which these issues were or were not present in Africa in the twentieth century, and the significance of their absence or presence for comparative analysis of slavery and slave "stories."

This is an attempt to marry concepts of "narrative," "story," and "history" in such a way as to give Fatma's voice another hearing.

A black Tuareg named Fodi; probably a bella (freed-slave) or a slave from a "noble" family.

The response reportedly was: "What would anyone want of you?" In other words, why would one need to prove one's liberty?

The "Liberation Army," fighting for independence from French rule, established control around 1955-56.

She spoke of her husband only as "Braïka," emphasizing that he had nothing.

According to Hassan, Mohamed Barka gave him half a house as reward; he was already freed.

This could have occurred in reality only if Moina was pregnant with Hassan's mother at the time Mohamed Barka returned to Goulimeine — difficult to credit, if, as Hassan says, that return took place some three years after the death of Ally Fall, Hassan's grandfather.

In response to a local story that Mohamed Barka had acquired his gold through marriage [which, in turn, is not entirely consistent with the assumption that Fodi was bella or slave].

An example of a "system of coherence." Nouhi understood what was being said, as I am sure the others present did. By contrast, I was juxtaposing this information first, with that just recounted | my inherent sense of
temporal ordering] and, second, with the "received wisdom" about master slave relationships being largely parental in nature — in short, missing the point.

55 Interviews with Haj Mouloud and his brother A'baid, and Caid en Najem bin M'Bark el'Abd Tizounin (southern Morocco), 7 August 1994. The brothers were born of a slave father from Mali.

56 The social relations between slaves (abid) and freed-slaves (haratin) is almost the reverse in the Mauritanian Sahara, which, in most other ways, appears identical [McDougall 1988].

57 There is a parallel to be drawn with the subjects of Fleischner's study, who moved into a "free" but hierarchical society, where race still marked social position. She talks about the constructed "family" they take with them and the strategies they use to "linguistically orient" themselves. While Fleischner refers to the composition of a written text, here we see the same "complicated task" reflected in the oral document [1996, 97-98].

58 The marriage occurred after Barka's death; Hassan says there were three or four children.

59 He was referring to the lack of state-based instruments of control, such as those open to slave owners in the Caribbean or United States.

60 I hesitate to say "male, Muslim, and Moroccan" because I suspect the same analysis applies to females.

61 Since the original presentation of this paper, Nouhi revisited Goulimine in November 1997 and spoke again with Kauri. He was told about Fatma's two children who died in infancy and about when her husband had died; he was shown the carte d'identité.

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